In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-14-00298-CR
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INGA JURI CHAPMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 11-271634
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Arguing that the trial court denied her request to have an attorney appointed
to represent her at the County’s expense, Inga Juri Chapman appeals from her
conviction for resisting arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 38.03 (West 2011). On appeal, Chapman argues that because the trial court
appointed an attorney to represent her for trial, the court abused its discretion by
refusing to appoint an attorney to represent her in her appeal. Because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Chapman’s request seeking court-
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appointed counsel in her appeal, we affirm the judgment. See Tex. R. App. P.
43.2(a).
The record from the trial court shows that the court conducted a post-trial
hearing on Chapman’s request seeking court-appointed appellate counsel. We have
the benefit of the transcript from the hearing in which the court considered
Chapman’s request: it shows the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
then determined that Chapman was not indigent.
Two witnesses testified during the hearing, Vincent Chapman, Chapman’s
husband, and Julissa Silva, an employee of the Montgomery County Office of
Indigent Defense. Vincent testified that he works at a local community college and
makes approximately $7,000 annually. Vincent explained that his family receives
approximately $1,000 per month in public assistance benefits. Vincent explained
that he and Chapman own their home, but he indicated the home had a lien against
it for back taxes of approximately $10,000.
Julissa Silva testified that in determining whether a person is indigent, she
follows the Local Montgomery County Rules, as the County adopted these
guidelines for evaluating requests for court-appointed counsel. The local rules
contain standards that she follows in determining whether an individual is indigent.
According to Silva, Chapman submitted an application to her office, and the
application disclosed Chapman’s liabilities and her assets. Based on these
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standards, the net value of Chapman’s home put Chapman above the poverty
standards as set out in the County’s local rules. 1 Silva testified that the
Montgomery County Office of Indigent Defense did not approve Chapman’s
request because her net worth disqualified Chapman from being able to establish
that she was indigent.
In her sole issue, Chapman argues that the trial court denied her
constitutional rights to receive due process because the trial court refused to
provide her with a court-appointed attorney to represent her on appeal. According
to Chapman, the trial court could not deny her request for court-appointed counsel
when it had previously appointed counsel to represent her in her trial. Chapman
contends that her financial condition never changed after the court appointed trial
counsel for her trial, and in the absence of any change, she is entitled to court-
appointed counsel.
We review an appeal complaining about a trial court’s determination of
indigency using an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Newman v. State, 937 S.W.2d
1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Generally, indigency determinations are made on a
1
In the application Chapman submitted to the Montgomery County Office of
Indigent Defense, Chapman represented that the net equity that she and her
husband had in their home was $129,000. During the hearing, Chapman indicated
that the appraisal district had reassessed the value of the home, valuing the home at
$112,080. However, Silva explained that using the more recent figures from the
appraisal office, Chapman still does not qualify as indigent.
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case-by-case basis when the issue is raised. See Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d
866, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A court may consider the net equity that a
defendant has in her homestead in deciding whether an individual is indigent. See
Newman v. State, 937 S.W.2d at 4.
In determining whether individuals are indigent, trial court’s engage in a
two-step process. First, the court determines whether the defendant seeking the
appointment of counsel has made a prima facie showing that she is indigent.
Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 874. Second, where the defendant has presented a prima
facie case to show she is indigent, the burden shifts to the State to show that the
defendant is not indigent. Id. The same process is employed to determine whether
an individual is entitled to have court-appointed counsel for an appeal. See id.
The Code of Criminal Procedure identifies several factors that may be
considered in determining indigency, among these are the defendant’s income,
source of income, assets, property, outstanding obligations, necessary expenses,
the defendant’s age, and the income of the defendant’s spouse, if that income is
available to the defendant to pay expenses. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
26.04(m) (West Supp. 2015).2 If the record contains evidence supporting the trial
court’s determination that an individual is not indigent, an appeals court will not
overturn that determination in an appeal. See Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 874.
2
We cite to the current version of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as
any amendments to the provisions at issue do not affect the outcome of this appeal.
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The record reflects that Chapman applied for a court-appointed attorney for
her appeal, but her application indicates that Chapman and her husband have a net
equity interest in their home of more than $100,000. While Chapman’s application
indicated that she had no income, and the evidence at trial indicated that Chapman
and her husband were receiving public assistance, the evidence on Chapman’s
liabilities did not reduce her net worth to a level that made her indigent. Instead,
the evidence in the hearing established that Chapman’s net worth exceeds the
guidelines for indigence that were established in Montgomery County. See
Montgomery Cty. (Tex.) Cty. Courts at Law Loc. R. IV (Indigent Defense Plan);
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(l) (West Supp. 2015) (requiring county
officials to adopt procedures and financial standards for determining a defendant
indigent).
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court was clearly authorized
to consider Chapman’s net worth in determining whether she was indigent. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(m). Based on the evidence admitted in the post-
trial indigency hearing, the trial court reasonably determined that Chapman, at the
time she sought the appointment of counsel for her appeal, was not indigent.
Chapman relies primarily on the fact that the trial court appointed an
attorney to represent her in the trial to suggest that the trial court was required to
appoint an attorney to represent her on appeal. While Chapman did have an
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appointed attorney for her trial, the record does not show that the attorney was
appointed because Chapman was indigent. Moreover, the record does not show
that the trial court ever found that Chapman was indigent at any stage of the
proceeding. And, the record shows that the trial court ordered Chapman to
reimburse Montgomery County for the fees charged by the attorney that the court
appointed for her trial. Because nothing in the record shows that Chapman ever
established that she was indigent, Chapman does not benefit from the presumption
in article 26.04(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure that she remained indigent
throughout the proceedings. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 26.04(p) (West
Supp. 2015).
Because the record shows that when the trial court conducted the post-trial
indigency hearing, Chapman’s net worth was sufficient to demonstrate that she
was not indigent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chapman’s
request seeking an appointed attorney for her appeal. We overrule Chapman’s
arguments asserting her rights were violated. The trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
______________________________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on December 31, 2015
Opinion Delivered September 7, 2016
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
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