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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
DWAYNE A. GOUDY
Appellant No. 1676 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000622-2009
CP-36-CR-0000625-2009
CP-36-CR-0000626-2009
CP-36-CR-0000627-2009
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2016
Appellant, Dwayne A. Goudy, appeals pro se from the order dismissing
his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) 1
as untimely. We affirm.
A jury convicted Goudy of numerous sexual offenses stemming from
his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 22 to 44 years’ imprisonment. Relevant to this
appeal, Goudy’s sentence was based, in part, upon application of the
mandatory minimum sentencing provision 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(1), due to
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42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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the age of his stepdaughter. Goudy’s post-sentence motion was denied. This
Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on May 10, 2011. Our Supreme
Court denied allocator on November 10, 2011. Goudy did not seek a writ of
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.
On June 8, 2012, Goudy timely filed his first pro se PCRA petition. The
PCRA court subsequently dismissed that petition, after providing Rule 907
notice. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. On August 11,
2015, Goudy filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his second, alleging,
inter alia, that his sentence is illegal based on the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).2
Goudy later filed an amended PCRA petition. On September 4, 2015, the
PCRA court dismissed Goudy’s petition as untimely, after providing Rule 907
notice. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Goudy claims that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his
petition as untimely where the sentence he is serving is illegal. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8. We disagree.
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In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact, other
than a prior conviction, that triggers application of a mandatory minimum
sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the factfinder.
See 133 S.Ct., at 2155. In Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 806
(Pa. Super. 2014), a case on direct appeal, a panel of this Court held section
9718 of the Sentencing Code unconstitutional in light of Alleyne and this
Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc) and Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa.
Super. 2014). However, Wolfe has not been held to apply retroactively to
cases on collateral review.
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Our standard of review of a trial court order granting or denying
relief under the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the
determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of
record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will
not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the
certified record.
Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-192 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Before we may assess the merits of Goudy’s claims, we must first
consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition, as it implicates the jurisdiction
of this Court and the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d
988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration
of the time for seeking such review. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are
jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the merits of
the issues raised if the petition was not timely filed. The
timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of
the nature of the individual claims raised therein. The PCRA
squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an
untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (citations and
footnote omitted).
Here, Goudy’s judgment of sentence became final on February 8,
2012, when the filing period for a certiorari petition expired. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup.Ct. R. 13(1) (“a petition for a writ of
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certiorari to review a judgment in any case … is timely when it is filed with
the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment[]”). Thus,
his second PCRA petition, filed over four years later on August 11, 2015, is
patently untimely. Unless Goudy pleaded and proved one of the statutory
exceptions to the time-bar, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review his
petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Section 9545 of the PCRA provides three limited exceptions that allow
for review of an untimely PCRA petition, which are as follows.
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
Id. A petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a petition within
60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(2).
In the present case, Goudy invokes the “newly discovered fact”
exception under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) and argues that he is entitled to relief
based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 9-13. He further asserts that his petition was timely filed
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because “he filed [it] within sixty (60) days of learning of the United States
Supreme Court decision in Alleyne.” Id., at 9. We disagree.
Goudy’s claim that he complied with the 60-day window under section
9545(b)(2) is incorrect. Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013. Goudy filed
the instant PCRA petition on August 11, 2015, more than two years later.
The date when Goudy learned of the Alleyne decision is inconsequential.
See Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(holding that appellant’s claim, alleging that a recently filed judicial decision
was a newly-discovered fact, failed because it did not comply with section
9545(b)(2), as “the sixty-day period begins to run upon the date of the
underlying judicial decision [,]” not the date appellant became aware of the
decision). Ignorance of the law does not excuse Goudy’s failure to file his
petition within 60 days of the Alleyne decision. See id. “Neither the court
system nor the correctional system is obliged to educate or update prisoners
concerning changes in case law.” Id. (citation omitted). Because Goudy
failed to file his petition within 60 days of Alleyne, his claim must fail. See
id.; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
We note that even if Goudy had timely raised his claimed exception,
his argument would still fail because “[o]ur Courts have expressly rejected
the notion that judicial decisions can be considered newly-discovered facts
which would invoke the protections afforded by section 9545(b)(1)(ii).”
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). We also observe that we have specifically held that Alleyne does
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not fall within the newly-recognized constitutional right exception to section
9545(b)(1), since it has not been held to be retroactive by either our
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court. See Miller, 102 A.3d at
995.
Due to the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Goudy has not met his
burden of proving that his patently untimely petition falls within one of the
three limited exceptions to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.3 Accordingly,
we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing his petition for relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2016
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3
Since we do not have jurisdiction over Goudy’s claims, we need not
address his argument regarding merger.
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