WR-82,437-01
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 3/13/2015 9:25:28 AM
March 13, 2015 Accepted 3/13/2015 9:54:30 AM
ABEL ACOSTA
No. WR-82,437-01 CLERK
______________________________
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
______________________________
EX PARTE SHERRON DONDRIEL PHILLIPS, Applicant.
______________________________
On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Cause No. CR-566-12-D(1), In the 206th District Court
From Hidalgo County
______________________________
BRIEF FOR THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES
______________________________
KEN PAXTON *JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Attorney General of Texas Assistant Attorney General
Supervising Attorney
CHARLES E. ROY for Non-Capital Appeals
First Assistant Attorney GeneralCriminal Appeals
Division
State Bar No. 00793549
EDWARD L. MARSHALL Joseph.Corcoran@TexasAttorneyGeneral.gov
Chief, Criminal Appeals Division
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
*Lead Appellate Counsel Telephone: (512) 936-1400
Facsimile: (512) 936-1280
_____________________________
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
To assist this Honorable Court in determining disqualification and
recusal, the Board of Pardons and Paroles certifies the following is a
complete list of the parties and their attorneys in accordance with Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a).
1. Applicant
SHERRON DONDRIEL PHILLIPS
TDCJ-CID No. 1926973
2. Counsel for Applicant
ALFREDO MORALES JR.
Texas Bar Number 14417290
700 S. 25 1/2 St. E.
Mcallen, TX 78501
3. Counsel for Applicant at trial
TORIBIO “TERRY” PALACIOS
(Deferred adjudication proceeding)
Texas Bar Number 15423050
1805 E Russell
Edinburg, TX 78539
MICHAEL TUTTLE
(Guilty plea proceeding)
Texas Bar Number 24037620
PO Box 4450
Edinburg, TX 78540
ii
4. Counsel for the State
GLENN DEVINO
(This proceeding)
Assistant District Attorney
Texas Bar Number 24012525
100 N. Closer
Edinburg, Texas 78539
JOAQUIN J. ZAMORA
(Both the deferred adjudication and guilty plea proceeding)
Texas Bar Number 24003229
Hidalgo County Courthouse
100 North Closner, Rm. 303
Edinburg, TX 78539
5. Counsel for the Board of Pardons and Parole
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Assistant Attorney General
Texas Bar Number 00793549
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
Tel.: (512) 936-1400
Fax: (512) 936-1280
6. Trial Court Judge
ROSE GUERRA REYNA
(Both the state habeas proceeding and adjudication proceeding)
G. JAIME GARZA
(Guilty plea proceeding)
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................... iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................... vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................. 1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .............................................................. 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ....................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................ 5
I. Because Applicant’s Legal Claim Does Not Advance a
Cognizable Liberty Interest, Article 11.07 is Unavailable to
Advance That Claim......................................................................... 5
A. To the extent that Applicant is asking this Court
to review the Board’s decision to deny him parole,
Article 11.07 does not provide a remedy because
the decision is not a proper subject of judicial
review ...................................................................................... 6
B. To the extent that Applicant is asking this Court
to determine whether § 508.1411 creates a liberty
interest, Applicant’s contention is reviewable by
this Court under Article 11.07 as a matter of first
impression. ............................................................................ 10
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
C. The language of § 508.1411 does not create a
liberty interest in parole ....................................................... 12
D. Where, as here, no liberty interest is implicated by
statute, and hence, no due-process rights are
created by statute, a prisoner is not entitled to a
written statement of the reasons for denial of
parole ..................................................................................... 16
E. Since Applicant’s claims do not implicate due
process protections, they do not advance a
cognizable basis for habeas relief, and Article
11.07 is not available going forward to challenge
the written reasons of the Board to deny simple
parole ..................................................................................... 18
II. Because § 508.1411 Does Not Create an Independent,
Freestanding Liberty Interest, a Prisoner Is Not
Constitutionally Entitled to a Written Statement of the
Reasons for Denial of Parole; Hence, There Can Be No Due
Process Violation Whether or Not the Board’s Reasons for
That Denial Comport With § 508.1411 .......................................... 19
III. An Application for a Writ of Mandamus Is Not the Proper
Remedy for Applicant’s Claim ....................................................... 20
A. The Court does not have jurisdiction to issue the
writ of mandamus in this circumstance ............................... 20
B. Alternatively, mandamus is wholly inappropriate;
Applicant has an adequate remedy at law ........................... 23
PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................... 26
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................ 27
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4 ............................................................ 28
vi
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910
S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)........................................................ 5
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) ..................................... 13
Braxton v. Dunn, 803 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) .................... 23
Connecticut Bd. Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) ................. 13
Dickens v. Court of Appeals, 727 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) .. 21
Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ....................... 20
Ex parte Geiken, 28 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ............... passim
Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ..................... 20
Ex Parte Hallmark, 883 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) .................. 8
Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ...................... 11
Ex parte McLain, 869 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) .................... 10
Ex parte Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) 12, 13, 16
Ex parte Palomo, 759 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)..................... 18
Ex parte Retzlaff, 135 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ...................... 14
Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ......................... 11
vii
Ex parte Ruiz, 750 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ........................... 9
Ex parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) .................... 8
Ex parte Thompson, 173 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .................. 6
Fabries v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1973) ................... 17
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979) .................................................................................... 9, 12, 16, 17
Kentucky Dep’t Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) ....................... 12
Peck v. Battey, 721 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1983) ........................................ 17
Robinson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989) ................. 7
Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ...... 21, 22, 23, 25
State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) .... 23
State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano, 692 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
.............................................................................................................. 20
State ex rel. Wade v. Mays, 689 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) .... 21
State v. Klein, 224 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949) ......................... 20
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.144 ....................................................................... 16
viii
Statutes
Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1154, § 14, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. ch. 1154 ......................................................................................... 7
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.04 ............................................................... 21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002 ......................................................................... 22
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.001(6) ..................................................................... 1
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.0441 ....................................................................... 7
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.1411 ................................................................. 7, 15
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.145(f) ...................................................................... 6
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149(d) ..................................................................... 9
Regulations
37 Tex. Admin. Code § 145.17 ..................................................... 18, 23, 24
37 Tex. Admin. Code § 145.6 ..................................................................... 7
ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant was convicted of possession of marihuana and sentenced
to forty-two months’ imprisonment. SHCR at 47–50.1 He did not appeal
his conviction. See Order at 1, Ex parte Phillips, No. WR-82,437-01 (Tex.
Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2014) (per curiam) (“Order”). As relevant here, on or
about August 1, 2014, the Board of Pardons and Paroles (“Board”)
conducted a simple parole review2 and decided not to grant Applicant his
release under the Texas parole statute. Order at 1. As part of this process,
the Board provided Applicant with written notice describing the reasons
for its denial. SHCR at 9. Applicant filed a habeas application pursuant
to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
in which he contended that the Board’s written notice of its denial
decision violated the Due Process Clause. Order at 1; SHCR at 7–8.
1“SHCR” refers to the clerk’s record for this state habeas application,
numbered WR-82,437-01. The Board will use the following format: “SHCR at [page].”
2 The Board will use the terms “simple parole” or alternatively “parole” to refer
to “the discretionary and conditional release of an eligible inmate sentenced to the
institutional division so that the inmate may serve the remainder of the inmate’s
sentence under the supervision of the pardons and paroles division.” Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 508.001(6) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
1
The state habeas trial court entered proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and recommended that Applicant’s application be
denied. SHCR at 52–55. The clerk of the trial court then transmitted the
application to this Court. The Court ordered that this application be filed
and set for submission to determine the following three questions:
(1) whether an applicant who contends that under §
508.1411 the [Board’s] written notice violates the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution has an
adequate remedy on habeas when there is not a
presumption of release to parole;
(2) assuming for the sake of argument that an applicant
does have an adequate remedy on habeas, whether §
508.1411 implicates due process and the written notice
provided by the [Board] satisfies due process; and
(3) whether an application for a writ of mandamus is the
proper remedy for such claims.
Order at 1–2 (citations omitted). The Court also invited the Board to
submit a brief to assist the Court in resolving the three issues. Order at
2.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Board respectfully submits that the primary legal questions
raised in this appeal are adequately presented in the briefs and record,
2
and that the decisional process on this point would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Unhappy with the Board’s decision to deny him parole, Applicant
filed an Article 11.07 habeas application in which he contended that the
Board’s written notice of its denial decision violated the Due Process
Clause. SHCR at 7–8. While Applicant suggests the existence of a due
process violation, he does not contend that the Board violated the
statutory requirements in Section 508.1411 of the Texas Government
Code when it provided its written reasons for denying parole. See SHCR
at 7–8. Nor does Applicant contend that any of the reasons provided in
the Board’s denial notice constituted a violation of the Board’s rules or
were factually or legally erroneous. See id. Rather, Applicant’s sole
contention is that the Board did not provide him “with
adequate/sufficient information supporting . . . [its] denial of parole[,]”
and that this purported failing constituted a violation of his
constitutional right to due process. SHCR at 8.
3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The first and second questions posed by the Court are intertwined.
The first asks whether Applicant’s particular due process claim is
cognizable under Article 11.07; the second assumes that it is, and then
asks whether Applicant might be able to establish that due process
violation. To answer the first question, however, requires a partial
answer to the second, i.e., if due process is not implicated by either §
508.1411 or the Board’s written notice denying parole, then under this
Court’s precedent, Applicant’s claim is not cognizable under Article
11.07. The answer to the second question, therefore, will partially answer
the first.
This does not mean, however, that Applicant’s present application
cannot be resolved by this Court under Article 11.07. Even if the Court
finally holds that claims like Applicant’s—ones that merely challenge the
sufficiency of the Board’s written reasons to deny simple parole—are not
cognizable in state habeas, this does not mean the Court is without
authority to make such a determination pursuant to Article 11.07, as a
matter of first impression in this case.
4
As the Board will demonstrate below, there is good reason that this
proceeding should not be cognizable under Article 11.07. Applicant’s
effort to turn a simple parole denial into an adversarial judicial
proceeding to test the “adequacy” of the Board’s written reasons in
denying parole is not supported by either Texas law or the Constitution.
The Court should therefore use this opportunity to confirm that §
508.1411 did nothing to change discretionary nature of parole denial in
Texas.
ARGUMENT
I. Because Applicant’s Legal Claim Does Not Advance a Cognizable
Liberty Interest, Article 11.07 is Unavailable to Advance That
Claim.
Before addressing the specifics of Applicant’s claim, the Board first
acknowledges that complaints related to parole are not always beyond
the scope of Article 11.07. “Parole is a form of restraint which allows an
applicant to pursue the remedies afforded under Article 11.07.” Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d
481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). “A claim that parole or other form of
administrative release has been unlawfully revoked must be brought to
5
the attention of the convicting court under Article 11.07.” Id. But, as the
Board will establish below, Applicant’s particular parole complaint
cannot be brought under Article 11.07.
A. To the extent that Applicant is asking this Court to review the
Board’s decision to deny him parole, Article 11.07 does not
provide a remedy because the decision is not a proper subject
of judicial review.
The parole statute in effect when the holding offense is committed
determines an inmate’s parole-release eligibility. Ex parte Thompson,
173 S.W.3d 458, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). As relevant here, Applicant’s
holding offense was committed on October 7, 2011. SHCR at 28. Thus, an
inmate like Applicant, who is not serving a sentence for one of several
disqualifying convictions, is eligible for release to parole “when the
inmate’s actual calendar time served plus good conduct time equals one-
fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less.” Tex. Gov’t
Code § 508.145(f) (West 2011). Once an inmate reaches that point, he is
only eligible for release to parole because § 508.145(f) does not mandate
that the inmate be released. Rather, when the inmate accrues sufficient
time-served credit under the statute, the Board determines—with near
6
absolute discretion—whether to grant or deny parole. See Tex. Gov’t
Code § 508.0441(a) (West 2011.).
Effective September 1, 2013, the Legislature directed the Board to
provide inmates like Applicant with a written statement containing the
reasons for the Board’s decision not to release him to parole. See Act of
May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1154, § 14, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 1154 (West) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.1411). The Board’s
administrative regulations require the same.3 See 37 Tex. Admin. Code §
145.6 (2014) (Tex. Bd. Pardons and Parole). The Board complied with its
legal obligations when it provided Applicant with written notification of
the reasons it denied parole. SHCR at 9. Applicant, however, is not
pleased with the reasons given by the Board in support of its decision to
3 Moreover, pursuant to the Board’s published policies and directives, it was
providing such notification before the 2013 change in the law. E.g., Texas Board of
Pardons and Paroles, Board Polices and Directives, BPP-DIR. 08-03.08,
(last
visited March 9, 2015) (showing that pursuant to a March 21, 2008 Board Directive,
inmates received written notice of the reasons for a parole panel denial). Although
the Board’s historic policy in this regard is not outcome determinative to this appeal,
the Board cites it to demonstrate that § 508.1411 did not actually change the Board’s
practice. See Robinson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 648, 652–53 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989),
aff’d and opinion adopted, 841 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (outlining the
circumstances in which an appellate court can take judicial notice of facts like the
Board’s executive policy, if they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
7
deny him parole; he considers them constitutionally inadequate. See
SHCR at 7–8.
To the extent that Applicant is attacking the adequacy of those
reasons in support of a desire to be released to parole, his contention is
synonymous with the decision to deny parole itself, and it is not
reviewable by this Court under the auspices of Article 11.07. This is
because the decision of whether to release an inmate to simple parole—
even though he is eligible—remains within the sound discretion of the
Board and is not subject to judicial review. See Ex parte Geiken, 28
S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Ex parte Rutledge, 741
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Ex
Parte Hallmark, 883 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). “[W]e have
reviewed procedures that relate to the granting of . . . parole without
reviewing the parole board’s ultimate decision granting or denying . . .
parole.” Id. at 557 (citing Ex parte Ruiz, 750 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex. Crim.
8
App. 1988)).4 And the Court provided a powerful justification for this rule
in Ex parte Geiken:
The simple fact is that not all government decisions
implicate constitutional rights and not all such decisions are
subject to review. As the Supreme Court noted, “[d]ecisions of
the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not
automatically invoke due process protection; there simply is
no constitutional guarantee that all executive decisionmaking
must comply with standards that assure error-free
determinations. This is especially true with respect to the
sensitive choices presented by the administrative decision to
grant parole release.”
Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at 556 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska
Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)).
It bears repeating—to the extent that Applicant is asking the Court
to review the Board’s substantive determination that he not be released
to parole, that decision is not subject to judicial review. See id.
4 Unlike the restriction on this Court’s authority to review the Board’s decision
to deny release to mandatory supervision, which is statutory, see Tex. Gov’t Code §
508.149(d), this limitation on the propriety of reviewing the Board’s decision to deny
simple parole appears to be the sound creation of the Court.
9
B. To the extent that Applicant is asking this Court to determine
whether § 508.1411 creates a liberty interest, Applicant’s
contention is reviewable by this Court under Article 11.07 as
a matter of first impression.
Applicant is advancing an argument implicating the force and effect
of § 508.1411, which requires the Court to first resolve whether that
statute creates a liberty interest sufficient to maintain an action under
Article 11.07. Like any threshold question regarding a court’s authority
to act, this Court necessarily has authority to first determine whether
Applicant’s claim, as it relates to § 508.1411, can proceed under Article
11.07. But as the Board will establish below, once this decision is made
generally—and assuming the Court agrees that § 508.1411 does not
create a liberty interest—the Court should then hold that Article 11.07
is not available to resolve claims like Applicant’s going forward.
“A threshold determination in any post[-]conviction habeas corpus
application is whether the claim presented is cognizable by way of
collateral attack.” Ex parte McLain, 869 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994); accord Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at 556 (“The first question we must
consider is whether Article 11.07 is the proper method for presenting
applicant’s claim to this Court”). To this end, the Court has held that
10
under “Article 11.07 . . . post-conviction habeas relief is available for
claims involving jurisdictional defects and violations of fundamental or
constitutional rights.”5 Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006) (citing Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002)).
Applicant is not here suggesting either a jurisdictional defect in his
judgment of conviction or a violation of a “fundamental” right; rather,
Applicant explicitly presses a due process violation. See SHCR at 7–8.
Hence, to determine whether Applicant advances a cognizable Article
11.07 claim, the question becomes whether the Board’s written reasons
denying parole, as required by § 508.1411, implicate the protections of
the Due Process Clause. If they do not—and as the Board will establish
below, they cannot—then Applicant’s claims are not cognizable, whether
or not he makes them with reference to the Due Process Clause.
A procedural due process analysis is two-tiered. The
reviewing court must determine whether a protected liberty
or property interest exists and, if so, decide whether sufficient
procedural safeguards are employed to assure the deprivation
of that interest is not arbitrary. The interest at issue must
5 Under the Court’s precedent, whether Article 11.07 is “available” to advance
a post-conviction claim, appears to involve only the cognizability of that claim, and
not a limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction to otherwise entertain that claim.
11
amount to more than a “unilateral hope.” [R]ather the
claimant must show an entitlement. A liberty interest may
arise from either the due process clause itself or from state
statutes. In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.
1 (1979), the Supreme Court acknowledged that even though
the due process clause itself does not embody a right to release
on parole, a state statute could create an entitlement to
release on parole.
Ex parte Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(citations omitted). Hence, the first question becomes whether § 508.1411
creates a liberty interest necessary to obtain the protections of the Due
Process Clause.
C. The language of § 508.1411 does not create a liberty interest
in parole.
“The Supreme Court has determined that a liberty interest is
created when state statutes use such mandatory language.” Geiken, 28
S.W.3d at 558 (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11–12). “A statute will
create an expectation or entitlement if it places ‘substantive limitations
on official discretion’ to deny the particular interest.” Montgomery, 894
S.W.2d at 327 (quoting Kentucky Dep’t Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
462 (1989)). “Explicitly mandatory language i.e., specific directives to the
decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present,
12
a particular outcome must follow will create a liberty interest.” Id. at
327–28 (internal quotations omitted). For example, “mandatory language
stating that a prisoner shall be released on parole unless certain
enumerated factors are found to be present was held to create a
presumption and, therefore, an expectation of release.” Id. at 328 (citing
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987)).
“On the other hand, unfettered discretion shown by an absence of
standards or mandatory prerequisites does not give rise to an
entitlement.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Connecticut Bd. Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981)). The preceding limitation bears
repeating— if the relevant statute does not create a liberty interest, then
the Due Process Clause in not implicated. Id.; see Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at
558 (where a statute does not create a liberty interest “then no procedural
due process safeguards are required.”). And absent a due process
violation, Applicant cannot obtain an Article 11.07 remedy because such
a claim would not be cognizable.
Indeed, this Court already determined that Texas’s simple parole
statutes—the ones applied here to deny Applicant release—do not create
13
a mandatory presumption in favor of release under the auspices of either
Greenholtz or Allen. “[A]n inmate does not have a statutorily vested
liberty interest in being released on parole.” Ex parte Retzlaff, 135
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at 558);
see also Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at 558 (“Unlike parole, which requires that
the Board vote in favor of release, the mandatory supervision statute
requires that the offender be released absent Board action to the
contrary”); id. (“[T]he parole system in Texas creates no such
presumption”). And again, since the Texas parole statute does not create
a liberty interest in parole, the Due Process Clause finds no application
to the Board process in denying parole. See Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at 558
(where a statute does not create a liberty interest “then no procedural
due process safeguards are required”).
The question then becomes whether the enactment of § 508.1411
somehow changed the Court’s legal resolution in Geiken, and created a
mandatory presumption in favor of release where there was none
before—it did not. The statute reads:
(a) For each decision of a parole panel granting or denying
the release of an inmate on parole, or denying the
14
release of an inmate on mandatory supervision, the
parole panel shall:
(1) produce a written statement, in clear and
understandable language, that explains:
(A) the decision; and
(B) the reasons for the decision only to the extent
those reasons relate specifically to the
inmate;
(2) provide a copy of the statement to the inmate; and
(3) place a copy of the statement in the inmate’s file.
(b) In a written statement produced under Subsection (a),
the parole panel may withhold information that:
(1) is confidential and not subject to public disclosure
under Chapter 552; or
(2) the parole panel considers to possibly jeopardize
the health or safety of any individual.
(c) The board shall keep a copy of each statement produced
under Subsection (a) in a central location.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.1411 (West 2014) (emphasis added). The single
“mandatory” word in the statute directs the Board to provide its rationale
after it has already denied release to parole. See id. Section 508.1411,
however, places no limits on the Board’s discretion to grant or to deny
parole and it does not suggest that a particular liberty-based outcome
must follow where the Board fails to provide a reason. As a result, it does
not create a free-standing liberty interest, which means that Applicant’s
legal complaints regarding the Board’s notice are not cognizable.
15
D. Where, as here, no liberty interest is implicated by statute,
and hence, no due-process rights are created by statute, a
prisoner is not entitled to a written statement of the reasons
for denial of parole.
The specificity demanded by Applicant is not called for by statute,
nor is it required by due process. In analyzing parole procedures which,
like the Board’s, are not grounded in a protectable liberty interest, the
Supreme Court has explained:
[T]here simply is no constitutional guarantee that all
executive decisionmaking must comply with standards that
assure error-free determinations. This is especially true with
respect to the sensitive choices presented by the
administrative decision to grant parole release.
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted). And because the Board is
given such broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny
parole,6 due process does not require that an inmate be given a reason for
the Board’s decision to deny parole. See e.g., Peck v. Battey, 721 F.2d
6 Indeed the Board is given complete authority to write its own rules and
policies regarding its decision to grant or deny parole, and can change those
guidelines on its own discretion. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.144 (West 2015). The
single substantive “requirement” is that the Board “ensure that the guidelines
require consideration of an inmate’s progress in any programs in which the inmate
participated during the inmate’s term of confinement.” See Tex. Gov’t Code §
508.144(a)(3). Importantly, however, this requirement does not actually place a
substantive limitation on the Board’s official discretion to deny parole. See
Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d at 327.
16
1157, 1159 (8th Cir. 1983) (because the applicable statutes did not
require the granting of commutation or parole upon a set criteria, the
inmate did not have “a statutorily created expectation” of early release,
and was therefore not entitled to written reasons for denial); Fabries v.
U.S. Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973) (where board is given
a broad range of discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an
application for parole, “a prisoner need not be . . . provided with a
statement of reasons for the Board’s actions”). As the Supreme Court
explained:
[W]e find nothing in the due process concepts . . . that requires
the Parole Board to specify the particular “evidence” in the
inmate’s file or at his interview on which it rests the
discretionary determination that an inmate is not ready for
conditional release. The Board communicates the reason for
its denial as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior. To
require the parole authority to provide a summary of the
evidence would tend to convert the process into an adversary
proceeding and to equate the Board’s parole-release
determination with a guilt determination.
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15–16 (citations omitted). Hence, under the
Texas parole scheme, due process does not require that the Board provide
Applicant with any reasons in support of its decision to deny parole—let
alone constitutionally “adequate” ones.
17
E. Since Applicant’s claims do not implicate due process
protections, they do not advance a cognizable basis for habeas
relief, and Article 11.07 is not available going forward to
challenge the written reasons of the Board to deny simple
parole.
The Court should not permit inmates like Applicant to convert the
Board’s determination to deny parole into a judicially mediated,
adversarial proceeding to test the legal “acceptability” of the denial
reasons. Due process does not require such an outcome, and nothing in
the text of the statute suggests the Legislature intended one.
This is not to say that Applicant is without a legal remedy to correct
hypothetical Board-errors in its written notice denying parole. Board
rules give inmates access to a procedure to seek special review after a
denial of parole, where such a request is premised upon “an allegation
that the parole panel has committed an error of law or board rule.” 37
Tex. Admin. Code § 145.17. Indeed, in similar contexts the Court has
found that the availability of an analogous form of administrative review
is more than adequate to justify the unavailability of judicial review in
habeas. See Ex parte Palomo, 759 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(noting that the Court has previously refused to consider matters such as
18
loss of good time credit, disciplinary proceedings and inmate
classification by way of a writ of habeas corpus, especially where
administrative procedures exist to correct errors).
II. Because § 508.1411 Does Not Create an Independent, Freestanding
Liberty Interest, a Prisoner Is Not Constitutionally Entitled to a
Written Statement of the Reasons for Denial of Parole; Hence,
There Can Be No Due Process Violation Whether or Not the Board’s
Reasons for That Denial Comport With § 508.1411.
The Court next asks the Board to consider the following—assuming
arguendo the availability of Article 11.07 to advance Applicant’s claim,
whether § 508.1411 implicates due process and, moreover, whether the
written denial notice provided by the Board satisfies due process. For the
reasons established, supra, the Board’s decision to deny simple parole
does not impute a cognizable interest under the Due Process Clause and
§ 508.1411 did nothing to change this. So, too, as established, supra, the
Board’s written notice of the reasons for denying parole can never
implicate due process under the present, Texas statutory scheme.
And because the Board’s written reason for denying parole does not
implicate the protections of the Due Process Clause—irrespective of the
requirements of § 508.1411—Applicant fails to advance a cognizable
19
claim under Article 11.07. The Court should therefore deny Applicant’s
application as being non-cognizable, to give guidance to the lower courts
in resolving this kind of claim going forward.
III. An Application for a Writ of Mandamus Is Not the Proper Remedy
for Applicant’s Claim.
A. The Court does not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of
mandamus in this circumstance.
“‘For a court to act, it must have jurisdiction to do so. This is
fundamental.’” State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano, 692 S.W.2d 470, 482 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985) (quoting State v. Klein, 154 Tex. Crim. 31, 224 S.W.2d
250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949)). The Court has original jurisdiction over
state habeas applications. See Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (recognizing this Court’s “constitutional powers over
the writ of habeas corpus”).
In cases not involving habeas corpus, the scope of the Court’s
jurisdiction is defined by the Texas legislature. See Ex parte Golden, 991
S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“The Legislature may define,
expand, or limit this Court’s original writ jurisdiction.”). Article 4.04 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure grants each member of this Court,
20
[T]he power and authority to grant and issue and cause the
issuance of writs of habeas corpus, and, in criminal law
matters, the writs of mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, and
certiorari. The court and each judge thereof shall have, and is
hereby given, the power and authority to grant and issue and
cause the issuance of such other writs as may be necessary to
protect its jurisdiction or enforce its judgments.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.04, § 1 (West 2014). Article 4.04 also provides
that this Court shall have appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the
limits of Texas in all criminal cases. Id. § 2. This Court, then, may issue
writs of mandamus to enforce its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus or the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in criminal law
matters.
Undoubtedly, this Court has jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus in “criminal law matters.” See Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d
784, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see Dickens v. Court of Appeals, 727
S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); State ex rel. Wade v. Mays, 689
S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). No such jurisdiction appears to
exist, however, where mandamus is directed at an executive agency like
the Board:
Only the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ
of mandamus or injunction, or any other mandatory or
21
compulsory writ or process, against any of the officers of the
executive departments of the government of this state to order
or compel the performance of a judicial, ministerial, or
discretionary act or duty that, by state law, the officer or
officers are authorized to perform.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c) (West 2014). So, too, with one exception, the
Board has been unable to locate any cases in which the Court maintained
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a non-judicial officer.
See Flack, 728 S.W.2d at 789. But Flack is distinguishable because the
Court there issued mandamus to enforce a pre-existing court order
directed to county officials. See id. at 788–89.
To the extent that Applicant might argue that the Court has
continuing jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus pursuant to this
pending Article 11.07 application, under the Court’s precedent his habeas
application is not a cognizable vehicle to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction
to do anything. Consequently, there can be no court order or mandate to
enforce. This is not to say that the Board is unmindful of its obligation to
comport with the spirit and text of § 508.1411—in Applicant’s case and
others. And moreover, the Board will plainly follow its own rules when
considering “an allegation that the parole panel has committed an error
22
of law or board rule” with regard to the Board’s written reason for
denying parole. See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 145.17.
In short, because mandamus would be directed against non-judicial
state actors, and because Applicant’s Article 11.07 application is not
cognizable, Applicant cannot invoke this Court’s original or continuing
mandamus jurisdiction.
B. Alternatively, mandamus is wholly inappropriate; Applicant
has an adequate remedy at law.
Alternatively, an original writ of mandamus is wholly
inappropriate to provide the specific remedy that Applicant seeks. To be
entitled to a writ of mandamus, Applicant must show that (1) the act
sought to be compelled is ministerial and non-discretionary, and (2) he
has no adequate remedy at law. See Braxton v. Dunn, 803 S.W.2d 318,
320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Assuming, arguendo, that § 22.002(c) does
not foreclose the Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directed
at a non-judicial officer, mandamus is not available here.
First, an act is ministerial only “if it constitutes a duty clearly fixed
and required by law.” Flack, 728 S.W.2d at 789 (quoting State ex rel.
Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (op. on reh’g)).
23
Further, an act is ministerial only if it can be “accomplished without the
exercise of discretion or judgment.” Id. The only action by the Board
which might qualify as “ministerial” under § 508.1411 is the act of
providing an inmate with a written reason for denying parole. But this
already happened. The reasons themselves—which Applicant explicitly
deems inadequate—are merely a reflection of the Board’s discretion to
deny parole. Therefore, an order directing the Board to justify or re-issue
its discretionary reasons to deny parole fail any conceivable legal
measure of “ministerial” and cannot support the Court’s authority to
issue a writ of mandamus.
Second, Applicant has an available remedy that is more than
adequate to protect the narrow statutory right created in § 508.1411. See
37 Tex. Admin. Code § 145.17; see also Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at 556 (holding
that the judicial process is not always available to ensure error-free
decision making by the executive, at least with respect to non-
constitutional “rights”). To be sure, the Court has held that even where
an adequate remedy exists, mandamus may be proper where the
alternative remedial process is “uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow,
24
inconvenient, inappropriate or ineffective as to be deemed inadequate.”
Flack, 728 S.W.2d at 792. Nothing in this record, however, suggests such
a view.
25
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this
Court deny Applicant’s Article 11.07 application and hold that such a
challenge is not cognizable under either habeas or mandamus processes.
Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General
EDWARD L. MARSHALL
Chief, Criminal Appeals Division
/s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN*
*Lead Counsel Assistant Attorney General
Supervising Attorney
for Non-Capital Appeals
Criminal Appeals Division
State Bar No. 00793549
Joseph.Corcoran@TexasAttorneyGeneral.gov
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
Tel.: (512) 936-1400
Fax: (512) 936-1280
ATTORNEYS FOR THE TEXAS
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Rule 9.5(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I do hereby certify that if the email address of attorneys
designated below is on file with the electronic filing manager, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing notice was served electronically by that
electronic filing manager, on the following attorneys via electronic mail:
Alfredo Morales, Jr.
Attorney for Applicant
Glenn Devino
Attorney for the State
Moreover, I do hereby certify that if the email addresses for the
designated attorneys are not on file with the electronic filing manager, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was served by placing
same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this the 13th day of
March, 2015, addressed to:
Alfredo Morales, Jr.
700 S. 25 1/2 St. E.
Mcallen, TX 78501
Glenn Devino
Assistant District Attorney
100 N. Closer
Edinburg, Texas 78539
27
/s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 73.1(f)
This brief complies with Tex. R. App. Proc. 73.3 in that it contains
6,478 words, as calculated pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 73.1(d), in
Microsoft Word 2013, Century, 14 points.
/s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Assistant Attorney General
28