United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
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No. 04-50889
Summary Calendar
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Mary Halley,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Mary Halley seeks reversal of the district court’s order
affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who
denied Halley Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. On
remand from the Appeals Council, the ALJ found that Halley was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The
district court affirmed.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
Our review is limited to two questions: (1) whether the
final decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2)
whether proper legal standards were used to evaluate the
evidence. Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir.
2002)(citing Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999)).
I. The ALJ Had Substantial Evidence to Support Its Conclusion
Substantial evidence “is more than a scintilla but less than
a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
Although we carefully examine the record, it is the
Commissioner’s role to weigh the evidence. Brown, 192 F.3d at
496.
Halley disputes that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to
support its conclusion that she had the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as a sales person. Specifically,
she points to the determinations of treating physician Dr. Darren
Geyer and the comments of vocational experts that someone could
not keep a job if they were absent approximately eight times per
month. But, as the district court noted, there is no evidence
that the restrictions outlined by Dr. Geyer applied during the
period of coverage.1 The ALJ doubted the credibility of Halley’s
1
Moreover, while Dr. Geyer characterized Halley’s panic
attacks as severe in his report, he identified her physical pain
as moderate. Even if the report did relate to Halley’s coverage
period, it is unclear that this characterization, coupled with
2
account of her limitations; and it evaluated her disability
status based on its understanding of her actual condition. In
doing, it considered the testimony of two evaluating medical
witnesses and relied on testimony from two vocational experts
that someone with Halley’s limitations could perform the light
semi-skilled work of a sales clerk. Thus, the ALJ relied on
substantial evidence.
II. The ALJ Applied the Proper Legal Standard
Halley argues that the ALJ applied an improper legal
standard in three ways. First, Halley contends that the ALJ
erred by failing to support its credibility assessment with
specific facts. The ALJ mentioned that it found no evidence of
allegedly frequent seizures, lost hearing or constant pain,
though it did find evidence of bleeding ulcers. Based on this,
it did “not find the claimant’s statements regarding severe
limitations in her activities of daily living or her inability to
perform any work activity to be credible.” The ALJ also relied
on a medical expert’s testimony that the level of psychological
distress described by Halley was not equivalent to an impairment
as required by Social Security Administration Regulations.
Second, Halley asserts that the ALJ applied an improper
legal standard by failing to give proper weight to Dr. Geyer’s
assessment, as treating physician. However, the doctor’s
his assessments on Halley’s mobility limitations, would prevent
the ALJ from determining that Halley was not disabled.
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evaluation related to a period after March 31, 2000, the end of
Halley’s coverage period. It did not describe Halley’s condition
during the relevant time-frame. Both examining physicians who
did address the coverage period, Drs. Margaret Sedberry and Sam
Benbow, concluded that Halley did not have severe limitations.
Third, Halley argues that the ALJ erred in failing to
address Halley’s ability to maintain employment. “[A]bsent
evidence that a claimant’s ability to maintain employment would
be compromised despite his ability to perform employment as an
initial matter,” the ALJ need not make a specific finding that
claimant can maintain employment. Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d
670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003). As in Dunbar, here the ALJ concluded
that Halley had the residual functional capacity to perform
relevant past work. In Watson v. Barnhart, the case establishing
the necessity of examining ability to maintain–rather than
obtain–employment, the claimant lost movement in his legs on a
periodic basis. 288 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2003). As the
district court here noted, no treating or consulting physician
pronounced Halley unable to work because of her impairments.
Halley’s migraine headaches and panic disorder are unlike the
claimant’s loss of movement in Watson because they do not prevent
her from working. See Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 619 (5th
Cir. 2003)(“[I]n order to support a finding of disability, the
claimant’s intermittently recurring symptoms must be of
sufficient frequency or severity to prevent the claiming from
4
holding a job for a significant period of time.”). In assessing
Halley’s claim, the ALJ applied the proper legal standards.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
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