80.3>3@ `05/0‘{ __N_®_Qr\;, 03 »2#\_»_\,6 _&»;\.@»Se__£k_a$v.§.§&a\_*\oo;\_l_o\ ~_\__-'§\,\Q\_§__C>§OAAQ;\-_C§ r\ %_ iq_\@@¥\_`_»\{_;_@\_cp_.,_(_x_cw§£§¥> ei,xea;gw_§a_,_g:z:.;A; 1`__0»$;_\§_*@£4\;¢\` f\__O\\Qou\ /“»\_p ___\}Q¢\\ '(\O. gm 653 164 )\ X>acw..>§<_:__¢, ,\\ _`_(_ e_C,` 999 Q,:\_av_ M_?_QS\_ Cac@_\ _______ E`>Y>’Q~e\(:_é____ :\-_L_\S_o.r_\_e,f.(_o_a__o_'>_'_b\\éa_€_o`~)_$£ AO._$_Y\QL&A_CDUQL/L_ M_‘::_\;\o~.\\\__\f.o,_.p §v~{ '~.`\§Q_Q/ A;~`,\W_u; Q_L`>QQ,.;L(“>\\ `|, l ©_,.v.;)_ '____ ,___ §FP§§ §§ ii:‘\l ©OL‘B¥@"’HW““ “FFE»*J»S MAR 2 6 2815 . Ah@é&c@§%a,€i@vk . . ' .- g@dzzw~<)z,<>q .\.‘. !,".'r$! 15 |, '_: `_ 32 NO- Tf. el no. Sq,zi;hu-L»¢\; 51854-02-»\ NO. WS-EQE, ,OZ.,!,§OZZ! -oz l maness AMM@M COURT OF CRIMINAL EX PARTE ¢»O‘)CO?CO'>¢O’>CO'> DAVID ABRAN ANAYA APPEALS, AUSTIN, TX APPLICANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT'S~ RECOMMENDED DENIAL OF HIS 11.07 HABEAS CORPUS COMES NOW, applicant, David Anaya, and files this objection to the trial court's denial of his ll.O7 Habeas Corpus for the above cause #s. and in support would show this Honorable Court: I. Applicant filed his Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 28th, 2015. On February 18th, 2015, the State filed its answer fm along with an affidavit from his trial attorney Rus Bailey asserting that his Habeas dorpus shouldv be denied. Applicant responded to the State's answer traversing the merits claiming this Writ Should be granted. For the perposes of this objection Applicant references to the Court his filed response and amplifies some spec~ ific points as to his trial coun§§!s ineffectiveness by failing to make a proper objection to his jury charge. II. 1. Failure to Properly Object to the Jury Charge As stated in Applicant's writ application in his supporting facts, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to the jury 'charge on self defense. Counsel's affidavit reflects that he objected to the jury charge but it was only to the specific point that adding the "phrase" criminal activity should not be allowed because it was "Constitutionally vague." The proper objection to the jury instruction was that it did not track the law set forth in Texas Penal Code 9.32(c). It does not say a "person is under a duty to retreat" "unless there is evidence before you." Counsel was clearly deficient as to the matter as his affidavit and exhibit in respon- se to this matter shows, by informing the court "Your Honor, as to objections- the charge as it is written tracks the law as it is in the Texas Penal Code" '\ (R.R. Vol 5 pr 155) The jury charge did not track the statutory language and was a comment on the weight of the evidence that should have never went before the jury because of it's prejudicial effect it had on the jury. Al- though Morales v. State 357 SW 3d 6 (TEX.CRIM.APP. 2011) was not decided until after Applicant's trial. The law was in effect as of 2007, two years prior to Applicant's trial. The law concurrent with his trial is clear that . a court's charge should track the statutory definition in the penal code, if it does not it is an improper comment on the weight of the evidence and focuses the jury on a specific type of evidence that may support an element of the offense or defense. Davis v. State 313 SW3d 317 (TEX.CRIM.APP. 2010); Brown v. state 122 Sw3d 794 (TEX.cRIM.APP. 2003); Geisburg v. State 984 sw 2d 245 (TEX.CRIM.APP. 1998); Walters v. State 247 SW 3d (TEX.CRIM.APP. 2007) Walters Id. clearly states that when the legislature modifies the penal code, previous and old laws should not be given in the jury instruction. Prior to 2007 the law allowed the jury to be instructed that a person has a general duty to retreat and after 2007 the law deleted the language of this matter. Walters along with other cases clearly provide precedent that the language in Applicant's jury instruction does-not track the provisions in the penal code and it is an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Because this law is clear that a_jury