Cathey, Eric Dewayne

WR-55,161-02 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS March 4, 2015 Transmitted 3/3/2015 4:59:55 PM Accepted 3/4/2015 9:50:00 AM ABEL ACOSTA CLERK IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS _________________________________ NO. WR-55-161-02 _________________________________ EX PARTE ERIC DEWAYNE CATHEY, Applicant. ___________________________________________________________ On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Cause No. 713189-B in the 176th District Court, Harris County ___________________________________________________________ REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT Layne E. Kruse State Bar No. 11742550 layne.kruse@nortonrosefulbright.com Sumera Khan State Bar No. 24064319 sumera.khan@nortonrosefulbright.com Emery G. Richards State Bar No. 24093038 emery.richards@nortonrosefulbright.com NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 1301 McKinney, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77010-3095 Telephone: (713) 651-5151 Telecopier: (713) 651-5246 Counsel for Eric DeWayne Cathey REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT On January 22, 2015, this Court submitted for rehearing Ex Parte Eric DeWayne Cathey, No. WR-55-161-02, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1762 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2014). At issue is how Texas should apply the mandate of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to exclude intellectually disabled 1 persons from execution in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) that these determinations be consistent with the medical community’s current diagnostic framework for intellectual disability. In overturning the trial court’s finding that Mr. Cathey is mentally retarded and cannot be executed, this Court upheld the Ex parte Briseño adaptive functioning factors, refused to allow the clinically-indicated Flynn Effect IQ-score adjustment, and rejected the finding that the best clinical practice adjusts an IQ score which was closer to the date of conviction instead of retesting after years of incarceration. Mr. Cathey acknowledges that upon a grant of rehearing, “[o]ral argument may, but normally will not, be permitted,” Tex. R. App. P. 79.4, and that if a case is not set for oral argument “counsel may—within 30 days of the date of the clerk’s notice—petition the Court to allow argument.” Tex. R. App. P. 75.2. In light of the fact that it is unclear whether a grant of rehearing has occurred, Mr. Cathey prays the Court grant his request for oral argument so the unique and precedential issues in his case may be considered fully. 1 In accord with Hall v. Florida, the term “intellectual disability” is used to refer to the disability previously known as “mental retardation.” This request uses “mental retardation” since it was used in the trial court findings. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Layne E. Kruse___________ Layne E. Kruse State Bar No. 11742550 layne.kruse@nortonrosefulbright.com Sumera Khan State Bar No. 24064319 sumera.khan@nortonrosefulbright.com Emery G. Richards State Bar No. 24093038 emery.richards@nortonrosefulbright.com NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 1301 McKinney, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77010-3095 Telephone: (713) 651-5151 Telecopier: (713) 651-5246 Counsel for Eric DeWayne Cathey CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of the above document was served on the State of Texas through electronic filing of this document and by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to Roe Wilson, Harris County District Attorney’s Office, 1201 Franklin, Houston, Texas 77002 and Jefferson Clendenin, Office of the Texas Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711 on this 3rd day of March 2015. /s/ Layne E. Kruse Layne E. Kruse