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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DOMINICK SERRATORE, : No. 1870 MDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, September 30, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No. CP-40-CR-0000140-1987
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND STEVENS,* P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2016
Dominick Serratore appeals pro se from the September 30, 2015
order denying his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”)1 as untimely. After careful review, we affirm.
The underlying facts of this case were set forth by a prior panel of this
court and need not be reiterated here. See Commonwealth v. Serratore,
778 A.2d 738 (Pa.Super. 2001) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2), appeal
denied, 788 A.2d 375 (Pa. 2001). On December 13, 1986, appellant was
charged with first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, and
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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two counts each of criminal conspiracy and aggravated assault.2 Following a
lengthy jury trial, appellant was found guilty on all counts on October 14,
1987. On October 15, 1987, the trial court sentenced appellant to life
imprisonment on the first-degree murder charge following a penalty-phase
hearing. Thereafter, on December 18, 1992, appellant was sentenced to a
consecutive term of 7½ to 15 years’ imprisonment on the remaining counts.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 11, 1993. On June 9,
1994, a panel of this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence, and
our supreme court denied allowance of appeal on January 10, 1995. See
Commonwealth v. Serratore, 648 A.2d 1237 (Pa.Super. 1994), appeal
denied, 655 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1995).
On October 21, 1996, appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. From
1996 to 1998, four separate attorneys were appointed to represent appellant
in this matter. On December 23, 1998, appellant’s counsel filed an amended
PCRA petition on his behalf. Following a hearing, the PCRA court dismissed
appellant’s petition on June 5, 2000. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal. On April 26, 2001, a panel of this court affirmed the PCRA court’s
June 5, 2000 order, and our supreme court denied allowance of appeal on
October 17, 2001. See Commonwealth v. Serratore, 778 A.2d 738
(Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 788 A.2d 375 (Pa. 2001).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501, 2901, 2902, 903, and 2702, respectively.
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On December 4, 2014, appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA
petition, his second, alleging that his sentence of life imprisonment violated
the Supreme Court’s mandate in Alleyne v. United States, U.S. ,
133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).3 On February 11, 2015, the PCRA court provided
appellant with notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), of its intention to
dismiss his petition without a hearing. Thereafter, on September 30, 2015,
the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s petition without a hearing. This timely
appeal followed.4
The crux of appellant’s argument on appeal is that the PCRA court
erred in denying his petition as untimely because his sentence of life
imprisonment violated Alleyne and that this case should be applied
retroactively. (Appellant’s brief at 4.)
Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition
is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,
102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s
findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in
the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super.
3
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires
that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155 (citation omitted).
4
Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings
of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the
record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Alderman,
811 A.2d 592, 594 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 825 A.2d 1259 (Pa.
2003) (citation omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant
must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction
or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(2). Further, these issues must be neither previously litigated nor
waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Lastly, we note that, “[a]lthough this
Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant,
pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant[.]”
Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation
omitted).
Before we address the merits of appellant’s arguments, we must first
consider the timeliness of appellant’s PCRA petition because it implicates the
jurisdiction of this court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Davis, 86
A.3d 883, 887 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
To be timely, a PCRA petition must be filed within
one year of the date that the petitioner’s judgment
of sentence became final, unless the petition alleges
and the petitioner proves one or more of the
following statutory exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously
was the result of interference by
government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of
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the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right
that was recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the
time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
We emphasize that it is the petitioner who
bears the burden to allege and prove that one of the
timeliness exceptions applies. In addition, a petition
invoking any of the timeliness exceptions must be
filed within 60 days of the date the claim first could
have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(2).
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719-720 (Pa. 2008) (some
citations omitted). “[A]n untimely petition may be received when the
petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited
exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at [42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545] are met.” Lawson, 90 A.3d at 5 (footnote omitted).
Instantly, it is undisputed that appellant’s PCRA petition, filed on
December 4, 2014, is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)
(providing “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
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the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review[]”). As a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review
appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged and proved one of the statutory
exceptions to the time bar, as set forth in Section 9545(b)(1).
Appellant avers that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne
constitutes a newly-discovered fact that would invoke the protections
afforded by Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). (Appellant’s brief at 6-9.) Appellant
further posits that Alleyne announced a new constitutional right under
Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) that applies retroactively. (Id. at 8, 16-17.) We
disagree.
Contrary to appellant’s contention, this court has expressly rejected
the notion that judicial decisions constitute newly-discovered facts that
invoke the protections afforded by Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See
Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 (Pa.Super. 2012) (holding
that a judicial determination does not qualify as a previously unknown “fact”
capable of triggering the timeliness exception set forth in
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA). Furthermore, courts in this
Commonwealth have recognized that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to
cases on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 2016 WL
3909088, *3 (Pa. 2016) (holding that the Alleyne decision does not apply
retroactively to collateral attacks upon mandatory minimum sentences
advanced in PCRA proceedings); see also Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119
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A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2015) (stating that, “while this Court has held
that Alleyne applies retroactively on direct appeal, we have declined to
construe that decision as applying retroactively to cases during PCRA
review”).
Additionally, even if appellant’s claim met the underlying requirements
of Section 9545(b)(1), he still would not be entitled to any relief. Appellant
has failed to demonstrate that he brought his exceptions to the PCRA
time-bar within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented, as
required by Section 9545(b)(2). To fulfill the 60-day requirement, appellant
needed to file his petition within 60 days from the date Alleyne was
decided. See Brandon, 51 A.3d at 235 (concluding that, “the sixty-day
period begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision[,]” not
the date appellant became aware of the decision). The Supreme Court’s
decision in Alleyne was filed on June 17, 2013. Appellant filed his PCRA
petition almost six months later on December 4, 2014. Thus, appellant’s
petition is untimely on this basis as well.
Finally, appellant’s life without parole sentence for first-degree murder
does not represent an Alleyne violation.
Accordingly, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in
dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/2016
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