MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Sep 23 2016, 10:20 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Gregory F. Zoeller
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard Denning James B. Martin
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Andrew Stetler, September 23, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
01A02-1605-PC-1000
v. Appeal from the Adams Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Patrick R. Miller,
Appellee-Respondent Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
01C01-1305-PC-1
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Andrew Stetler appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He
argues that the post-conviction court should have found that he received the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for four reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to
object to the testimony of two sexual assault nurse examiners; (2) trial counsel
failed to object to a jury question; (3) trial counsel failed to impeach a witness
with a prior inconsistent statement; and (4) trial counsel failed to object or ask
for an admonishment during the State’s closing argument. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Facts
[2] The underlying facts of this case were described by this Court in Stetler’s direct
appeal:
In July of 2010, Stetler attended a campfire in nine-year-old
S.G.L.’s backyard. S.G.L.’s seven-year-old friend, K.H., was
also present. During the campfire, K.H. decided to walk to her
home next door for a pillow, and Stetler walked with her. When
Stetler and K.H. arrived at her house and were on the back
porch, Stetler pulled down K.H.’s pants and underpants and
licked her “private.” Transcript at 377. After Stetler and K.H.
returned to S.G.L’s house, S.G.L. climbed onto Stetler’s lap and
fell asleep. S.G.L. awoke when Stetler put his hands down the
front of her pants and inside her underwear, touching her
“private part” with his finger. Id. at 353. Both girls reported
Stetler’s behavior to a neighbor. The neighbor informed the girls’
parents and the parents informed the police. Both girls were
taken to the Child Advocacy Center in Fort Wayne, Indiana,
where the girls were questioned about Stetler touching them.
They were also physically examined by a Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner. During trial, S.G.L. testified that during the
examination, the nurse touched her in the same location as
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Stetler had. The nurse testified that when she used a sterile swab
on S.G.L.’s clitoral hood, which is in the interior of the female
sex organ, S.G.L. confirmed she was touching her in the same
location as Stetler had.
Stetler v. State, 972 N.E.2d 404, 405-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[3] At trial, sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) Leslie Cook testified regarding
her examination of S.G.L. Cook has a dual role of patient care and forensic
evidence collection. Cook testified that, as part of her examination of S.G.L.,
she obtained a patient history, explaining:
That’s the patient’s words. That’s why they’re telling you that
they’re coming to see you today . . . . Patient history is the single
most important part of, not only mine, but any kind of nursing
diagnosis so when you go to any kind of a healthcare setting,
your nurse is going to ask you, can you tell me why you’re here
today because that’s going to help to formulate that nursing
diagnosis plan for their treatment.
Tr. p. 459, 461. Cook asked S.G.L. to tell her why she was there that day and
S.G.L. responded appropriately. Cook performed a head-to-toe physical
examination of S.G.L., instructing S.G.L. to put on a gown, and Cook wore
gloves during the examination, focusing on the genitalia. S.G.L. was eleven
years old at trial and testified that Cook was “like a nurse or something,” and
that “She did an exam or something.” Id. at 360. The trial court permitted
Cook to testify regarding S.G.L.’s statements, and Stetler’s counsel did not raise
a hearsay objection.
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[4] After Cook testified, the jury indicated that it had a question for Cook. With no
objection from Stetler’s attorneys, the trial court asked Cook the question: “Did
[S.G.L.] tell you that Andy Stetler had touched her on her private parts on more
than one occasion?” Tr. p. 469. Cook responded affirmatively.
[5] SANE nurse Joyce Moss also testified at trial. She stated that K.H. told her
that Stetler had pulled down K.H.’s pants and licked her “pee-pee.” Id. at 432.
Moss also testified that K.H. said that Stetler told her not to tell anybody and
that “he did it to my friend [S.G.L.] like ten times.” Id. at 433. Stetler’s
attorneys did not object or move for an admonishment.
[6] Rocky Winget was at the campfire on the night that Stetler molested the two
girls. Winget testified that S.G.L. was sitting on Stetler’s lap and attempted to
get up, only to have him hold her down, and that it happened more than once.
Id. at 391. In his videotaped statement to police, Winget said that S.G.L. had
attempted multiple times to get on Stetler’s lap but that each time, he got upset
and pushed her off. Stetler’s attorneys did not impeach Winget with this prior
inconsistent statement.
[7] During the State’s closing argument, the deputy prosecutor stated to the jury
that “[t]here is no evidence to support any reason for you to disregard the
testimony of [K.H.]. None. You should not speculate. Your job is not to find
a reason to find Andy Stetler not guilty. That is not your job. Your job is to
consider the evidence presented in this cause.” Id. at 483. The State also
argued, “You cannot put yourselves above the experts. You should not do that.
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If you do that then what you’re [sic] job is not considering the evidence, but
now your job is beginning trying [sic] to find a way to find him not guilty.” Id.
at 485. Stetler’s attorneys did not object to these statements.
[8] Following the trial, the jury found Stetler guilty of two counts of class A felony
child molesting—one count for each victim. Stetler admitted to being an
habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of ninety
years imprisonment. Stetler appealed, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient and that the sentence was inappropriate. This Court affirmed. Id.
at 409.
[9] On May 24, 2013, Stetler filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
amending the petition by counsel on August 27, 2015. A post-conviction
hearing was held on February 23, 2016, and the post-conviction court denied
the petition on April 8, 2016. In pertinent part, the post-conviction court found
as follows:
20. The Court finds that the decision not to use the pretrial
statement of Winget was a strategic decision by defense
counsel, [and] the evidence does not support a finding of
any resulting prejudice. Therefore, the court finds no basis
for relief . . . .
21. Stetler contends . . . that defense counsel was ineffective
when they failed to object to hearsay testimony of Leslie
Cook and Joyce Moss. Both Cook and Moss are [SANEs]
and testified about their respective examinations of the two
different children molested by Stetler. The court finds the
statements to fall within the hearsay exception found in
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Rule 803(4) of the Indiana Rules of Evidence and therefore
were readily admissible. Therefore, there is no basis for
relief . . . .
***
23. The court finds that the [juror question of Cook as to
whether S.G.L. had told her that Stetler had touched her
on her private parts on more than one occasion] was
objectionable.
***
26. The failure to object to the juror question did not result in
prejudice such that the outcome of the criminal trial would
be different had counsel objected. Counsel’s failure to
object was not so significant to amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Therefore, the court finds no basis
for relief . . . .
***
29. Finally, Stetler contends defense counsel failed to object
during the prosecutor’s closing argument. . . . Trial counsel
testified that they decided against objecting because it
could have resulted in the prosecutor emphasizing the
same points. Again, this was a strategic decision made by
competent trial counsel. Stetler’s trial counsel was
afforded the opportunity to address the jury as well. No
prejudice resulted from the counsel’s failure to object
during the prosecutor’s closing argument. Therefore, the
court finds no basis for relief . . . .
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Appellant’s App. p. 79-81 (some internal citations omitted). Stetler now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[10] The general rules regarding the review of a ruling on a petition for post-
conviction relief are well established:
“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden
of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).
“When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the
petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative
judgment.” Id. To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-
conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a
whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion
opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Weatherford v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the post-
conviction court in this case made findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post–Conviction
Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction
court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings
and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear
error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Ben–Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d
102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014).
[11] A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel requires a showing that: (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of
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reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s
performance prejudiced the defendant such that “‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444
(Ind. 2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “A
reasonable probability arises when there is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind.
2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “Failure to satisfy either of the two
prongs will cause the claim to fail.” Gulzar v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012). However, “[i]f we can easily dismiss an ineffective assistance
claim based upon the prejudice prong, we may do so without addressing
whether counsel's performance was deficient.” Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 80, 91
(Ind. 2011). “Indeed, most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be
resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone.” French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824
(Ind. 2002).
II. Nurse Testimony
[12] Stetler argues that his trial attorney should have objected to the testimony
provided by Nurses Cook and Moss. According to Stetler, portions of their
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay that would not have been admitted
had an objection been made.
[13] Hearsay—an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted—is generally inadmissible unless it falls under an exception. Ind.
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Evidence Rules 801(c), 802. Evidence Rule 803(4) provides an exception for a
statement that:
(A) is made by a person seeking medical diagnosis or
treatment;
(B) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical
diagnosis or treatment; and
(C) describes medical history; past or present symptoms, pain
or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.
Evid. R. 803(4). To determine if hearsay should be admitted under this
exception, we ask two questions: (1) “is the declarant motivated to provide
truthful information in order to promote diagnosis and treatment,” and (2) “is
the content of the statement such that an expert in the field would reasonably
rely on it in rendering diagnosis or treatment.” McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d
329, 331 (Ind. 1996).
[14] When a party attempts to admit hearsay under this exception and the hearsay
statements were made by a child, “we require a more robust evidentiary
foundation[.]” VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ind. 2013). Therefore,
there must be evidence that the declarant understood the professional’s role.
“This evidence does not necessarily require testimony from the child-declarant;
it may be received in the form of foundational testimony from the medical
professional detailing the interaction between him or her and the declarant,
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how he or she explained his role to the declarant, and an affirmation that the
declarant understood that role.” Id. at 261.
A. Nurse Cook
[15] With respect to Nurse Cook, Stetler focuses on her testimony that S.G.L. told
Cook that Stetler had touched her on her internal clitoral hood. According to
Stetler, “[t]his evidence was hearsay and no foundation had been laid for the
medical exception to the hearsay rule.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. Therefore, had
counsel objected, it would have been sustained, and as this evidence was the
sole evidence establishing penetration, Stetler would not have been convicted of
a class A felony.
[16] Stetler argues that the State failed to establish a sufficient foundation under
Rule 803(4) with respect to Cook’s testimony. We turn first to the first prong of
our inquiry—whether the declarant was motivated to provide truthful
information. In this case, S.G.L. was nine years old at the time, meaning that
she likely understood the need to be truthful during a medical examination. Cf.
VanPatten, 986 N.E.2d at 265 (noting that if the six-year-old victim had been
older, “the appearance of the building, the exam room, and [the nurse’s] scrubs
and job title would probably be sufficient circumstances from which to infer
that [she was] motivated to speak truthfully”). Nurse Cook testified that while
she was examining S.G.L., Cook was wearing gloves and S.G.L. was wearing a
gown. S.G.L. testified that Cook was “like a nurse or something” and that
“[s]he did an exam or something.” Tr. p. 360. We find that this evidence
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sufficiently establishes the first prong of our inquiry—that S.G.L. was
motivated to provide truthful information for the purpose of medical diagnosis
and treatment.
[17] With respect to the second prong—whether the hearsay statements were such
that an expert in the field would reasonably rely on them in rendering diagnosis
or treatment—Stetler argues that S.G.L.’s statements were obtained exclusively
in Cook’s forensic, as opposed to her diagnostic or treatment, role. This Court
has determined that statements about the nature of abuse, even if they identify
the perpetrator, can satisfy this prong of the reliability test. Steele v. State, 42
N.E.3d 138, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Therefore, in cases involving child
abuse, “courts may exercise their discretion in admitting medical diagnosis
statements which relay the identity of the perpetrator.” Id.
[18] In this case, during Cook’s head-to-toe physical examination of S.G.L., the
child had no difficulty telling the nurse what had happened, talking about some
soreness she had experienced, and stating the identity of the perpetrator. These
statements were germane to the nurse’s recommendations for diagnosis and
treatment. We find that this evidence sufficiently establishes the second prong.
[19] In sum, we find that the post-conviction court did not err by determining that
the foundation for S.G.L.’s hearsay statements to Nurse Cook had been
properly laid by the State. In other words, had an objection been raised by
Stetler’s attorneys, it would have been overruled. We find no ineffective
assistance on this basis.
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B. Nurse Moss
[20] With respect to Nurse Moss, Stetler focuses on the testimony that K.H. told
Moss that Stetler had licked S.G.L.’s privates ten times. Stetler argues that this
testimony does not fit within any exceptions to the hearsay rule and that his
attorneys’ failure to object to it “prejudiced Stetler because it was evidence of
prior misconduct which S.G.L. had not testified about and was different in
nature from the accusation S.G.L. had made.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14.
[21] We agree that this testimony was objectionable. Initially, we note that Stetler’s
attorneys would not have been able to predict that this testimony was about to
occur because it was in response to the very general question, “anything else?”
PCR Tr. p. 40. Furthermore, counsel testified that he had to make a decision
about whether to call the testimony to the trial court’s attention and ask to
admonish the jury or to refrain from commenting and hope that the jury would
not “spend too much time on it.” Id. at 41.
[22] It is well established that a failure to object does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel if the decision to remain silent was a strategic one.
Pennycuff v. State, 745 N.E.2d 804, 815 (Ind. 2001). Indeed, a defense attorney
may well pass up an opportunity to object out of a desire to avoid focusing the
jury’s attention on a particular statement. Id. In this case, that is precisely what
occurred, and the post-conviction court properly declined to second-guess
counsel’s strategic decision. We find no error on this basis.
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III. Juror Question
[23] Next, Stetler argues that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to a
jury question asking Nurse Cook if S.G.L. told her that Stetler “had touched
her on her private parts on more than one occasion.” Tr. p. 469. The post-
conviction court found that, while the question was objectionable, Stetler has
not established prejudice stemming from the lack of an objection. As noted
above, to establish prejudice, Stetler must show that, but for his attorneys’
failure to object, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different. Davidson, 763 N.E.2d at 444.
[24] Initially, we note that the jurors’ question was not specific in that it did not
distinguish between acts of touching that occurred in this incident and any acts
that may have occurred on other occasions altogether. In other words, the
question could have been an inquiry about repeated touching during this
incident. And Cook simply responded “[s]he did,” without further elaboration
or specific details. Tr. p. 469. Aside from Nurse Moss’s unresponsive remark
about K.H.’s statement, the record is devoid of questioning or testimony about
prior conduct. The State did not attempt to present evidence or argument about
ongoing acts of molestation that would have caused the jury to convict based
upon a propensity to commit sexual acts upon a child. Instead, the State
elicited from S.G.L. that she considered Stetler a friend at the time of the
assault but no longer thought of him as a friend at the time of trial because “[h]e
did that to me,” implying that this was the first time Stetler had molested her.
Tr. p. 365.
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[25] The evidence in the record strongly supported Stetler’s guilt, and this brief,
general, and isolated instance of testimony in response to the jury question was
inessential to the State’s case. Therefore, we find that the post-conviction court
did not err by finding that Stetler has not established a reasonable probability
that if his attorneys had objected to the jury question and the objection had
been sustained, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
IV. Witness Impeachment
[26] Next, Stetler argues that his attorneys should have impeached Winget’s
testimony with his prior inconsistent statements that he had made to police. In
both his police interview and trial testimony, Winget admitted to being
extremely drunk during his observations of what happened at the campfire. Tr.
p. 389-90. Consequently, counsel made a strategic determination that Winget
was an unreliable witness lacking credibility and was not worried about the jury
giving significant weight to his testimony. Moreover, counsel was “concerned”
that if Winget’s entire prior statement had been admitted, it would have been a
net negative result for Stetler. PCR Tr. p. 43. In addition to Winget being a
generally non-credible witness, “the less those little girls were on my client’s lap
with the jury, the better.” Id. In other words, Stetler’s attorneys made a
strategic decision to refrain from emphasizing this testimony for the jury
because Winget was not a reliable, credible witness. The post-conviction court
did not err by declining to second-guess this strategy.
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V. Closing Argument
[27] Finally, Stetler argues that his attorneys should have objected to certain
statements made by the State during closing arguments. The statements to
which he directs our attention are the following:
“There is no evidence to support any reason for you to disregard the
testimony of [K.H.]. None. You should not speculate. Your job is not
to find a reason to find Andy Stetler not guilty. That is not your job.
Your job is to consider the evidence presented in this cause.” Id. at 483.
“You cannot put yourselves above the experts. You should not do that.
If you do that then what you’re [sic] job is not considering the evidence,
but now your job is beginning trying [sic] to find a way to find him not
guilty.” Id. at 485.
To the extent that Stetler contends that the second statement improperly urged
the jury to credit and give weight to Cook’s testimony, we note that the jury
was correctly instructed with regard to expert testimony: “A person who has
specialized education, knowledge or experience is permitted to express an
opinion in those areas. You should evaluate this testimony as you would other
evidence in this case. You should also consider the witness’s skill, experience,
knowledge, and familiarity with the facts in this case.” Tr. p. 526.
[28] Moreover, Stetler’s attorneys made a strategic decision to address the
statements during their own closing argument rather than raising an objection
during the State’s closing argument that may not have been sustained.
Specifically, counsel argued as follows:
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The statements by the two nurses, Leslie Cook and Joyce Moss
prove any element of the crime? No. They don’t. They did their
best to provide you with the knowledge that they have. But don’t
leave your knowledge out of the equation. You guys are each
independent thinkers, who have to come together as a collective
on this matter. The only portion of their statements that is
firsthand knowledge is if they both saw no injury on either of
these girls and I understand with the nature of what they . . .
what my client is accused of, there may not have been injury to
those girls. But I want you, when you’re back in that jury room,
ask yourselves, wouldn’t that piece of evidence really have
helped and would it not have removed all reasonable doubt from
your minds.
Id. at 511-12. In other words, Stetler’s attorneys did address the statements
made by the deputy prosecutor; they merely chose to do so during their own
closing rather than objecting during the State’s argument. The post-conviction
court properly declined to second-guess this matter of strategy. Stetler’s
attorneys were zealous advocates for their client throughout the trial, and we
find no error in the post-conviction court’s conclusions that Stetler did not
establish ineffective assistance of counsel and that Stetler is not entitled to post-
conviction relief on that basis.
[29] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.
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