UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4112
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TONY BERNARD ALEXANDER, a/k/a Sealed Dft #1,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:95-cr-00178-MOC-1)
Submitted: August 19, 2016 Decided: September 14, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tony Bernard Alexander, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tony B. Alexander appeals from the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and imposing an 11-month sentence.
On appeal, Alexander contends that the probation officer presented
false testimony, and that the sentence imposed is unreasonable. *
Finding no error, we affirm.
To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find
a violation of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). This standard “simply
requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact
is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan,
592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, the district court heard the evidence
presented by the probation officer and heard Alexander’s argument
that the officer’s testimony was false. We conclude that the
district court’s finding of a violation is supported by the
evidence and there is no clear error in the court’s credibility
determination. See United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th
Cir. 2012) (providing that great deference is given to trial
court’s credibility determinations). We find no abuse of
discretion by the district court in revoking Alexander’s
*We grant Alexander’s motions to supplement his informal
brief and have considered the arguments raised therein.
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supervised release upon finding that he violated the terms of his
supervision. See United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992).
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v.
Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will affirm a
revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-
40 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court properly considered the
applicable Chapter 7 policy statements in the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable
in the supervised release revocation context, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439, and provided sufficient
explanation for the sentence imposed, see United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). The court noted the
policy statement recommendation of an 8 to 14 month sentence and,
addressing the relevant factors, the court denied the Government’s
motion for an upward departure and determined that an 11-month
sentence would be appropriate. We conclude that the court’s
explanation for the selected sentence is sufficient.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district
court did not err in finding that Alexander violated the terms of
his supervision and did not abuse its discretion in imposing an
11-month sentence to be followed by an 8-year term of supervised
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release. We therefore conclude that the sentence imposed was not
plainly unreasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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