FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 14 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCELINA DIAZ, No. 15-55711
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
8:14-cv-01819-SJO-E
v.
KIMBERLY HUGHES, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 29, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and WALTER,*** Senior
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States Senior District Judge
for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
page 2
In sufficiency of the evidence cases, “the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Juan H. v.
Allen, 408 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2005), we held that a state court’s application of
Jackson “must be objectively unreasonable” to be cognizable on habeas review.
Id. at 1275 n.13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the state court’s decision that there was sufficient evidence to convict
Diaz was not objectively unreasonable. The court pointed to expert evidence that
“there was a one in a trillion chance the DNA on the garden shears belonged to
someone other than Diaz.” A juror would have to make inferences to connect the
DNA evidence to the actual burglary, but the court found that such inferences were
reasonable based on the physical and circumstantial evidence. This was not an
objectively unreasonable application of Jackson.
Diaz argues that there was no direct evidence that she personally entered the
residence. But direct evidence is not necessary: The jury could infer that she
entered by considering the dimensions of the hole along with Diaz’s size and the
DNA evidence. Diaz also argues that DNA can be easily transferred, but this is a
jury finding that we are not entitled to second-guess.
page 3
DENIED.