ACCEPTED
13-14-00501-cr
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
1/15/2015 12:52:02 PM
DORIAN RAMIREZ
13-14-00501-CR CLERK
NO. 2014-DHC-2879
IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, CORPUS
TEXAS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
1/15/2015 12:52:02 PM
DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
Clerk
SAMUEL OSVALDO GARCIA,
Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
On appeal from the 357th Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas
Honorable Oscar X. Garcia, Judge Presiding
Rafael de la Garza III, Esq.
Texas Bar No. 24076343
De la Garza & Ramirez
4943 South Jackson Rd.
Edinburg, Texas 78539
Phone: (956) 533-1426
Facsimile: (956) 284-0518
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
1
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
Appellant: Samuel Osvaldo Garcia
Appellee: The State of Texas
Trial counsel for Appellant: Rafael de la Garza
Texas Bar No. 24076343
4943 South Jackson Road
Edinburgh, Texas 78539
Appellant counsel for Appellant: Rafael de la Garza
Texas Bar No. 24076343
Ricardo Ramirez
Texas Bar No. 24079177
4943 South Jackson Road
Edinburg, Texas 78539
Counsel for Appellee: Honorable Luis Saenz
Assistant District Attorney
964 East Harrison Street
Brownsville, Texas 78520
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Identity of Parties & Counsel 2
Table of Contents 3
Index of Authorities 4-5
Statement of the Case 5
Issues Presented 5
Statement of Facts 6-8
Summary of Argument 8-9
Standard of Review 9
Arguments & Authorities 10-20
Prayer for Relief 20
Certificate of Service 21
Certificate of Compliance 21
Appendix 22
A. Final Order, Executed on September 5, 2014
B. Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia
C. Affidavit of Attorney Daniel Sanchez
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Page
United States Constitution
Sixth Amendment 11, 13, 14
Statutes
Texas Health and Safety Code Section 481.112 6
8 USC Section 1101(a)(43) 12
8 USC Section 1101(a)(43)(B) 12-13
8 USC Section 1229b 12
Cases
Chaidez v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1103 (2013) 10, 11, 19
Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985) 16
Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223 16-17
Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 9
Lyles v. State, 850 S.W.2d 497, (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 9
London v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 18
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 15
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). 9
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 US 356 (2010) 10, 11, 13
United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 10
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 10, 15
4
United States v. Wade, 88 U.S. 218, 227-28 14-15
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 14, 15, 16,
18, 19
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns Appellant’s “Application for Post-Conviction Writ of
Habeas Corpus Seeking Relief in Accordance with Article 11.072 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure,” which was filed in the 357th Judicial District Court, Cameron
County, Texas, on May 8, 2014. See Index Pg. 40-48. Appellant filed same seeking
to vacate a criminal conviction. Id. The State of Texas filed a response to
Appellant’s application on June 5, 2014. See Index Pg. 49-60. Then, on August 4,
2014, the district court denied Appellant’s application and this appeal followed. See
Index Pg. 66.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue 1: Whether Mr. Garcia can proceed on an ineffective assistance claim
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, on the ground
that he was affirmatively misadvised of the immigration consequences of his plea,
notwithstanding the ruling rendered in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (U.S.
2010).
Issue 2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Garcia’s habeas
petition on the bases that former counsel’s affirmative misadvise regarding
immigration consequences, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation
of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which would require
vacature of the underlying conviction.
5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Samuel Osvaldo Garcia (hereinafter, “Mr. Garcia”) is a forty five (45) year
old Guatemalan citizen who obtained status as a Lawful Permanent Resident
(“LPR”) of the United States in 1987. See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo
Garcia. He has been residing in the United States since he was ten (10) years old.
Id.
On August 23, 2002, Mr. Garcia was arrested for “Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Deliver,” in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code
Section 481.112. See Index Pg. 9. He was indicted on September 11, 2002 and
counsel was appointed to represent him. See Index Pg. 12. Former counsel met with
Mr. Garcia and advised him that the state was offering probation. See Appendix B –
Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia. Mr. Garcia inquired regarding the immigration
consequences of his plea as follows:
“I asked my attorney if I would be deported if I pled guilty to the charge and
got probation. He said that I would probably be okay. He said that the charge
would probably not result in deportation.”
Mr. Garcia relied on his counsel’s advice and entered a plea of guilty to the charge
on January 29, 2003, in cause number 02CR 1042. Id. Mr. Garcia was sentenced to
ten (10) years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, which term
was suspended in lieu of placement on community supervision for ten (10) years.
See Index Pg. 17.
6
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) picked up Mr. Garcia soon
thereafter and presented him before an immigration judge. See Appendix B –
Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia. The immigration judge rescinded Mr. Garcia’s
LPR status and deported him as a result of his conviction for “Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver.” Id. If Mr. Garcia had known that he
was going to be deported as a result of his plea of guilty, he would have pled not
guilty and fought his case. Id.
On May 8, 2014, Mr. Garcia filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in
the Trial Court. See Index Pg. 40-48. Mr. Garcia submitted his affidavit as well as
the affidavit of former counsel Daniel Sanchez, in support of his Petition. See
Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia and Appendix C – Affidavit of
Attorney Daniel Sanchez. Mr. Garcia’s affidavit explains he asked Mr. Sanchez
about losing his LPR status and Mr. Sanchez stated “he would probably be okay,
and the charge would probably not result in deportation.” See Appendix B – Affidavit
of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia. Mr. Garcia also states he would not have waived his
right to a trial if he had been apprised of the certain loss of his LPR status upon
conviction. Id. Mr. Sanchez’s affidavit is also in the record. Appendix C – Affidavit
of Attorney Daniel Sanchez. Mr. Sanchez’s affidavit states his advice was consistent
with the admonishments at Article 26.10 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
7
and that he does not remember any other substantive conversation in the moments
before he accompanied Mr. Garcia in the courtroom. Id.
On June 5, 2014, the State of Texas filed its’ opposition to Mr. Garcia’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See Index Pg. 49-60. In its’ opposition, the State
of Texas urged the Trial Court that Attorney Sanchez’s representation was not
deficient. Id.
Then, on August 4, 2014, the Presiding Judge of the 357th Judicial District
Court denied the Application for Post-Conviction Relief. See Index Pg. 60 and
Appendix A. However, the Presiding Judge failed to specify the bases for the denial.
Id. Mr. Garcia filed his Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2014. See Index Pg. 66.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Garcia has been an LPR since 1987 and has been residing in the United
States since he was a child. See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia.
He was arrested for “Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver”
in 2003. Id. Mr. Garcia’s former counsel advised him to enter a plea of guilty. Id.
Former counsel also advised Mr. Garcia that his plea of guilty would not result in
his deportation. Id. Former counsel’s advice regarding the immigration
consequences of the plea constituted affirmative misadvise since the conviction
immediately rendered Mr. Garcia an aggravated felon subject to deportation from
the United States. Id. Former counsel did not have a duty to advise Mr. Garcia of
8
the fact that his plea would result in deportation. Nonetheless, former counsel was
obligated to not affirmatively misadvise and / or actively mislead Mr. Garcia on any
matter, however related to criminal prosecution, including immigration
consequences. Former counsel’s affirmative misadvise constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
As such, the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Garcia’s habeas
petition and Mr. Garcia hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court’s final order and remand this case for further proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicant for a writ of habeas corpus based on an involuntary guilty plea
has the burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals will uphold the decision of the Trial Court absent an abuse of
discretion. The Trial Court abuses its discretion when the court acts without
reference to any guiding rules or principles, or arbitrarily or unreasonably, or when
its’ decision lies outside of the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Lyles v. State,
850 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d
372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
9
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
I. Mr. Garcia Can Proceed With His Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Pursuant to Chaidez Since He Was Affirmatively Misadvised
Concerning The Immigration Consequences of His Guilty Plea.
a. Current Law Regarding Affirmative Misadvise
In 2010, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (U.S. 2010), held that trial
counsel must inform their clients of the possible immigration consequences of
pleading guilty. Then, in 2013 the case of Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103
(2013), held that “…defendants whose final convictions became final prior to
Padilla…cannot benefit from the holding of Padilla.” Id. at 1113.
However, Chaidez made clear that individuals like Mr. Garcia can bring
ineffective assistance claims on the bases of affirmative misadvise:
“…true enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state courts)
held before Padilla that misstatement about deportation could support
an ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that
a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise
actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to
a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005,
1015-1017 (C.A.9 2005). They co-existed happily with precedent,
from the same jurisdictions (and almost all others), holding that
deportation is not “so unique as to warrant an exception to the general
rule that a defendant need not be advised of the collateral consequences
of a guilty plea.” See United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769
(C.A.11 1985). So at most, Chaidez has shown that a minority of courts
recognized a separate rule for material representations, regardless
whether they concerned deportation or another collateral matter. See
Chaidez at 13.
10
As such, Chaidez left open the possibility of ineffective assistance claims
based on affirmative misadvise of former counsel. Chaidez established that claims
based on misstatements about deportation are sufficient to support a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
In this case, Mr. Garcia’s conviction became final in 2003, before the Padilla
holding was handed down in 2010. See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo
Garcia. As such, Padilla is not applicable and former counsel did not have a duty
to advise Mr. Garcia of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. However,
Chaidez clearly provides that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be
alleged when a defendant is affirmatively misadvised concerning immigration
consequences.
b. Because the Relevant Immigration Statutes Clearly Provide For
Automatic Deportation Upon Conviction For An Offense that
Involves Drug Trafficking, Former Counsel’s Statements to Mr.
Garcia Constitute Affirmative Misadvise.
The evidence in the record establishes that Mr. Garcia inquired regarding the
immigration consequences of his plea and former counsel advised as follows:
“I asked my attorney if I would be deported if I pled guilty to the charge
and got probation. He said that I would probably be okay. He said
that the charge would probably not result in deportation.”
See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia.
11
Former counsel’s statement to Mr. Garcia, indicating that his plea was
unlikely to result in deportation, was entirely misleading. This is because the
relevant immigration statutes clearly provide that Lawful Permanent Residents
(LPR’s) with drug convictions, that involve an element of trafficking, are considered
aggravated felonies that make LPR’s automatically deportable. Because the
immigration statutes clearly define Mr. Garcia’s underlying conviction as one that
constitutes an “aggravated felony,” former counsel’s statements constitute
affirmative misadvise.
LPR’s that are seeking relief from deportation may seek a discretionary
waiver from the immigration judge. The elements that must be established to obtain
relief are as follows:
Section 240A Cancellation of Removal; Adjustment of Status
[8 U.S.C. 1229b]
(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents.—The
Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien--
(1) Has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not
less than 5 years,
(2) Has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after
having been admitted in any status, and
(3) Has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.
The term “aggravated felony” referred to above is defined under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43). The statute contains a laundry list of offenses that constitute an
aggravated felony. Specifically, 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(B), provides:
12
(B) Illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of
the Controlled Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined
in section 924(c) of title 18, United State Code).
The immigration law on this issue is clear and succinct – an LPR that seeks to
cancel his deportation and preserve his status is barred from doing so if the LPR has
a conviction for an “aggravated felony.” Mr. Garcia was convicted of “Possession
with Intent to Deliver.” A review of the above-mentioned sections would have
placed Mr. Garcia’s former counsel on notice that a plea of guilty would render Mr.
Garcia an aggravated felon ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Former counsel’s statements to Mr. Garcia that he would “probably be okay”
and that the “charge would probably not result in deportation” are misleading and
constitute affirmative misadvise since they convinced Mr. Garcia that he would not
be deported. They are also misleading and constitute affirmative misadvise because
the conviction would make Mr. Garcia an aggravated felon and subject him to
automatic deportation.
As such, Mr. Garcia can proceed on an ineffective assistance claim pursuant
to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution on the ground that he was
affirmatively misadvised regarding the immigration consequences of his plea,
notwithstanding the ruling in Padilla.
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Mr. Garcia’s Habeas
Petition Since The Evidence Established That Former Counsel’s
Affirmative Misadvise Regarding Immigration Consequences
13
Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Violation of Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The record clearly establishes that the Trial Court abused its discretion in
denying Mr. Garcia’s Habeas Petition. This is because the evidence makes it more
likely true than not, that Mr. Garcia’s plea was not knowing, intelligent and
voluntary, due to former counsel’s affirmative misadvise. Specifically, the evidence
establishes that Mr. Garcia entered his plea of guilty as a result of former counsel’s
admonishment that his plea of guilty would not result in a deportation. See Appendix
B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia.
The affirmative misadvise of former counsel is sufficient to establish that his
performance was deficient such that it prejudiced Mr. Garcia in the underlying case,
in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. In light
of the evidence, it is clear that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied
the Habeas Petition.
a. The Sixth Amendment of the United States recognizes the right to
effective assistance of counsel for Mr. Garcia
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees effective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2063, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The right to counsel guarantees that the defendant
will have effective assistance of counsel during all critical stages of the criminal
proceeding. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18
14
L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). The time at which a defendant is called to enter his plea to a
felony is considered a critical stage. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed. 2d 763 (1970). In order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel pertaining to a guilty plea, a Petitioner must
demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-93.
(1) Former counsel’s performance was deficient because he chose to
affirmatively misadvise Mr. Garcia
Defense counsel is obligated not to misadvise or “actively mislead his client
on any important matter, however related to a criminal prosecution.” See United
States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-1017 (C.A. 9). Former counsel failed to abide
by the holding of Kwan in that he effectively misled Mr. Garcia regarding the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
In this case, Mr. Garcia’s former counsel affirmatively misadvised him that
he would “probably be okay” and that the “charge would probably not result in
deportation.” See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia. These
statements taken together effectively convinced Mr. Garcia that entering a plea of
guilty to “Possession with Intent to Deliver,” would not result in his deportation. Id.
Former counsel affirmatively made these statements. Id. If instead former counsel
had remained silent or stated he did not know what effect Mr. Garcia’s plea would
have on his legal status, former counsel’s performance would have been acceptable.
15
As mentioned in Section I.b above, an inquiry into the immigration
consequences of Mr. Garcia’s plea would have determinatively shown that a plea
would result in Mr. Garcia being characterized as an “aggravated felon” subject to
automatic deportation. Alternatively, former counsel could have told Mr. Garcia
that he did not know or would rather not advise regarding the immigration
consequences of his plea.
Unbeknownst to former counsel, his decision to affirmatively misadvise Mr.
Garcia had a devastating effect on Mr. Garcia’s future – one that would only be
remedied by revisiting former counsel’s deficient performance. Id. Therefore, the
first prong of Strickland is met.
(2) Former counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Garcia
since the plea resulted in an automatic deportation
In order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, “the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See Hill v. Lockhart, 106
S.Ct. 366 (1985). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Further, as stated in
Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), the applicant need
not show that he would have received a “more favorable disposition had he gone to
trial.” The prejudice inquiry in the involuntary guilty plea context is designed to
16
ensure that the defendant would actually have availed himself of the proceeding in
question. Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 231-32.
Mr. Garcia pled guilty to “Possession with Intent to Deliver” in 2003 due to
his former counsel’s affirmative misadvise. See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel
Oswaldo Garcia. As a result of his plea, Mr. Garcia was characterized as an
“aggravated felon” subject to automatic deportation. In his affidavit, Mr. Garcia
testified regarding what actions he would have taken had his former counsel
informed him of the specific consequences of his guilty plea. Id. If Mr. Garcia
would have known of the immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have
pled guilty to the charge of “Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Deliver.” Id. He would have instead fought the case. Id. The clear consequence of
exile from this country and separation from one’s family are extremely important
factors to be considered by any reasonable person, especially for an LPR like Mr.
Garcia, who had spent the majority of his life in the United States. Id. With his
testimony, Mr. Garcia has demonstrated that but for his former counsel’s deficient
advice regarding the specific and direct immigration consequences of his guilty plea,
an issue of vital importance to applicant, he would not have plead guilty. Id.
For a non-citizen, serving time in prison may not be the most important factor
to consider when taking a plea. Mr. Garcia was removed (deported) on 2003. He
has lost his Lawful Permanent Resident Status; he will be separated from his family
17
and will be forever barred from returning to the United States. Id. Former counsel’s
misadvise to Mr. Garcia resulted in the violation of many of his fundamental liberty
interests. Namely, Mr. Garcia’s right to live and work in the United States and to
interact with his family within the United States has been violated. Id. In London
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), the court wrote: “Plasencia’s interest here is,
without question, a weighty one. He stands to lose the right to stay and live and work
in this land of freedom…further he may lose the right to rejoin immediate family, a
right that ranks high among the interest of the individual.” Id. at 34. Mr. Garcia has
clearly been harmed by his former counsel’s affirmative misadvise. As such, the
second prong of Strickland has been met.
b. Because Mr. Garcia has demonstrated that former counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced him, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is warranted pursuant to Strickland.
As mentioned in Strickland, a Court deciding an ineffective assistance claim
must judge the “reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” See 466 U.S. at 690.
The defendant must identify the acts and / or omissions that are alleged to not have
been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. The Court must then
determine whether the identified acts and / or omissions of counsel were outside the
“wide range of professionally competent advice.” Id.
18
Mr. Garcia relied on the affirmative misadvise of his former counsel that he
would “probably be okay” and that the “charge would probably not result in
deportation.” See Appendix B – Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia. This in and
of itself constitutes a deficient performance by former counsel, since it mislead Mr.
Garcia to enter a guilty plea. Former counsel’s affirmative misstatements caused
Mr. Garcia to be prejudiced in that his guilty plea directly caused his deportation.
Id. As a result, Mr. Garcia faced significant and direct consequences to his
immigration status in the United States. Id. Specifically, Mr. Garcia was exiled
from this country and will not be able to immigrate to the United States. Id.
Chaidez makes clear that Mr. Garcia can bring a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel for affirmative misstatements. Further, the evidence clearly
demonstrates that former counsel’s affirmative misadvise constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, as described in Strickland. Accordingly, Mr. Garcia respectfully
requests that the underlying conviction for “Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Deliver” be vacated.
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court make a determination that the
Trial Court abused its discretion in denying his Habeas petition since the evidence
clearly establishes that former counsel’s affirmative misadvise regarding the
19
immigration consequences of his plea constitute ineffective assistance in violation
of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Mr. Samuel Osvaldo Garcia
prays that this Court reverse the district court’s final order and remand this case for
further proceedings. Alternatively, Mr. Samuel Osvaldo Garcia prays that this Court
remand for further proceedings to allow Mr. Samuel Osvaldo Garcia to testify before
the Court and to compel the district court to enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Rafael de la Garza
Rafael de la Garza, Esq.
Texas Bar No. 24076343
De La Garza & Ramirez
4943 South Jackson Road
Edinburg, Texas, 78539
(956) 533-1426
(956) 284-0518
Attorney for Appellant
Samuel Osvaldo Garcia
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing, Brief of Appellant, was served on the following counsel on December
31, 2014:
VIA ELECTRONIC FILING
Honorable Luis Saenz
Assistant District Attorney
964 East Harrison Street
Brownsville, Texas 78520
/s/ Rafael de la Garza
Rafael De La Garza, Esq.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-
point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with
the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains
3,641 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
VIA ELECTRONIC FILING
Honorable Luis Saenz
Assistant District Attorney
964 East Harrison Street
Brownsville, Texas 78520
/s/ Rafael de la Garza
Rafael De La Garza, Esq.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
12/31/2014
Date
21
NO. 2014-DHC-2879
IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
SAMUEL OSVALDO GARCIA,
Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee,
APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF
A. Final Order, Executed on September 5, 2014
B. Affidavit of Samuel Oswaldo Garcia
C. Affidavit of Attorney Daniel Sanchez
22
.• ' ...)
\.;I
CAUSE NO. 2002-CR-1042-E
EX PARTE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
&
§ 352TH JIIDICIAI DISTRICT
§
SAMUEL OSVALDO GARCIA § CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR POST -CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
SEEKING RELIEF IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11.072 OF THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
On this day, came on for consideration, before this Court, the Post-Conviction Writ of
Habeas eorpus Seeking Relief in Accmdance with Article l U:l92 of the eode of eriminal
Procedure by Samuel Osvaldo Garcia (hereinafter Applicant) on May 8, 2014. After reviewing
said Application, together with the evidence attached thereto, and the Response of the State in
opposition thereto, and all other evidence brought before this Court, the Court is of th€ opinion
that said Application should be denied.
THEREFORE, this Court DENIES any and all relief requested in Applicant's
Application.
-:.~
Signed on the) day of ~~w.2014.
0> \) / / 81 /
~ I
.;2LJ I~ ELIZABETH E. MAZA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
January 31, 2015
4
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY DANIEL SANCHEZ
STATE OF TEXAS §
COUNTY OF CAMERON §
"My name is Daniel A. Sanchez. I am over twenty-one years of age and have never been
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. I have personal knowledge of
the statements herein made. I am fully competent to testify to the matters stated herein, and the
matters stated herein are true and correct.
I have been a duly licensed attorney in the State of Texas since 1998. I represented
Samuel Oswaldo Garcia on a criminal case in Hidalgo County, Texas in 2002. Mr. Garcia had a
pending charge for Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver 4 grams or more
but less than 200 grams, out of the 35]1h Judicial District Court, Cameron County, Texas, on or
about December 5, 2002.
After having discussed the offense pending against Mr. Garcia, Mr. Garcia made a
decision that he would be entering a plea of guilty to the above-mentioned charge. Prior to
entering the plea, I discussed all plea paperwork with Mr. Garcia. Specifically, I discussed the
document titled, "Written Waiver and Consent to Stipulation of Testimony, Waiver of Jury and
Plea of Guilty," with Mr. Garcia.
I also explained to Mr. Garcia that ifhe was not a citizen of the United States of America,
his plea of guilty or nolo contendere for the offense charged may result in deportation, the
exclusion from admission to this Country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law, or a
combination of the any of the aforementioned options.
I do not remember discussing anything else with Mr. Garcia. Mr. Garcia pled guilty to
the charged offense thereafter.
I swear under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
:Jiii::sic~
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to me, the undersigned authority, on this the 'd- S day
of T~ , 2014.
KRYSTAL MALLEN
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
Aprll 13, 2015
My Commission Expires b4/13/~1s
1