IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NOS. WR-61,939-01 and WR-61,939-02
IN RE DAVID DOW, Movant
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY
ENFORCEMENT OF CONTEMPT ORDER ISSUED IN HABEAS APPLICANT
PAREDES’S CASE FROM CAUSE NO. 2000-CR-6067B
IN THE 399 TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BEXAR COUNTY
NO. WR-62,099-03
IN RE ROBERT LYNN PRUETT, Petitioner
ON COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR AND FILE A MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND A
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION IN PETITIONER PRUETT’S CASE
FROM CAUSE NO. B-01-M015-0-PR-B
IN THE 156 TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BEE COUNTY
A LCALA, J., filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING STATEMENT
I respectfully concur in this Court’s order that essentially permits attorney David Dow
to represent Robert Lynn Pruett in his current pleadings before this Court. I dissent,
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however, from this Court’s order refusing to stay enforcement of its sanction against Dow.
Rather than carve out a limited exception to the suspension imposed by this Court against
Dow, I would instead immediately terminate the sanction in its entirety.
Today marks my third opinion documenting my ongoing disagreement with this
Court’s excessive action against Dow. Through its present order, a majority of this Court
now permits Dow to represent only Pruett in his current litigation, but it leaves the one-year
suspension in place. This baby step is in the right direction, but instead a giant leap is
needed.
When this Court suspended Dow from practicing before it for one year, the suspension
order was intended to affect only actions in this Court, but the punishment ended up being
more expansive and punitive than what was ordered by or apparently intended by this Court.
In addition to now having successfully completed about one-fourth of the entire term of his
sanction, Dow’s punishment became far more severe than originally intended because he was
also prohibited from practicing in a federal district court for a six-week period due to
reciprocal discipline by the federal court. Because this Court’s sanction became more
punitive than what was apparently intended, this Court should early terminate the sanction
imposed against respondent Dow, fully releasing him from all penalties imposed on him by
this Court’s order dated January 14, 2015. Whatever the degree of Dow’s infraction or the
propriety of this Court’s January majority order sanctioning him, his months of suspension
that were, in effect, carried out by this Court and a federal district court should satisfy this
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Court’s desire to punish him for his conduct. Because this Court refuses to early terminate
its order imposing sanctions, I concur only in the ultimate conclusion reached to permit Dow
to represent Pruett in this case.
Filed: April 1, 2015
DO NOT PUBLISH