J-S49021-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHAMAR DARIUS ALEXANDER,
Appellant No. 395 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003299-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA and OLSON, JJ. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2016
Appellant, Shamar Darius Alexander, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on January 5, 2015, following his jury trial convictions for
first-degree murder, abuse of corpse, and possessing an instrument of
crime.1 Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On June 23, 2011, a Chester City police officer on routine
patrol found the body of a deceased man, later identified as
John Tony Dillard, wrapped in plastic trash bags in the back
seat of a taxi in a lot in the 1100 block of Lamokin Street.
An autopsy later revealed the presence of the plastic tip and
spring of a Papermate pen through the left jugular vein of
the deceased’s throat. His body also had evidence of
strangulation as well as multiple blunt force injuries, mostly
to the face. The medical examiner later testified that the
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 5510, and 907, respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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manner of death was homicide, and the cause of death was
a stab wound to the neck and strangulation contributed to
by multiple blunt force injuries.
At first, officers could not develop any solid leads or identify
any prime suspects. The deceased’s fiancé, [Shauna]
Jordan, advised them that on the date of his death, she
accompanied him to Philadelphia Traffic Court, where he
paid off some tickets prior to a scheduled wedding date.
She never saw him again.
A month later, two Chester detectives pursued the only lead
they had and ventured to the Philadelphia Traffic Court to
view surveillance footage of the deceased’s final hours. The
video showed the deceased, Jordan, and another man
walking together in the courthouse. Despite Jordan’s
misidentification of the second man, the detectives were
able, several months later, to identify him as [Appellant], a
felon whose DNA profile was known to the Pennsylvania
State Police. The officers compared that profile with
samples taken from the crime scene [including DNA found
inside the pen used in the murder and on tape securing the
garbage bags wrapped around the body] and, after
confirming a match, obtained an arrest warrant.
On February 23, 2012, Corporal Patrick McFate and
Detective Tyler of the Chester Police Department arrested
[Appellant] and, after advising him of his right to remain
silent and securing his signature on a [waiver of rights]
card, interrogated him. [Appellant] made a confession that
was tape recorded and later played to the jury. Although he
attempted to minimize his involvement in the murder, he
admitted to participating with knowledge that his [alleged]
accomplice[] intended to murder the victim.
* * *
[Appellant] admitted his involvement in a scheme to kill
Dillard in exchange for the cancellation of a drug debt owed
to an individual known as “Poo.” He agreed that since he
owed “Poo” money, one way to pay off the debt was to help
another man by the name of Terrence Gardner “get rid of”
Dillard. In response to [detective] question[ing] about the
meaning of “get rid of,” [Appellant] explained that it meant
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“kill.” He attempted to minimize his involvement by
asserting that Gardner actually stabbed Dillard in the neck
with the pen. However, he admitted that he and Gardner
plotted to kill Dillard, that he held Dillard down while
Gardner administered blows to Dillard’s body and that, after
they were certain that Dillard was dead, he wrapped the
body with trash bags and tape. At the end of the
confession, he apologized to the deceased’s family for the
fact that he “took a life” and agreed that he should
“definitely” suffer the “consequences” of that action.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/2015, at 1-3 (record citations omitted).
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with first, second, and
third-degree murder and various related offenses. The trial court held a
weeklong jury trial in October 2014 following which the jury convicted
Appellant of the aforementioned charges. On January 5, 2015, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, followed by consecutive
terms of imprisonment of 30 to 60 months for possessing an instrument of
crime and 12 to 24 months of imprisonment for abuse of corpse. This timely
appeal followed.2
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2
On January 14, 2015, the trial court granted trial counsel’s request to
withdraw from representation. On January 16, 2015, the trial court
appointed new counsel for Appellant. The trial court granted newly
appointed counsel’s request for an extension of time to file post-sentence
motions. While the timely filed post-sentence motions were pending,
Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The trial court denied the post-
sentence motions on February 17, 2015. Counsel did not file a new notice of
appeal. However, upon receipt of Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal, the
trial court ordered appointed counsel to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Counsel for
Appellant complied timely. Thus, despite the premature, pro se filing of the
notice of appeal, we conclude the appeal was perfected by counsel’s and the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
I. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient
evidence to support the conviction of first[-]degree
murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a), rather than
third-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c)?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (complete capitalization omitted).3
Appellant contends he “has never contested that he had some
involvement in the [] events leading up to the killing of John Tony Dillard on
June 23, 2011.” Id. at 6. However, Appellant claims the Commonwealth
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed first-degree
murder because a review of the evidence shows “Appellant acted in a
reckless manner consistent with [t]hird[-d]egree [m]urder.” Id. More
specifically, and in sum, Appellant maintains:
In the instant case, there [was] no direct or circumstantial
evidence that [] Appellant actually committed the homicide,
regardless of the [Commonwealth’s] efforts to twist his
inconclusive confession into evidence of malice, motive, and
the required specific intent. The trial court opinion states
that “malice may be inferred by the use of a deadly weapon
by the accused on a vital portion of the victim’s body.” The
alleged “deadly weapon” was a pen on which there was DNA
evidence identifying [] Appellant, the victim, and the DNA of
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(Footnote Continued)
trial court’s subsequent actions. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of
appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry
of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the
day thereof.”). The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on June 3, 2015.
3
Appellant “expressly waives consideration of all other issues contained” in
his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Appellant’s Brief at 4 n.1.
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a third party who was never identified by the police. But
this individual was identified by [] Appellant as Terrence
Gardner, the person who actually committed this crime. In
spite of this identification, the [Commonwealth] chose to
believe only those portions of Appellant’s statements which
allegedly supported a specific intent to kill and not his
identification of the real killer. Since the police were not
able to find this individual, the trial court found that “the
jury could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Gardner was
a fictional character and that no other person was present
during the commission of the crime.” The trial court further
found that even if Gardner committed the actual killing, []
Appellant “was guilty as an accomplice.”
Simply put, the trial court cannot have it both ways. The
trial court in effect dismisses the existence of Terrence
Gardner, yet assumes his existence to posit the argument of
accomplice liability. The trial court engages in a confusing
double standard. The trial court ignores the significance of
the DNA evidence on a murder weapon which points to the
existence of a perpetrator other than [] Appellant. Yet this
same trial court opinion defends the verdict of [f]irst[-
d]egree [m]urder under an accomplice liability theory based
on the existence of this same perpetrator whom the trial
court calls a “fictional character.” The person either existed
or he did not. Clearly, the only reasonable conclusion is to
find that this person did exist and thus there must be at the
very least confusion as to whether [] Appellant was the
murderer. The DNA of Terrence Gardner itself should have
created reasonable doubt as to who actually committed the
homicide. The only conclusion which is manifestly obvious
beyond a reasonable doubt is that [] Appellant took part in
a beating of the victim but may not have had anything to do
with the actual murder. This evidence adduced at trial does
not compel a conclusion which supports a finding of the
recklessness and indifference to human life on the part of []
Appellant consistent with [t]hird[-d]egree [m]urder.
Id. at 9-10 (record citations omitted).
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“A claim impugning the sufficiency of the evidence presents us with a
question of law.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Our standard of review is well-established:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence.
This standard is equally applicable to cases where the
evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the
combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a conviction must be
based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the
Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
certainty.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
“A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first[-]degree when it is
committed by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). The
legislature has defined “intentional killing” as a “[k]illing by means of poison,
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or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d). “In order to prove first-
degree murder, the Commonwealth must establish that: (1) a human being
was killed; (2) the accused caused the death; and (3) the accused acted
with malice and the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,
130 A.3d 697, 709 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).
“The jury may infer the intent to kill based upon the defendant's use of
a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body.” Id. “[I]tems, not
normally considered to be weapons, have [] been categorized as deadly
weapons under certain circumstances […when] used in such a manner as to
create a high probability of serious bodily injury or death.” Commonwealth
v. Raybuck, 915 A.2d 125, 128 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations
omitted). Moreover, “evidence of manual strangulation is also sufficient to
establish specific intent required for first-degree murder.” Commonwealth
v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 445 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).
The medical examiner testified that the victim’s cause of death was a
combination of a stab wound to the left jugular vein and strangulation. N.T.,
10/7/2014, at 20-25. There were also injuries to the victim “consistent with
a struggle.” Id. at 23. The stab wound penetrated two inches into the
decedent’s neck. Id. at 20. The medical examiner removed “a plastic tip of
a pen along with a spring that goes into the plastic tip [that] was stuck in
the subject’s throat.” Id. A forensic scientist from the Pennsylvania State
Police laboratory testified that she analyzed the broken pen casing found at
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the scene of the crime and discovered Appellant’s DNA inside of it. N.T.,
10/8/2014, at 71-73. Appellant was one of the last people seen on
surveillance video with the decedent before his demise. N.T., 10/7/2014, at
130-138. Appellant admitted to detectives that he had a $6,000.00 drug
debt that would be forgiven if he killed the victim. N.T., 10/8/2014, at 114-
115.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as our standard requires, we conclude the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s first-degree murder
conviction. Here, there was no dispute that a human being was killed. The
Commonwealth provided evidence that Appellant caused the death by
showing: (1) Appellant had a motive to kill the victim to have a debt
discharged; (2) Appellant was last seen with the decedent; and (3)
Appellant’s DNA was found on the murder weapon. The Commonwealth also
proved Appellant’s specific intent to kill the victim. Appellant employed
several methods to kill the victim, forcefully stabbing him in a vital organ
and strangling him, while the decedent struggled. All of this evidence taken
together demonstrated a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. Thus,
we conclude the Commonwealth proved each element necessary to support
Appellant’s first-degree murder conviction.
Furthermore, while Appellant implicated another person in the murder
during his confession to police, the jury was free to believe all, part or none
of that evidence. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that
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Appellant was never able to identify Terrence Gardner with specificity and
police were unable to locate a man by that name. N.T., 10/8/2014, at 120-
121. Accordingly, we need not consider Appellant’s conviction in light of an
alternative theory of accomplice liability.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/13/2016
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