NUMBER 13-15-00089-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ROBERTO SAVEDRA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court
of Jackson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant Roberto Savedra appeals from a judgment rendered by the 24th District
Court of Jackson County, Texas. After a trial before the bench, the trial court found
Savedra guilty of the third-degree felony offense of possession of marijuana in an amount
between five and fifty pounds, and sentenced him to prison for six years. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
Savedra raises four issues on appeal complaining that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because: (1) the evidence against him was obtained via
an illegal prolonged detention; (2) the search of his vehicle was rendered unconstitutional
by the officer’s failure to Mirandize him prior to requesting consent to search; (3) he did
not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search; and (4) his statement was not
knowingly and voluntarily made. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 16, 1999, Trooper Frank Rios with the Texas Department of Public
Safety noticed a 1981 Dodge truck travelling northbound on Highway 59. The truck
lacked a front license plate, did not have a side mirror on the driver’s side of the vehicle,
and had a defective muffler. Trooper Rios activated his emergency flashing lights and
stopped the vehicle. Savedra exited the vehicle at Trooper Rios’ request and voluntarily
provided his driver’s license. Trooper Rios testified that Savedra appeared more
nervous than warranted by a routine traffic stop and would not make eye contact with him.
Trooper Rios asked Savedra routine questions regarding his trip: Savedra stated that
he was traveling from Brownsville to Louisiana for the purpose of picking up another
vehicle. Savedra’s wife, Olga Savedra, was also in the vehicle at the time of the stop.
Trooper Rios noted that she also appeared nervous, and he asked her the same
questions. Olga stated that she did not know where they were going and did not know
the purpose for the trip.
As a result of the Savedras’ nervous behavior and their inconsistent statements,
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Trooper Rios testified that he became increasingly suspicious that they were engaged in
criminal activity and Trooper Rios asked for and received Savedra’s permission to search
the vehicle. At this point the Savedras had been stopped for three to four minutes.
Trooper Rios had not yet determined whether Savedra had any outstanding warrants,
cited him for his driving violations, or written him a warning.
While visually examining the vehicle, Trooper Rios noticed that two non-factory
welds on the drive-shaft yoke and that certain bolts connecting the drive shaft had been
disturbed even though the universal joint had not been replaced. Trooper Rios
determined that he required additional tools to continue the search and asked Savedra to
follow him to a garage in Ganado where he could continue his inspection. Savedra again
consented and followed Trooper Rios to Ganado. Upon arrival at the garage, Trooper
Rios again asked Savedra if he could continue his search—Savedra again consented.
Trooper Rios drilled an “inspection hole” into the drive shaft and found that it contained
marijuana. Upon dismantling the drive shaft, Trooper Rios discovered 9.60 pounds of
marijuana. At all times Trooper Rios and Savedra conversed in English.
Sergeant Pat Brennan, an investigator with the Department of Public Safety
Narcotics Service, was called to take Savedra’s statement. Sgt. Brennan read Savedra
his Miranda rights and provided the required warnings. Savedra indicated that he
understood his rights, agreed to waive them, and continued to provide his statement. In
his statement, Savedra admitted to possessing the marijuana. At all times Sgt. Brennan
and Savedra conversed in English.
Though arrested for the offense in February of 1999, Savedra skipped bail on his
charge. Fifteen years later, on April 7, 2014, Savedra was pulled over for another traffic
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offense. The officer noted Savedra had an outstanding warrant and arrested him.
Savedra was returned to Jackson County, Texas for trial. Savedra waived his right to
trial by jury.
Savedra’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
search and a motion to suppress Savedra’s statement. The trial court ruled that the
motions to suppress were to be carried with the trial. After the State rested, Savedra’s
counsel again urged the motions to suppress, which the trial court denied. The trial court
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found “that there was
probable cause for the stop, that the trooper received consent for the subsequent
searches, and . . . the statement . . . was voluntary and that [Savedra] had been properly
admonished.” After considering all the evidence and argument presented by both
parties, the trial court found Savedra guilty of possession of marijuana and assessed a
sentence of six years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. PRESERVATION
As a threshold matter, the State contends that Savedra failed to preserve his
issues on appeal because they were not clearly raised before the trial court.
Preservation of error is a systemic requirement on appeal. Blackshear v. State, 385
S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We will not address the merits of an issue that
has not been preserved for appeal. Id. at 591. To preserve a complaint for appellate
review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion
that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the
context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). A defendant who files a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence must also obtain a
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ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. See Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref’d).
On appeal, Savedra challenges the searches and his later statement because they
were allegedly tainted by an illegal prolonged detention, the searches were performed
before an officer read Savedra his Miranda rights, Savedra did not knowingly and
voluntarily consent to the search, and Savedra did not knowingly and voluntarily waive
his rights when he gave his statement. Savedra’s motion to suppress evidence cites the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article 1, section
9 of the Texas Constitution, and Chapter 14 and article 1.06 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure as bases for suppression. Savedra also filed a separate motion to suppress
the statement he provided Sgt. Brennan, citing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, article 1, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, and article
38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court denied Savedra’s motion.
After reviewing the record, we determine that Savedra’s motions and argument to
the trial court were made with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of his
complaints. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339. We disagree
with the State that Savedra failed to preserve his issues on appeal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
discretion, using a bifurcated standard. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88–89
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give “almost total deference” to the trial court's findings of
historical fact that are supported by the record and to mixed questions of law and fact that
turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. at 89. We review de novo the trial
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court's determination of the law and its application of law to facts that do not turn upon an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is
reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to
the case. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
IV. PROLONGED DETENTION
By his first issue, Savedra contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because both his consent to the search and his statement to
Sgt. Brennan were obtained as the result of an illegal prolonged detention. Specifically,
we construe Savedra’s argument to contend that the initial traffic stop was complete and
the officer’s continued inquiry was unwarranted and not based on a reasonable suspicion.
A. Applicable Law
“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.”
Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (Apr. 21, 2015). In
the context of a traffic stop, an investigative detention may last no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Id.; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983);
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Once the purpose of the
stop has been satisfied, the stop may not be used for an unrelated “fishing” expedition.
Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. The propriety of the stop's duration is judged by assessing
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or
confirm their suspicions quickly. Id. at 245. “Authority for the seizure thus ends when
tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.
Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614.
The reasonableness of a temporary detention after the tasks tied to the traffic
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infraction are completed must be examined in terms of the totality of the circumstances
and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, lead to the conclusion that the person
detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. See Woods v. State,
956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); $217,590 in U.S. Currency v. State, 54 S.W.3d
918, 923 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867,
869 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref'd).
B. Discussion
On appeal, Savedra does not challenge the reasonableness of the initial stop.
Trooper Rios testified that from the time he stopped Savedra until the time he obtained
consent to search the vehicle, only three to four minutes passed. It is Savedra’s
contention that the initial three to four minute stop constituted an unreasonably prolonged
detention.
During the three to four minute period, Trooper Rios spoke with both Savedra and
Olga, asked them standard questions regarding their trip plans, checked Savedra’s
license, and visually inspected the vehicle. Trooper Rios testified that he asked for
consent to search the vehicle before he concluded the purpose of the stop; he still had to
check for warrants and fill out a citation or warning for Savedra to sign. However, based
on the Savedras’ responses to his questions, Trooper Rios requested consent to conduct
further investigation.
Even if Trooper Rios had completed the purpose of his initial stop, he had
reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation. See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614;
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. Trooper Rios stated that he based
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his reasonable suspicion on the following articulable facts: (1) Savedra’s excessive
nervousness, beyond that typically caused by a police stop; (2) Savedra’s inability to meet
Trooper Rios’ eyes; (3) the inconsistent statements provided by Savedra and Olga
regarding their trip; and (4) Olga’s excessive nervousness, beyond that typically caused
by a police stop. Because the Savedras’ conduct was reasonably suspicious, Trooper
Rios determined the Savedras merited further investigation and requested consent to
search the vehicle.
Savedra’s detention during Trooper Rios’ traffic stop was warranted, Trooper Rios
had not yet completed the purpose of the stop, and the stop did not last longer than
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct.
at 1614; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. Trooper Rios diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm his suspicions quickly. See Davis, 947
S.W.2d at 243; Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. ref’d). We determine that Savedra was not subjected to a prolonged detention
before Trooper Rios obtained his consent to search the vehicle. We overrule Savedra’s
first issue.
V. VALIDITY OF CONSENT
We address Savedra’s second and third issues together. By his second issue,
Savedra contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of the illegal search. Specifically, Savedra argues that the traffic
stop escalated into a custodial detention such that the officer was required to read
Savedra his rights before obtaining consent to search the vehicle. By his third issue,
Savedra contends that his consent to the search was not voluntarily and knowingly given.
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A. Applicable Law
“Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a search conducted without a
warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only
to . . . specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Rayford v. State, 125
S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973)). A search conducted with the suspect’s voluntary consent is one such
exception. Id. The validity of a suspect’s consent to a search is a question of fact to be
determined from all of the circumstances. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
40 (1996)). The assessment of the voluntariness of consent is objective
reasonableness; that is, what a reasonable person would have understood from the
exchange between the citizen and the police. Valtiera v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 449
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole and
exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony.
Rayford, 125 S.W.3d at 528. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
we give almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts. Id.
Under the Texas Constitution, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that
the consent was valid. Id.
There is no authority that requires a suspect be read his Miranda rights before
consenting to a search. Id. While the failure to inform a suspect that evidence found
can be used against him may be one factor to consider, it would not automatically render
his consent involuntary. See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (determining that a police officer's failure to inform accused that he can refuse
consent does not automatically render accused's consent involuntary, but is a factor for
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the court to consider). Nor is consent rendered involuntary merely because the accused
is under arrest. Rayford, 125 S.W.3d at 528–29 (noting that consent is not involuntary
because the suspect is under arrest if the officer’s guns are not drawn).
B. Discussion
Savedra argues that Trooper Rios was required to Mirandize him before requesting
consent to search because he was under arrest at the time he consented to the search.1
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that consent is not involuntary
merely because the accused is under arrest. See id. In Johnson, the court of criminal
appeals found that consent to search was voluntary even though the defendant was
handcuffed and arrested, no Miranda warnings were given, and no consent to search
form was signed, because the officers' guns were not drawn, the officers were in
appellant's house pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, and the initial protective sweep was
legal. See 68 S.W.3d at 652–53. It is uncontested that the initial stop was based on
probable cause and we have already determined that Trooper Rios had a reasonable
suspicion to continue the investigation. Therefore, the fact that Savedra was not read
his Miranda rights before he consented to the search does not render his consent invalid.
See Rayford, 125 S.W.3d at 528–29; Johnson, 69 S.W.3d at 652–53.
Savedra further contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the
searches because he was not aware he could refuse consent and the language barrier
prevented him from meaningfully understanding Trooper Rios. We review the
voluntariness of Savedra’s consent for objective reasonableness. See Valtiera, 310
1 We disagree with Savedra’s contention that he was under arrest at the time he consented to the
search.
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S.W.3d at 449. The following are the undisputed facts pertinent to Savedra’s consent:
(1) Trooper Rios asked for permission to search the vehicle within three to four minutes
of the initial stop; (2) Savedra was still with his vehicle at the time he consented to the
search; (3) Savedra was not in handcuffs and had not been placed in Trooper Rios’ patrol
vehicle when he gave his consent; (4) Savedra drove his own vehicle to the body shop
for further inspection after consenting to a second search; and (5) Savedra provided
written consent to Trooper Rios before the officer drilled into his vehicle’s drive shaft.
The trial court entered a finding that “the communications between Trooper Rios
and [Savedra] were in English and understood by [Savedra] and that his answers and
responses were consistent with the defendant understanding and being able to
communicate with Trooper Rios in English.” Because the validity of a suspect’s consent
to a search is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, we give the
trial court’s findings of fact almost total deference. Rayford, 125 S.W.3d at 528.
In giving the trial court’s findings almost total deference and considering the
undisputed facts set forth above, we determine that the trial court did not err when it
denied Savedra’s motion to suppress on the basis that Savedra’s consent to each of the
subject searches was valid. See id. at 528–29. We overrule Savedra’s second and
third issues.
VI. INVOLUNTARY STATEMENT
By his fourth issue, Savedra contends that the statement he provided to Sgt.
Brennan was involuntarily obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, and articles 38.21 and
38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, Savedra contends that his
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inability to comprehend English and Sgt. Brennan’s inability to speak Spanish made the
English-only interview presumptively involuntary.
An oral statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation is
admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding if: (1) an electronic recording is
made of the statement; (2) before the statement, but during the recording, the accused is
given the warnings required by article 38.22; and (3) the accused knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waves the rights conveyed by the warning. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.22 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). When a question is raised regarding the
voluntariness of a statement of an accused, the court must make an independent
determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was voluntary.
See id.; Vasquez v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Savedra contends that he did not voluntarily waive his rights because he did not
understand the statutory warnings when he consented to the custodial interrogation.
Savedra stated that he speaks limited English and that Sgt. Brennan gave the statutory
warnings in English. 2 Upon request, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the voluntariness of Savedra’s waiver. The relevant
findings are as follows:
17. The [c]ourt finds that Sgt. Investigator, Pat Brennan, went over the
Miranda Rights with [Savedra] and that [Savedra] fully understood
each and every right and that [Savedra] knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waived such Miranda Rights and agreed to talk to Pat
Brennan. As further evidence of these findings of fact, the court
incorporates by reference, all of the communications between Pat
Brennan and [Savedra] that are reflected in a 25 minute interview
which is set forth in State’s Exhibit 8.
2It is undisputed that the statement was electronically recorded and that the requisite warnings
were read to Savedra. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
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18. The [c]ourt finds that Pat Brennan went through each of [Savedra’s]
rights on State’s Exhibit 8 and that [Savedra] stated as to each and
every right that he understood that right and wished to waive that
right.
19. The [c]ourt finds that all of [Savedra’s] answers to Pat Brennan’s
questions, as well as [Savedra’s] explanation of his answers, clearly
indicate that the interview was not coercive, but rather was
voluntarily given by [Savedra].
20. The [c]ourt further finds that [Savedra’s] answers and explanations
to Pat Brennan’s questions in the 25 minute interview clearly show
that the defendant understood Pat Brennan’s questions and that his
answers were responsive to such questions.
21. The [c]ourt further finds that in such 25 minute interview, [Savedra]
never suggested to Pat Brennan that he didn’t understand Mr.
Brennan’s questions or even that he needed Mr. Brennan to further
clarify any of his questions.
22. The [c]ourt further finds that [Savedra] explained why he was
smuggling marijuana, which was “for the money”, with [Savedra]
explaining that neither he nor his wife worked and that they needed
additional money besides their welfare check.
....
24. The [c]ourt further finds that Pat Brennan explained all of
[Savedra’s] rights not only in legal language, but in more
understandable layman terms. For example, Pat Brennan said “if
you want to stop, just say stop—Do you understand” Do you
understand this right” If you don’t want to talk to me, you don’t have
to—Do you understand that? Do you want to continue?”
And the court concluded that Savedra “understood all of his rights and warnings . . . and
that Savedra knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived such rights prior to giving his
confession as set out in State’s Exhibit 8.”
The trial court is the “sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of
the witnesses” and the evidence presented, particularly where the motion to suppress is
based on the voluntariness of a confession. See Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 238
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court’s ruling is also reasonably supported by the
record. See State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Based on
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the preponderance of the evidence
supports the trial court's conclusion that appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waived his rights before giving his custodial statement. As such, the trial court did not
err in finding appellant's statement admissible under article 38.22. See id. We overrule
Savedra’s fourth issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
22nd day of October, 2015.
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