United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit December 20, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-40404
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
VERSUS
JUAN LOZANO
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas, McAllen
#00-CR-439-1
Before JOLLY, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS:*
In this direct criminal appeal, Lozano challenges his
conviction on a number of grounds. We find no error and affirm.
I.
A number of law enforcement agencies, organized into a task
force, conducted a four-year investigation of a drug organization
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
that was transporting cocaine and marijuana from the Rio Grande
Valley in Texas to other parts of the United States. The
investigation revealed that Juan Lozano, residing primarily in
Mexico (though apparently never observed traveling to or from
Mexico), organized and operated the drug organization from as early
as 1995 and employed many people to transport large quantities of
drugs -- and to distribute them to other drug-trafficking
organizations, the participants of which were separately
prosecuted.
In August 2000, Lozano, along with co-defendants Marivel
Lozano (his wife), Rumaldo Lozano (his brother-in-law), and Ray
Perez were indicted on various drug-related charges. Lozano was
charged with 17 counts: Count One charged conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine (Counts
Four and Six through Eight charged the underlying substantive
offenses); Count Two charged conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute over 1,000 kilograms of marijuana (Counts Five, Ten, and
Fifteen through Eighteen charged the underlying substantive
offenses); Count Three charged conspiracy to commit money-
laundering (Counts Eleven through Fourteen charged the underlying
substantive offenses).
Juan Lozano was tried with his co-defendants listed above.
During trial, the Government offered the testimony of about 65
witnesses, some of whom had dealt directly with Lozano and others
who had never heard of Lozano or spoken to him. On the fourth day
2
of trial, Perez changed his plea to guilty and ultimately testified
against Lozano. After the Government rested its case, the district
court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal as to Lozano’s
wife. After a full 18-day trial, during which the court denied
Lozano’s properly preserved motions for a judgment of acquittal,
the jury acquitted Lozano’s brother-in-law of the two counts in
which he was charged, but convicted Lozano on all counts.
Several months later, the district court sentenced Lozano to:
life imprisonment for Counts One, Two, Four, Six, Seven, and Eight
(the cocaine offenses); 40 years imprisonment for Counts Five, Ten,
Fifteen, Sixteen, and Seventeen (the marijuana offenses); and 20
years imprisonment for Counts Three, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and
Fourteen (the money-laundering offenses); a $25,000 fine, and a
$1,700 assessment. Lozano timely appealed his conviction and
raises a number of issues which we discuss below.
II.
A.
Lozano argues first that the magistrate judge erred in
refusing to order the Government to disclose “reports” compiled
from wire taps and witness interviews during his detention hearing.
The Jencks Act requires the Government to produce any
"relevant and competent reports and statements in the possession of
the Government touching the events and activities as to which a
Government witness has testified at the trial." Goldberg v. United
States, 425 U.S. 94, 104 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 3500(b). The magistrate
3
judge concluded that the “reports” were not “statements” the
Government was required to disclose under the Jencks Act. 18
U.S.C. §3500.
The Government argues that Lozano’s claim is moot now that he
stands convicted. That is, the granting of bail would not have
affected the outcome of the trial, and Lozano has no “current
cognizable interest” in the resolution of the report disclosure
issue. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982). In
Murphy, the Eighth Circuit, in an appeal of the detention order
that was decided after the defendant had been convicted, found that
the defendant had been wrongfully denied bail. The Supreme Court
held, however, that the claim at issue was no longer live, and that
the defendant “lack[ed] a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Id. Murphy controls the resolution of this issue. Now
that Lozano has been convicted, his claim that he was wrongfully
denied Jencks Act material is no longer a live issue and does not
serve as a basis for disturbing the conviction.
B.
Lozano argues next that the district court abused its
discretion by disqualifying his first and second defense counsel
based on conflicts of interest.
In January 2001, two days after Jose “Bobby” Flores filed a
notice of appearance as Lozano’s (first) counsel, the Government
moved to disqualify Flores, alleging a conflict of interest because
of Flores’s previous representation of Lozano’s co-defendant Perez.
4
The magistrate judge observed that the previous drug trafficking
charges had been dismissed and were incorporated into the present
case as part of the overall conspiracy. Flores claimed not to have
learned anything about Lozano from Perez and Lozano and Perez
signed a waiver of any conflict, which the magistrate accepted and
denied the Government’s motion.
Two months later, the Government filed a sealed motion to
disqualify and requested reconsideration of the conflict issue,
arguing that Flores was now an unindicted co-conspirator in the
case. At the conflict hearing, several FBI agents testified as to
wire intercepts and surveillance that revealed connections between
Flores and others in the drug conspiracy. The magistrate again
advised Lozano of the potential conflict, which Lozano again
waived. The magistrate concluded that it would be inappropriate to
allow Flores to continue representing Lozano, citing the integrity
of the judicial system and based on “appearances and potential for
problems in this criminal proceeding as it goes forward,” and
disqualified him in a written order dated June 11.
Lozano then retained Jack Pytel and Robert Berg. At a
pretrial hearing on August 20, the district court questioned
Flores’s apparent continued involvement in the case. The marshals
verified that Flores had discussed a plea offer with Lozano, and
Flores apparently acknowledged that he was back on the case at the
request of Lozano’s family. The court also inquired about any
connections between Flores and Lozano’s new counsel. Berg
5
acknowledged that Flores had first contacted him about representing
Lozano should Flores be disqualified, while Lozano had apparently
hired Pytel directly. Berg claimed to have had no substantive
discussions with Flores after being hired, but that Flores had
offered to let Berg use his offices, and he did so “just to meet”
with Flores. The court advised Lozano of this serious potential
conflict, which Lozano again attempted to waive.
During a recess, Berg informed the Government that he had
previously represented Flores on a motion to quash a grand jury
subpoena. He also stated that he might call Flores as a witness in
this case, but claimed that Pytel would examine Flores. Flores
waived any attorney-client privilege he had with Berg. It was also
revealed that Berg had been paid for this case directly by Flores,
with the “understanding” that the money came from Lozano’s sister.
The payment was in cash, but Berg did not know how much money he
had received because he “had not counted it yet” and had not filed
any documents reporting the transaction. At Lozano’s request, the
court appointed Micaela Alvarez to discuss these conflicts with
him.
The court reconvened on September 20 and decided that, in the
light of the questionable connections between Flores and Berg, and
of Pytel being able to represent Lozano with no apparent conflicts,
Berg’s potential conflicts were too great. Despite Lozano’s desire
to continue with Berg as counsel, the court deemed the conflict not
waiveable and disqualified Berg.
6
This court reviews a district court’s disqualification of a
defense attorney for conflict of interest for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Millsaps, 157 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1998). The
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel and a “correlative right to representation
free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,
271 (1981).2 An actual conflict exists when “defense counsel is
compelled to compromise his or her duty of loyalty or zealous
advocacy to the accused by choosing between or blending the
divergent or competing interests of a former or current client.”
Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
Srickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
Should a defendant desire to waive the conflict, the trial
court must establish a knowing, voluntary waiver. United States v.
Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1975). In determining the
validity of a waiver, the district court is afforded “substantial
latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only if
an actual conflict is demonstrated, but in cases where a potential
for conflict exists which may result in an actual conflict as the
trial progresses.” United States v. Vasquez, 995 F.2d 40, 45 (5th
2
The right to assistance of counsel does not guarantee that
a defendant will be represented by a particular attorney. Caplin
& Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). Although
there is a presumption in favor of a defendant’s counsel of
choice, that presumption may be overcome by the existence of an
actual conflict or by evidence of a serious potential for
conflict. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
7
Cir. 1993) (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163).3 The court must also
evaluate the potential effect on the integrity of the judicial
system. United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 870 (5th Cir.
1998); United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 511 (5th Cir. 1995).
Lozano argues that for an actual conflict claim to prevail on
appeal, one’s lawyer must have been operating under an actual
conflict which adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. The
Government properly points out that the actual and/or potential
conflicts of interest in this case only begin with the conflicts
raised by prior representations and extend to almost every
conceivable conflict of interest problem. First, the conflicted
counsel potentially has privileged information unavailable to non-
conflicted counsel. Moreover, certain evidence indicated that
Flores was an indictable co-conspirator, and was advising other co-
conspirators on how to avoid detection and prosecution. Indeed,
Flores was as much a potential witness as a potential co-defendant.
And Berg’s connections to and dealings with Flores suggest that
Berg’s representation was simply a “pseudo-representation” by
Flores. The fact that Flores remained involved in the case after
his disqualification further tainted Berg’s representation.
In sum, the district court properly observed the potential
3
An accused’s right to waive conflict-free representation is
not absolute. See, e.g., United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782,
791 (5th Cir. 1996) (district court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing waiver to permit multiple representation of
defendants).
8
pitfalls during the upcoming trial and the threats to the integrity
of the judicial process inherent in Flores’s and Berg’s continued
representation of Lozano in the case. The court did not abuse its
discretion in disqualifying them.
C.
Lozano argues next that the indictment does not sufficiently
allege a money laundering conspiracy offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §1956(h).
We review de novo the issue of whether an indictment
sufficiently alleges all elements of an offense. United States v.
Biegnaowski, 313 F.3d 264, 285 (5th Cir. 2002). The substantive
offense of money laundering is set forth in §1956(a). A separate
subsection states that “any person who conspires to commit any
offense defined in this section . . . shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). One
of the elements of the substantive offense of money laundering is
that the defendant knew that the property used in a financial
transaction represented unlawful activity. Lozano contends that
the indictment failed to allege this essential element of the
conspiracy offense with which he was charged.
Lozano’s argument fails for a number of reasons. First, count
3 of the indictment charged the defendants with “knowing that the
transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal and
9
disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of
the proceeds of such specified unlawful activity, and that while
conducting and attempting to conduct such a financial transaction,
that the property involved in the financial transactions . . .
represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).” Lozano seems to argue that
Count 3 fails to allege Lozano’s knowledge that the property used
in the financial transaction represented unlawful activity because
he is not listed in the “overt acts” as having such knowledge. The
above quoted portion of the allegations of Count 3 of the
indictment adequately alleges Lozano’s knowledge that the property
involved in the financial transactions represented the proceeds of
unlawful activity.
Moreover, because Lozano is charged with conspiracy to commit
money laundering under § 1956(h), the knowledge element Lozano
claims is missing from the indictment is not even an element of the
crime. See Threadgill, 172 F.3d at 366-67. In Threadgill, we
held that charging the defendant with conspiracy to commit money
laundering was sufficient to apprise a defendant of the charged
crime without requiring the inclusion of the elements of the
substantive crime. For these reason, we conclude that Count 3 of
the indictment adequately charged Lozano with money laundering
conspiracy under § 1956(h).
D.
Lozano argues next that the district court erred by allowing
10
the Spanish speaking jury to hear and consider tapes of Lozano’s
conversations in Spanish. The district court admitted into
evidence tapes of several conversations in which Lozano
participated that were conducted in Spanish. All the jurors stated
that they spoke and understood Spanish. The court informed all
parties that English transcripts of the tapes would also be
admitted, but only as aids–-the tapes controlled in the event of a
discrepancy. The court also invited the defendants to submit their
own competing English transcripts. The court then admitted both
the Spanish tapes and the English transcripts. The Spanish tapes
were played in open court and the jurors had the English
transcripts available to read as they were listening to the tapes.
Lozano argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted into evidence recordings that were in a language
other than English. He contends that such evidence allowed the
jurors to impose their own translation of colloquial expressions,
particularly with respect to “Valley Spanish.” Lozano suggests
that the English transcript should have been the primary source of
evidence and not the Spanish tapes.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 661
(5th Cir. 2002). However, as in this case where the defendant
failed to object at trial, we review for plain error. United
States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995), citing United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). To prevail under this
11
standard, the appellant must show an error that was plain, that
affected his substantial rights and that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
The Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864, requires that court
proceedings in United States federal courts be conducted in
English. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d at 4. However, tapes of
recorded conversations are not “testimony” but are admitted in
evidence as exhibits. This is true whether the taped conversations
are in English or some other language. Id. At 7. The law is also
clear that the tape recording itself constitutes the best evidence
and that a transcript of that tape is used as an aid to understand
the tape. United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 480 (7th Cir.
1977).
Lozano relies upon United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 1189
(5th Cir. 1992), where this court affirmed the exclusion of taped
conversations which took place in Spanish. That case is readily
distinguishable. In Valencia, only two of the jurors spoke Spanish
and both parties stipulated to the accuracy of the English
transcripts of the tapes. In the instant case, however, all of the
jurors spoke Spanish and the parties did not stipulate to the
accuracy of the English translation. Furthermore, because the
English translation was admitted into evidence, the jurors had
available to them the English translation of each tape as it was
played and had available both the tape and the English translation
12
in the jury room. In the light of these facts, we are satisfied
that the district court committed no plain error in allowing the
jurors to hear the Spanish tapes.
E.
Lozano argues next that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions for conspiracy to commit money laundering
and the substantive offense. This court reviews challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 247, 254 (5th Cir. 2000).
“The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable
constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Cano-Guel, 167
F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1999). If the evidence supports equally or
gives nearly equal circumstantial support to theories of guilt and
innocence, this Court will reverse because, under these
circumstances, the jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173
(5th Cir. 1992).
The elements of a conspiracy to commit money laundering are:
(l) that there was an agreement between two or more persons to
commit money laundering, and (2) that the defendant joined the
agreement knowing its purpose and with the intent to further the
13
illegal purpose. United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 573 (5th
Cir. 2000).
To establish the substantive offense of money laundering under
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the Government must show the
defendant “(1) knowingly conducted a financial transaction; (2)
which involved the proceeds of an unlawful activity; and (3) with
the intent to promote or further unlawful activity.” United States
v. Dovalina, 262 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 2002).
For purposes of § 1956, a financial transaction can be
established by evidence that cash proceeds from drug trafficking
are given to the care and possession of another. United States v.
Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 160-161 (5th Cir. 1998). To satisfy
the promotion element of a money laundering conviction, the
Government must show that a defendant conducted the financial
transaction in question with the specific intent of promoting the
specified unlawful, activity. United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d
221, 226 (5th Cir. 2002). Payment to co-conspirators for their
participation in the conspiracy for the purpose of continuing the
unlawful activity amounts to “promoting the carrying on of the
unlawful activity.” United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 378 (5th
Cir. 2001).
The Government produced substantial evidence to support
Lozano’s conviction for conspiracy to launder money. Multiple
witnesses place Lozano in charge of the drug organization: Casas
transported drugs, called Lozano if there was trouble with a
14
shipment, and verified that attorney Flores was on standby to
provide legal advice. Multiple phone intercepts established that
proven drug traffickers had close ties to Lozano and that they
purchased a trailer used to transport drugs with a large cash
payment. The Government produced evidence that members of the
Lozano organization transported drugs and then would receive large
cash payments for transport back to Lozano back in Texas. This
evidence established the existence of an agreement to conduct
financial transactions that promoted the drug trafficking
enterprise as well as Lozano’s knowledge and voluntary
participation in that enterprise. The jury was entitled to reject
Lozano’s evidence that his large cash purchases for property
vehicles, horses, furniture and other items were made from
legitimate income.
With respect to the substantive offenses of money laundering,
various witnesses testified as to the drug related financial
transactions pertaining to each count. Testimony and wire
intercepts established that Lozano asked certain underlings to
bring him drug proceeds on February 28, 2000. (Count 11) Testimony
and wire intercepts established drug related financial transactions
by Lozano’s co-conspirators on March 8 (Count 12), March 13 (Count
13) and March 22, 2002 (Count 14). See United States v. Garcia,
917 F.2d 1370, 1377 (5th Cir. 1990)(party to a conspiracy may be
held responsible for a substantive offense committed by a co-
conspirator even if that party has no knowledge of that particular
15
substantive offense).
Our review of the record persuades us that the Government
produced substantial evidence that would permit a rational trier of
fact to find Lozano guilty of both the conspiracy and substantive
money laundering counts.
F.
In Lozano’s final assignment of error, he argues that the
district court abused its discretion by interfering with his cross-
examination of certain witnesses, thereby depriving him of a fair
trial. Lozano’s brief points to dozens of instances in the record
where the district court interrupted his trial counsel during
cross-examination of the Government’s witnesses.4 Lozano argues
that the district court’s actions created the appearance that the
district court sided with the Government and lead the jury to
presume guilt. Lozano further argues that the district court’s
multiple statements to the jury explaining its impartiality were
insufficient to cure the constitutional error.
This court reviews a district court’s examination of witnesses
and involvement in a trial for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court
has wide discretion over the “tone and tempo” of a trial and may
elicit information from a witnesses if he believes it would benefit
4
Lozano complains of the court’s questioning of Jorge
Casas, Angel “Chago” Vela, Sergio Guerra, Ruben Vasquez, Jr.,
Mario Martinez Alejos, and FBI Agents Ernesto Cruz and Jorge
Velasco.
16
the jury. United States v. Saenz, 134 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 1998).
In reviewing a claim of partiality by a district judge, we must
“determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it
denied the [defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.”
United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1086 (5th Cir. 1987). To
make this determination, we must consider the district court’s
actions as a whole, considering factors such as context, frequency,
and the presence of curative instructions. United States v. Lance,
853 F.2d 1177, 1182 (5th Cir. 1988).
Lozano, in his brief to this court, details literally dozens
of instances where the district court questioned witnesses and made
comments during Lozano’s cross-examination of Government witnesses.
Considered out of context, these numbers appear troubling; however,
when we consider the fact that this trial lasted 18 days and the
Government presented 65 witnesses, the number of interruptions by
the district court is not unreasonable on its face. The need for
a trial court to question witnesses and clarify testimony is
proportionate to the length of a trial and number of witnesses
presented. Id. at 703; Williams, 809 F.2d at 1087.
Turning to the content of the district court’s actions, a
thorough review of the record reveals that several of the district
court’s actions have been mischaracterized by Lozano in this
appeal.5 The record also reveals that many of the interruptions
5
For example, Lozano argues that the district court
interrupted his trial counsel and called him to the bench just as
17
were aimed at remedying the often repetitive questioning by
Lozano’s attorney’s.6 Interruptions of this type become more
“he was about to gain a concession” from the witness regarding
the fact that he had not mentioned [the defendant] to the agent
with whom he was cooperating before he was arrested.”
Appellant’s Brief, p. 25. The record clearly reveals that it was
Lozano’s counsel, not the district court, who requested
permission to approach the bench in order to inform the district
court that he intended to use documents not in evidence. And,
naturally, when the Government expressed concern over the
genuineness of the documents the district court reminded the
Government that they would have a chance to voir dire before the
documents were used. See R. Vol. 28, p. 82-84.
6
For example, Lozano lists the following interruption as
problematic. Here, Lozano’s counsel questions Jorge Casas on
cross and attempts to establish that he is not trustworthy:
Q: Now, Mr. Casas, you have told a lot of lies in your
lifetime, haven’t you?
A: Yes.
Q: You have lied to the DEA agents, right?
A: Yes.
Q: As a matter of fact, when you became an informant, you
signed a contract with the Drug Enforcement Administration,
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And as part of that contract, was that you not lie,
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Yet, you lied to them, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Further, that you were not to be engaged in any drug
trafficking while you were an informant, yet, you went and
ventured on your own drug business while you were an
informant, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You also lied to other drug dealers, your co-workers or
employees or cohorts, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You have asked other people to lie, such as, your wife
and your mother-in-law, correct?
A: My ex-mother-in-law and my ex-wife.
Q: And you have asked them to lie when the only one that
would benefit form the lie would be you, correct?
18
justified as the length of a trial increases. Saenz, 134 F.3d at
704-05; United States v. Adkins, 741 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1984).
The record further reveals that many of the Government’s witnesses
spoke very little English and needed the assistance of an
interpreter. These language difficulties sometimes required the
district court to ask questions to clarify the witnesses earlier
A: Yes.
Q: When I say “lie,” Mr. Casas, you instructed them,
actually, to commit perjury, to commit--to say--to tell a
lie under oath, correct?
A: I don’t understand. How is that?
Q: Pardon me. I’m sorry. If they were asked to come in an
testify under oath, you instructed them to lie for you,
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And your involvement, with respect to drug dealing, you
have also threatened people, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And it appears as though, Mr. Casas, that every time you
have a problem, that is, you’re caught in a crime, you
decide to join forces with law enforcement against other
people, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Now, you have admitted that you have lied to DEA
agents under oath, other drug dealers, asked people to lie
for you and that’s the truth, is it not?
A: Yes.
Q: You’ve also had, for example, in your possession a
driver’s license that had your photo, yet somebody else’s
name; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you’ve admitted to telling big lies, huge lies,
correct?
THE COURT: How many times are we going to ask the same
question, Mr. Pytel? I think he as made an admission here.
I don’t think we need to be repetitive here.
19
testimony.7 In addition, the district court was sometimes required
to interject and correct the interpreter.8 Where a witness’s
testimony is confusing or misinterpreted, a court is certainly
justified in interjecting for the sake of clarity and correctness.
Saenz, 134 F.3d at 704; United States v. Adkins, 741 F.2d 744, 748
(5th Cir. 1984). The record also reveals that on some occasions
7
For example, on direct examination Sergio Guerra testified
that he had spoken directly with Lozano about hiding a shipment
of marijuana. R. Vol. 31 at 107-108. On cross examination,
however, Sergio Guerra and Lozano’s counsel had the following
exchange:
Q: Has [Lozano] been involved in the drug business? Ever
been involved in the drug business?
A: Not that I know of, but people have tell me.
* * *
THE COURT: And your testimony, you’re also saying that you
also had a conversation yourself with Mr. Lozano, or are
your taking that testimony back?
THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You said you had a conversation with Mr. Lozano
about some marijuana.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Or is that not true?
THE WITNESS: That is true.
THE COURT: Ok, go ahead.
R. Vol. 31 at 124-125.
8
During the cross-examination of Angel Vela:
Q: And it was seven months later, in March of this year that
you first met with the FBI agents about your involvement?
THE COURT (to the interpreter): I don’t think it was “the
attorneys” (sic) he said. I think he meant “the FBI and law
enforcement officials” is what he said.
Repeat the question because this wasn’t interpreted
correctly.
R. Vol. 31 at 26.
20
the district court interjected because Lozano’s counsel clearly
mischaracterized a witness’s testimony.9 Finally, the record shows
that throughout the trial the district court repeatedly instructed
the jury that nothing he said or did was to be considered as an
endorsement of either party.
We have reviewed all of the passages in the record relied upon
by Lozano in support of his claims that the district court unduly
interjected itself into the trial to Lozano’s prejudice. We
conclude that the district court had solid grounds for its comments
and questions as discussed above, and thus the district court’s
comments and questions did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
9
For example, on cross-examination of Jorge Casas:
Q: Now, what has happened to all this money that you have
made, Mr. Casas, throughout the years?
A: I’ve made investments.
Q: Such as?
A: The hotel. The shops I have in Mexico.
Q: What else?
A: I’ve bought real estate.
Q: In the United States or in Mexico?
A: In Mexico and here.
Q: Where do you have property here?
A: Right now, I don’t have any.
Q: So that’s a lie?
* * *
MS. PROFIT (Government): Your Honor, I’m going to object.
That–
* * *
THE COURT: I mean, it’s a mischaracterization to say “that’s
a lie.” He didn’t say that he owned it right now. He said
he has invested in property and so that is a
mischaracterization and that’s a proper [objection].
R. Vol. 28 at 47-48
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III.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Lozano’s
assignments of error are without merit. The judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED
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