ACCEPTED
04-14-00716-CR
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
2/6/2015 6:30:25 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
2/6/2015 6:30:25 PM
KEITH E. HOTTLE
NO. 04-14-00716- CR Clerk
FRANCISCO JAVIER AZUARA, JR.,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
APPEALED FROM 111TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBB COUNTY TEXAS
CAUSE NO. 2014-CRM-389-D2
Honorable Monica Z. Notzon, Judge Presiding
AMENDED BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
OSCAR A. VELA, JR.
OSCAR A. VELA, JR., P.C.
1004 E. Hillside Rd., Ste. B
Telephone: (956) 568-0221
Facsimile: (956) 568-0052
State Bar No.: 24004967
Attorney for Appellant
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 38.21(a), Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure, a complete list of the names of all parties to this action and counsel are
as follows:
Appellant: Francisco Javier Azuara
Attorney for Appellant Nathen Chu
At Trial: 5517 McPherson Rd., Ste. 14
Laredo, Texas 78041
Attorneys for Appellant Oscar A. Vela, Jr.
On Appeal: 1004 E. Hillside Rd., Ste. B
Laredo, Texas 78041
Attorney for State: Isidro R. Alaniz
Webb County District Attorney
1110 Victoria St., Suite 401
Laredo, Texas 78040
Trial Court: Honorable Monica Z. Notzon
District Court Judge
111th District Court
Webb County, Texas
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................... v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED............................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 7
ARGUMENT
I. Issue One: The evidence is factually and legally insufficient to prove that
Appellant committed the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
“as a party by aiding” the shooting of each individual identified in Counts 1-
7 of the Indictment or that he acted as a principal to such an offense. ........ 10
II. Issue Two: The trial court erred by submitting an erroneous and defective
jury charge on the law of parties without naming the principal, without
providing guidance to the Jury in the application paragraph as to the law of
parties, and without identifying the “aiding” conduct of Appellant………..26
III. Issue Three: The trial court abused its discretion and erred in admitting
hearsay testimony in violation of Rule 801(d) and Rule 802 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence in violation of Appellant’s substantial rights………… 32
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 38
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 39
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
United States Supreme Court Decisions
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)......................................................... 11
Jackson v. Virgina, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ................................................................. 10
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) .................................................................. 10
United States Courts of Appeals Decisions
Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1985) .................................................... 11
United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249 (2nd Cir. 1994) ....................................... 11
United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465 (5th Cir.1999),
cert denied, 528 U.S. 1095 (2000) ........................................................................... 11
State of Texas Decisions
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)………………………. 27
Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)……………… 36
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) ......................................... 10
Calvert v. Union Producing Co., 402 S.W.2d 221
(Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1996, writ ref’d n.r.e.)....................................................... 11
Chatman v. State, 846 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)……………………30, 31
Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 187
(Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet ref’d) .................................................... 24
Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)………………………….. 35
iv
Fowler v. State, 379 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Crim.App.1964)………………………….35
Gabriel v. State, 973 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.)……………… 32
Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d)............ 35
Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)…………………………. 20
Hughes v. State, 128 S.W.3d 247 (Tex.App.-Tyler, 2003)……………………… 35
Johnson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)………………………. 31
Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)………………………. 37
Jones v. State, 111 S.W.3d 600 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)………………………… 32
King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)………………………….. 32
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)………………………….. 30
Marvis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 878 (Tex.Crim.App.2001)………………………….. 31
Mize v. State, 922 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ............................................. 22
Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002)…………………………. 32
Monroe v. State, 81 S.W. 726 (App.1904)………………………………………. 19
Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)……………………26, 27
Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Crim. App.1982) .....................................19, 22
Pesina v. State, 949 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997)…………………18
Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)………………………….. 30
Ricondo v. State, 475 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Crim.App.1971)……………………….. 35
Rhyne v. State, 620 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)........................................ 22
v
Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141 (Tex.Crim.App.2001)…………………………..35
Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1989)………………………. 34
Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356 (Tex.Crim.App.2001)………………………. 33
Texas Employer’s Ins. Ass’n v. Goad, 622 S.W.2d 477
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1981, no writ)............................................................................ 11
Valdez v. State, 92 S.W.3d 911………………………………………………….. 19
Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) …………….. 28, 29, 30
Weaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 506, 258 S.W. 171 (1924) ..................................... 11
Williams v. State, 410 S.W.3d 411 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013)………... 12, 19, 21
Wooden v., State, 101 S.W.3d 542
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d.) ……………………20, 2, 23, 24, 25
STATUTES AND RULES PAGE
Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 36.13…………………………………………………12, 19
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02 .............................................................................19, 25
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 ...........................................................................12, 23
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 ...........................................................................12, 25
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)……………………………………………………………32
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2………………………………………………………………32
Tex. R. Evid. 801(d)………………………………………………………….32, 33
Tex. R. Evid. 802…………………………………………………………….32, 33
Tex. R. Evid. 803(2)…………………………………………………………….. 35
vi
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PAGE
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution……………………………………31
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution ………………………….............31
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution …………………………….31
vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 29, 2014, appellant pled not guilty to the offense of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. [CR1:22] [RR9:153].1 After a jury trial, Appellant
was found guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon “as a party by
aiding.” [CR1:419-431, 432-436]. On July 28, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to
14 years and 6 months confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division and a $2,500.00 fine per count of conviction. [CR1:454-456,
476].
On October 6, 2014, Appellant’s motion for new trial was denied by the trial
court. [RR18:56]. On October 10, 2014, Appellant perfected this appeal by filing
his Notice of Appeal. [ CR1:622-623].
1 Appellant uses the following citations: Clerk’s Record will be cited as [CR#:#], where CR
refers to Clerk’s record, followed by volume number and the page number; Reporter’s
Record will be cited as [RR#:#], Where RR refers to the reporter’s record, followed by the
volume number and the page number; States Exhibit [SX#]; and Defendant’s Exhibit [DX#].
1
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.
The evidence is factually and legally insufficient to prove that Appellant
committed the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon “as a party by
aiding” the shooting of each individual identified in Counts 1 – 7 of the Indictment
or that he acted as a principal to such an offense.
II.
The trial court erred by submitting an erroneous and defective jury charge on
the law of parties without naming the principal, without providing guidance to the
Jury in the application paragraph as to the law of parties, and without identifying
the “aiding” conduct of Appellant.
III.
The trial court abused its discretion and erred in admitting hearsay testimony
in violation of Rule 801(d) and Rule 802 of the Texas Rules of Evidence in
violation of Appellant’s substantial rights.
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 7, 2013, a shooting occurred outside D.J.’s Republic night club
(herein after the “Club”) located in Laredo, Texas. [RR9:153]. As a result of the
shooting, a total of Seven (7) individuals were injured by gun shots fired into a
crowd gathered outside the front entrance of the night club. [RR9:153].
According to the facts of the case on July 7, 2013, at approximately 1:38
AM, Alfonso Carlos Tamez (herein after “Tamez”), Francisco Javier Azuara
(herein after “Azuara” and/or “Appellant”), and Jessica Ortega (herein after
“Ortega”) (sometime collectively referred to as the “Parties”) arrived together to
the Club in a white H2 Hummer (herein after “Hummer”). [RR11:198, 205, 209].
Appellant drove the Hummer to the Club and parked along the west side of the
Club on the sidewalk near the patio area. [RR10:206]; [RR11:205, 209, 218].
Upon parking the Hummer, the parties walked into the night club at 1:39 AM.
[RR11:198]. As the Parties walked through the Club, a bottle was thrown at
Ortega. [RR9:154]. As Ortega, Azuara and Tamez looked for the person
responsible for throwing the bottle, another beer bottle hit Tamez on the head.
[RR9:184]; [RR10:149]. Shortly, thereafter, a fight broke out and Tamez, Azuara
and Ortega were escorted out of the Club. [RR11:73]. Azuara was not alleged to
have been involved in the fight. [RR9: 196]. A total of three minutes elapsed
between the time the Parties entered the Club and the time they were escorted out.
3
[RR11: 198]. During the same three minutes, several other fights broke out and
various other patrons were also being escorted out of the Club. [RR9:184].
Once outside the Club, several other fights broke out outside of the Club and
it was utter chaos. [RR9:187,189]; [RR10:150-151]. One of these fights occurred
“right by Molly Street” on the west side of the club. [RR10:151]. Punches were
being thrown by everyone and there were 10 to 15 people involved in the fight.
[RR10:241] [RR11:83]. However, the Parties were not involved in any of the
fights that took place outside the Club. [RR10:149]. At approximately 1:46 AM,
three (3) minutes after the Parties had been escorted out of the Club, shots rang out
and 7 people were injured. [RR11: 200]. 911 dispatchers received their first call at
1:51 AM. [RR9:174]. The gun shots allegedly came from the direction of Molly
Street which was located to the west of the Club and directly adjacent to the patio
area of the Club. [RR10:20, 93, 95, 104]; [SX108]. Several witnesses claimed the
shots came from an area to the west of the club near a parking lot across the street
(Molly Street) from the night club. [RR10:93, 95, 104]; [SX167]. Witnesses also
claimed the shots came from a dark SUV driving south on Molly street. [RR10:93,
95, 104]; RR11:16, 76-77, 87]. Additionally, several vehicles were identified as
being near the area where the shots were alleged to have originated. [RR10:45].
Witnesses identified a red dodge pickup, a white SUV, a dark colored SUV, and a
yellow mustang. [RR9:157]; [RR10:45, 241]; [RR11:76-77, 181-182]; [SX3]. No
4
witnesses could identify the shooter, no witness saw a weapon, and no witness
positively identified any action committed by the Appellant.
That same night at approximately 2:00 AM, a witness called Tamez to
inquire whether he was involved in the shooting. [RR10:80, 120]. Tamez denied
involvement and told the witness and officers that he wanted no problems and
wanted to clear his name. [RR10:121-123]. After this phone call, Tamez, Ortega,
and Appellant drove back to the club and met with law enforcement for over 6
hours to discuss the events that took place on the night of the shooting.
[RR11:179-180]. Appellant and the co-defendants drove back to the Club less than
1 hour from the time they had left the Club. [RR10: 120]. Appellant drove the
Hummer back to the Club and once they arrived, they all fully co-operated with
law enforcement officials. [RR10:76-77]. Appellant and the co-defendants were
padded down, searched and placed in separate patrol units for further investigation.
[RR10:76]. Appellant was cooperative, normal in disposition, and normal in
temperament. [RR10:108]. Appellant gave consent to search the Hummer and a
search was performed. [RR10:76-77, 107-108]. No weapons or other evidence was
found inside the Hummer or on the person of Appellant. [RR10:79]. Appellant and
the co-defendants submitted to questioning without counsel, they submitted to a
gun residue testing, they allowed law enforcement to inspect and search the
Hummer, and they allowed law enforcement to search their homes. [RR: 11: 51-57,
5
179-193, 201-204, 247]. Additionally, Appellant and the co-defendant allowed law
enforcement to conduct a finger print analysis and gun residue test on the Hummer.
[RR11:136, 145]. At no time did Appellant or any of the co-defendants admit to
participating in the shooting made the basis of the indictment. At no time after the
shooting did anyone claim that Appellant was the shooter or a participant in the
shooting. See [RR9, 10, 11, 12].
Appellant, Tamez, and Ortega were subsequently detained and transported to
the Laredo Police Department. [RR11:193]. Appellant was interviewed regarding
this incident. [RR11:193, 205-207] [SX165]. The interrogation lasted about an
hour and the interrogation revealed that Appellant was unaware that someone had
been shot or that he participated in the shooting. [RR11: 205-207]. After the
interrogation, Appellant gave investigators consent to search his home and nothing
was found. [RR11:51]. Appellant was subsequently allowed to return home and he
was not arrested.
On March 26, 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment against all three
defendants. [CR1: 53]. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon as a principal and as a party and was subsequently arrested.
[CR1:47-53].
6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This is a case of insufficient evidence. There is insufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding by the jury that the Appellant committed the act of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a principal, and there is insufficient
evidence to find that Appellant used or knew that a gun was being used during the
commission of this offense. The record is also absent of evidence showing that
Appellant was aware a weapon was being possessed by any person in the vehicle
that he occupied or that any person would use a weapon during any alleged assault.
The record is further absent of evidence showing that Appellant was aware a
weapon was going to be used by any person in the vehicle he occupied.
Additionally, there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under a party liability theory. Under the
Texas law of parties, a person is criminally responsible for the acts of others when
that person acts with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense,
and solicits, encourages, aid, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the
offense. Tex. Pen. Code § 7.02. The record contains no indication that Appellant
knew the offense was occurring or was going to occur therefore negating the intent
element required to support the conviction of the offense. Although Appellant was
alleged to have been an occupant of the Hummer as it drove away from the Club,
Appellant did not have the requisite intent to be found criminally responsible for
7
any of his co-defendants’ actions and there was no evidence that any of his co-
defendants committed any crime. In fact, his co-defendant Ortega was acquitted
on all counts. Additionally, no one could identify the shooter in the case and
neither co-defendant Tamez or Ortega were alleged to have possessed a gun, used
a gun, or shot any of the victims named in Count 1-7 of the amended indictment.
Contrary to the conviction, there was no evidence that Appellant or his co-
defendants were involved in the shooting made the basis of the indictment. In fact,
originally during opening statements the State claimed that Appellant was alleged
to have been an occupant of the Hummer as the Parties left the Club and that an
occupant of the Hummer shot the victims named in the indictment. But as the trial
progressed, the State’s theory fell apart. At closing, the State abandoned their
original theory and now claimed that Appellant occupied a different vehicle and
was in fact the shooter. However, the record was devoid of any evidence that
showed Appellant was the shooter and there was no evidence that Appellant aided
a third party in any way. Additionally, had no motive or reason to commit the
crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and he did not have any motive
to shoot anyone. Further, Appellant was not aware that a shooting was going to
take place, that a shooting took place, or that a weapon was present in the vehicle
he occupied. Additionally, there was no evidence that Appellant aided anyone in
any fashion as required for a conviction under the law of parties alleged by the
8
State. In essence, this was a mere presence case and mere presence at the scene of
a crime is no evidence of guilt. As such, there is legally insufficient evidence to
support a conviction of Appellant as either a principal or under a party liability
theory.
Further, the Court committed error in the jury charge by instructed the jury
that it could find Appellant guilty under the law of parties. The charge failed to
identify the responsible third party, it did not refer the jury back to the abstract
portion of the jury charge on the law of parties, and it failed to identify how the
Appellant aided any principal. As stated above, at closing the State changed its
theory and claimed Appellant was the shooter. However, the State was mistaken
and misstated the testimony of one witness who specifically testified that Appellant
had not shot her. Therefore, even the State was confused as to the theory of their
case and there representations doom the conviction in this case.
Lastly, the trial court impermissible allowed the introduction of hearsay
testimony that affected the Appellant’s substantial rights.
9
ARGUMENT
I. The evidence is legally insufficient to prove that Appellant committed
the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by shooting the
victims identified in the indictment or that he acted as a party to such
offenses.
A. Standard of Review
The sole standard of review an appellate court should apply when
determining legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).
In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that its previous “no
evidence” test was “simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the
constitutional standard of reasonable doubt” because ‘“[a] mere modicum of
evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard.”’ Jackson v. Virginia, 443, U.S. at
320, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting)).2 The question, then, is whether the evidence in this case is genuinely
legally sufficient, not whether there is some proof from which a conclusion of guilt
could be drawn. If the evidence “gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial
2 A “mere modicum” of evidence was said to “include “any evidence that is relevant—that
has any tendency to make the existence of a crime slightly more probably that it would be
without evidence. Id.
10
support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocent of the crime charged, then a
reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” Clark v. Procunier,
755 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir.1985); Weaver v. State, 96 Tex.Crim. 506, 258 S.W. 171
(1924); Texas Employer’s Ins. Ass’n v. Goad, 622 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex App.—
Tyler 1981, no writ); Calvert v. Union Producing Co., 402 S.W.2d 221, 227
(Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1996, writ ref’d n.r.e.); See also United States v. Moreno,
185 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir.1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1095 (2000) (“While the
jury is free to choose among reasonable construction of the evidence, a verdict
cannot be affirmed if it is based on circumstantial evidence that is as consistent
with innocence as it is with guilt.”); United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1256
(2nd Cir. 1994) (evidence “at least as consistent with innocence as with guilt”
insufficient to support a guilty verdict) (internal question marks omitted). See also
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 323-4 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The law goes far to protect the citizen. Even suspicious acts observed
by…officers may be as consistent with innocence as with guilt. That is not
enough, for even the guilty may not be implicated on suspicion alone.”)
B. Principal liability
Although the state abandoned their principal theory of liability by submitting
a jury charge which allowed a conviction against Appellant only under a party
theory of liability, Appellant addresses principal liability in abundance of caution.
11
[CR1:419-431]. Although Appellant addresses the principal liability theory,
Appellant claims the Jury could not have convicted him as a principal in that the
jury charge permitted a conviction only under the law of parties as an aider. See
Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 36.13 (the jury is governed by the law it receives form the
Court); see also Williams v. State, 410 S.W.3d 411 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013)
(the jury is bound by the law it receives from the court).
The offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires that a
person intentionally or knowingly commit the offense of assault as defined in
Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code and that the person: (1) causes serious
bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse; or (2) uses or exhibits a
deadly weapon during the commission of an assault. Tex. Pen. Code §22.02 (a)(1),
(2). Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code provides that a person commits an
assault when a person (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another, including the person’s spouse (2) intentionally or knowingly
threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the person’s spouse; or
(3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as
offensive or provocative.
In this case, Appellant did not assault anyone nor did he use or exhibit a
deadly weapon (a firearm) during the commission of any assault. See [RR9,10,11,
12
12]. Furthermore, the jury could not have found Appellant responsible as principal
because the Court instructed the jury only under a party theory of liability, namely
“a party by aiding”. See [CR1:419-432].
After leaving the night club, there was no evidence that Appellant assaulted
anyone nor is there evidence that Appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon
either individually or by aiding in the shooting of any of the victims in Counts 1-7
of the indictment. During the trial, a total of 29 witnesses testified for the state
and not one witness identified Appellant as the shooter, nor did any witness
identify Appellant as using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the shooting that
occurred on July 7, 2013. [RR9, 10, 11, 12]. The closest the State came to an
identification of Azuara as a principal was when a witness testified that a person
who may have exited a vehicle involved in the shooting resembled Azuara. In fact,
the State used Angel Cruz-Avitu’s testimony during closing arguments to claim
that Appellant was the shooter, but they were mistaken. [RR12:35].
During his direct examination, Angel Cruz Avitu stated that he heard a
screeching sound, he saw a dark colored Expedition pull up, the passenger door
then opened, a person got out of the vehicle with a dark colored shirt wrapped
around his hand. Cruz-Avitu then stated that he turned around and then heard
shots fired. [RR11:76-78]. When asked by the prosecution what this person
looked like, Cruz-Avitu stated: “The person that I had described – I had said it was
13
a Hispanic male. He was about, I believe, like kind of my height. He had a goatee,
mostly describing the gentleman right here.” [RR11:78]. Cruz-Avito then pointed
to Azuara and stated the person he was describing resembled Azuara. [RR11:78].
The state then ran with this statement and asked Cruz-Avitu: “And is that the same
Expedition that we’re talking about where you saw Mr. Azuara stepping out? Yes,
sir.” However, Cruz-Avitu never stated that he saw Azuara stepping out of the
Expedition. [RR11:76-85]. Additionally, Cruz-Avitu responded “yes” in response
to the question if it was the same Expedition.
The Defense clarified this point on cross examination when Mr. Amaya
asked Cruz-Avitu the following:
Mr. Amaya: Okay. And are you sure it’s the gentleman that’s sitting here
that you saw, or you’re just saying that he looks like him?
Cruz-Avitu: I’m just saying he looked like him.
Mr. Amaya: And I want to get this right so that the Jury understands. You
are saying a Hispanic male about 5’9?
Cruz-Avitu: Yes.
Mr. Amaya: But you’re not saying it’s this gentleman?
Cruz-Avitu: No.
[RR11:82].
Mr. Amaya went on and asked Cruz-Avitu about the person he claimed
exited the Expedition. Mr. Amaya asked the following:
14
Mr. Amaya: Tell me if I get this wrong. He stops, the passenger door opens,
correct?
Cruz-Avitu: Yes.
Mr. Amaya: A person gets up?
Cruz-Avitu: Yes.
Mr. Amaya: He had a gun? Did you see the gun?
Cruz-Avitu: No, sir.
…
Mr. Amaya: You never saw a gun flash?
Cruz-Avitu: No. Not until I was hit already on the floor.
Mr. Amaya: Okay. Then you turned around, correct?
Cruz-Avitu: Uh-huh.
[RR11:84-85].
The Defense further asked Cruz-Avitu whether he saw any person shoot at
him. Mr. Chu asked the following:
Mr. Chu: So you’re saying that somebody got out right here?
Cruz-Avitu: Yes, sir.
Mr. Chu: And was firing at you?
Cruz-Avitu: No, sir.
Mr. Chu: No?
15
Cruz-Avitu: No. I didn’t say they fired. I said they had gotten off the
vehicle.
Mr. Chu: Okay. But you’re not telling us or the Jury that that person that
got out fire a weapon?
Cruz-Avitu: Yes, sir. I’m not saying that.
Mr. Chu: You don’t know who fired the weapon?
Cruz-Avitu: No, sir. I don’t.
As for Cruz-Avitu’s statement that the person who exited the dark expedition had a
“goatee,” the Defense showed the Jury in SX163 (video file 0179) that neither
Azuara nor Tamez had a “goatee” on the night of the shooting. [RR12:56]. This
video was taken by surveillance cameras located at the front entrance of the Club
which captured Tamez, Azuara and Ortega as they entered the Club. Therefore,
not only did Cruz-Avitu’s own testimony eliminate Azuara as the occupant of the
dark expedition, but so did the video surveillance taken at the Club because Azuara
did not have a “goatee.” [SX163, video file 0179]. In essence at the end of the
State’s case, there was no testimony that Azuara participated in the shooting in any
manner.
As for the co-defendants, while several witnesses testified they thought co-
defendant Tamez was involved in the shooting, no witness testified that Tamez was
in fact the shooter. [RR9,10,11,12]. No witness testified to seeing any of the
occupants of the Hummer (Appellant, Ortega or Tamez) shooting, possessing a
16
firearm, or as using a firearm. [RR9:196-205]; [RR10:167, 184, 201-203, 241-
242]; [RR11:13-14]. Additionally, while the State initially claimed the shot were
fired from the Hummer or a vehicle ahead of the Hummer this theory was flawed.
During their case in chief, the States claimed the Hummer was in the middle of
Molly Street when the shots were fired, but that was not true. The Hummer was
parked on the sidewalk adjacent to the patio area located to the west of the Club.
[RR10:206]. From this position it was impossible for the Hummer to have been
located in the middle of Molly Street when the shots were fired. See [SX 87, 108,
167]. Additionally, there was no testimony that the Hummer drove north up Molly
Street made a U-turn and then came back south on Molly Street to participate in
the shooting. Further, as stated in the statement of facts, Appellant and his co-
defendants returned to the scene of the crime less than 1 hour after they left the
Club. They returned because a witness called Tamez to inquire whether he was
involved in the shooting. [RR10:80, 120]. Tamez denied involvement and told the
witness and officers that he wanted no problems and wanted to clear his name.
[RR10:121-123]. After this phone call, Tamez, Ortega, and Appellant drove back
to the club and met with law enforcement for over 6 hours to discuss the events
that took place on the night of the shooting. [RR11:179-180]. Appellant drove the
Hummer back to the Club and once they arrived, they all fully co-operated with
law enforcement officials. [RR10:76-77]. Appellant and the co-defendants were
17
padded down, searched and placed in separate patrol units for further investigation.
[RR10:76]. Appellant was cooperative, normal in disposition, and normal in
temperament. [RR10:108]. Appellant gave consent to search the Hummer and a
search was performed. [RR10:76-77, 107-108]. No weapons or other evidence
was found inside the Hummer or on the person of Appellant. [RR10:79].
Appellants also submitted to questioning without counsel, they submitted to a gun
residue testing, they allowed law enforcement to inspect and search the Hummer,
and they allowed law enforcement to search their homes. [RR: 11: 51-57, 179-193,
201-204, 247]. Additionally, Appellant and the co-defendant allowed law
enforcement to conduct a finger print analysis and gun residue test on the Hummer.
[RR11:136, 145]. At no time did Appellant or any of the co-defendants admit to
participating in the shooting made the basis of the indictment and at no time did
law enforcement claim that Appellant was the shooter or a participant in the
shooting. See [RR9, 10, 11, 12].
Subsequently, Appellant, Tamez, and Ortega were transported to the Laredo
Police Department and interviewed regarding the shooting. [RR11:193, 205-207]
[SX165]. The interrogation lasted about an hour and the interrogation revealed
that Appellant was unaware that someone had been shot or that he participated in
the shooting. [RR11: 205-207]. After the interrogation, Appellant gave
18
investigators consent to search his home and nothing was found. [RR11:51].
Appellant was subsequently allowed to return home and he was not arrested.
Clearly, under the facts of this case, the record is absent of evidence that
Appellant possessed a gun, used a gun, saw any of the other defendants possess a
gun, use a gun, or even that he knew a gun was possessed by either of his co-
defendants. Additionally, the victims testified that they did not witness who the
shooter was and did not identify Appellant as a shooter or as a participant.
Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon under a principal liability theory. Pesina v. State,
949 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) (finding insufficient evidence of
direct liability where there was no direct evidence supporting the allegations that
appellant intentionally or knowingly and acting along or as a primary actor stabbed
the victim).
C. Party Liability
There is also insufficient evidence to support a conviction under the law of
parties. To convict under this party theory, the State was required to prove
Appellant was criminally responsible by showing he was acting with intent to
promote or assist the commission of the offense, by soliciting, encouraging,
directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person in committing said offense.
Tex. Pen Code. § 7.02(a)(2). Additionally, under the law of parties, the State was
19
required to show more than mere presence to establish participation in a criminal
offense. Valdez v. State, 623 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). Mere
presence or even knowledge of an offense do not make one a party to the offense.
Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Monroe v. State, 81
S.W. 726, 727 (App.1904). (holding mere fact defendant who was present but did
not participate or aid in homicide, concealed the offense for a time or failed to
report killing, did not make him guilty of any offense).
In this case, the State chose to try Appellant on a theory of party liability and
submitted a jury charge reflecting criminal responsibility only on a party theory of
liability. [CR1:423-426]. By limiting itself and submitting a party theory of
liability the Jury could only convict Appellant if they found him responsible “as
party by aiding.” See Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 36.13 (the jury is governed by the
law it receives form the Court); see also Williams v. State, 410 S.W.3d 411
(Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013) (the jury is bound by the law it receives from the
court). However, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under the
law of parties. Additionally, the evidence was also insufficient because the
application paragraph of the jury charge contained no third party who Appellant
aided in the commission of the crime. Without naming the third party that
Appellant aided, there was no manner for which the jury could convict Appellant
20
as an aider. Additionally, there was no explanation in the jury charge of how
Appellant aided the commission of the crime.
As stated previously, the State established Appellant’s presence at the scene
of crime prior to the shooting. However, the state failed to establish that Appellant
was present during the shooting or that he participated in the shooting. No witness
identified Appellant as a party to the offense and no witness identified Appellant as
an aider. There was no evidence that Appellant aided any principal in the
commission of the offense. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)
(finding evidence insufficient to support conviction for murder under law of
parties; although defendant was present at the crime scene and possessed the
murder weapon, there was no evidence that indicated that defendant anticipated
that the person he was with would shoot the victim, there was no evidence that the
defendant assisted or encouraged the shooting, and there was no evidence of or
prior or contemporaneous plan to commit the murder); Wooden v. State, 101
S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 203, pet. ref’d) ( the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction as a party to aggravated robbery,
and thus, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal as there was no evidence that
the defendant knew a gun was in the car or that the defendant aided or encouraged
another passenger to threaten the witness with a gun, the defendant testified that he
did not see any weapons when the defendant and accomplices were looking around
21
the truck they attempted to rob); Williams v. State, 410 S.W.3d 411 (Tex.App.-
Texarkana 2013) (reversing and rendering judgment of acquittal when the evidence
failed to show that Williams committed aggravated assault either as a principal or
as a party to crime committed by Ramirez).
While Appellant associated with co-defendants prior to and subsequent to
the shooting, his association with the co-defendants is no proof that Appellant
committed the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Additionally,
there is no evidence whatsoever that Appellant knew that any of his co-defendants
committed the crime charged or that his co-defendants committed any crime
whatsoever. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Appellant did not participate
in the shooting, he was not present when the shooting occurred, he did not possess
a firearm, he did not reach for a gun, he did not pass a gun to someone, he did not
shoot anyone, and he did not aid in any shooting. In fact, after learning that the
police suspected co-defendant Tamez committed the crime, Appellant and his co-
defendants returned to the scene of the shooting and submitted themselves to
police investigation. Additionally, no witness identified Appellant as a participant
in the shooting. Without participation, Appellant could not have aided in the
shooting of any victim. His mere presence with the co-defendants prior to the
shooting is no evidence of guilt. In essence, Appellant was merely present and was
an occupant of a vehicle that may have been associated with the shooting that took
22
place on the night of July 7, 2013. There is no evidence that Appellant assisted in
the shooting, that an offense would be committed or that an offense was
committed. On the record of this case, there insufficient to convict Appellant of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to that offense. “Standing
alone, proof that an accused was present at the scene of the crime or assisted the
primary actor in making his getaway is insufficient [to hold the accused criminally
responsible for the conduct of another].” Wooden v., State, 101 S.W.3d 542, 546
(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d). The record lacks any evidence that
Appellant acted with the intent that any of the victims named in the indictment be
shot and his mere presence, if any, is insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. Mize v.
State, 922 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 174,
177 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Rhyne v. State, 620 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.
1981), Wooden, at 546. The State failed to prove Appellant intended to promote or
assist any person by aiding any person in committing the act of aggravate assault
with a deadly weapon. See Wooden, at 546. The evidence is therefore legally
insufficient under this party liability theory as well.
D. Aggravated Enhancement
Lastly, there is no evidence that shows that Appellant knew a weapon was
being used or exhibited at any time while any other person committed the offense.
23
Neither did Appellant intend to cause bodily injury or know that any victim had
sustained any type of injury during the shooting.
The offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires that the
actor intentionally or knowingly assault another person with the intent to inflict
serious bodily injury on him and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the
commission of the offense. Tex. Pen. Code 22.02. The record lacks any evidence
showing that Appellant himself ever used, exhibited, or even possessed a deadly
weapon. No witness identified him as the shooter in this case. No witness
identified any other person as the shooter in this case. It is clear from the record
that there was no gun during Appellants presence at the scene of the crime and
there is no evidence that Appellant was a participant in the shooting.
Additionally, no evidence was introduced to show that Appellant knew or
saw that any person had a deadly weapon or that Appellant was even aware of the
existence of a weapon in any vehicle he occupied. The only eye-witness, the
victim, failed to testify about Appellant’s involvement with, or possession of, any
gun. As such the State failed to prove the necessary actions and intent required of
Appellant.
There is also insufficient evidence to support a conviction under a party
liability theory. Aggravated offenses present the same standard under Texas case
law. “In order to convict a defendant as a party to an aggravated offense, the State
24
must prove that the defendant was criminally responsible for the aggravating
element.” Wooden at, 547-48 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d); See also
Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 187, 201 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet
ref’d). Appellant claims that there was no evidence that he or any of the other co-
defendant’s possessed or used a weapon. The evidence does not show that
Appellant knew anything about a gun. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence
that show any of the defendants possessed a gun. Even if a rational jury could
have inferred that Appellant knew something had gone wrong or that someone had
been shot, the evidence clearly does not show that he had knowledge of what the
object of the crime was or that he participated in it. The fact that Appellant may
have been an occupant of the Hummer is no evidence of a crime. Evidence at trial
did not reveal any evidence regarding Appellant’s knowledge of a weapon during
the incident. Without evidence suggesting his knowledge of a gun, possession of a
gun, or the disposal of a gun, a rational trier of fact could not have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s actions promoted or assisted any third
party with the use of a weapon or the commission of the crime of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. Tex. Pen. Code 22.02 (a)(1), (2); Tex. Pen Code. §
7.02(a)(2).
Reading the criminal responsibility statute in conjunction with the
aggravated assault / enhancement statute, Appellant’s actions as charged to the jury
25
would have had to aid a third party in committing aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. If Appellant’s act of simply being an occupant in the Hummer could not
have constituted being a party to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, it
logically follows that he could not have assisted or promoted by aiding in the use
of a deadly weapon. See Wooden, at 546. Evidence did not show that Appellant
possessed a weapon or that he even knew a weapon existed. Without evidence
showing that Appellant somehow assisted or promoted a third party in causing
serious bodily injury to the victims, or the he had knowledge of a gun, a rational
jury could not have found this essential element of assisting or promoting this
offense by aiding.
II. The trial court erred in instructing the Jury on the law of parties
without identifying the principal actor, without referring the Jury to the
abstract paragraph, and without providing the Jury the actions
committed by Appellant that aided the commission of the alleged crime.
A. Standard of Review
Jury charge errors are reviewed by considering two questions: (1) whether
error existed in the charge; and (2) whether sufficient harm resulted from the error
to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). The
degree of harm necessary for reversal under the second inquiry depends on
whether the appellant preserved the error. Id. at 743. “... If the error in the charge
was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if
the error is ‘calculated to injure the rights of defendant,’ which means no more
26
than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. In other words,
an error which has been properly preserved by objection will call for reversal as
long as the error is not harmless. “... the actual degree of harm must be assayed in
light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested
issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other
relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). If the appellant failed to object,
the appellate court will reverse only if there is “egregious harm.” Ngo at 743-44.
Egregious harm is demonstrated by showing that the appellant did not receive a
fair and impartial trial. Almanza at 171. This determination requires an
examination of the record as a whole and the actual degree of harm must be
analyzed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the
contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and
any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id. In
this case, the jury charge error was preserved. [RR12:4-10].
B. Deficient Jury Charge – Law of Parties
The trial submitted the case to the jury under the law of parties. [CR1:419-
432]. However, the jury charge was deficient because the charge failed to correctly
instruct the jury. The trial court failed to name the principal in the application
paragraph of the jury charge, failed to identify the acts committed by the Appellant
27
that aided the commission of the named offense, and failed to refer the jury to
another part of the jury charge that authorized the conviction under the law of
parties. Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (failure to
narrow the specific modes of party-liability conduct when properly requested is
reversible error if the defendant has suffered actual harm to his rights). As to who
the third was or what Appellant did to aid a third party, the State admitted and
conceded during the charge conference that they did not know who the shooter was
and they were not sure what actions were committed by the Appellant or the co-
defendants that aided in the alleged offense.
STATE: We just cannot – we don’t have direct evidence as to saying that it
was for sure, in fact, one of the individuals. [RR 11:254].
…
COURT: If you’re going to put the law of parties in, I’m going to require you
put the mode in.
STATE: Okay, Which is as to the specific factual scenario of which we’re s
saying she aided, for instance, the codefendant Jesse Ortega?
CHU: All of them.
COURT: All of them.
STATE: Okay. Yeah, I know, but as to her, it has to be a factual – like for
instance, let’s say the driver, with the codefendant aiding by being the
driver.
COURT: Whatever the facts are
…
28
COURT: But whatever the facts are that are supported by the record has to be
linked based upon the case. And I did see that they raised that motion
the first day, so that has to happen.
STATE: Okay. That’s fine, you Honor. That’s fine. We’ll provide that in more
detail.
[RR 12:6-9].
During the charge conference on the third version of the jury charge, the
Parties again requested that the state narrow the scope of it law of party’s theory to
the facts of the case, however, the State was unsure. In the Fourth and final draft
of the jury charge, the state narrowed the scope of the law of party’s theory to
“aiding” by stating:
“Now, if you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
on or about the 7th of day July, 2013, in Webb County, Texas, the
defendant, Francisco Javier Azuara, Jr., as a party by aiding, did then
and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury
to Angel Avitu-Cruz and did then and there use or exhibit a deadly
weapon, to-wit: a firearm, during the commission of said assault, you
will find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon as charged in the indictment.
The same application paragraph was repeated for each victim identified in the
indictment in counts 1-7. (CR1:423-426). However, the application paragraph was
deficient. Because a jury charge is the instrument by which the jury convicts, it
must contain an accurate statement of the law and must set out all the essential
elements of the offense. Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012).
In this case, the State was required to identify who the Appellant aided and
how the Appellant aided the offense. By failing to name a third party and by
29
failing to name how the Appellant aided in the offense, the Jury could not have
returned a guilty verdict under the law of parties. See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 389
S.W. 3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (commenting that although the trial judge did
not name the principals in the application paragraph, there was no dispute at trail
that those two men were the ones who actually carried guns, threatened Jenny and
Zulma, and stole money and other property from the women, and defendant
admitted he acted as the driver for his roommates, after they hatched the robbery
scheme. From the confession, a reasonable jury cold infer the appellant was the
one who solicited, encourages, or directed the others to commit the crime, and that
he aided his roommates to carry out the robbery); Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300,
304 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), overruled on other ground by Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), stating (the instruction clearly did not direct the
jury to convict either the appellant or his co-defendant under any specified
conditions). Additionally, the jury had no instruction on how to apply the law of
parties in the application paragraph and had no instruction on what the Appellant
did to aid in the commission of the crime. Further, the State never argued
conviction based on the law of parties during their closing arguments and instead
argued the Appellant was responsible as a principal. [RR12:31-42, 61-69]; Vasquez
at 368 (a general reference to the law of parties in the application paragraph is
sufficient and is not error when the See, e.g., Chatman v. State, 846 S.W.2d 329
30
(Tex.Crim.App.1993) (holding application paragraph sufficient where application
paragraph incorporated the law of parties by stating that the defendant “either
action alone or as a party, as that term has been defined,” sufficiently applied the
law of parties to the facts of the case). Here there was no third party named, no
evidence of third party action, no admissions by any defendant, no allegations of
how Appellant aided in the offense, and the State conceded it did not know who
any third party was or what a third party did. Where the application paragraph fails
to define the manner in which the defendant acted as a party, error occurs.
Chatman v. State, 846 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) citing Johnson v. State,
739 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). A charge which fails to apply the law to
the facts is insufficient to authorize conviction on that theory. As such the charge
as submitted in this case deprived the defendant of due process and a fair and
impartial trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution as applied to the State through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Marvis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 878 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (finding charge error
resulted in egregious harm). The jury could therefore, not convict under the law of
parties and Appellant must be acquitted on all counts. Alternatively, Appellant is
entitled to a new trial under the law of parties.
31
III. The trial court abused its discretion and erred in admitting hearsay
testimony in violation of Rule 801(d) and Rule 802 of the Texas Rules of
Evidence in violation of Appellant’s substantial rights.
A. Standard of Review
A timely and proper objection is sufficient to make the trial court aware of
the complaint and preserves error. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) provides that a non-constitutional error “that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” A violation of the evidentiary rules
that results in the erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error.
Jones v. State, 111 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). When a non-
constitutional error is made during the course of a trial, it will be disregarded as a
harmless error if the error did not affect the substantial rights of the appellant.
Gabriel v. State, 973 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.) citing Tex.
R. App. P. 44.2; King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). A
substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict. King at 271. In assessing the likelihood
that the jury's decision was adversely affected by the error, the appellate court
should consider everything in the record, including any testimony or physical
evidence admitted for the jury's consideration, the nature of the evidence
supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how it might be
considered in connection with other evidence in the case. Motilla v. State, 78
S.W.3d 352, 355-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (footnote omitted). “[S]ubstantial
32
rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence ‘if the appellate
court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did
not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Motilla, Id. at 355 (citing
Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Johnson v. State, 967
S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
B. The trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony over objection.
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it meets an exception under
the Texas Rules of Evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 802.
In this case, during the States’ case in chief the State elicited hearsay
testimony from Officer Aldo Alaniz about out of court statements allegedly made
by witness Maria Santos. During the examination of Officer Aldo Alaniz, the
prosecutor elicited hearsay testimony regarding the shooting made the basis of the
indictment. The State began by asking Officer Aldo Alaniz about how many
witnesses he interviewed on the night of the shooting in question. Then the State
impermissibly elicited hearsay testimony from Officer Alaniz as follows:
Q. Now, what about Maria Santos – how did she appear to you at the
time?
A. Pretty frightened, shaking, everybody was like scared.
33
Q. Now, from the time that you arrived and you were able to make
contact with Maria Santos, approximately how much time had elapsed
from the time that you arrived to the time that you spoke to her?
A. Maybe 10 or 15 minutes.
Q. You say it was fairly close to the time of the shooting?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Officer Alaniz, did she, in her frightened state, did she say
anything to you as to what she might have heard or what she saw?
Mr. Chu: Objection, hearsay, your Honor.
Court: Overruled. You can answer.
A. She stated to me that she had seen a white SUV that committed –that
fired the shots.
Q. And did she say anything else to you?
A. That the individuals that had shot at the civilians were involved in a
fight inside the bar.
This testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered for no other
purpose than to prove the matter asserted. Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111, 114
(Tex.Crim.App.1989) (holding a police officer’s testimony was inadmissible
hearsay because it was offered for no other reason than to inferentially prove what
another office had told him). Additionally, the state offered no explanation as to
what exception to the hearsay rule they were seeking to admit the out of court
statement. [RR10:119].
34
The only exception to the hearsay rule the state could have offered would
have been an excited utterance exception under Rule 803(2) of the Texas Rules of
Evidence. An excited utterance is “a statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition.” Tex. R. Evid. 803(2); Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154
(Tex.Crim.App.2001). The basis for the excited utterance exception is “a
psychological one, namely, the fact that when a man is in the instant grip of violent
emotion, excitement or pain, he ordinarily loses the capacity for reflection
necessary to the fabrication of a falsehood and the “the truth will come out.’”
Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). In other words, the
statement is trustworthy because it represents an event speaking through the person
rather than the person speaking about the event. Id.; Ricondo v. State, 475 S.W.2d
793, 796 (Tex.Crim.App.1971). A reviewing court must determine whether the
statement was made “under such circumstances as would reasonably show that it
resulted from impulse rather than reason and reflection.” Fowler v. State, 379
S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Crim.App.1964). Responses to questioning that is calculated
to elicit information about past events and activities are normally considered
reflective narratives of past events and hence lack the spontaneity required to be
admissible under the excited utterance exception. Hughes v. State, 128 S.W.3d
35
247 (Tex.App.-Tyler, 2003), citing Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 765
(Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d).
In this case, the statement offered by Officer Alaniz allegedly came from
witness Maria Santos who had been at the scene of the shooting for at least 25 to
30 minutes before Officer Alaniz had the opportunity to interact with the witness.
[RR10: 109, 119]. The only thing Officer Alaniz stated about Maria Santos was
that she appeared frightened and shaking. [RR10:118]. There was no other
testimony regarding how Officer Alaniz obtained the statement from Maria Santos
or what her state of mind was. Additionally, there was more than ample time to
permit reflective thought from the witness and as such her alleged statement was
hearsay. Where the time interval between the event and the statement is long
enough to permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded in the absence
of some proof that the declarant did not in fact engage in a reflective thought
process. Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). The
State offered no evidence to allow the Court to adequately evaluate whether the
witness had engaged in reflective thought and therefore, the Court erred in
admitting the hearsay testimony.
In considering the harmful effect of the evidence to Appellant’s substantial
rights, the State elicited hearsay testimony from Officer Aldo Alaniz about a
statement allegedly made by Maria Santos. Officer Alaniz testified that Maria
36
Santos told him that “she had seen a white SUV that committed – that fired the
shots, that the individuals that had shot at the individuals were involved in a fight
inside the bar.” [RR10:119]. The inference from this testimony was that Appellant
and the co-defendants were occupants of the SUV (white Hummer) and therefore,
Appellant and his co-defendants were the shooters. However, during Maria Santos
testimony, Ms. Santos testified that she did not see the shooting and did not see
who shot. [RR10:201-202]. She also testified that she never told Officer Alaniz
that the shots came from a white SUV. [RR10:203-204]. Lastly, she testified that
she only stated that the people who had fought arrived in a white Hummer.
[RR10:203-204]. Had the State not elicited the improper and incorrect hearsay
testimony form Officer Alaniz, the Jury would not have heard the allegation that
Maria Santos saw the occupants of the white Hummer commit the shooting. The
jury was left with the impression that the shooter occupied the white Hummer and
therefore, there is no fair assurance that this information did not influence the jury
in their decision to return a verdict of guilty. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410,
417 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (a criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-
constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole,
has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight
effect). The erroneous admission of the hearsay testimony affected Appellant’s
substantial rights and a new trial is warranted.
37
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully prays
this Court to reverse his conviction and enter an order of acquittal. Alternatively,
Appellant respectfully prays that this Court reverse his conviction and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Oscar A. Vela, Jr.
Oscar A. Vela, Jr.
State Bar No. 24004967
THE LAW OFFICE OF
OSCAR A. VELA, JR., P.C.
1004 E. Hillside Rd., Ste. B
Laredo, Texas 78041
Telephone: (956) 568-0221
Facsimile: (956) 568-0052
ovela@thevelafirm.com
Attorney for Appellant
38
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
By affixing my signature above, I hereby certify that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was hand-delivered/faxed to the Webb County District Attorney’s
Office 1110 Victoria Street, Suite 401, Laredo, Texas 78040, on February 6, 2015.
/s/ Oscar A. Vela, Jr.
39
Francisco Javier Azuara, Jr. v. State
Combined Opinion