Michael Tankersley v. James Almand

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1081

MICHAEL EDWARD TANKERSLEY,

Plaintiff − Appellant,

v.

JAMES W. ALMAND, in his official capacity as Trustee of the
Client Protection Fund; DOUGLAS M. BREGMAN, in his official
capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; CHARLES
BAGLEY, IV, in his official capacity as Trustee of the
Client Protection Fund; JOSEPH B. CHAZEN, in his official
capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; CECELIA
ANN KELLER, in her official capacity as Trustee of the
Client Protection Fund; PATRICK A. ROBERSON, in his official
capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; LEONARD
H. SHAPIRO, in his official capacity as Trustee of the
Client Protection Fund; DONNA HILL STATEON, in her official
capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; DAVID
WEISS, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client
Protection Fund; CLIENT PROTECTION FUND OF THE BAR OF
MARYLAND; HONORABLE MARY ELLEN BARBERA, Chief Judge, in her
official capacity; HONORABLE SALLY D. ADKINS, Judge, in her
official capacity; HONORABLE CLAYTON GREENE, JR., Judge, in
his official capacity; HONORABLE MICHELLE D. HOTTEN, in her
official capacity as Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals;
HONORABLE ROBERT N. MCDONALD, Judge, in his official
capacity; HONORABLE SHIRLEY WATTS, Judge, in her official
capacity; BESSIE M. DECKER, in her official capacity as
Clerk of the Court of Appeals; MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS,

Defendants − Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:14−cv−01668−RDB)
Argued: May 12, 2016 Decided: September 13, 2016

Before KING and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge King joined. Senior Judge Davis wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

ARGUED: Scott Matthew Michelman, PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION
GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michele J. McDonald,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Julie A. Murray, PUBLIC CITIZEN
LITIGATION GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Brian E.
Frosh, Attorney General, Alexis Rohde, Assistant Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.

2
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

All attorneys licensed in Maryland who are not permanently

retired must pay an annual fee to the Client Protection Fund of

the Bar of Maryland. In addition to paying the fee, Maryland

attorneys must also disclose their social security numbers to

the Fund. Relying on federal law, the Court of Appeals of

Maryland enacted this particular mandate in support of the

state’s efforts to collect back taxes and past-due child-support

payments from attorneys.

The Court of Appeals suspended Michael Tankersley’s law

license after he refused to provide his social security number

to the Fund. In response, Tankersley sued the trustees of the

Fund and the judges and the clerk of the Court of Appeals (the

“Defendants”), all in their official capacities, seeking

injunctive relief based on his claim that his suspension

violated the federal Privacy Act.

The district court granted the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Because we find that federal law gives Maryland the

power (acting through its agents) to compel the disclosure of

social security numbers in this circumstance, we affirm.

3
 I.

A.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland has the statutory power to

“establish a Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland,” in

order “to maintain the integrity of the legal profession by

paying money to reimburse losses caused by defalcations of

lawyers.” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-311. As part

of this principal mission, the Fund is also required by statute

to “provide a list of lawyers who have paid an annual fee to the

Fund during the previous fiscal year to . . . the Comptroller,

to assist the Comptroller in determining whether each lawyer on

the list has paid all undisputed taxes.” Id. § 10-313(a). That

list must include “the federal tax identification number of the

person or, if the person does not have a federal tax

identification number, the Social Security number of the

person.” Id. § 10-313(b)(2)(ii).

In promulgating rules to enforce this statute, the Court of

Appeals referenced the power given to the state by 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i). That provision was enacted as part of the

Tax Reform Act of 1976, and it allows states to collect social

security numbers for certain enumerated purposes, including the

administration of tax laws.

The Court of Appeals also uses the Fund to comply with the

Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666, which Congress passed in

4
1996 to “increase the effectiveness of the [child support

enforcement] program which the State administers.” Id.

§ 666(a). To that end, the Welfare Reform Act conditions

federal funding on states’ having in effect “[p]rocedures

requiring that the social security number of . . . any applicant

for a professional license . . . be recorded on the

application.” Id. § 666(a)(13).

In 1997, the Maryland General Assembly passed a series of

statutes to comply with the Welfare Reform Act, including Family

Law section 10-119.3(b)(1), which compels each “licensing

authority” to “(i) require each applicant for a license to

disclose the Social Security number of the applicant; and (ii)

record the applicant’s Social Security number on the

application.” If Maryland’s Child Support Enforcement

Administration notifies the licensing authority that a licensee

is in arrears on a child support order, it can “request a

licensing authority to suspend or deny an individual’s license.”

Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 10-119.3(e)(1). The Court of Appeals

of Maryland is such a licensing authority. Id. § 10-

119.3(a)(3)(ii)(15).

In 2009, then-Chief Judge Robert M. Bell of the Court of

Appeals notified all Maryland attorneys that they were required

to provide their social security numbers to comply with sections

10-119.3 and 10-313. Most Maryland attorneys heeded the Chief

5
Judge’s notice, but over nine thousand did not. When the

General Assembly threatened to withhold $1 million from the

judiciary’s budget if it did not move more aggressively against

the recalcitrant attorneys, the Court of Appeals amended its

rules to provide for enforcement.

The resulting Rule 16-811.5 mandated that “each attorney

admitted to practice before the Court of Appeals . . .

shall . . . provide to the treasurer of the Fund the attorney’s

Social Security number.” Md. Rules, Rule 16-811.5(a)(1) (2014)

(current version at Md. Rules, Rule 19-605(a)(1) (2016)). 1 In

addition, Rule 16-811.6 provided that the Court could suspend

the license of any attorney who fails to comply with Rule 16-

811.5. Md. Rules, Rule 16-811.6 (current version at Md. Rules,

Rule 19-606).

B.

Tankersley has been licensed to practice law in Maryland

since 1986 and in the District of Columbia since 1987. He has

practiced primarily in the District of Columbia, while living in

either the District or Virginia. Outside of the suspension

underlying this case, he has never been disciplined.

1 The Court of Appeals has since reorganized the relevant
rules. Though some parts of Rule 16-811.5 have changed,
subsection (a)(1) is identical except for updated cross-
references.

6
 Tankersley was notified in February 2013 that the Fund had

never received his social security number, as requested in 2009,

and that he had until March 22, 2013 to provide it. Tankersley

responded that he generally does not share his social security

number unnecessarily because of concerns about identity theft.

Tankersley also noted that Maryland state agencies have suffered

cyberattacks, resulting in the exposure of individuals’ private

information.

Citing these concerns, Tankersley refused to provide his

social security number to the Fund, and questioned the legality

of Rule 16-811.5. He was thereafter notified that his license

had been suspended because of his failure to comply with the

Court’s rule.

C.

Tankersley sued James Almand, the Chair of the Fund, the

other trustees of the Fund, and the judges and clerk of the

Court of Appeals, alleging that the suspension of his license to

practice violated section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act. He sought

injunctive relief.

Tankersley moved for summary judgment, and the Defendants

moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary

judgment. The district court, relying on its decision in

7
Greidinger v. Almand, 30 F. Supp. 3d 413 (D. Md. 2014), 2 granted

the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The court in Greidinger held that the word “applicant” in

§ 666 was not limited to “those who are applying or reapplying

for a license,” as “it is clear that under [the Welfare Act] the

federal government intended to implement a system which required

complete disclosure of [social security numbers] by every

individual who is subject to a licensing authority,” and § 666

therefore superseded section 7(a)(1). 30 F. Supp. 3d at 422,

424. The court also found that § 405 of the Tax Reform Act

superseded section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, noting that

although “the statutory language is less than clear, the

legislative history provides ample evidence that the Senate

Finance Committee believed the needs of State and local

governments trumped individual privacy in [the tax

administration] context.” Id. at 426.

Finding no basis for distinguishing the instant case from

its holding in Greidinger, the district court dismissed

Tankersley’s complaint. This appeal followed.

2Like Tankersley, Greidinger is a licensed Maryland
attorney who declined to provide his social security number to
the Fund.

8
 II.

A.

Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-

579, 88 Stat. 1896, in light of the government’s “increasing use

of computers and sophisticated information technology,” which

“greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur

from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of

personal information.” Id. § 2(a)(2). To protect against such

harms, section 7(a)(1) of the Act makes it “unlawful for any

federal, state or local government agency to deny to any

individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law

because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social

security account number.” Important here, however, is section

7(a)(2), which makes section 7(a)(1) inapplicable to “any

disclosure which is required by federal statute.” Id.

§ 7(a)(2)(A).

Both the Tax Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i), and

the Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13)(A), allow states

to collect individuals’ social security numbers in specific

situations. This case turns on whether either provision applies

to Maryland’s annual collection of social security numbers from

attorneys it has already licensed to practice. If so,

Tankersley may not rely on the Privacy Act to shield his social

security number from the Fund.

9
 B.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Kensington Volunteer Fire

Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir.

2012). “[W]e may affirm on any grounds supported by the record,

notwithstanding the reasoning of the district court.” Kerr v.

Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 75 n.13 (4th Cir.

2016).

We also review questions of statutory interpretation de

novo. Broughman v. Carver, 624 F.3d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 2010).

When interpreting a statute, our “objective . . . is ‘to

ascertain and implement the intent of Congress,’ and Congress’s

intent ‘can most easily be seen in the text of the Acts it

promulgates.’” Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 392 (4th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Broughman, 624 F.3d at 674-75). Where

Congress has not defined a term, we are “bound to give the word

its ordinary meaning unless the context suggests otherwise.”

Id. at 392-93.

C.

We first address whether, as the district court determined,

the Welfare Reform Act requires Tankersley to provide his social

security number to the Fund.

The Welfare Reform Act compels states to have “[p]rocedures

requiring that the social security number of . . . any applicant

10
for a professional license . . . be recorded on the

application.” 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13) (emphasis added). We

agree with Tankersley that “applicant” cannot properly be read

to include a Maryland attorney who must pay an annual fee to

maintain his license.

We are guided here by a fundamental principle of statutory

interpretation, which directs that we “presume that a

legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a

statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are

unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial

inquiry is complete.” Aziz, 658 F.3d at 392 (quoting Crespo v.

Holder, 631 F.3d 130, 136 (4th Cir. 2011)). As Congress did not

define “applicant,” we give the word its ordinary meaning. Id.

at 392-93.

An applicant is “someone who formally asks for something

(such as a job or admission to a college)” or “someone who

applies for something.” Applicant, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/applicant; see also

Applicant, Webster’s Dictionary (2d ed. 2001) (defining

“applicant” as “a person who applies for or requests something;

a candidate”). We think it plain that the ordinary meaning of

the word does not reach someone like Tankersley who has already

satisfied the requirements for a license to practice law in

Maryland but must pay an annual fee to maintain that license.

11
As Tankersley points out, one would not say that a college

sophomore who must pay the next semester’s tuition before being

allowed to continue his studies is an “applicant.” See

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5-6. So too here.

Moreover, the form the Fund uses to direct Maryland

attorneys to provide their social security numbers underscores

how poorly the word “applicant” fits in this context. It asks

simply for the attorney’s name, address, and social security

number. See J.A. 30. Such a bare-bones form can in no way be

described as an “application,” and, indeed, even the Fund does

not refer to the form as such. See J.A. 29-30 (referring to the

document as the “attached form” and the “completed form”).

Relying on Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259

(2014), the Defendants say that our understanding of “applicant”

renders the provision absurd because it excludes the majority of

Maryland attorneys, “alone among covered professions,” from the

Welfare Act’s coverage. Appellees’ Br. at 24. Not so. In

Abramski, the Supreme Court chose between two readings of an

ambiguous provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968. The Court

rejected the reading that would have allowed a straw purchaser

of a firearm to present himself as the actual buyer, because it

“would undermine—indeed, for all important purposes, would

virtually repeal—the gun law’s core provisions,” including “an

12
elaborate system to verify a would-be gun purchaser’s identity

and check on his background.” 134 S. Ct. at 2267.

We do not face a similar consequence here. It is certainly

true that our reading of § 666 is under-inclusive in that the

Fund cannot compel disclosure of social security numbers from a

subset of Maryland attorneys who were licensed before a certain

date. But that is a far cry from saying that it works a

“virtual repeal” of the statute’s core provisions, given that

the Fund’s enforcement power nonetheless extends to a

substantial portion of the Maryland Bar, and expands each year

as new attorneys are admitted to practice. That the statute

exempts some lawyers from the Fund’s enforcement reach merely

reflects the reality that “[n]o legislation pursues its purposes

at all costs,” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702,

1710 (2012) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522,

525-26 (1987)), and the final result “often involves tradeoffs,

compromises, and imperfect solutions.” Preseault v. ICC, 494

U.S. 1, 19 (1990).

We hold that the district court erred in relying on § 666

of the Welfare Reform Act to dismiss Tankersley’s complaint.

Accordingly, we turn to consider whether the Tax Reform Act

provides the statutory hook necessary to support the district

court’s judgment.

13
 D.

Section 405(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Tax Reform Act allows “any

State (or political subdivision thereof)” to use social security

numbers “in the administration of any tax . . . law within its

jurisdiction, . . . and may require any individual who is or

appears to be [affected by the tax law] to furnish to such State

(or political subdivision thereof) or any agency thereof having

administrative responsibility for the law involved, [his] social

security account number.” See also Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d

1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The final version [of

§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i)] authorizes States to use [social security

numbers] only ‘in the administration of any tax, general public

assistance, driver’s license, or motor vehicle registration.’”).

Recall that Tankersley’s claim is premised on the view that

the Fund violated his right under the Privacy Act not to

disclose his social security number. But as we noted earlier,

the Privacy Act does not help Tankersley if the disclosure is

required by federal law—in this case, say the Defendants,

§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Tankersley resists this conclusion on three grounds.

First, he says that Maryland’s statutory requirement that the

Fund furnish the Department of Assessments and Taxation and the

Comptroller with a list of attorneys who paid the annual fee to

the Fund does not amount to the use of social security numbers

14
“in the administration of any tax.” Second, he posits that the

Fund is not an entity that has administrative responsibility for

taxes, as contemplated by § 405. Third, he argues that he is

not an “individual who is or appears to be” affected by

Maryland’s tax laws because he neither works nor lives in

Maryland, and he has never owed taxes there.

We address these contentions in turn.

1.

As was the case with the Welfare Reform Act, Congress did

not define “administration” in § 405, thus we give it its

ordinary meaning. Aziz, 658 F.3d at 392-93. The ordinary

meaning of “administration” is the process of “manag[ing] the

operation of” something, or putting something “into effect.”

Administering, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/administering; see also Administration,

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary

/administration (defining “administration” as “the act or

process of administering”).

The breadth of the plain meaning of “administration” is

consistent with Congress’s treatment of the term as part of the

broader legislation that enacted § 405. See Tax Reform Act of

1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 §§ 1202, 1211, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified

as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103; 42 U.S.C. § 405). There, in a

provision of the Act expanding the Internal Revenue Code’s

15
regulation of the disclosure of tax returns and tax return

information, Congress defined “tax administration” as “the

administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision

of the execution and application of” tax laws, including

“assessment, collection, enforcement, litigation, publication,

and statistical gathering functions under such laws.” 26 U.S.C.

§ 6103(b)(4); see also id. § 6103(h)(1) (“Returns and return

information shall . . . be open to inspection by or disclosure

to officers and employees of the Department of the Treasury

whose official duties require such inspection or disclosure for

tax administration purposes.”).

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 is comprehensive in scope. In

addition to making changes to the Internal Revenue Code,

Congress also amended, for example, the Social Security Act, the

Tariff Act of 1930, and the Commodity Exchange Act. While the

Act’s definition of “tax administration” as applied to the

Internal Revenue Code does not speak directly to the definition

of “administration” in 42 U.S.C. § 405 (which was passed as part

of the changes Congress made to the Social Security Act), it

does inform our analysis. It not only shows that the same

Congress that enacted § 405 understood “administration” to be an

expansive term, but it does so in the context of a provision

balancing individual privacy—there, of tax return information—

16
against the government’s need to use private information to

administer taxes, just as § 405 does.

Given this, we are satisfied that the ordinary meaning of

the term “administration” in § 405 is sufficiently expansive so

as to allow the state of Maryland to compel lawyers licensed in

Maryland to disclose their social security numbers. The

practice “assist[s] the Department [of Assessments and Taxation]

in identifying new businesses within the State” and “assist[s]

the Comptroller in determining whether each lawyer on the list

has paid all undisputed taxes,” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof.

§ 10-313(a), which are functions of collection, enforcement, and

statistical gathering required to enforce Maryland’s tax laws.

2.

We are also not persuaded by Tankersley’s contention that

the Fund “is not an entity to which [social security number]

disclosures may be required under § 405,” Appellant’s Br. at 26,

in that it is not the “State (or political subdivision thereof)

or [an] agency thereof having administrative responsibility for

the law involved,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Tankersley would have us ignore that the “[s]tate [of

Maryland] ‘can act only through its officers and agents,’” and

thus the act of collecting social security numbers is

necessarily carried out by an officer or agent of the state.

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 365 (2001) (quoting Tennessee v.

17
Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)). Moreover, to allow only the

state agency directly responsible for administering the tax laws

to collect social security numbers would read the phrase “or

political subdivision thereof” out of the statute, because it

would not allow the state of Maryland, acting through other

agents or political subdivisions, to collect the numbers. See,

e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a

cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute

ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be

prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,

void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 174 (2001))).

We also think it clear that the Court of Appeals of

Maryland (as a subdivision of the state) and the Fund are—at

least for these purposes—agents of the state. “A State acts by

its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It

can act in no other way.” Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia,

100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) (emphasis added). Maryland’s

constitution vests judicial authority in the Court of Appeals,

Md. Const., Art. IV, §1, and the Court of Appeals has understood

that power to include “the regulation of the practice of law,

the admittance of new members to the bar, and the discipline of

attorneys who fail to conform to the established standards

governing their professional conduct,” Attorney Gen. v. Waldron,

18
426 A.2d 929, 934 (Md. 1981). The Court of Appeals of Maryland

is thus an agent of the state.

So too is the Fund, as an agent of the Court of Appeals.

The Court, through the rulemaking authority given to it by

statute, see Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-311(a) (“The

Court of Appeals may adopt rules that . . . provide for the

operation of the Fund.”), has delegated to the Fund the power

“[t]o perform all . . . acts authorized by these Rules,” Md.

Rules, Rule 19-604(a)(15). Of course, the Rules authorize the

Fund’s collection of social security numbers. In this capacity,

the Fund acts as an agent of the Court of Appeals, which is in

turn an agent of the state. The Fund is therefore an entity

under § 405 for purposes of requiring the disclosure of social

security numbers.

3.

Tankersley’s final salvo with respect to the reach of § 405

is that he is not a person who “is or appears to be” affected by

Maryland’s tax laws, because in the twenty-eight years that he

has been licensed to practice law in Maryland, he has never

lived in or owned property in Maryland, nor has he been required

to pay taxes or make unemployment insurance contributions to the

state.

We take Tankersley at his word when he says that he is

someone who has not been affected by Maryland’s tax laws. But

19
the statute reaches further to include individuals who “appear[]

to be” affected by tax laws. Mindful of “our duty ‘to give

effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,’”

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting

Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152

(1883)), a fair reading of § 405(c)(2)(C)(i) extends to all

attorneys licensed to practice law in Maryland. Why? Because

even though lawyers who live and practice elsewhere are less

likely to owe taxes to Maryland than those who live and work in

the state, Tankersley’s ability to earn income in the state (by

virtue of his license) is enough to make him someone who

“appears to be” affected by Maryland tax laws for the purpose of

§ 405. See Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-401 (providing for non-

resident allocation of income, losses, and adjustments for tax

purposes).

Accordingly, § 405 of the Tax Reform Act applies to

Tankersley, and the state of Maryland may lawfully compel him to

provide his social security number to the Fund on pain of

suspension of his law license. The district court’s judgment

dismissing Tankersley’s complaint is therefore

AFFIRMED.

20
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

Maryland Rules of Procedure 16-811.5 and 16-811.6, adopted

in 2014, require that each attorney admitted to practice as a

member of the Maryland bar disclose her social security number

(“SSN”) to the treasurer of the Client Protection Fund (“the

Fund”) or face suspension of her license to practice law.

Michael Tankersley, an attorney who has long been admitted to

practice in Maryland but has apparently never actually lived,

worked, or practiced in the state, contends that, as applied to

him, these Maryland Rules violate the federal Privacy Act of

1974. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act provides that “[i]t

shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government

agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or

privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal

to disclose his social security account number.” Pub. L. No.

93-579, § 7(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a

note).

Upon suspension of his law license for refusing to provide

his SSN, Tankersley brought this suit against all Maryland Court

of Appeals judges, the Clerk of Court, and the trustees of the

Fund (together, “Appellees”) in their official capacities. The

district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on its

determination in a previous case that both the Welfare Reform

21
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666, and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405, supersede the Privacy Act’s guarantee that an individual

may not be denied any legal right, benefit, or privilege for

failing to disclose her SSN. My friends in the majority affirm

on the ground that § 405, but not § 666, supersedes section

7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act as applied in this case.

While I agree with the majority that § 666 does not

supersede the Privacy Act as it pertains to Tankersley, I

respectfully dissent from its holding that § 405 does supersede

the Privacy Act. I would also hold that Tankersley has a

private right of action to enforce his Privacy Act rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in my view, Tankersley’s suspension

from practicing law for refusing to disclose his SSN violated

his Privacy Act rights. Accordingly, I would reverse the

district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to grant

summary judgment for Tankersley.

I.

This Court reviews de novo a dismissal for failure to state

a claim, Kenney v. Indep. Order of Foresters, 744 F.3d 901, 905

(4th Cir. 2014), and we likewise review de novo a denial of

summary judgment, Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295,

299 (4th Cir. 2008). Because I agree with the majority that

§ 666 does not supersede Tankersley’s Privacy Act rights, as

Tankersley is not an “applicant” for a professional license, I

22
begin by considering whether § 405 supersedes Tankersley’s

rights under the Privacy Act. Unlike the majority, I conclude

that it does not.

II.

Under the Tax Reform Act,

any State (or political subdivision thereof) may, in
the administration of any tax, general public
assistance, driver’s license, or motor vehicle
registration law within its jurisdiction, utilize the
social security account numbers issued by the
Commissioner of Social Security for the purpose of
establishing the identification of individuals
affected by such law, and may require any individual
who is or appears to be so affected to furnish to such
State (or political subdivision thereof) or any agency
thereof having administrative responsibility for the
law involved, the social security account number . . .
issued to him by the Commissioner of Social Security.

42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i). The Act also provides that, “[i]f

and to the extent that any provision of Federal law heretofore

enacted is inconsistent with the policy set forth in clause (i),

such provision shall . . . be null, void, and of no effect.”

Id. § 405(c)(2)(C)(v). Appellees argue, and the majority

agrees, that § 405 supersedes Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act

to the extent that it enables states to require individuals to

furnish their SSNs in the administration of any tax law. See

Appellees’ Br. 26.

I would hold, however, that § 405 does not supersede the

Privacy Act in this case for three reasons: First, the Fund’s

collection of SSNs is not an effort undertaken by the state “in

23
the administration of any tax” law. See § 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Second, the Fund is not an entity to which the state may require

individuals to furnish their SSNs, as it is not a direct agent

of the state itself or a state “agency . . . having

administrative responsibility for” any tax law. See id. Third,

Tankersley is not an “individual who is or appears to be . . .

affected” by any Maryland tax law. See id. Thus, § 405 does

not authorize the Maryland Court of Appeals to penalize

Tankersley for refusing to disclose his SSN, and it does not

supersede section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act as applied here.

A.

The language of § 405 is fairly limiting. The statute

specifies (1) who may require the disclosure of SSNs (a “State

(or political subdivision thereof)”); (2) for what purpose (“in

the administration of any tax . . . law within [the State’s]

jurisdiction”); (3) to whom an individual may be required to

make the disclosure (“to such State (or political subdivision

thereof) or any agency thereof having administrative

responsibility for the law involved”); and, finally, (4) who may

be required to disclose her SSN (“any individual who is or

appears to be . . . affected [by the State tax law]”).

§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i). I begin by examining the first two

requirements: whether the mandatory disclosure of SSNs at issue

24
in this case is an effort undertaken by the state of Maryland

“in the administration of any tax” law. See id.

Maryland law requires that, each year, the Fund must

“provide a list of lawyers who have paid an annual fee to the

Fund during the previous fiscal year” to the State Department of

Taxation “to assist the Department in identifying new businesses

within the State” and to the Comptroller “to assist the

Comptroller in determining whether each lawyer on the list has

paid all undisputed taxes and unemployment insurance

contributions.” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-313(a).

For each person listed, the Fund must provide “the federal tax

identification number of the person or, if the person does not

have a federal tax identification number, the Social Security

number of the person.” Id. § 10-313(b)(2)(ii). In an apparent

effort to comply with this state law, the Maryland Court of

Appeals adopted Maryland Rules of Procedure 16-811.5 and 16-

811.6 and amended the rules of admission to the Maryland bar,

see Md. Admis. R. 2(b), to require that applicants and members

of the bar supply their SSNs to the Fund.

The Fund’s stated purpose, however, is unrelated to the

state’s administration of any tax law: “The purpose of the Fund

is to maintain the integrity of the legal profession by paying

money to reimburse losses caused by defalcations of lawyers.”

Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-311(b). It is therefore

25
dubious to conclude that Maryland has acted “in the

administration of any tax” law by requiring the Fund, an entity

that does not itself collect taxes and that exists for an

entirely distinct purpose, to collect SSNs and supply them to

the Comptroller for the Comptroller’s use in monitoring

compliance with tax laws.

Relatedly, the Maryland Rules at issue in this case are not

the state laws requiring the Fund to provide SSNs to state tax

authorities; instead, the Rules under review are Maryland Rules

16-811.5 and 16-811.6, which the Court of Appeals promulgated to

require bar members to furnish their SSNs to the Fund. The

suggestion that the state (through its Court of Appeals) acted

“in the administration of any tax” law in promulgating Rules

requiring that the Fund collect SSNs from bar members so that

the Fund can comply with a separate Maryland law that requires

it to provide SSNs to Maryland tax authorities so that those

authorities may check compliance with tax laws is thus all the

more attenuated. 1 Accordingly, it does not appear that § 405

authorizes the Maryland Rules at issue.

1
Tankersley characterizes the Fund’s duty to pass along
SSNs to state tax authorities as a “game of telephone across
state agencies,” Appellant’s Br. 31, that is part of a
“patchwork” scheme, id. at 32, involving a “hodgepodge of
statutes through which SSNs wend their way from the [Fund] to
state taxation authorities,” Reply Br. 13. While the statutory
scheme might not quite warrant this colorful description, the
(Continued)
26
 B.

In any event, § 405 also specifies the type of entity to

which a state may require individuals to supply their SSNs: a

state may mandate SSN disclosure “to [a] State (or political

subdivision thereof) or any agency thereof having administrative

responsibility for the law involved.” § 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Appellees argue that the Fund, in collecting SSNs under the

Maryland Rules, is acting as an agent of the state, and since

§ 405 authorizes “the State” as well as state agencies

responsible for administering tax laws to collect SSNs, the

Maryland Rules comply with § 405. See Appellees’ Br. 30–35. In

other words, Appellees contend that two groups may collect SSNs

under § 405—the state, including its direct agents, and state

agencies with “administrative responsibility for the law

involved”—and that the Fund belongs in the former group. 2 See

id. at 32. The majority agrees.

The language of § 405 is not so expansive, however, as to

allow us to consider the Fund a direct agent of the state of

scheme is certainly complex, and the Maryland Rules’ connection
to the state’s administration of tax laws is tenuous at best.
2 Notably, Appellees expressly concede that the Fund does

not qualify for the latter group. That is, they do not suggest
that the Fund is a state agency with administrative
responsibility for any tax law. See Appellees’ Br. 31 (“[F]or
purposes of § 405, the Fund is not itself a state ‘agency’ that
administers a tax, but rather an agent of the State housed in
the judicial branch.”).

27
Maryland. In interpreting a statute, we must “give effect to

every provision and word in a statute and avoid any

interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or

superfluous.” Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th

Cir. 2005). If the phrase “the State (or political subdivision

thereof)” were to include any state agency, such as the Fund,

then the next phrase in § 405, authorizing SSN collection by

“any [state] agency . . . having administrative responsibility

for the law involved,” would be superfluous. See

§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Likewise, by expressly providing that “any [state] agency

. . . having administrative responsibility for the law involved”

may collect SSNs, Congress appears to have specifically excluded

from § 405’s purview state agencies, like the Fund, that are not

responsible for administering tax laws. See id. If it intended

otherwise, Congress could simply have established that a state

may require SSN disclosure to “any state agency” and left it at

that. See Reyes v. Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861,

865 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he doctrine of expressio un[ius] est

exclusio alterius instructs that where a law expressly describes

a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was omitted

or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.”); cf. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015) (“Thus,

Congress’s choice to say ‘specifically prohibited by law’ rather

28
than ‘specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation’

suggests that Congress meant to exclude rules and

regulations.”).

Appellees argue, on the other hand, and the majority

agrees, that the statutory canon requiring that we attempt to

“give effect to every provision and word in a statute,” Discover

Bank, 396 F.3d at 369, cuts the other direction. See Appellees’

Br. 32–33. They contend that the phrase “State (or political

subdivision thereof)” must include the state’s direct agents for

that term to have any meaning, as a state cannot act of its own

accord. See id. at 32. Yet that proposition does nothing to

demonstrate that the Fund in particular qualifies as a direct

agent of the state. Although the Court of Appeals might meet

this description, see Md. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (vesting

Maryland’s judicial power in the Court of Appeals), I see no

reason to conclude that the Fund, a subset of the Maryland Court

of Appeals, may serve as a proxy for the state itself.

That Congress, in enacting § 405, did not intend for a

state agency to qualify as a stand-in for the “State (or

political subdivision thereof)” is again exemplified by § 405’s

inclusion of a subsequent phrase specifically pertaining to

state agencies—a statutory phrase that would more naturally

describe the Fund, if only the Fund were a state agency with

administrative responsibility for any Maryland tax law. See

29
§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i). Accordingly, the majority’s labored

analysis, reasoning that the Maryland Court of Appeals is an

agent of the state and the Fund is an agent of the Court of

Appeals and thus the Fund is an agent of the state, forgets that

the relevant question is whether the Fund is a direct agent of

the state—the personification of the state itself—as opposed to

a state agency organized and managed under the auspices of the

state. Because the Fund is neither a direct state agent nor an

agency with administrative responsibility for any Maryland tax

law, § 405 does not authorize the Maryland Rules at issue here,

which require disclosure of SSNs to the Fund.

C.

Finally, even if § 405 does authorize the Fund’s collection

of SSNs in some circumstances, it does not allow Maryland to

require the collection of Tankersley’s SSN in particular, as

Tankersley is not an “individual who is or appears to be”

affected by any Maryland tax law. See id.

Although Tankersley has been licensed to practice law in

Maryland since 1986, he has been a resident of Virginia or

Washington, D.C., and has worked in Washington, D.C., for the

duration of that time, J.A. 114—indeed, he has also been

licensed to practice law in Washington, D.C., since 1987, J.A.

10. For the nearly three decades that Tankersley has been

licensed in Maryland, he has not owned property in Maryland, and

30
he has not owed Maryland any taxes or unemployment insurance

contributions. J.A. 114. Moreover, Tankersley has annually

reported his home and work addresses to the Fund, which uses

this information each year, along with information regarding

Tankersley’s bar memberships outside of Maryland, to determine

whether he is subject to a mandatory assessment. See J.A. 114–

15; Regs. of the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Md.

Currently Effective, § (i)(1)–(3), http://www.courts.state.md

.us/cpf/pdfs/regulations.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2016).

Thus, not only does Tankersley not owe any taxes in

Maryland (nor has he for nearly thirty years), but he also does

not appear to owe any taxes in Maryland, as is clear from the

information that Tankersley provides the Fund on a yearly basis.

Someone who lives in Virginia and works in Washington, D.C.,

where he is licensed to practice law, does not “appear[] to be

affected” by Maryland tax laws simply because he is also

licensed to practice law in Maryland, particularly when he has

not practiced law there and has no other apparent connection to

the state.

Appellees contend that a more individualized approach to

SSN collection would “require an unworkable, burdensome,

administrative mechanism to determine whether there was some

basis for taxing the specific individual.” Appellees’ Br. 29.

Perhaps so. Yet, as mentioned above, the Fund already uses

31
individual bar members’ information to determine whether each

attorney owes a mandatory assessment, so the requisite mechanism

already exists. More to the point, § 405 is clear in specifying

who may be required to disclose her SSN: “any individual who is

or appears to be” affected by state tax law. Appellees cannot

eschew this language due to policy concerns about inefficiency. 3

Given that we must, to the extent possible, attempt to construe

§ 405 so as to preserve the Privacy Act, see Morton v. Mancari,

417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of

co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly

expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard

each as effective.”), Appellees’ argument concerning the

relative ease and efficiency of a blanket mandatory collection

of all licensed attorneys’ SSNs is unpersuasive.

Lastly, it is ironic that, upon acknowledging that we must

be “mindful of our duty to give effect, if possible, to every

clause and word of a statute,” ante at 20 (citations and

3
Indeed, even if it were necessary to look beyond the
statutory text, the relevant legislative history demonstrates
that Congress intended for § 405 to be limited in scope. When
advocating the passage of § 405, the Senate Committee on Finance
stated that it “believe[d] that State and local governments
should have the authority to use social security numbers for
identification purposes when they consider it necessary for
administrative purposes.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 391 (1976)
(emphasis added). Maryland cannot in good faith consider a more
efficient system strictly necessary, especially when the state’s
current administrative system is already capable of the task at
hand.

32
internal quotation marks omitted), the majority ignores the

precise wording of § 405—which authorizes the mandatory

collection of an SSN only from an “individual who is or appears

to be” affected by Maryland tax laws, § 405(c)(2)(C)(i)—and

instead declares that “a fair reading of § 405(c)(2)(C)(i)

extends to all attorneys licensed to practice in Maryland,” ante

at 20. Congress did not enact such an expansive statute, and we

should not transform § 405 into one, particularly where we are

obligated to give effect to every word in a statute and to

interpret § 405 in a manner that preserves the federal Privacy

Act (and the important protections it provides), to the extent

possible.

Accordingly, I would hold that § 405 does not authorize the

Fund to penalize Tankersley for failing to supply his SSN, as

Tankersley is not an individual “who is or appears to be

affected” by any Maryland tax law.

III.

Having concluded that neither § 666 nor § 405 supersedes

Tankersley’s rights under section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act,

the question remains whether Tankersley has a private right of

action to enforce his rights. Tankersley argues that he may

pursue his claim for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Appellant’s Br. 36–43. I agree.

33
 Section 1983 “imposes liability on anyone who, under color

of state law or regulation, deprives a person ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.’” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). A

plaintiff seeking redress under § 1983 “must assert the

violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal

law.” Id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles,

493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)). We consider three factors when

determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise

to a federal right. Id. “First, Congress must have intended

that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.” Id.

(citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth.,

479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987)). The Supreme Court has clarified that

the federal right must be “unambiguously conferred”; it is

insufficient that “the plaintiff falls within the general zone

of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” Gonzaga

Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). “Second, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the

statute is not ‘so vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement

would strain judicial competence.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41

(quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 431–32). “Third, the statute must

unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In

other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right

34
must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.”

Id. at 341 (citing cases).

However, “[e]ven if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal

statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable

presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983. Because

our inquiry focuses on congressional intent, dismissal is proper

if Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.’”

Id. (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)).

Congress may do so expressly or impliedly, such as by “creating

a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with

individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id. (citing Livadas v.

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994)).

A.

While the question of whether section 7(a)(1) of the

Privacy Act confers an individual right enforceable under § 1983

is an issue of first impression in this Circuit, 4 the Eleventh

Circuit has answered this question in the affirmative. See

Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). The Ninth

Circuit, the only other one of our sister circuits to resolve

4Because the district court below concluded that § 666 and
§ 405 supersede Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, it did not
reach this issue. See J.A. 123–24. The district court in
Greidinger v. Almand, which served as the basis for the district
court’s decision in this case, noted that this is “an open
question in the Fourth Circuit,” but it also declined to resolve
the issue. 30 F. Supp. 3d 413, 426 (D. Md. 2014).

35
the issue, 5 agreed that section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act

creates an individual right, but it held that Congress

intentionally foreclosed § 1983 as a remedy. See Dittman v.

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 1999).

I would hold that, in enacting section 7(a)(1) of the

Privacy Act, Congress created an individual right enforceable

under § 1983. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act provides that

“[i]t shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local

government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit,

or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s

refusal to disclose his social security account number.”

§ 7(a)(1). Even though this provision proscribes the activity

of a “Federal, State or local government agency,” the statute is

unambiguously focused on the right of an individual to retain

her legal rights, benefits, and privileges when refusing to

disclose her SSN. See Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1292 (“[T]he Privacy

Act clearly confers a legal right on individuals: the right to

refuse to disclose his or her ssn without suffering the loss ‘of

any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law.’”). Moreover,

Congress explained that it enacted the Privacy Act “to provide

5 This issue has come before the Tenth Circuit as well, but
that court acknowledged the existing circuit split and dismissed
the plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims for other reasons. See
Gonzalez v. Vill. of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 662–63 (10th
Cir. 2012).

36
certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of

personal privacy,” Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896,

expressing an intent to create and preserve individual rights.

Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act differs in this way from

the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”)

at issue in Gonzaga University v. Doe. See 536 U.S. at 276.

The Supreme Court in Gonzaga determined that FERPA, which

provides that “[n]o funds shall be made available . . . to any

educational agency . . . which has a policy or practice of

permitting the release of education records . . . of students

without the written consent of their parents,” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1232g(b)(1), did not contain the requisite “rights-creating”

language to allow for enforcement under § 1983. Gonzaga, 536

U.S. at 287. The Court explained that the statute’s focus on

funding for educational agencies “is two steps removed from the

interests of individual students and parents and clearly does

not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’ that is

enforceable under § 1983.” Id. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy

Act, by contrast, establishes that individuals are entitled to

decline to provide their SSNs while retaining their legal

rights, benefits, and privileges. In doing so, section 7(a)(1)

plainly confers an individual right and satisfies the first

requirement for enforcement under § 1983. See Schwier, 340 F.3d

at 1292; Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1028.

37
 Further, the individual right created by section 7(a)(1) is

not “‘so vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain

judicial competence.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41 (quoting

Wright, 479 U.S. at 431–32). An individual’s right to retain

“any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law” is clearly

defined. See Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1028 (“[T]he statutory

obligation imposed on governmental bodies is clear: A

governmental body may not deny any individual any right,

benefit, or privilege because she refuses to disclose her social

security number, unless otherwise permitted by law.”).

Moreover, the Act unambiguously imposes a binding and mandatory

obligation on the states by using the phrase “it shall be

unlawful.” See § 7(a)(1). Tankersley has thus established a

rebuttable presumption of enforceability of his Privacy Act

rights under § 1983.

B.

Appellees have failed to counter this presumption by

demonstrating that Congress “specifically foreclosed a remedy

under § 1983,” see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 (quoting Smith, 468

U.S. at 1005 n.9), as their argument rests primarily on their

38
contention that the Privacy Act does not confer an individual

right, 6 see Appellees’ Br. 39–45.

As it happens, Congress has not foreclosed a remedy under

§ 1983. In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit reasoned

that, “[a]lthough the prohibitions of § 7(a)(1) apply to all

governmental entities, including state and local governments, by

limiting the scope of the Privacy Act’s civil remedy provision,

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), Congress clearly intended to ‘foreclose

private enforcement’ against any entity other than federal

agencies.” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1029. The civil remedy

provision to which the Ninth Circuit referred, however, applies

only to section 3 of the Privacy Act, which concerns the

maintenance of individuals’ records and which itself only

regulates federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The civil

remedy provision does not apply to section 7, the section at

issue in this case. See Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1289 (“Dittman

6
Appellees also assert that Tankersley cannot pursue his
Privacy Act rights under § 1983 because “Congress lacked
authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
states in the Privacy Act.” Appellees’ Br. 38. The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized, however, that “official-
capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the state.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)). Accordingly, because Tankersley
seeks injunctive relief, not damages, from state officials in
their official capacity, this case does not implicate any
Eleventh Amendment concerns. See id. (“Of course a state
official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 . . . .”).

39
failed to recognize that the remedial scheme of section 3

applies only to section 3 and has no bearing on section 7.”).

Appellees acknowledge as much in their brief. See Appellees’

Br. 38 (“The only private cause of action created under the

Privacy Act exists under Section 3 of that Act, and is limited

to claims against federal entities.”). As the Privacy Act

establishes “no enforcement scheme at all” with respect to the

individual rights that section 7 confers, Congress has not

foreclosed enforcement of these rights under § 1983. 7 Schwier,

340 F.3d at 1292.

IV.

Thus, neither 42 U.S.C. § 666 nor 42 U.S.C. § 405

supersedes section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act and authorizes the

enforcement of Maryland Rules 16-811.5 and 16-811.6 against

Tankersley. Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers a private right

of action for Tankersley to enforce his Privacy Act rights.

Because this case involves no genuine issue of material fact,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, I would reverse and remand to the

7Tankersley argues in the alternative that a federal court
may exercise its “inherent equitable power to enjoin violations
of federal law.” Reply Br. 19. Because I conclude that
Tankersley has a private right of action to enforce his section
7(a)(1) Privacy Act rights under § 1983, I do not address this
issue.

40
district court for entry of summary judgment 8 in favor of

Tankersley.

8 The parties have sufficient notice that we may grant
summary judgment, as Tankersley filed a motion seeking this
relief and Appellees styled their dispositive motion as a
“Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment.” See J.A. 116.

41