J. S48019/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
CAMERON PHILLIP REIHNER :
Appellant :
: No. 1406 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Criminal Division No(s): CP-63-CR-0002613-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, DUBOW, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2016
Appellant, Cameron Phillip Reihner, appeals from the Judgment of
Sentence entered in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas
following his jury trial and conviction of one count of Aggravated Assault—
Causing Serious Bodily Injury, two counts of Aggravated Assault—Causing
Bodily Injury with a Deadly Weapon, two counts of Simple Assault—Causing
Bodily Injury, two counts of Simple Assault—Negligently Causing Bodily
Injury with a Deadly Weapon, one count of Recklessly Endangering Another
1
Person, and one count of Disorderly Conduct—Engage in Fighting. We
affirm.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4), 18 Pa.C.S. §
2701(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(2), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, 18 Pa.C.S. §
5503(a)(1), respectively.
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The trial court set forth the facts as established at trial as follows:
During the trial conducted January 13, 2014, through
January 15, 2014, the jury heard evidence detailing that
early in the morning on June 23, 2012, [Appellant] and his
fellow actors, following a verbal altercation with Johathan
Irizzary (hereinafter “Jonathan”) and Stephen Irizzary
(hereinafter “Stephen”) at a Denny’s restaurant in West
Washington, Canton Township, followed Jonathan and
Stephen to Jonathan’s home in Houston, Pennsylvania.
Witnesses identified [Appellant] as being the driver of a
silver or gray car, and that another, darker colored car was
following that car. [Appellant] and others confronted
Jonathan and Stephen in front of the house, and Stephen
followed the vehicles on foot around the block. Stephen
approached the gray car and was then assaulted by an
unknown member of the group with a baseball bat, and
while attempting to come to his brother’s aid, Jonathan
was attacked by [Appellant] and other members of the
group coming from the direction of the darker car—some
(including [Appellant]) also wielding baseball bats.
[Appellant] hit Jonathan in the face with the baseball bat.
Jonathan began to bleed, and then asked [Appellant] to
stop. [Appellant] and the others did not stop, but rather
continued to strike Jonathan with baseball bats and kick
him when he was on the ground, causing Jonathan to
suffer serious injuries, including facial fractures, a
fractured ankle, and partial loss of sight. Stephen suffered
less severe injuries during his altercation, and refused
medical treatment.
Trial Ct. Op., 1/26/16, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
Following Appellant’s January 15, 2014 conviction, Appellant filed a
Motion for Extraordinary Relief on November 5, 2014. The trial court denied
the Motion on February 4, 2015. The trial court sentenced Appellant on
March 30, 2015 to an aggregate term of eight and three-quarters years’ to
seventeen and a half years’ incarceration.
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On April 9, 2015, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion for Arrest of
Judgment and/or a New Trial and/or Modification of Sentence. The trial
court denied the Motion on August 19, 2015. Appellant timely appealed.
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by the Commonwealth “to establish that [Appellant] was
the actor, or an accomplice or co-conspirator of the actor(s), who committed
any offense where Stephen Irizzary was the victim/complainant?”
Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant claims that, based on Commonwealth’s
evidence, it is as just as likely that Appellant participated in one assault
committed by a single group of men acting in concert as it is that there were
two separate independent assaults. Id. at 20. Under Appellant’s alternate
theory, he was only involved in the altercation with Jonathan Irizzary and,
therefore, the convictions relating to Stephen Irizzary,2 and predicated solely
on accomplice liability, cannot stand. Id. at 20-21.
“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
2
Although not explicitly stated by Appellant, we infer from Appellant’s Brief
that he is referring to his conviction for Simple Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2701(a)(1), and Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014),
appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
The Commonwealth pursued the charges against Appellant as they
related to Stephen Irizzary under the theory of accomplice liability. A
conviction based on accomplice liability requires the fact-finder to determine
that “with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
crime,” Appellant “aid[ed] or agree[d] or attempt[ed] to aid” another person
in planning or committing a crime. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c). Accomplice
liability can be proven by a showing of “the least degree of concert or
collusion” between the accomplice and the principal. Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2002).
For Appellant to be convicted of Simple Assault, Section 2701(a)(1) of
the Crimes Code requires that the Commonwealth prove that Appellant
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“attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d]
bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). To be found guilty of
Recklessly Endangering Another Person, the Commonwealth was required to
prove that Appellant “engage[d] in conduct which place[d] or may [have
placed] another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 2705.
With respect to Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claims, the trial
court opined as follows:
At [Appellant’s] trial, the witnesses stated that, following
the altercation at Denny’s, the same individuals, including
[Appellant], followed them home in a sliver or gray car,
with multiple witnesses identifying [Appellant] as being in
that car with others, and at least one witness identified
[Appellant] as the driver. Testimony showed that a
second, darker colored car also followed the victims.
When Stephen followed the silver car through the
neighborhood, it pulled off the road, near where another
car was waiting. Stephen was attacked by one of the
occupants of the other, darker car, said attacker wielding a
baseball bat as a weapon, and striking Stephen with that
weapon. Jonathan then attempted to come to Stephen’s
aid, and before he reached his brother, he was attacked
and severely beaten by [Appellant] and several other
individuals, some of whom, including [Appellant], were
also wielding baseball bats as weapons.
Given the evidence provided at trial, it is patently
reasonable to draw the inferences that one of the actors
“attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly cause[d] bodily injury” to Stephen, that one of
the actors “engage[d] in conduct which place[d]” Stephen
“in danger of death or serious bodily injury,” and that
[Appellant], by driving at least some of the other actors to
the victim’s home, and his participation in the attack
against Jonathan, (1) “promote[d] or facilitate[d] the
commission of the crime,” namely the assault and reckless
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endangerment against Stephen, and (2) acted in “the least
degree of concert or collusion” with the individual who
actually attacked Stephen with a baseball bat. As such the
evidence was sufficient to support [Appellant’s] conviction
of the charges, including those counts listing Stephen as
the victim.
Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find every element of Simple Assault
and Recklessly Endangering Another Person beyond a reasonable doubt,3
and to convict Appellant based on the theory of accomplice liability. As
recounted supra, the evidence adduced at trial indicates that Appellant, as
either a passenger or the driver of the lighter colored vehicle, promoted or
facilitated the commission of the crimes of Simple Assault and Reckless
Endangerment against Stephen Irizzary, and that Appellant acted in concert
or colluded with the person who attacked Stephen Irizzary with a baseball
bat. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/7/2016
3
In fact, Appellant concedes this point in his Brief. See Appellant’s Brief at
18.
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