UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4597
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEYON D. NELSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:08-cr-00200-HEH-1)
Submitted: August 25, 2016 Decided: September 26, 2016
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Olivia L. Norman, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Keyon D. Nelson appeals the district court’s order
sentencing him to 30 months’ imprisonment upon revocation of his
supervised release. Nelson contends that his sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised
release to determine whether they “fall[] outside the statutory
maximum” or are “plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). “We first decide
whether the sentence is unreasonable[,] . . . follow[ing]
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we
employ in [our] review of original sentences . . . .” United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “Only if a
revocation sentence is unreasonable must we assess whether it is
plainly so.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court considered the policy statements in Chapter Seven
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the applicable 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373; see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). The court must provide an adequate
statement of reasons for the revocation sentence it imposes, but
this statement need not be as specific or as detailed as that
required in imposing an original sentence. United States v.
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Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010); see United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[M]ere reference to
[factors omitted from § 3583(e)] does not render a revocation
sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are
relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated
§ 3553(a) factors.”). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the court stated a proper basis for concluding
that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 440; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e). However,
“the sentencing court retains broad discretion to . . . impose a
term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Padgett, 788
F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record reveals no procedural or
substantive error by the district court. The court’s passing
reference to the need to provide just punishment, in the context
of the court’s reasoning as a whole, does not render the
sentence plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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