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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-14666
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00417-MHT-SRW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DERYKE MATTHEW PFEIFER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(September 26, 2016)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Deryke Pfeifer appeals the district court’s order granting the government’s
motion to involuntarily medicate him to restore him to competency to stand trial
for his charged offense of threatening the President of the United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. Pfeifer confines his appeal entirely to the first factor
set forth by the Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180, 123 S.
Ct. 2174, 2184 (2004), specifically, he argues that the district court did not
consider the special circumstances surrounding his case when it concluded that the
Government had proven that there was an important interest in prosecuting him.
Further, he argues that the court erred when it found that Pfeifer’s liberty interest in
being free from confinement superseded his interest to be free from forcible
medication.
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s determination of the first Sell
factor. United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011). The
government bears the burden of proving the factual findings underlying the Sell
factors by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1331-32.
In Sell, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of involuntary medication to
restore competency. Two earlier cases – Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110
S. Ct. 1028 (1990), and Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) –
had established that an individual has a significant constitutionally-protected
liberty interest in “‘avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic
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drugs.’” Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2183 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 221). In Riggins, the
Court stated that only an “‘essential’ or ‘overriding’ state interest might overcome”
the constitutionally protected right. Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134). The
Court in Riggins had “suggested that, in principle, forced medication in order to
render a defendant competent to stand trial for murder was constitutionally
permissible.” Id. Ultimately the Court held that the State could have satisfied due
process if it had demonstrated that treatment was medically appropriate and
essential for the sake of Riggins’ safety or others’ safety. Id. With this
underpinning, the Court developed the four factors for courts to consider when
asked to authorize involuntary medication to restore competency. The first one is
the only at issue in this case:
First, a court must find that important
governmental interests are at stake. The Government’s
interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a
serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense
is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime
against property. In both instances the Government seeks
to protect through application of the criminal law the
basic human need for security.
Courts, however, must consider the facts of the
individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest in
prosecution. Special circumstances may lessen the
importance of that interest. The defendant’s failure to
take drugs voluntarily, for example, may mean lengthy
confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and
that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to
freeing without punishment one who has committed a
serious crime. We do not mean to suggest that civil
commitment is a substitute for a criminal trial. The
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Government has a substantial interest in timely
prosecution. And it may be difficult or impossible to try a
defendant who regains competence after years of
commitment during which memories may fade and
evidence may be lost. The potential for future
confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the
strength of the need for prosecution. The same is true of
the possibility that the defendant has already been
confined for a significant amount of time (for which he
would receive credit toward any sentence ultimately
imposed, see 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)). Moreover, the
Government has a concomitant, constitutionally essential
interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair one.
123 S. Ct. at 2184 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The district court here determined that the Government had an important
interest in bringing Pfeifer to trial. The court acknowledged Pfeifer’s 14-month
stay in prison, which amounted to a “sizeable portion of his expected sentence.”
Order at 16. And it recognized that Pfeifer would likely be institutionalized
indefinitely. Id. After reciting Pfeifer’s charged and uncharged offenses – which
included threats to other governmental entities and assaults on family members –
the court concluded that Pfeifer’s conduct “upset ‘the basic human need for
security’ of those he threatened.” Id. at 17 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180). The
court concluded that the Government’s interest in prosecuting Pfeifer is not only
for protection of the president but to uphold the integrity of our system of
government. Id. (citing United States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2014)).
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Contrary to Pfeifer’s arguments, the district court did not ignore the special
circumstances of his case. Pfeifer identifies as those special circumstances the
possibility of civil commitment, his mental state at the time of the offense, time
served, and likely sentence. The district court discussed all of those circumstances
but determined that the Government’s interest in proceeding to trial outweighed
those factors and we agree. While it is true that Pfeifer will likely be
institutionalized for a lengthy period, if not indefinitely, his violent actions were
serious and numerous. In addition, it is unlikely that Pfeifer will gain competency
on his own, and delays in prosecution only serve to make the process less efficient
or fair. The Government has met its burden of showing an important interest in
medicating Pfeifer.
AFFIRMED
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