in the Interest of K.R.M. and A.B.D., Children

Opinion filed August 21, 2015 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-15-00032-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF K.R.M. AND A.B.D., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 244th District Court Ector County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. C-3369-PC MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from an order in a parental termination case in which the district court denied a request for a de novo hearing. In a single issue, Appellant, who is the mother of the children, contends that the district court erred when it refused to hold a de novo hearing. We affirm. I. Background Facts The record shows that the associate judge conducted a trial on the merits of the issue of parental termination. On Friday, January 9, the trial concluded, and on Monday, January 12, the associate judge sent her report via e-mail to the parties. The associate judge signed the final termination order on Friday, January 16, and Appellant filed a request for a de novo hearing before the referring court that same day. The referring court, “[a]fter reviewing all pleadings and briefs,” denied Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing. II. Analysis Section 201.015(a) of the Family Code provides that a party may file a request for a de novo hearing to be conducted by the referring court; however, the request must be written and must be filed “not later than the third working day after the date the party receives notice of the substance of the associate judge’s report.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(a) (West 2014) (emphasis added). When such a request is filed, the referring court “shall hold a de novo hearing” within thirty days. Id. § 201.015(f). In this case, Appellant received notice of the substance of the associate judge’s report on January 12 when the associate judge sent the report via e-mail. See id. § 201.011; TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(f)(10). Appellant filed her request for a de novo hearing on January 16, four working days after receiving notice of the substance of the associate judge’s report. Thus, Appellant’s request was not filed in a timely manner. Appellant contends that she had seven days to file her request, but she relies on a previous version of the Family Code that does not apply to this case. The three- day limit took effect on September 1, 2013. See Act of May 24, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 916, §§ 5, 11, 12, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws ___ (effective September 1, 2013) (replacing the word “seventh” with the word “third”) (current version at FAM. § 201.015(a)); see also Craig v. Craig, No. 11-15-00029-CV, 2015 WL 1569938, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 2, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). The original petition for protection of a child was filed in January 2014; accordingly, the current statute controls. Craig, 2015 WL 1569938, at *1 n.1. Because Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing before the referring court was not timely filed, Appellant was not 2 entitled to a de novo hearing, and the district court did not err when it denied Appellant’s request. See FAM. § 201.015(a); In re B.M.A.J., No. 12-12-00225-CV, 2012 WL 6674428 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 20, 2012, pet. denied). We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. III. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. MIKE WILLSON JUSTICE August 21, 2015 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson, J., and Bailey, J. 3