United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 21, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
_____________________ Clerk
No. 04-11205
____________________
JIM MARLOW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(03-CV-81)
__________________
Before JOLLY, DAVIS and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Jim Marlow appeals the district court's affirmance of the
Commissioner's order denying Marlow’s application for social
security disability insurance benefits. Marlow argues that (1)
the ALJ should have considered the treating physician's opinion
under the six factors set forth in Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448,
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
1
453 (5th Cir. 2000), and should have requested supplemental
information from the treating physician; (2) the ALJ did not give
proper consideration to the side effects of Marlow's pain
medication; and (3) the finding of the administrative law judge
("ALJ") that Marlow retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform a full range of sedentary work was not
supported by substantial evidence; (4) the finding of the ALJ
that Marlow’s mental impairment was not severe was not supported
by substantial evidence.
This Court's review of the Commissioner's final decision to
deny benefits under the Social Security Act, per 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the proper
legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence and (2)
whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
Marlow argues that the ALJ failed to give proper
consideration to the opinion of one of his treating physicians,
Michael Auringer. The ALJ gave a detailed account of Marlow’s
medical history, including treatment by Auringer. The ALJ was not
required to give a more detailed analysis under Newton, because
medical evidence from seven other physicians, as well as
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Auringer’s own records, controverted Auringer’s conclusory
opinion. See Shave v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001);
Newton, 209 F.3d at 453. Marlow has not demonstrated that the ALJ
was required to request supplemental information from the
treating physician, because he has not demonstrated that
supplementation would have led to a different decision. See
Newton, 209 F.3d at 458 (holding that reversal appropriate only
if applicant shows prejudice).
Marlow contends that the ALJ failed to give proper
consideration to the side effects of Williams's treatment. As
reflected in the decision denying benefits, the ALJ considered
Marlow’s testimony regarding the side effects but found his
subjective complaints to be credible only to the extent reflected
in the residual functional capacity. See Crowley v. Apfel, 197
F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1999). The ALJ's credibility
determination is accorded great deference. Harrell v. Bowen, 862
F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1988). Marlow has failed to produce
objective medical evidence to support his subjective complaints
regarding the side effects of his treatment. See Anthony v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 296 (5th Cir.1992); Selders v. Sullivan,
914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir.1990).
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Marlow argues that the ALJ’s findings that he was able to
engage in a full range of sedentary work activity his and that
his mental impairment was not severe were not supported by
substantial evidence. Marlow ignores, however, the ALJ’s
exhaustive examination of his medical record, including evidence
from eight different treating or consulting physicians.
Additionally, although Marlow argues that the ALJ ignored the
recommendation of the DDS physicians in the pre-hearing stages of
the proceeding, those physicians concluded that Marlow’s physical
limitations were not severe and that he had no exertional
limitations, and that while his mental impairment was of marginal
severity, it did not interfere with Marlow’s ability to engage in
a wide range of basic work-related mental activities. The record
reveals that the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits was supported by
substantial evidence. See Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173
(5th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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