ACCEPTED
12-14-00229-cr
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
1/14/2015 8:37:47 PM
CATHY LUSK
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
TYLER, TEXAS 1/14/2015 8:37:47 PM
CATHY S. LUSK
Clerk
BLAKE CARRINGTON GEE, §
APPELLANT §
§
RECEIVED IN
VS. § APPEAL NO.12th
12-14-00229-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
§ TYLER, TEXAS
1/14/2015 8:37:47 PM
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
CATHY S. LUSK
APPELLEE § Clerk
ANDERS BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE 241st JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS, CAUSE NO. 241-1861-13
THE HONORABLE JACK SKEEN, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
L. Charles van Cleef
State Bar No. 00786305
P.O. Box 2432
Longview, Texas 75606-2432
903-248-8244 Telephone
903-248-8249 Facsimile
charles@vancleef.pro
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................... - 2 -
II. IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .............................................. - 3 -
III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... - 4 -
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................... - 5 -
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................... - 6 -
A. Procedural History .................................................................................... - 6 -
B. Trial Proceedings and Evidence ............................................................... - 6 -
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................ - 13 -
VII. ISSUE RESTATED................................................................................... - 13 -
THE UNDERSIGNED FINDS NO LEGALLY OR FACTUALLY NON-
FRIVOLOUS GROUNDS FOR APPEAL. ........................................................ - 13 -
A. Summary of the Argument ..................................................................... - 13 -
B. Argument And Discussion ..................................................................... - 13 -
C. Jurisdiction and General Due Process .................................................... - 14 -
D. Pretrial Motions ...................................................................................... - 15 -
E. Jury Selection ......................................................................................... - 16 -
F. Guilt/innocence Phase ............................................................................... - 17 -
G. Sentencing Phase .................................................................................... - 18 -
H. Global ..................................................................................................... - 18 -
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................ - 20 -
IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................. - 22 -
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II. IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
BLAKE CARRINGTON GEE, TDCJ NO 01948254, Appellant
Joe F. Gurney Transfer Facility
1385 FM 3328
Tennessee Colony, TX 75803
HON. JACK SKEEN, DISTRICT JUDGE, Trial Judge
241ST Judicial District Court
Smith County Courthouse
100 N. Broadway, Room 220
Tyler, Texas 75702
KENNETH M. BIGGS and LUCAS R. MACHICEK, Trial Counsel for Appellee
Assistant District Attorney
Smith County District Attorney's Office
100 N. Broadway
Tyler, Texas 75702
THAD WATTS DAVIDSON, Trial Counsel for Appellant
Davidson Law Office
329 S. Fannin Avenue
Tyler, TX 75702
L. CHARLES VAN CLEEF, Appellate Counsel for Appellant
P.O. Drawer 2432
Longview, Texas 75606-2432
MICHAEL WEST, Appellate Counsel for Appellee
Smith County District Attorney's Office
100 N. Broadway
Tyler, Texas 75702
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III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) ................. - 13 -
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ....................................................... - 17 -
Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ....................................................... - 15 -
Eastep v. State, 941 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................................................ - 14 -
Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ..................................................... - 15 -
Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 742–44 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ............................................... - 16 -
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979) ........................................................ - 18 -
McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) ................................ - 14 -
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............................................. - 14 -
Zweig v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 306, 171 S.W. 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) ............................. - 15 -
Statutes
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.01 ............................................................................................ - 15 -
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.011 .......................................................................................... - 15 -
TEX. PEN. CODE § 32.51 ............................................................................................................ - 17 -
TEX. PEN. CODE § 32.51(c)(3)................................................................................................... - 17 -
TEX. PEN. CODE § 71.01(b) ....................................................................................................... - 18 -
TEX. PEN. CODE § 71.02(a)(8)................................................................................................... - 17 -
TEX. PEN. CODE § 71.02(b) ....................................................................................................... - 17 -
TEX. PEN. CODE § 72.01(c) ....................................................................................................... - 19 -
Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 .................................................................................................................... - 5 -
TEX. R. APP. PROC. 33.1(a) ....................................................................................................... - 15 -
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER, TEXAS
BLAKE CARRINGTON GEE, §
APPELLANT §
§
VS. § APPEAL NO. 12-14-00229-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
ANDERS BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:
Comes now Movant L. CHARLES VAN CLEEF, counsel for BLAKE
CARRINGTON GEE, Appellant herein, and files this, his Anders Brief in
accordance with TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 and this Court’s orders.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns fraudulent use or possession of identifying information
and Engaging in Organized Crime, a first degree felony. Appellant pleaded guilty
as an “open” plea, with sentencing before the judge. Appellant and others collected
identifying information and obtained false loans, cable, and electricity. There were
twenty-three defendants and approximately fifty identified victims. Appellant was
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found in possession of compiled lists of personal identifying information and
participated in obtaining at least one fraudulent loan.
Appellant received a 30 year sentence.
Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on March 14, 2012. CR, at 68.
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 1, 2013, the appellant was indicted for the offense of
“Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity,” a first degree felony. Clerk’s Record
(CR) at 1. The appellant executed plea documents and pleaded guilty to the
indicted offense on June 4, 2014, having rejected a proposed plea agreement.
Sentencing, by the judge, occurred on July 9 and 10, 2014. The appellant received
a 30 year sentence.
This appeal followed.
B. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
As this case proceeded on a plea, the undersigned examines the entire
record.
On December 1, 2013, the appellant was indicted for the offense of
“Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity,” a first degree felony. Clerk’s Record
(CR) at 1. The indictment alleged that the appellant and others engaged in a
scheme or continuing course of conduct that began in June 2012 and continued
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until April 2013. Ibid. The indictment further alleged that the scheme was to
obtain and possess at least 10 and less than 50 items of identifying information of
particular victims. The indictment alleged that the information was used to open
bank accounts to facilitate fraudulent loans. Ibid. Bond was set at $750,000. CR at
3. Approximately 5616 pages of discovery were made available to defense
counsel. CR at 5. The State filed numerous pretrial motions and supplemented
discovery with a CD-ROM containing a forensic report and court hearing
transcripts. CR at 16. Further discovery was provided. CR at 19.
However, the next entry in the Clerk’s Record is a request for presentence
investigation report indicating the date of plea was June 4, 2014. CR at 20. The
July 10, 2014 Judgment, CR at 23, indicates that the appellant pleaded guilty to the
offense stated in the indictment and received a 30 year sentence. The judgment
indicates that the plea was “open.” Ibid. It further notes that the appellant filed a
written notice of appeal.
On July 17, 2014, the appellant’s trial counsel moved to withdraw. CR at
27. Significantly, in the motion, trial counsel stated that he advised the appellant
of the following three options: “(a) go to trial; (B) accept the prosecutor’s 25 year
plea offer; or (C) plead open before the court, contribute to a PSI, and present
witnesses and evidence at a sentencing hearing.” He continued “[d]efense counsel
also repeatedly advised Defendant that if he competently, knowingly and
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voluntarily entered a plea agreement, or if you competently, knowingly and
voluntarily plant open before the court, as long as either a plea offer was accepted
by the court or, via defendant’s open plea, the court sentence the defendant within
the punishment range of the 1st° felony for which he was indicted, then defendant’s
abilities to pursue a successful appeal would be extremely limited or none.” Ibid.
that motion was granted on July 30, 2014. CR at 29. The appellant’s notice of
appeal was filed on the same date and by the same person as the motion to
withdraw: July 17, 2014. CR at 30. The undersigned was appointed for purposes
of appeal on July 30, 2014. CR at 34. The trial court, on the same date, also
certified the appellant’s right to appeal since this was not a plea bargain case. CR
at 35.
After considerable wrangling, the District Clerk supplemented the appellate
record with copies of plea papers executed on June 4, 2014. Clerk’s Record,
Supplemental (CR SUP).
The first document is an “agreed punishment recommendation,” which
merely indicates that the plea was an open plea. CR Supp at 1. This document
was signed by the appellant. Ibid. The second document is an “acknowledgment of
admonishments,” indicating that the range of punishment was 5 to 99 years or life
and up to a $10,000 fine, among other matters. CR Supp at 2-3. This document
was signed by the appellant. The third document is a “waiver of trial by jury,” also
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signed by the appellant, indicating that he knowingly and intentionally waived his
right to a trial by jury, and requesting a trial before the court upon his plea of
guilty. CR Supp at 4. The appellant signed a “waiver of confrontation an
agreement to stipulate,” CR Supp at 5, “stipulation of evidence” containing
identical language to the indictment, CR Supp at 6, “agreement to stipulate
testimony” waiving his right to appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination
of witnesses and that evidence may be made by stipulation, CR Supp at 8, and a
“waiver of motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment and waiver of
right to appeal,” CR Supp at 9. He requested a PSI report. CR Supp at 10.
Finally, he received advice on his right to appeal. CR Supp at 11. All of the
documents are signed by the appellant and appear in regular order, and were
admitted as exhibits.
Transcripts of the two proceedings (change of plea and sentencing) mirror
the written documents. The June 4, 2014, transcript of the change of plea,
Reporter’s Record (RR) at volume 1, indicates that of the preceding began with a
rendition of the charges and waiver of reading and presentation of the indictment
with other formalities. RR volume 1 at 3-4. The appellant indicates that he
reviewed and signed all of the aforementioned plea documents, and he received a
verbal explanation of the term “open plea” and his waivers that comports with the
legal definition of such. Ibid. at 4-11. The appellant’s trial counsel even
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explained, on the record, the nature and implications of an open plea, and the
appellant indicated that he understood and desire to go forward with an open plea.
Ibid. at 11-16. The appellant indicated his understanding of his rights, waivers,
and the plea documents. Ibid. at 16-17. The court asked questions to determine
his competency, ibid. at 17-18, once again ensured that the appellant understood
the charges and penalties, ibid. at 17-19, offered to answer any questions (there
were none), ibid. at 20, received the appellant’s plea of guilty, ibid. at 20, ensured
that the appellant was making his plea knowingly, voluntarily, freely, and
intelligently, ibid. at 21, and accepted his plea, ibid. The proceeding shifted to a
discussion of the indicted activity, during which trial counsel for appellant
explained in more detail the activity embodied in the indictment, and the appellant
indicated his understanding and acknowledgment of the stipulation of evidence.
Ibid. at 23-25. The plea was supported with a discovery compliance form (Exhibit
1), the stipulation of evidence (Exhibit 2), and the plea documents. Ibid. at 25.
Sentencing occurred on July 9, 2014. Reporter’s Record (RR) at volume 2.
The court began by taking judicial notice of the presentence investigation report
(PSI) and its addenda. Ibid. at 4. There were no objections. Ibid. at 5-6. Letters
of reference were admitted to the record (for the appellant). Ibid. at 6. The State
rested on the PSI. Ibid. at 8. Defense counsel announced that the appellant wished
to testify. Ibid. The court admonished the appellant regarding the waiver of his
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Fifth Amendment right and pitfalls of taking the stand to testify; the appellant
indicated he understood and that he wished to testify. Ibid. at 9-10. Defense
counsel further admonished the appellant regarding his taking the stand. Ibid. at
11-12. There were no objections to his testimony. The State cross-examined the
appellant. Ibid. beginning at page 36. There were no objections during that
testimony. Redirect examination by defense counsel begins on page 82. There
were no objections. Recross examination begins on page 93. There were no
objections.
The court asked for clarification or understanding of some of the testimony.
Ibid. beginning at 94. The court asked for clarification where the scraps of paper
containing identifying information were kept and what sort of information they
contained. Ibid. at 94-104. There were no objections to this discussion.
The next witness was Fred Moore, but he had left for work. Ibid. at 105.
The next witness was Julia Bell, the appellant’s grandmother. Ibid. at 106. She
explained some of the physical layout and the appellant’s job duties at ETMC
hospital where some of the identifying information had been taken. See ibid. at
109. She was also a character witness. The next witness was the appellant’s niece.
Ibid. at 113. She was a very brief character witness. The next witness was the
appellant’s sister, who was also a very brief character witness. Ibid. at 116-118.
Following her testimony, the defense rested. Ibid. at 118.
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The court then considered the presentence report and asked the prosecutor if,
in its “hundreds of pages” the prosecutor could point to any portion that indicates
that the appellant accessed the stolen identifying information at ETMC; the answer
was no. Ibid. at 120. The court asked several other questions of the prosecutor
designed to determine the appellant’s level of culpability. Ibid. at 120-123.
Defense counsel responded. Ibid. at 123-125. There was considerable discussion
concerning where the defendant fit in the hierarchy of the organization. Ibid. at
125-136. The State requested a 50 year sentence. The defense requested a “light
sentence” based on its interpretation of the appellant’s relative position within the
hierarchy of the organization. Ibid. at 136-140. The State made a brief response
and the court stated that it would require additional time to consider their
arguments and the evidence. Sentencing was continued to the following day. Ibid.
at 144-145.
Continuation of the sentencing hearing began on July 10, 2014. RR at
volume 3. The court provided a lengthy, and accurate, description of events
leading to the continued sentencing; neither party had anything to add. Ibid. at 1-8.
Having considered the prior proceedings, evidence, as well as the range of
sentencing, arguments of counsel and the presentence investigation report, the
court assessed a sentence of 30 years confinement, no fine, and payment of court
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costs. Restitution was to be determined by post sentence report. The appellant
received credit for time served. Ibid. at 9.
This appeal followed.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellate counsel has reviewed the record thoroughly and has failed to
identify any legally non-frivolous issues. Appellant has not suggested any grounds
for appeal.
VII. ISSUE RESTATED
THE UNDERSIGNED FINDS NO LEGALLY OR FACTUALLY NON-
FRIVOLOUS GROUNDS FOR APPEAL.
A. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The undersigned has reviewed the entirety of the appellate record, in detail,
and finds substantial compliance at all stages of litigation in this case based on the
Record, that the guilt/innocence and sentencing proceedings were conducted in the
correct manner, and that the sentence was within the range of punishment for
Appellant’s offense.
B. ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493
(1967), the United States Supreme Court created a procedure that appointed
counsel in criminal cases must follow when seeking to withdraw from an appeal
that counsel believes is frivolous. Before requesting permission to withdraw,
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counsel must "master the trial record, thoroughly research the law, and exercise
judgment in identifying the arguments that may be advanced on appeal." McCoy v.
Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988); see also Anders, 386
U.S. at 744-45.
After a conscientious review of the record, Movant concludes that the case is
wholly frivolous, and therefore must advise this Court and request permission to
withdraw. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991).
C. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL DUE PROCESS
The undersigned has reviewed the Indictment and trial testimony to
determine whether there is a basis for challenging the trial Court's jurisdiction. The
Indictment appears to be in proper form and alleges sufficient facts to apprise a
Defendant of the charges. Further, those charges are stated in substantial
conformance with the cited statutes. Both the Sixth Amendment and Article I, §
10 of the Texas Constitution, require that a defendant be given notice before trial
of the "nature and cause" of the accusation against him, and require further that the
notice be given with sufficient clarity and detail to enable the defendant to
anticipate the State's evidence and prepare a proper defense to it. See Eastep v.
State, 941 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under Article I, § 10, the
requisite notice must come from the face of the charging instrument. Ibid. Thus, an
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Indictment must allege, in plain and intelligible language, all the facts and
circumstances necessary to establish all the material elements of the offense
charged. Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Zweig v.
State, 74 Tex. Crim. 306, 171 S.W. 747, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914).
The fact that the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of the Court,
comprising Smith County, Texas, was expressly established by the Indictment, CR
at 1, and Appellant’s Stipulation of Evidence, CR Supp at 6.
D. PRETRIAL MOTIONS
The undersigned finds no evidence that Appellant was arraigned prior to his
plea. “In all felony cases, after indictment, and all misdemeanor cases punishable
by imprisonment, there shall be an arraignment.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
26.01. An attorney representing a defendant may present a waiver of arraignment,
and the clerk of the court may not require the presence of the defendant as a
condition of accepting the waiver. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.011. However,
as a prerequisite to presentation of the complaint on appeal, that the record show
the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection or motion,
and the court ruled adversely or refused to rule. TEX. R. APP. PROC. 33.1(a);
Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (applying Rule 33.1).
No objection was made. Further, a plea of guilty entered voluntarily and
understandingly without benefit of a plea bargain agreement waives all
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nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea. See Jack v.
State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 742–44 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994).
With regard to pretrial motions, several were filed. No defense motions were
denied.1
E. JURY SELECTION
The case was tried to the Court pursuant to the appellant’s waiver.
1
The sole defense request was a request for a Presentence Investigation Report.
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F. GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE
The appellant pleaded guilty with all formalities, both written and verbal.
Further, the undersigned has examined the record from the perspective of
both legal and factual insufficiency, and finds no arguable basis for appeal.
The Indictment and stipulation establish a violation of TEX. PEN. CODE §
71.02(a)(8), by means of a violation of TEX. PEN. CODE § 32.51, and based on the
number of items, § 32.51 and § 71.02 require first degree felony punishment. TEX.
PEN. CODE § 32.51(c)(3) (10 items or more); TEX. PEN. CODE § 71.02(b).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that there is "no meaningful
distinction between the former Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and
the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard" and that the Jackson standard "is the only
standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence
is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902-03,
912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Accordingly, this Court would review any claim of
evidentiary sufficiency under "a rigorous and proper application" of the Jackson
standard of review. Ibid. at 906-07, 912. Moreover, Texas courts do not refer
separately to legal or factual sufficiency. See Ibid. at 895. Under the Jackson
standard, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
Here, the evidence is the stipulation of evidence signed by the appellant; the
undersigned has reviewed the stipulation and Indictment, and finds them in
compliance with the cited statutes and cases.
G. SENTENCING PHASE
There were no objections during sentencing.
Appellant’s sentence of 30 years was within the permissible range of
punishment for a first degree felony.
H. GLOBAL
There were no adverse rulings in pretrial, trial, or sentencing matters.
The undersigned could find no errors of a magnitude that would not require
an objection, and no record of any kind was made regarding any such errors.
The sole troubling issue identified by the undersigned is that portion of the
change of plea proceeding where defense counsel made an explanation of engaging
in organized criminal activity that may not comport to the plea. Specifically,
counsel described engaging in organized crime as a “conspiracy.” RR volume 1 at
23-24. While that is most certainly true, TEX. PEN. CODE § 71.01(b), it is also true
that the underlying offense, fraudulent use or possession of identifying
information, found in § 32.51, is a second-degree felony carrying a penalty of at
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least two and no more than 20 years imprisonment for the number of items
indicted, § 32.51(c)(3), and “[c]onspiring to commit an offense under [§ 72.01] is
of the same degree as the most serious offense listed in Subsection (a) [, meaning,
here, a violation of § 32.51] that the person conspired to commit.” TEX. PEN. CODE
§ 72.01(c). Section 72.01 is oddly and confusingly worded insofar as it seems to
say, in the context of this case, that one who conspires with others to commit a
conspiracy to fraudulently use or possess identifying information with 10 to 50
items of identifying information has committed a second-degree felony but one
who conspires to engage in organized crime but who actually does fraudulently use
or possess identifying information as described is guilty of a first-degree felony.
TEX. PEN. CODE § 72.01(b) and (c). Defense counsel’s explanation does not make
clear which, if any, type of conspiracy to which he refers, but the explanation
would seem to apply to both. However, the indictment and stipulation clearly set
forth first-degree felony conduct, and Appellant pleaded guilty to the indictment.
Further, evidence adduced at sentencing clearly demonstrated that the appellant
was aware and agreed that he personally participated in the possession of
identifying information and use of that information, as opposed to mere
conspiracy. It is possible that the appellant and his attorney understood that some
of his behavior constituted engaging in organized crime and some of it constituted
conspiracy to engage in organized crime. In any case, this matter is not
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sufficiently developed in the record for presentation on appeal. It is unclear what,
exactly, trial counsel informed appellant prior to the court appearance and it is
unclear what the appellant’s understanding of that advice was. The record does
establish that, at a minimum, there was some apparent confusion. It is not clear
whether there was any actual confusion or that the apparent confusion was
confined to defense counsel. Under the circumstances, additional evidence would
be required to thoughtfully analyze this issue; accordingly, the issue is not ripe for
appeal.
In sum, the record presents no meritorious claims for review.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The undersigned has scoured the entire record, researched the law, and
exercised professional judgment in consideration of potential claims. In light of the
foregoing, the undersigned finds no legally non-frivolous issues and urges that this
appeal should be denied, and respectfully requests that he be allowed to withdraw
from further representation in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ L. Charles van Cleef
______________________________
L. Charles van Cleef
State Bar No. 00786305
P.O. Box 2432
- 20 -
Longview, Texas 75606-2432
(903) 248-8244 Telephone
(903) 248-8249 Facsimile
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
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IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has
been forwarded by electronic filing to counsel for Appellee in accordance with
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5(b)(1) on this Wednesday, January 14, 2015.
Further, a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been
forwarded by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to:
BLAKE CARRINGTON GEE, TDCJ NO 01948254
Joe F. Gurney Transfer Facility
1385 FM 3328
Tennessee Colony, TX 75803
on the same date.
/s/ L. Charles van Cleef
______________________________
L. Charles van Cleef
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I. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document complies with Rule 9.4(e) of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. In particular: This document was
produced using Microsoft Word 2013 using no smaller than Times New Roman
font, 14pt (body) and 12pt (footnotes).
In accordance with Rule 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that, exclusive of caption,
identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of
contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, issues presented, statement of
jurisdiction, statement procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification,
certificate of compliance, and appendix, this document consists of 3,154 words,
relying on the word count function of Microsoft Word 2013.
/s/ L. Charles van Cleef
_____________________________
L. Charles van Cleef
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