United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2121
JOSEPH ANGIUONI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF BILLERICA; DANIEL ROSA,
individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
John V. Siskopoulos, with whom Alexandra C. Siskopoulos and
Siskopoulos Law Firm, LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Jeremy Silverfine, with whom Deidre Brennan Regan and Brody,
Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP were on brief, for appellees.
September 23, 2016
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Joseph Angiuoni, a military
veteran, brought a claim against the Town of Billerica and Daniel
Rosa, Chief of the Billerica Police Department, under the Uniform
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), see 38
U.S.C. § 4301-4335, claiming that his status as a veteran was a
motivating factor for defendants' termination of his employment.
A jury found in favor of defendants. In this appeal, Angiuoni
argues that the district court made a series of errors in its
evidentiary rulings that warrant a new trial. We affirm.
I.
We recite the facts as the jury could have found them.
See Sinai v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471, 472 (1st Cir.
1993). Angiuoni, an Army veteran, began working as a probationary
patrol officer for the Billerica Police Department ("Department")
after graduating in 2009 from the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority Police Academy. The Department's probationary period
lasts eight weeks and is designed to determine if a new officer
will be a good fit for the Billerica force.
The Department has a Field Training Program to help
police officer trainees build on their instruction at the academy.
One component of the program is on-the-job feedback from Field
Training Officers ("FTOs"), who accompany individual trainees in
cruisers to evaluate and comment on their performance.
- 2 -
Angiuoni's FTOs observed and reported on numerous
incidents and issues with his performance. For example, early in
his field training, Angiuoni backed a cruiser into a wall while
transporting two prisoners to court. Then, on the return trip, he
shouted at a crew of prisoners cleaning up the roadside, which his
FTO, Officer McKenna, told him was inappropriate behavior.
On another occasion, Angiuoni, accompanied by FTO Moran,
made a traffic stop of a car containing two females and two males
who appeared to be in their late fifties or early sixties. When
Angiuoni told Moran that he planned to search the car for drugs
because he thought he had smelled something, Moran said he did not
smell anything and told Angiuoni not to search the car. Angiuoni
replied that he was taught at the police academy to search every
car he stopped because of the potential for drugs. Moran explained
that that was not correct, and, in that instance, finding drugs
was unlikely given the ages of the individuals.
Similarly, Angiuoni argued with Officer Moran when they
spotted a white van parked at a shopping mall with two people
apparently "making out" in the back. Angiuoni ran toward the van,
disregarding Moran's instructions, twice, not to do so. When
approached and questioned, the female in the vehicle explained
that the male was her boyfriend. Despite Moran's contrary
guidance, Moran insisted that he was taught at the police academy
- 3 -
to rush a vehicle in such circumstances because a rape could have
been happening.
Two other episodes that occurred while Officer Moran
accompanied Angiuoni similarly involved Angiuoni's ignoring
instructions or debating with Moran about what should be done.
During one exchange, after Moran explained how Angiuoni should
have handled a house alarm call differently, Angiuoni complained
that another officer who started training around the same time as
he did was being treated more favorably. Moran explained that
that officer had prior law enforcement experience in Massachusetts
and, hence, was already familiar with the responsibilities of a
police officer. Angiuoni then said he had been in Iraq, and he
knew what things were like and that people were out to get him.
In May 2009, Angiuoni took handgun and rifle tests. He
passed the handgun test, but did not qualify on the rifle test.
He was the only officer who failed the rifle test that day and the
only officer in that training cycle who did not qualify.
When Angiuoni's probationary period ended, Lieutenant
Opland, who oversees operation of the Field Training Program, did
not clear Angiuoni for patrol. The FTOs who had worked with him
reported concerns about Angiuoni's progress, demeanor, and
professionalism, and stated that he did not listen to feedback,
had trouble taking instructions, and became argumentative with
- 4 -
them. They also noted that he had difficulty with simple tasks,
such as writing reports and radio communications.
Lieutenant Opland met with Angiuoni to review the Report
of Deficiencies and to discuss the extension of his probation and
training. The Report noted, among other things, that Angiuoni
needed to work on proper radio operation and communication, and on
preparing police reports; that he needed to become familiar with
the town and its streets; that he did not qualify ("DNQ") on the
rifle test and needed more training; and that he was involved in
an accident with the cruiser. Despite the negative feedback,
Lieutenant Opland and Chief Rosa decided to extend Angiuoni's
probationary period and provide him with further field training.
At about the same time, in June 2009, a rumor circulated
at the Department regarding layoffs due to budgetary cuts.
Angiuoni told Officer Moran that the FTOs were out to get him
because of the possible layoffs. According to Angiuoni, Officer
Moran said during this conversation that layoffs would be more
dangerous to him, i.e., Moran, than to Angiuoni because Moran was
not a veteran. According to defendants, however, Moran explained
to Angiuoni that, if any FTOs were to be laid off, it would be him
(Moran) since he was the most junior FTO, that Chief Rosa would
have to lay off about one-sixth of the Department to even reach
Moran, and that any layoff was unlikely. No layoffs occurred.
- 5 -
During Angiuoni's extended probationary period, between
June and November 2009, the problems identified in his Report of
Deficiencies persisted. On numerous occasions, Angiuoni either
confused the address to which he was dispatched or could not find
the location, despite having the correct address. In one instance
involving a high-stress police situation, Angiuoni was twenty
minutes late to the scene because he had gotten lost. He blamed
a fellow officer for his delayed arrival, telling his superior
that his colleague had given him the wrong directions even though
the colleague had in fact helped him find the location.
Other performance issues also arose. For example, his
FTO observed Angiuoni set up a radar device at a sharp curve in a
road, despite having been told that that spot was not a good
location for radar. On another occasion, an administrative
complaint was filed based on Angiuoni's conduct during a traffic
stop of a young female driver. The complaint alleged that Angiuoni
had sworn at the driver and made derogatory comments about her
relative who worked at the local sheriff's office.
In November 2009, after meeting with Angiuoni to discuss
the continuing issues with his performance, Chief Rosa placed
Angiuoni on administrative leave pending a hearing with the Town
Manager. A few days later, Rosa met again with Angiuoni at the
request of the police union president to go over the problems with
his performance. During that conversation, Angiuoni complained
- 6 -
about his FTOs and stated, in particular, that Officer Moran had
said that veterans should not get special treatment.
In a written report presented to the Town Manager, Chief
Rosa outlined areas of concern regarding Angiuoni's performance,
including: lack of self-initiative on patrol; poor radio
communications (procedure and etiquette); lack of knowledge of
town streets, which interfered with his ability to respond to calls
in a timely manner; failure to follow protocol regarding officer
safety; lack of situational awareness; poor quality and accuracy
of police and accident reports; citizen complaint regarding his
handling of a traffic stop; and a DNQ on the rifle test. The
report also noted that Angiuoni lacked the "ability to take
responsibility for his own actions or take any constructive
criticism during his training phase," and that he did not make
adequate progress during the extended probationary period despite
being informed of his issues in June. Following Chief Rosa's
presentation, the Town Manager terminated Angiuoni's employment.
Angiuoni subsequently filed this action against the Town
of Billerica and Chief Rosa, claiming, inter alia, that defendants
terminated his employment "due to [his] military service," in
violation of the USERRA. In a pretrial motion, Angiuoni asked the
court to exclude evidence of the number of veterans in the
Department for lack of probative value, stating, "[t]here is no
allegation that . . . [defendants] harbored discriminatory animus
- 7 -
against veterans in general." In response, defendants argued that
such evidence was relevant because Angiuoni had alleged in his
amended complaint that defendants "expressed a strong antagonism
towards veterans," and that there was a "general bias against
veterans" in the Department. The district court denied the motion
without prejudice, thereby permitting Angiuoni to renew the motion
during the trial.
The case proceeded to trial in September 2014. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of defendants, finding that Angiuoni
had not shown that his veteran status was a substantial or
motivating factor in defendants' decision to terminate him. The
district court entered judgment, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Angiuoni identifies three evidentiary errors
that he argues warrant a retrial. First, he asserts that the
district court erred in excluding evidence of a rifle test that he
took after his termination from the Department, which he claims
would have rebutted the results of the rifle test that he had
failed during his training. Second, he claims that the court
failed to sequester witnesses in violation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 615. Finally, he argues that the court improperly
admitted prejudicial and inflammatory evidence on the number of
veterans at the Department.
- 8 -
II.
USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating on the
basis of military service. The operative provision, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311, states, inter alia, that a person who "has
performed[] . . . service in a uniformed service shall not be
denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment,
promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis
of [the military service]." Id. § 4311(a). An employee making a
discrimination claim under USERRA bears the initial burden of
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee's
military status was "at least a motivating or substantial factor"
in the adverse employment action. Valázquez-García v. Horizon
Lines of P.R., 473 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Sheehan
v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Such
discriminatory intent or motivation may be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence, which includes, among others,
"inconsistencies between the proffered reason and other actions of
the employer, an employer's hostility towards members protected by
the statute together with knowledge of the employee's military
activity, and disparate treatment of certain employees compared to
other employees with similar work records or offenses." Sheehan,
240 F.3d at 1014. If the plaintiff meets this initial requirement,
the burden shifts to the employer, who must then "prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the action would have been
- 9 -
taken despite the protected status." Velázquez-García, 473 F.3d
at 17 (quoting Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014); see 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311(c)(1).
With this background in mind, we address each of
Angiuoni's evidentiary claims.
A. Rifle Test Evidence
On the third day of trial, Angiuoni's counsel tried to
show the jury a physical exhibit containing the results of a rifle
test that Anguioni took after his termination. Specifically, the
exhibit was an unmarked and unidentified picture of a bullseye
with multiple shots in the middle. Defense counsel objected. In
a sidebar conversation with counsel for both parties, the district
court judge asked why the evidence was relevant. Angiuoni's
counsel said it would show that Angiuoni's failure on the May 2009
rifle test was likely attributable to a faulty rifle. Defense
counsel argued that the issue at trial was whether Angiuoni failed
the rifle test during his employment. His rifle skills following
his termination were irrelevant. The court sustained the
objection.
The parties dispute whether Angiuoni waived this claim
of error by failing to make an offer of proof or mark the exhibit
for identification in the trial proceedings. We need not -- and
hence do not -- address the waiver issue because we reject
Angiuoni's claim on the merits. See, e.g., Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco,
- 10 -
556 F.3d 53, 68 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[B]ecause we easily reject
petitioner's claim on the merits, we need not resolve this dispute
[regarding waiver].").
We afford trial courts "a wide berth in respect to
regulating the scope of rebuttal testimony." United States v.
Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976) ("Within limits, the
[trial] judge may control the scope of rebuttal
testimony, . . . [and] may refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive,
or irrelevant testimony . . . ."). Indeed, while "[r]ebuttal
evidence may be introduced to explain, repel, contradict or
disprove an adversary's proof," its "admissibility is a matter for
the trial court's discretion." United States v. Laboy, 909 F.2d
581, 588 (1st Cir. 1990). The wide latitude afforded to trial
courts extends to "determining whether proposed evidence is proper
rebuttal."1 United States v. Thuna, 786 F.2d 437, 444 (1st Cir.
1986); see also United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 760
(1st Cir. 1978).
1 Hence, we reject Angiuoni's argument that de novo review
should apply because rebuttal evidence is admissible as a matter
of right. As we noted above, his underlying assertion is
incorrect. See Laboy, 909 F.2d at 588. Moreover, the argument
misses the point because the district court decided that the
evidence that Angiuoni sought to introduce was irrelevant (and
thus did not constitute rebuttal evidence), not that Angiuoni could
not present rebuttal evidence.
- 11 -
We find no such abuse of discretion here. Most
critically, even if we were to assume that the exhibit that
Angiuoni sought to present to the jury -- an unidentified picture
of a bullseye -- was the result of Angiuoni's rifle test, it is
undisputed that the test occurred after his termination from the
Department. Hence, at best, the evidence has limited relevance to
the question of whether defendants improperly relied on the result
of Angiuoni's May 2009 rifle test to evaluate his fitness to be a
police officer. Relatedly, we do not see how the subsequent test
could have conclusively rebutted the result of Angiuoni's May 2009
rifle test, especially when various officers testified at trial
that they shot with the same fully inspected rifle on the same day
without any problems.
Additionally, Angiuoni's DNQ on the rifle test was only
one issue among many that defendants considered in evaluating his
suitability for police work. Even if the subsequent rifle test
could help demonstrate that Angiuoni's failure in May 2009 does
not fairly portray his rifle skills, the probative value of the
evidence for his discrimination claim would be low. In sum, it
was well within the district court's ample discretion to deny
admission of Angiuoni's rifle test evidence.
B. Sequestration of Witnesses
Angiuoni also argues that the district court's failure
to sequester witnesses violated Federal Rule of Evidence 615. Rule
- 12 -
615 provides that, "[a]t a party's request, the court must order
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses'
testimony. Or the court may do so on its own." Fed. R. Evid.
615 (emphasis added). Here, however, Angiuoni never asked for
sequestration. On the first day of trial, the following exchange
took place between Angiuoni's counsel and the district court:
[Angiuoni's Counsel]: Thank you, your Honor.
A quick question beforehand. I noticed the
next witness after this witness in the
courtroom. I wasn't sure if there was any
concern, sequestration for having witnesses --
The Court: Well, if there hasn't been any
motion about sequestration, then there's no
problem.
[Angiuoni's Counsel]: The plaintiff calls
Dwayne Eidens.
While Angiuoni tries to characterize his counsel's
"question" regarding sequestration as a request, it cannot be so
construed in light of the subsequent remarks, which included
counsel remaining silent after the district court indicated that
it did not understand that any request had been made.
"Absent a request from counsel, the district court
enjoys broad discretion in determining whether or not to sequester
witnesses before their testimony." United States v. Casas, 356
F.3d 104, 126 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. De Jongh,
- 13 -
937 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991). No such abuse occurred here.2
Indeed, other than conclusory statements about how the witnesses'
presence compromised effective cross-examinations, Angiuoni has
not shown how failure to sequester witnesses was prejudicial in
this case. See United States v. Charles, 456 F.3d 249, 257 (1st
Cir. 2006) (noting that "a district court's decision on whether to
sequester a witness" will "not be questioned absent a showing of
prejudice") (citing United States v. Jewett, 520 F.2d 581, 584
(1st Cir. 1975)). If anything, the record shows that Angiuoni's
counsel himself asked witnesses during cross-examinations whether
they had been present during the testimonies of other witnesses to
help refresh their memories and elicit favorable responses. Thus,
the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to sequester
witnesses sua sponte.
C. Evidence Regarding the Number of Veterans at the Department
Finally, Angiuoni contends that the district court
abused its discretion in allowing evidence regarding the number of
veterans at the Department.3 In particular, he argues that the
2Arguably, plain error review should apply here because
Angiuoni did not object to the court's decision not to sequester
witnesses. His claim fails even under the abuse of discretion
standard, however, and thus we do not linger on the standard of
review. See United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 163 n.12
(1st Cir. 2013).
3As with the previous issues, the parties dispute whether
Angiuoni waived this contention. Because Angiuoni's claim "fails
- 14 -
evidence was highly prejudicial and inflammatory because it could
have misled the jury to believe that Angiuoni had to prove that
the Department as a whole had an anti-military bias, when, in fact,
his USERRA discrimination claim at trial was that "Officer Moran[]
held an anti-military bias against him," and that "Chief Rosa and
the Department relied on Officer Moran's biased and unfavorable
review of Angiuoni" in making a termination recommendation.
First, we disagree with Angiuoni's characterization of
his claim. In his amended complaint, Angiuoni alleged that
"certain officers and superiors in the Department, including
Plaintiff's FTO, ha[d] expressed a strong antagonism to veterans."
He then listed "[e]xamples of incidents and comments that
demonstrate [such] animus," which included conduct of officers at
the Department other than Officer Moran. Similarly, in his Answers
to Interrogatories, Angiuoni argued that there is "a general bias
against veterans" within the Department. At the least, therefore,
his own allegations made the issue of generalized bias relevant.
We also reiterate here that an employer's "expressed
hostility towards [veterans]" may be a relevant factor in
determining discriminatory motivation. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014;
see also Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 571 F.3d 511, 518 (6th Cir.
2009); Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir.
under even the less deferential abuse of discretion standard, we
decline to resolve the dispute." McDonough, 727 F.3d at 163 n.12.
- 15 -
2002). Also, courts have considered an employer's lack of general
bias or hostility towards people with military service in rejecting
a discrimination claim under the USERRA. See Becker v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 414 F. App'x 274, 277 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(considering the fact that other veterans were selected for
interviews by the employer in denying a claim that the plaintiff's
veteran status was a motivating factor in not being selected for
an interview); Burroughs v. Dep't of Army, 254 F. App'x 814, 817
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (denying a USERRA discrimination claim because,
inter alia, "there is nothing in the record to suggest anti-veteran
animus on the part of the screening committee in particular, and
the agency as a whole"). Hence, while we acknowledge, as did the
district court, that the probative value of the evidence regarding
the number of veterans at the Department is low, see Velázquez-
García, 473 F.3d at 20 (noting that "the failure to treat all
members of a class with similar discriminatory animus does not
preclude a claim by a member of that class who is so treated"), we
cannot conclude that allowing such evidence was an abuse of
discretion.
Affirmed.
- 16 -