Frederick Dawson Graham v. Dena Marie Turner

ACCEPTED 12-14-00336-CV TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 4/23/2015 3:09:33 PM CATHY LUSK CLERK NO. 12-14-00336-CV ______________________________ FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE TYLER, TEXAS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS 4/23/2015 3:09:33 PM AT TYLER, TEXAS CATHY S. LUSK Clerk ______________________________ FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM VS. DENA MARIE TURNER FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM, RESPONDENT/APPELLANT DENA MARIE TURNER, PETITIONER/APPELLEE ______________________________ Appealed from the County Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas ______________________________ APPELLANT’S BRIEF ______________________________ TOM RORIE State Bar No. 17238000 210 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED  IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL In accordance with Rule 38.1(a) of the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE , Appellant Frederick Dawson Graham provides the following list of all parties, and the names and addresses of all counsel: Appellant: Frederick Dawson Graham Counsel: Mr. Tom Rorie 210 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 trorie@sbcglobal.net Appellee: Dena Marie Turner Counsel: Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle One Riverway, Suite 1700 Houston, TX 77055 (713) 907-8668 FAX (713) 840-6351 jarettlarochelle@yahoo.com ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Identity of Parties and Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Statement of the Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Points of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Argument and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Point of Error No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Appellee An Ownership Interest in Appellant’s Residence Point of Error No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Parties were Tenants in Common in Appellant’s Separate Property Residence Because the Evidence is Insufficient to Support that Holding Point of Error No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Trial Court Erred by Divesting Appellant of One-Half of His Ownership in His Separate Property Residence and Awarding that Interest to Appellee Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Basis for the Trial Court’s Ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Court Should Decline to Follow Harrington and Aaron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Evidence is Not Sufficient to Support a Finding that the Parties were Tenants in Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 iii  Existence of Joint Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Looking for a Residence Together is Not Evidence of Ownership . . . . . . 9 Was there a Common Plan or Design in Acquiring the Residence? . . . . 10 Prior Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appellant Made a Substantial Down Payment with Separate Funds . . . . 11 Appellant Paid off the Residence Quickly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties is Evidence of Intent . . . . . . . . . 13 The Trial Court had No Discretion to Divest Appellant of Any Interest in His Separate Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Point of Error No. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Find that the Residence was Not Purchased with Appellant’s Separate Property Funds When the Evidence Conclusively Showed a Purchase with His Separate Funds Point of Error No. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion when it Disregarded Uncontradicted Evidence that Appellee Committed Fraud on the Community Estate Point of Error No. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Disregarding Evidence of Substantial Benefits Received By Appellee During the Marriage Point of Error No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Finding that Appellant at Fault in the Break-Up of the Marriage by Considering Evidence that was Not Relevant in Time and Not Supported by the Evidence Appellant “Assaulted” Appellee on Eight Occasions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 iv  Appellant Held Appellee Captive Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Evidence of Conduct Before or After Marriage are Not Relevant as Fault in Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Point of Error No. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Ordered Appellant to Pay Spousal Support to Appellee Although He had No Ability to Pay Point of Error No. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding a Disproportionate Part of the Tract Adjoining the Residence Conclusion and Prayer for Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 v  INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Aaron v. Aaron 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bowers 393 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. V. McShane 239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex.2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Butnaru v. Ford Motor Company 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex.2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Cameron v. Cameron 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14, 15 Chavez v. Chavez 269 S.W.3d 763 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008) no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Davis v. Huey 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Griffin v. Birkman 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17 Harrington v. Harrington 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Hooks v. Bridgewater 229 S.W. 1114 (Tex. 1921) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 In re Allstate Insurance Company 232 S.W.3d 340 (Tex.App-Tyler 2007, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 In re Bass 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 vi In re Case 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 In the Interest of M.C.F. 121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jackson v. Smith 703 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Knight v. Knight 301 S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc. 724 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17 Lozano v. Lozano 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 9620, 2009 WL 4882816 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no writ hist.) 7 Mangum v. Turner 255 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, pet. den.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 McKeehan v. McKeehan 355 S.W.3d 282 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. den’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 28 Mea v. Mea 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1971, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Powell v. Powell 822 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1991, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Puntarelli v. Peterson 405 S.W.3d 131 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Schlueter v. Schlueter 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Verhage v. Verhage 2006 TexApp LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (TexApp-Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.) . 8, 9, 14 Walker v. Packer 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 vii Wilhoite v. Sims 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Zagorski v. Zagorski 116 S.W.3d 309 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2003, pet. den.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Codes, Rules and Statutes Page TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 TEXAS CONSTITUTION , Article 16, §15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 TEXAS PROPERTY CODE §5.072(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , Rule 401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 viii  STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE Appellant and Appellee were married in 2007 and in 2012 Appellee filed for divorce. The issues in the divorce case all involved property. A hearing on a request by Appellee for temporary orders was held on March 24, 2014, and Appellant was ordered to pay temporary spousal support to Appellee in the amount of $2,000 per month. Trial on the merits was conducted by the trial court on May 30, 2014; July 17, 2014; and July 18, 2014. The court granted the divorce, divided various items of personal property, and held that the residence acquired by Appellant prior to the marriage was owned by the parties as tenants in common. The trial court ordered a disproportionate division of the proceeds of the sale of a lot adjoining the residence to Appellee, ordered Appellant to pay $8,000 in unpaid temporary spousal support, and awarded Appellee $10,000 in attorney’s fees. ix  STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant is a native of the United Kingdom who was trained as an accountant and worked for Texaco for 28 years. His specialty was in the field of accounting for the oil and gas industry. He held a number of very responsible positions. In that capacity he was also Texaco’s representative to international organizations that developed and implemented software and accounting systems for that industry. Appellant was married and has three daughters. He retired from Texaco when that company was taken over by Chevron and had both vested retirement benefits and received what he called a “redundancy,” another term for severance pay. He received those benefits both in a lump sum and in periodic monthly installments of retirement benefits. In 2001 Appellant was employed by Shell Oil Company in Houston, Texas and living in an apartment. Appellee was one of his neighbors. They met and began a romantic relationship. Eventually they moved in together into Appellee’s apartment. Appellant began divorce proceedings to be divorced in the U.K. While the divorce proceeding was pending Appellant altered or forged some documents in order to mislead Appellee as to the status of his divorce. Appellant explained at trial that in the UK one can be divorced either by separation, which is a longer process, or by alleging cruelty or adultery. Because of his concern about his family and in particular one daughter about whose mental health he had concerns, he wanted to seek a divorce by the less traumatic but slower divorce process. He modified the papers sent to him from the UK to represent that divorce was imminent when the process was actually slower. Appellant left Shell and began to work as a international business consultant, taking jobs with oil and gas producers in Mexico, Asia, and other places where he would work for several months by x contract for an agreed contract amount. In 2006 he formed an LLC named Graham Global Consulting to which his income as a consultant was paid. Appellant and Appellee lived together at the time but Appellee was not shown as an owner of the company. Appellee wanted to move to Nacogdoches, her home town. The parties looked at residences in Nacogdoches to consider purchase. In 2006 Appellant purchased a residence in Nacogdoches. He paid the initial down payment and closing costs with funds sent to him by wire transfer from the UK in the amount of $85,000. The residence was conveyed to Appellant alone as grantee and he alone signed the note and deed of trust in order to secure a loan for payment of the balance. Appellant paid off the balance in monthly installment payments of several thousand dollars sent to him by wire transfer, and in less than two years had paid off the entire balance owed. Appellee claimed at trial that the parties had purchased the residence together with the agreement that both would own it, and that Appellant had orally agreed to convey an interest in the home to her. Appellant denied any such agreement. The parties were married on January 31, 2007. At the time of marriage Appellee had no property of any value. She had defaulted in payment of student loan debt and Appellant showed at trial that he had paid $63,000 of her student loan debt during their relationship. In 2008 a lot adjoining the residence lot became available for purchase. Appellant purchased it in his name only and again solely signed a promissory note and deed of trust in order to secure a loan. He paid several thousand dollars down. The parties made several payments on the lot, but eventually they defaulted. Shortly before trial Appellant borrowed approximately $15,000 from his sister and brother in law to pay off the balance owed on the lot to avoid foreclosure. xi  During the marriage Appellee seldom worked and earned little income. The parties lived on income earned by Appellant in his consulting business. Appellant also had some income from his retirement benefits earned prior to marriage and some funds he received from his father’s estate after the father’s death. Appellant experienced numerous health issues. He had four strokes, two heart attacks, and epileptic seizures. Both his physical health and mental capacity declined. He suffered from residual effects on his mental functioning, slurring of words at times, problems maintaining his balance or equilibrium, and memory problems. He has not worked since 2010. On several occasions he had funds wire-transferred from the UK to pay living expenses and by the time the parties had separated he had expended all his funds. At the time of trial his only income was his Texaco retirement check from which he netted $1,856 per month. The parties had a tumultuous relationship, with numerous arguments and disputes. By the end of 2011 they were discussing divorce. At this time Appellee was aware of Appellant’s health issues. She testified at trial that she took him to see several medical specialists. She told Appellant at that time she it was her turn to take care of him. However, the parties continued to bicker and argue. In April of 2012 Appellant accompanied Appellee to Houston to help do repairs to the home of an aunt of Appellee. The parties again argued and Appellant decided to leave to drive back to Nacogdoches. They wrestled over the car keys which Appellee refused to give to Appellant. Appellee claimed at trial that on this occasion Appellant assaulted her. Appellant drove home and when he arrived at his residence he discovered Appellee’s father removing personal property from the residence. xii  The parties again discussed divorce and Appellant prepared a written document as evidence of their agreement to divide their property. He secured $20,000 from the UK to pay to her as part of a settlement. Appellee accepted the money but later denied she was bound by any agreement because Appellant had “breached” that agreement because he had not executed all the documents necessary for divorce before he left for a trip to the UK. According to Appellee’s divorce petition, the parties separated July 1, 2012. A few weeks later Appellant traveled to the UK to see his family members and attend the wedding of a daughter. While Appellant was in the UK Appellee discovered that while he was there he had visited some porn sites on line and she discovered the papers regarding his divorce from his previous spouse that he had altered or forged. Much of the trial was consumed with Appellee’s evidence, presented in numerous three-ring binders indexed and tabbed, itemizing all the wrongs that Appellant had done her, including numerous counts of fraud, allegations that Appellant had committed adultery, numerous allegations of assault or emotional distress, allegations that Appellant had visited porn sites while in the UK, and evidence of the substantial income she could have earned in her occupation had she not married Appellant. She testified at great length that her services to Appellant in connection with his consulting business were critical to his ability to perform his job, to the extent that she should be considered a partner in his business. Appellant’s response was that Appellee had no experience in accounting, much less the specialized area in his expertise, that she never provided any services to a client, that she never worked in a client’s workplace, that he had clerical and secretarial support from his clients in the work place, and that he had never charged nor collected any compensation for any services by xiii Appellee. He further showed that while she may have proof-read reports to clients, she lacked the knowledge and expertise to write any such reports. In March of 2014 Appellee set a hearing on a request for temporary orders, including a request for temporary spousal support. Appellant appeared pro se, telling the court that his attorney had withdrawn due to his inability to pay, he had just returned from the UK where he had suffered another stroke, and that he could not pay spousal support. The trial court ordered him to pay to Appellee temporary spousal support of $2,000 per month. He has not done so. The trial court ordered him on final hearing to pay that support for four months, or $8,000. In a hearing held after the trial on the merits Appellant showed the trial court that he had borrowed money to pay off the note on the lot which adjoined the residence and the trial court modified its ruling to allow payment of that debt out of the proceeds of any sale before the parties divided the remaining proceeds. xiv  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The trial court abused its discretion by judicially finding and declaring that Appellant and Appellee are tenants in common as to the residence purchased by Appellant prior to their marriage. The purported oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in real property is not enforceable because of the Statute of Frauds, found in TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE 26.01. If an oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in real property is permitted under Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.) and Aaron v Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.), the evidence heard by the trial court is insufficient to support an oral agreement in this case. To grant an interest to Appellee in Appellant’s residence is to divest him of an interest in his separate property, which is an abuse of discretion. Any finding by the trial court that Appellant’s residence was not purchased with his separate funds is unsupported by the evidence, as Appellant conclusively established that his funds earned or acquired prior to marriage was the source of the down payment and mortgage payments. The trial court abused its discretion in failing and refusing to consider in its division of the community property of the parties acts by Appellee which constitute fraud on the community estate and involve an amount of money that is significant in relation to the total community estate. The trial court abused its discretion in failing and refusing to consider in its division of the community property of the parties financial benefits Appellee received, including Appellant’s payment of her student loans incurred prior to the marriage, when the amount involved was significant in relation to the total community estate. xv  The trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence of alleged wrongful acts by Appellant both prior to the marriage and after the parties had separated and agreed to divorce because such evidence was not relevant to the issue of the breakup of the marriage. The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Appellant to pay temporary spousal support to Appellee when the evidence showed that the amount ordered was in excess of his income, he was disabled and unable to work, and he had no resources with which to pay support. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding to Appellee a disproportionate ownership interest in a lot adjoining Appellant’s residence acquired during the marriage when the evidence showed that Appellant provided the down payment and incurred debt to pay off the mortgage note when foreclosure was threatened. xvi  POINTS OF ERROR POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE. POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON IN APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT HOLDING. POINT OF ERROR NO. 3: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DIVESTING APPELLANT OF ONE-HALF OF HIS OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE AND AWARDING THAT INTEREST TO APPELLEE. POINT OF ERROR NO. 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE RESIDENCE WAS NOT PURCHASED WITH APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY FUNDS WHEN THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED A PURCHASE WITH HIS SEPARATE FUNDS. POINT OF ERROR NO. 5: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COMMUNITY ESTATE. POINT OF ERROR NO. 6: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY APPELLEE DURING THE MARRIAGE. POINT OF ERROR NO. 7: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT RELEVANT IN TIME AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. xvii POINT OF ERROR NO. 8: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO APPELLEE ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO ABILITY TO PAY. POINT OF ERROR NO. 9: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE TRACT ADJOINING THE RESIDENCE. xviii  ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES Appellant shows the court that the trial court in this divorce case abused its discretion and committed errors as a matter of law that in reasonable likelihood caused or contributed to an unjust or improper decision. Those errors are grouped by subject matter and argument is combined in order to avoid duplication. All issues involve either the division of marital property or temporary spousal support. POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE. POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON IN APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT HOLDING. POINT OF ERROR NO. 3: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DIVESTING APPELLANT OF ONE-HALF OF HIS OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE AND AWARDING THAT INTEREST TO APPELLEE. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review in a family law case is clear: whether the trial court abused its discretion. “Abuse of discretion” occurs if a trial court makes a decision that is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it amounts to a clear error. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.2003). As long as the trial court does not abuse its discretion it may divide the marital property in such a way as it deems right. Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1971, no writ hist.). Despite that 1 broad discretion there must exist some reasonable basis for an unequal division of the property of the parties. Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it makes a finding without sufficient facts on which to rationally base its ruling. Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.–Austin 2008, pet. ref’d). While a trial court has discretion to weigh evidence that supports its decision, if the evidence is legally insufficient to support that decision the court abuses its discretion. In the Interest of M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d). When a trial court fails to analyze or apply law correctly it may abuse its discretion. There is no discretion in either determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992); In re Allstate Insurance Company, 232 S.W.3d 340 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2007, no writ hist.). Even evidentiary rulings may abuse a trial court’s discretion if they violate the Rules of Evidence. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.App.–Austin 1987, no writ hist.). THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING From comments made during the trial and the multitude of findings by the trial court against the interest of Appellant the trial judge’s disapproval of Appellant’s conduct is obvious. However, the court recognized that there was little community property and what is acquired prior to marriage cannot be community property (RR Vol. 2, p.80.) The evidence showed that Appellee already had almost all of it. She had all the operating motor vehicles the parties had acquired; had received $20,000 from Appellant, which he secured to carry out an agreement between them in contemplation of divorce (Ex. D-46, D-44); and she had emptied Appellant’s business bank account by taking 2 $9,400 without his consent, leaving that account overdrawn (Ex. D-44). The parties had already divided their personal property with a few exceptions. The only property of any significant monetary value remaining was Appellant’s residence, purchased by him prior to marriage. Under the facts and law the trial court was limited in what it could do regarding that residence. The evidence was clear that the residence had been purchased prior to marriage and that all the closing documents showed Appellant as the sole owner (Ex. R-11, R-12, R-13). The substantial down payment made at closing of the purchase came from funds acquired by Appellant prior to marriage. Appellant was able to trace all the payments made on the mortgage note to their sources, his retirement benefits earned prior to marriage and his inheritance from his father. There was no evidence of an enhancement in value of the residence by use of community funds, so Appellant neither sought nor did the trial court award any reimbursement to the community estate from Appellant’s separate estate. Under these circumstances, if the trial court wanted to award property to Appellee only one option remained: find a way to give Appellee an interest in Appellant’s residence. So the trial judge adopted a theory advanced by Appellee, that the parties jointly acquired Appellant’s residence as “tenants in common.” The trial court then awarded Appellee an undivided one-half interest in Appellant’s residence and ordered it sold. That theory has been adopted in only two cases of which Appellant is aware. In Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.), the court affirmed a finding by the trial court that the parties were “tenants in common” in a residence acquired solely in the husband’s name two years prior to marriage solely in his name. In 2012 the 14th Court of 3 Appeals followed Harrington as precedent in Aaron v. Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.). There the court found that the parties had an oral agreement to jointly own a residence purchased in the name of the husband solely as a matter of convenience. The Findings of Fact signed by the trial judge are puzzling. For example, Findings 27 and 28 purportedly state that the funds used to purchase Appellant’s residence were not his separate funds. Yet the trial court did not find that the residence was community property, and the actual judgment declares Appellee to be a tenant in common, not an owner as community property. Finding 27 also finds that neither the down payment nor the monthly payments were made with funds from Appellant’s money market account. And Finding 24 finds (incorrectly) that the down payment was made with Appellant’s business income, not separate funds. Yet the purchase of the residence and the payment of the down payment occurred prior to marriage, and there is no evidence that Appellee ever contributed any monies of hers to the purchase. All monies used to purchase the residence were earned or acquired by Appellant prior to the marriage: by definition those funds must have been his separate property. Since the Final Decree of Divorce signed by the trial judge adjudicates that the parties are tenants in common in the residence, Appellant focuses on that issue. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO FOLLOW HARRINGTON AND AARON It is public policy that any agreement to convey an interest in real property must be in writing. TEX . BUS. & COMM . CODE § 26.01(b)(4). This means that when any performance of an agreement requires a transfer of property in land, that agreement must be in writing. Mangum v. Turner, 255 4 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.App.–Waco 2009, pet. den.). Traditionally this rule has been referred to as the “Statute of Frauds” and dates back to the earliest Texas jurisprudence. Even if the parties only agree to a future conveyance of an interest in real property a written contract is nonetheless required. TEX .PROP .CODE § 5.072(a). In the very limited instances in which Texas courts have allowed exceptions to the “Statute of Frauds,” specific evidence and performance by the vendee is required. The most common exception is that based on Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex.1921), which allows a party to enforce an oral agreement provided that he can show (1) payment of consideration, in either money or services, (2) possession by the vendee, which must be exclusive, and (3) the making by the vendee of valuable and permanent improvements to the property. This case does not show evidence that meets the Hooks v. Bridgewater standard. There is no evidence that Appellee paid any consideration for an interest in Appellant’s residence, that her possession was exclusive, or that she made any valuable and permanent improvements to the property (and if any improvements were made they were funded by Appellant’s income). Given the public policy of Texas against oral agreements to convey real property, is there anything about the facts in this case that justified the trial court ignoring that public policy? Appellant will show that given the facts in this case, and in all cases involving oral promises between persons in intimate relationships, there is even less reason to ignore that public policy and enforce such promises. It is the policy of the State of Texas that promises between spouses or those who reside together without marriage should only be enforceable if they are in writing. TEX . BUS. & COMM . CODE §26.01(b)(3). Texas recognizes that promises made in an intimate relationship may be less 5 reliable than arms-length transactions because of the nature of the relationship. The requirement of written agreements avoids elevating “pillow talk” to enforceable agreements. Oral agreements between parties engaged in an intimate relationship are less likely to be confirmed by any written evidence or documentation. In arms-length transactions it is common to find communications between the parties, whether mailed correspondence as in the past or communications sent by email, or telecopier today. Those communications are available to a court as evidence that can either confirm or deny the existence of an oral agreement. When promises are made in intimate relationships written documentation is much less likely to be found because any communications are likely private. In cases to enforce oral promises made by those in intimate relationship it is much less likely that any third party witnesses will be aware of the communications between the parties and available to testify. In arm’s length transactions it is much more likely that some third party, whether a realtor, real estate appraiser, loan officer at a potential lender, or property surveyor may have some knowledge of any oral agreement between the parties. Those engaged in intimate relationships are likely to discuss issues privately and without any witnesses. Another reason to refuse to enforce oral agreements between persons in intimate relationships is that they almost always require reliance on testimony by an interested party. Testimony by an interested witness always requires a different level of scrutiny than other types. It has been recognized that in some instances the testimony of an interested witness may amount to no evidence at all. The exception to the interested witness rule is that evidence by an interested witness may be considered if it is not contradicted by any other witness or circumstances and is “direct and positive” and free of any contradiction, inaccuracy , or other conflicting circumstances. Anchor Casualty Co. 6 v. Bowers, 393 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.1965); Lozano v. Lozano, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 9620, 2009 WL 4882816 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2009, no writ hist.). Such testimony may be quite difficult to find in cases involving persons in intimate relationships. Finally, a reason to refuse to enforce oral agreements to convey real property between those in intimate relationships is that the language used in those relationships may differ from that which would be usual and customary in an arms-length transaction. For example, if two persons who do not co-habit and do not have an intimate relationship make mention of “our land” or “our property” the language used has some legal significance, i.e. that each of them owns an interest in the property. On the other hand, if two people in an intimate relationship speak of “our home” that word has several possible meanings other than joint ownership. It means where they live. Parties can have a “home” in an apartment, in a rent house, in a mobile home in a mobile home park. Thus the words “our house” or “our home” may not be as reliable an indicator of ownership as in other circumstances. With the increased frequency of co-habitation by unmarried persons it is likely that more cases of this nature will arise. The adoption of a theory of “tenancy in common” by those contemplating marriage threatens to become the exception that consumes the rule. Harrington and Aaron are not based on the TEXAS FAMILY CODE or any other statutory provision adopted by the State of Texas. The theory of “tenancy in common” ignores the public policy of the state against enforceability of oral agreements for conveyances of land, strong presumption that ownership of property should be governed by its characterization as either community or separate under the Texas Constitution and the TEXAS FAMILY CODE, and the policy that agreements between spouses must be written. Those cases offer no reason why the courts 7 should uphold one rule prohibiting oral agreements in most cases but adopt a different rule for those who cohabit. This court has recognized that rulings regarding ownership of real property of spouses must not disregard the distinction between separate and community property. Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App.LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.). To adopt a theory that a spouse or potential spouse can acquire an interest in the separate property of the other party by some oral agreement threatens to upend the accepted rules of characterization of property, to simply allow a party to make an “end run” around accepted law. Other than the Harrington and Aaron, Texas courts have declined to adopt a theory that persons in intimate relationships, or those who marry, may become tenants in common based on alleged oral promises. This court should likewise decline to adopt the reasoning of Harrington and Aaron and find that the trial judge abused his discretion in enforcing an alleged oral agreement between the parties to convey an interest in Appellant’s residence to Appellee. THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A A FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON Even if the court declines to reject the reasoning of Harrington and Aaron the purported oral agreement in question in this suit should not be enforced as there are substantial differences in the facts between those cases and this one. The evidence in this case is insufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Evidence that is so slight that any inference would be in effect a guess is no evidence at all. McKeehan v. McKeehan, 355 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. den’d). 8 Existence of Joint Tenancy Is a Question of Law: It is well established that a trial court hearing a divorce case has substantial discretion in dividing a marital estate. But the trial court does not have the same discretion on a question of law. For example, although the court has discretion to decide what evidence it gives weight to, whether the agreement between the parties is governed by the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2013, no writ hist.). The trial court has no discretion at all to award to one spouse an interest in the separate property of the other. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982); Powell v. Powell, 822 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1991, no writ hist.); In re Case, 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2000, no writ hist.); Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App.LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.). Looking for a Residence Together is Not Evidence of Ownership: Appellee testified that she and Appellant looked for a residence together. In Harrington the court noted the testimony of the wife that the parties referred to the residence as “our home.” This leads to a simple question. How else would the parties who are co-habiting in a residence refer to it? Joint occupancy is not the same as joint ownership. So how legally significant is the use of the term “our house” or “our home?” At the time Appellant purchased his residence the parties had co- habited for several years and intended to continue to do so. Appellant expected that Appellee would reside with him in any residence he acquired, whether rented or owned. Doubtless he would have consulted with Appellee before acquiring any residence in which he expected both of them to reside, whether community or separate. It would be unusual indeed for one party to unilaterally make a decision to choose a residence for both of them without consulting with the other party. 9  Appellant’s testimony as to the circumstances under which the parties looked for a residence in Nacogdoches is consistent with this narrative (RR Vol. 3, pp. 79-80). To illustrate this point, assume that the parents of one of the parties offered to purchase a house for their son or daughter in expectation of marriage, as a gift to their child. The betrothed couple then search for a house together in which they will begin their married life. They go to the closing of the conveyance together. Does their joint search convert the separate property acquired by gift into jointly owned property? The answer is clearly no. To further illustrate the point, assume one party owns a separate property business which he or she either owned prior to marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance. The other party works there. She or he refers to the business as “our business.” Does that language convert the ownership from separate to community? That the parties jointly searched for a residence acceptable to both is not an indicia of ownership, but a recognition that one member of a couple is likely to consider the wishes of the other in selecting a place for them to reside. Therefore, that evidence is of little import. Was There a Common Plan or Design in Acquiring the Residence? One factor mentioned in both Harrington and Aaron is evidence of a common plan or design to divide or allocate the expenses of the purchase of the residence and their living expenses. In Harrington the appellee testified that “she spent much of her separate property income on the house and on living expenses of the children.” In Aaron the appellee testified that she paid the closing costs for the purchase of the residence, that she paid the mortgage payments for the first six months after they acquired the 10 residence, and that when the appellant began to make the mortgage payments she paid for their food and utilities, a contribution that was equal to the monthly mortgage payment. The contrast between those cases and this case could not be more clear. The evidence showed that: !Appellant paid the entire down payment and all closing costs with his separate funds received by him by wire transfer from his accounts; ! Appellant paid, with his separate funds, all the mortgage payments after the purchase and fully paid the balance due on the note made to purchase the residence; ! Appellant paid all the living expenses of the parties, while Appellee paid none except with his income (RR Vol. 3, p. 47). Appellee used any income she earned during their relationship for her own purposes and not as part of a common plan: Appellant paid all their living expenses. (RR Vol. 3, p. 47) There is no evidence that Appellee contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the purchase of the residence. Prior Conduct: In Harrington the court noted that the parties had lived together “for about three years in residences leased in both their names.” In this case, there is no such indication of a prior joint residence. In fact, when asked whose residence the parties lived in prior to their marriage Appellee insisted it was her residence (RR Vol. 2, p. 82). Appellant Made a Substantial Down Payment with Separate Funds: In Aaron the court noted that the wife was not able to “contribute” as much toward the down payment as the husband, clearly implying that there was a joint effort to accumulate funds in order to purchase the residence. In this case it is clear that all the funds used to purchase the residence 11 were acquired or earned before the parties even knew each other, as a result of Appellant’s long term employment with Texaco. The size of the initial payment made by Appellant is significant evidence of his intent to purchase the home as his own (Ex. R-17; also see p. 20 of Exhibit P-4 showing instructions to wire transfer the funds and Ex. R-14 which shows the amount required for the closing). If Appellant’s intent was to acquire a jointly owned residence why commit such a large portion of his separate funds to the down payment instead of paying for the residence during the marriage? Appellant Paid Off the Residence Quickly: If one assumes that the parties intended their relationship to last and it was agreed, as Appellee argues, to jointly own the residence, why would Appellant agree to such a short note term and such large monthly payments? He paid off the residence in less than two years after he purchased it with separate funds he had accumulated prior to the relationship of the parties (Ex. R- 19). If the parties’ intent was to jointly own the residence why not utilize a more common 15 to 25 year mortgage to be repaid by the earnings of the parties during their marriage? The short payment schedule for payment of the mortgage on the residence is some evidence of Appellant’s intent to primarily rely upon his separate property funds to pay for the residence instead of community income he earned during their marriage. This shows an intent to treat the residence as his alone. Appellant provided the court with an itemized statement tracing all the funds used to make the monthly house payments to their source (Ex. R-19). Likewise, Respondent traced all the income earned during the marriage and how it was disposed of, what funds he had on hand at the time of the marriage, and showed that none of his post-marriage income was sent to the UK 12 and could have been the source of the funds used to make the payments on the residence (Ex. R19a-25). The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties is Evidence of Intent: Appellee testified that Appellant told her that the residence would be theirs and that he would convey record title to her. Yet in 2008 Appellant purchased an adjoining lot in his name only (Ex. R-26, R-27, R-29, and R-33). Appellee was aware of this purchase. If Appellee had an agreement that the residence would be conveyed to her and jointly owned, why did she not object to Appellant also acquiring title to the second tract in his name alone after their marriage? At the time of the second purchase she was aware that he had never conveyed any ownership interest in the residence to her although she says he had promised to do so. Her silence is evidence that contradicts her claim. Appellee testified that “[i]t was joint ownership of everything, because we built the business together from 2003 forward.” (RR Vol. 2, p. 109). In 2006, the same year as when Appellant purchased the residence, he created an LLC named Global Energy Consulting (RR Vol. 2, 84-85) which showed Appellant as the only owner. So there again, even though she claimed they were “joint owners” Appellee knew she was not shown as an owner of the LLC. For the reasons outlined above, the evidence is simply insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that the parties agreed to purchase Appellant’s residence and own it jointly, and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a one-half interest in that residence to Appellee. 13  THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO DIVEST APPELLANT OF ANY INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY The Texas Supreme Court directly addressed an award to one spouse of an interest in the separate property of the other in Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982). The court explained the distinction between community and separate property this way: Community property owes its existence to the legal fact of marriage, and when the parties to that compact determine their relationship should end, property acquired during the marriage is and should be divided among them in a just and right manner. By way of contrast separate property, in the community property setting, owes its existence to wholly extramarital factors, things unrelated to the marriage. In relation to that property, the parties are, in essence, strangers; they are separate. Any property that arises independently of marriage as a means of “equitably” balancing the spouse’s positions on divorce cannot be justified. An award of an interest in Appellant’s separate property residence to Appellee is actually an attempt to characterize his separate property as some other form of property so that the trial court can “equitably balance” the positions of the parties, exactly what the Texas Supreme Court said is not permissible. As this court said, in Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.). Any judicial divestiture of separate property would essentially disregard the constitutionally mandated distinction between the separate and community property of spouses. . . . . Moreover, allowing a trial court to divest separate property from one spouse and award it to the other spouse as part of the latter’s separate estate would impermissibly enlarge the exclusive constitutional definition of separate property. If the trial court mis-characterized Appellant’s separate property as either community property of the parties or as the separate property of his spouse, that error is reversible error, because 14 the effect would be to divest the spouse of his separate property. Tex.Const., art. 16, § 15; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1977); Cameron v. Cameron. This court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in divesting Appellant of his separate property and awarding Appellee an interest in it. The court should reverse and render judgment that Appellant’s residence remains his sole and separate property, not subject to sale by the order of the trial court, and that Appellee has no ownership interest therein. POINT OF ERROR NO. 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE RESIDENCE WAS NOT PURCHASED WITH APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY FUNDS WHEN THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED A PURCHASE WITH HIS SEPARATE FUNDS. As Appellant noted above, some confusion exists as to the effect of the trial court’s finding of fact that his separate property funds were neither used to pay the down payment on the residence nor the mortgage note payments, when the court then did not find the property to be community property. The purchase was made prior to the marriage of the parties with Appellant’s funds, so how could the funds used be anything other than separate property? Appellant is not aware of any authority that a spouse has a claim to income earned by the other spouse prior to marriage. Appellant is also confused by the findings by the trial court because, if in fact community funds were used to improve or pay down debt against the residence the remedy or relief would be a right of contribution, not a transfer of ownership. Characterization of property is determined at the property’s inception of title. Chavez v. Chavez, 269 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2003, pet.den.) 15  Confusion also arises from the court’s finding because the actual evidence is at such odds with Findings of Fact 24, 25, 27, and 28. Appellant reviews the evidence regarding the purchase of the residence to explain the events and to make clear that the findings of fact by the trial court do not add up to the result. Appellant’s residence was purchased on August 25, 2006 (Ex. R-11). Appellant was required to pay at the closing $83,934.95 (Ex. R-11, R-17). Appellant wire-transferred his funds for the down payment three days prior, on August 22, 2006, in the amount of $85,000 (Ex. R-18). The parties were not married until January 31, 2007. Appellant showed the source of each payment made. He showed that the funds used for payments were sent to him by wire transfer from the United Kingdom and he traced each payment made to those funds. In support of his claim that his separate funds were used to make the payments on the residence he offered the testimony of an officer of his bank that he sent no monies abroad to the UK except for some specific funds used for a specific purpose (RR Vol. 3, p. 9-12). The purpose of that testimony was to establish that no funds had been transferred by Appellant to the UK after the marriage of the parties; therefore, any funds that came into the US to Appellant must be his separate funds because they had to be in the UK prior to the marriage of the parties. Appellee’s testimony, that the payments made on the residence were actually funded by community income, is so weak as to be laughable. She claimed the source of the down payment was income earned by Appellant as a payment for his services through his business and those funds, coupled with a little of this and a little of that, somehow added up to the amount used to fund the purchase of the residence. Appellee failed to show how the parties could pay their living expenses with Appellant’s income, pay income taxes on it, and yet have 100% of it available as a down 16 payment on the residence. And no explanation was given as to how Appellant’s income prior to marriage became community funds. If the trial court relied on Appellant’s testimony to support her claim that she should be an owner of Appellant’s house it clearly abused its discretion. The trial court’s findings of fact, if it even relied upon them, are at such odds with the credible evidence that it is raises the question if the trial judge even read them. A trial court abuses its discretion if it relied on facts that are so unreliable or weak to form a sufficient basis for a rational decision. Griffin v. Birkman, p. 197. A trial court that makes a decision which is not based on sufficient facts to make a decision either way abuses its discretion. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., p.938. POINT OF ERROR NO. 5: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COMMUNITY ESTATE. Appellant offered evidence that during his marriage to Appellee she had used community funds to improve the residences of both her mother and her aunt (Ex. R-37; R-38a-38i) as well as payment of other expenses of her family members. He corroborated that testimony with checks and other records that showed the expenditures (Ex. R- 38a-38i). Appellant testified that these expenditures were made without his knowledge and consent, and only discovered by him at a later date (RR Vol. 3, p. 107-111; Ex. R-37; Ex. R-38A-38H; Ex. R-39-39E). Appellee never denied making those expenditures and never claimed that Appellant was either aware of or had consented to her expenditures. The use of community funds by a spouse to improve the property of a relative, without the knowledge and consent of the other spouse, is what has been termed “fraud on the community.” 17 Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998). Fraud on the community occurs when one spouse breaches his fiduciary duty to the other by disposing of community property without the consent of the other. Puntarelli v. Peterson, 405 S.W.3d 131, 137-138 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] no pet.). Once a spouse produces evidence of such a transfer the burden shifts to the other spouse to rebut the presumption of constructive fraud. Jackson v. Smith, 703 S.W.2d 791, 795-796 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1985, no writ). Once Appellant produced evidence of use of community funds for the use and benefit of Appellee’s relatives the burden shifted to her to rebut the presumption that her expenditures were fraudulent. Appellee was never required by the trial court to provide any explanation for her use of community funds to enhance the value of her relative’s residences. In fact, the court simply ignored this evidence. And Appellee never offered any evidence to rebut the presumption of fraud. Appellant concedes that the trial court had discretion to hear this evidence and to consider it in making a fair and equitable division of the estates of the parties. But can the trial court simply ignore it? Appellant also acknowledges that if the amount involved is minimal in relation to the overall estate being divided by the court that the court may be justified in ignoring it. But in this case the amount involved was equal to or greater than the value of the community property the court was dividing. A trial court has discretion to base its decision on conflicting evidence. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978). And a trial court has discretion to decide an issue if there is some evidence of a “substantive and probative character” to support a decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Company, 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex.2002). But if there is no evidence that the use of funds by a spouse was for the benefit of the community estate and made with the consent of the spouse it is an 18 abuse of discretion for a trial court to ignore that evidence, especially when the amount involved is as great at the community estate being divided. Appellant requests that the trial court remand the division of the community estate of the parties with directions to the trial court to consider the fraud on the community estate committed by Appellee in its division of the community estate. POINT OF ERROR NO. 6: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY APPELLEE DURING THE MARRIAGE. The testimony at trial showed that Appellant had by the time she met Appellant defaulted in repayment of her student loans1. Appellant provided evidence of payments of her student loans with his income of $63,000 (Ex. R-41). While Appellee questioned the amount paid, she did not question that Appellant had in fact paid her pre-existing student loan debt (RR Vol. 3, p. 178). The trial judge makes no mention of the payment of Appellee’s student loan debt in his findings or fact and there is no indication that these payments were even considered. While a trial judge has discretion to weigh evidence in making a just and right division of the parties to a divorce action, he has no discretion to simply ignore evidence. While the court has discretion to ignore transactions involving minimal amounts of money or amounts that are small in relation to the total estate of the parties, the amounts that Appellant paid toward Appellee’s student loan debt is approximately two times the value of the community estate the court divided. To ignore such evidence and facts is an abuse of discretion. 1 Appellee’s inability to pay her pre-existing student loan debt is puzzling in view of her testimony of her exceptional ability and the lucrative career she gave up to be married to Appellant. 19  POINT OF ERROR NO. 7: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT RELEVANT IN TIME AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE The trial court found that Appellant was at “fault” in the breakup of the marriage (FF 32). If that finding had no effect on the rulings of the trial court Appellant would not address it; however, since it appears that this finding was the foundation for the trial court’s decision to award Appellee an interest in Appellant’s residence, Appellant must address it. Appellant and Appellee had at times a rocky relationship, without any doubt. However, Appellee’s testimony is characterized by gross exaggerations and dramatization of events that the actual testimony frequently does not support. Appellee alleged that several events occurred supporting her claim that Appellant’s conduct was the reason for the dissolution of the marriage of the parties. In her typical fashion, those events are documented at great length (“127 counts of fraud”). However, an examination of the actual evidence shows that she often testified more about her “conclusions” or “feeling” than about the actual facts of the event. An example is her testimony that they had a dispute over money while driving in a car one day, which she characterized as “financial terrorism.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Appellant raises this issue because that the evidence in the record does not actually support the findings of the trial court on several of these points, and the trial court has no discretion to ignore the actual evidence. Appellant “Assaulted” Appellee On Eight Occasions: Finding of Fact No. 6 by the trial court finds that Appellant assaulted Appellee on eight different occasions. There are two major problems with this finding. 20  First, there is a complete lack of corroboration of any of these claims. There is no evidence that Appellee ever reported to any law enforcement officer that she had been assaulted. There is no evidence that she ever sought medical treatment. There is no photographic evidence that she was assaulted. No witness testified as to seeing any assault or sign of assault. And it is almost a certainty that anyone as verbose as Appellee would have told someone had she been assaulted; yet no family member, friend, or neighbor was called to confirm that Appellee had made a contemporaneous report of an assault. Second, there is a marked disparity between the actual testimony and what Appellee referred to as an “assault.” The first instance of “assault” referred to by Appellee relates to events while the parties were traveling through Malaysia and Thailand (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Appellee says that “there was a violent explosive that he has lunging and I went flying.” Yet there is no actual evidence that Appellant ever even touched Appellee. The next instance which Appellee testified about concerned an event at home (RR Vol.1, p. 50). Appellee said that they had an argument. Even though she and her brother were having an argument about their mother’s care and they were “crosswise” by the time of trial it was Appellant who was solely responsible for their dispute. She went upstairs and he followed her, he was “screaming” and “she slid down the wall.” Nowhere is there any evidence that Appellant ever touched Appellee, much less assaulted her. In the next event that Appellee related, a trip to Hot Springs, Arkansas, an argument between the parties occurred (RR Vol. 1, p. 54). Appellee says there was no reason for Appellant to be upset about anything. Appellant testified that he became upset when Appellee said to her friends that she wished she was not with him, which humiliated him in front of her friends (RR Vol. 3, pp. 139-140). 21 Appellant was upset but there is no evidence that he touched anyone, much less assaulted Appellee. He went to bed, got up early the next morning, and drove home. Next Appellee testified about an incident in which she claimed Appellant became angry over a power cord (RR Vol. 1, p. 56). She said he “got into a Rugby stance” and she was “fearful.” However, there is no evidence that Appellant ever touched her. According to Appellee there was another instance at the residence in which Appellant flew into a “rage” (RR Vol. 1, p. 60). She further said “he yelled at me and came at me. He didn’t hit me, but he came close. I raised my fist and I backed up.” She says that Appellant then ran around the house destroying personal property, one of many occasions on which she claimed he destroyed personal property. If in fact Appellant had destroyed the personal property of the parties as many times as Appellee claimed in her testimony there would have been no property for the court to divide. The most telling incident is one that Appellee related at her aunt’s home in Houston (RR Vol. 1, p. 69.). The parties had gone to the aunt’s home to make repairs. Appellee yelled at Appellant. She said that Appellant grabbed her, threw her up against the wall, and choked her. Appellant’s testimony was that he did not assault her but was trying to get his car keys which she refused to give to him so he could return home (RR Vol. 3, p. 143). Appellee herself admitted that they were in a tussle over the car keys, her refusing to give them to him. What is most interesting about these events is that when Appellant returned to his home in Nacogdoches he found Appellee’s father parked at the house removing his personal property. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 51-53). Appellee admitted that she told her father to go the residence and gather up property from the house (RR Vol. 2, p. 104-105). The argument over the car keys was not because Appellant was being unreasonable but because Appellee wanted to detain him as long as possible in Houston while 22 her father cleaned out the house (RR Vol. 3, p. 143). It is also instructional that when law enforcement was called it was not for the purpose of charging Appellant with a crime but rather to ascertain if he was safely driving to his residence in Nacogdoches (RR Vol. 1, p. 69-71). And, Appellant, the man who had assaulted her, called her when he reached home to tell her he had arrived safely (RR Vol. 1, p. 71). Of the eight instances of “assault” there is actual testimony of any touching by Appellant of Appellee on only one occasion, at Appellee’s aunt’s home, and the testimony there is conflicting and supports the conclusion that a disagreement arose when Appellee attempted to detain Appellant in Houston for a sufficient period to allow her father to clean out his residence of his personal property. When the events of that day are understood in context it is more likely that no assault actually occurred but instead a “tussle” over the car keys happened. On another occasion Appellee testified that “[h]e assaulted me.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 121). She says not that he hit her, or knocked her down, but instead “I broke down. I completely just fell out to the point of not being able to physically get up.” Again, while Appellee characterizes as an “assault” lacks any evidence of any touching by Appellant. Appellant Held Appellee Captive Abroad: Appellee testified that Appellant had essentially held her captive for a period of five months on a trip to Malaysia and Thailand (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Again, there is no evidence that Appellee reported that event to any authorities nor made any attempt to “escape.” There was no contact made reporting her status to local United States Diplomatic authorities. There is no evidence of how Appellant could have imprisoned Appellee in a hotel room and kept her there while he worked at the offices of the company for which he was contracted to provide consulting services. When Appellee 23 returned to the United States she sought no protection, from law enforcement or anyone else. She returned to her residence with Appellant, the man who she claimed held her captive abroad for five months. Evidence of Conduct Before or After Marriage Not Relevant As Fault in Marriage: The evidence showed that prior to the marriage of the parties Appellant altered or modified some documents relating to his divorce from his previous spouse in the United Kingdom and showed those to Appellee. Appellant admitted to such conduct. (RR Vol. 3, p. 24-27). He explained at trial that in the UK there are different ways of seeking a divorce, the shorter procedures requiring proof of either cruelty or adultery, and that he chose the more lengthy option of separation in consideration of his family. Appellee testified that she discovered Appellant’s forgery of divorce documents in September of 2012 after the parties had separated and after he had left the country to return to the UK for a family visit. Appellant objected to all this evidence on the basis of relevance. Evidence of conduct prior to the marriage is not relevant to the issue of fault in the breakup of the marriage, particularly when it is not discovered until the parties have already separated and filed for divorce. Appellee had already decided to divorce Appellant the previous December. She said she remained with him only to care for him, and intended to stay no longer than one year. She filed a petition for divorce herself on September 21, 2012. She contended that she was not bound by any agreement with Appellant to accept $20,000 and items of personal property because he had “breached” their agreement. The way he had done so? By not executing all the documents in full satisfaction of her claim to the community assets needed to finalize the divorce by the time he left to travel to the UK in July of 2012. 24  The evidence conclusively showed that Appellant’s action regarding his divorce papers occurred prior to the marriage and that Appellee did not discover his action until months after the parties had separated and filed for divorce. Therefore, that conduct could not have been a material factor causing the divorce. Likewise, Appellant testified that learning that Appellant had visited pornographic web sites while he was in the UK was relevant to the issue of “fault” in the marriage. Again, this conduct occurred after the parties agreed to divorce, the parties had already separated, and Appellant left for the UK. Appellant objected to all this testimony when offered on the grounds of relevance, i.e., that what occurred before the marriage and after the marriage over could not be relevant to the issue of fault in the breakup or dissolution of that marriage. Evidence must be both relevant and material. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex.2007). Appellant concedes that a trial court has discretion to hear and weigh the evidence and reach conclusions based on it, that any evidentiary rulings by the trial court are committed to its discretion, and that reversal is justified only when the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, p. 234). But relevance has limits. Under Rule 401, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , the court is to determine the purpose of offering the evidence and whether there exists some logical or direct connection between the evidence offered and what the offering party seeks to prove. What is the scope of admissible evidence to prove fault in the breakup of the marriage? First, the event must have happened during the marriage. Evidence of some act by Appellant before the parties married cannot, by definition, constitute fault during the marriage. 25  Second, the event must have happened prior to the decision of the parties to “break up.” Once the decision to terminate the marriage has been made, no act afterwards can be considered a cause of the decision to divorce. The trial court found “fault” by Appellee and awarded both an interest in his separate property and a disproportionate part of the community property to Appellee; therefore, it cannot be said that this evidence was harmless or that it was not a cause of the trial court’s division of the marital estate. Consideration of evidence which is not legally relevant is a breach of discretion. POINT OF ERROR NO. 8: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO APPELLEE ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO ABILITY TO PAY A trial court has substantial, but not unlimited, discretion to order one party in a divorce proceeding to pay spousal support to the other. In this case the order of the court for payment of temporary spousal support was an abuse of discretion. The ability to pay support was not based on any actual evidence of ability, but upon mere suspicion or surmise. At the time the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $2,000 monthly in temporary support Appellant was over 60 years of age and had suffered four mini-strokes (including one shortly before the hearing on temporary orders), and epileptic seizures, and two heart attacks. His physical condition prevented him from working and his last income was over two years before in 2010. While at one time his services as an accountant in the oil and gas industry were in demand, companies in that industry had completed their adoption of the accounting system he had helped develop so there was less demand for his services (RR Vol. 4, p. 40). In fact, he had experienced a stroke about a week before he returned for the temporary orders hearing (RR Vol. 3, p.138). 26  Appellant’s only source of income was his retirement benefits in the amount of $1,856 per month. That amount is less than he was ordered to pay Appellee as temporary support. His living expenses were $1,574. (RR Vol. 3, p. 72-73; Ex. R-9, R-10, R5-8). Appellee herself, perhaps without meaning to do so, confirmed the decline in Appellant’s health and his inability to support even himself. In her testimony about the events that occurred at her aunt’s house in Houston she mentioned that she did not want Appellant on a ladder and that she thought it unsafe for him to drive himself home to Nacogdoches (RR Vol. 1, p. 70). She also acknowledged not long before she filed her petition for divorce that rather than expect Appellant to take care of her, she expected that his needs required her to take care of him (RR, Vol. 2, p. 120-121). In the course of her testimony about their conversation at the time she emphasized that “I went all over the State of Texas for months running him to cardiologists and neurologists and post stroke specialists, biochemical specialists, speech therapists.” Yet this is the person she contends shall be supporting her. Appellee herself is both younger and in substantially better health than Appellant. And if her testimony is to be believed she is capable of making literally hundreds of thousands of dollars from her occupation. The only basis on which the trial court could have found an ability by Appellant to pay temporary spousal support is if it was believed that Appellant owned or controlled substantial funds in the United Kingdom. Appellee testified that he did, but her testimony was not based on any actual knowledge, but only on suspicion or surmise. If there was evidence that Appellant had funds in the UK available to him and there was a dispute over whether they were available for payment of support the trial court had discretion to decide who to believe. But when the only evidence is that “he has 27 money in the UK” without identifying those funds, that testimony amounts to nothing more than surmise or suspicion. Evidence of that nature is no evidence at all. McKeehan v McKeehan,, 365 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.App.–Austin 2011, pet. den’d). The only actual evidence of Appellant’s ownership of any assets in the UK was his divorce decree from his previous spouse, which awarded all his assets in the UK to her. Even if the trial court simply concludes “I do not believe Appellant when he says he has no money in the UK” that does not prove that he does have money. It does no more than raise a suspicion. A suspicion is no evidence at all. The only asset in the US which could possibly serve as collateral for a loan by Appellant to pay spousal support was his residence, but Appellee had filed a lis pendens as to that property which precluded any access to funds (RR Vol. 3, p.135; Ex. R-54, R-55). Thus he showed he had no capacity to borrow funds for that purpose. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to pay temporary spousal support to Appellee in an amount in excess of his monthly income and without reliable evidence that he had any other source of income or property to pay that support. POINT OF ERROR NO. 9: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE TRACT ADJOINING THE RESIDENCE The trial court awarded a disproportionate part of the lot adjoining Appellant’s residence to the parties, 60% to Appellee and 40% to Appellant. Under the circumstances that disproportionate award is an abuse of discretion. The adjoining lot was purchased for $54,000. Appellant paid at closing $10,681.07 in addition to $500 he had already deposited as earnest money (Ex. R-30). After he became unable to 28 work and his business income ended, he fell behind in making payments, risking foreclosure. The balance due to avoid foreclosure was $15, 229.64 (Ex. R-29, R-30). Appellant secured a loan from his sister and brother-in-law to pay off the lot, avoid foreclosure, and retain it (Ex. R-31). Thus the trial court has awarded a disproportionate part of the lot to Appellee despite the fact that the purchase was only possible by the use of Appellant’s separate property at the time of purchase and his borrowing money to pay it off and avoid foreclosure. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award to Appellee a greater interest in property she would never have had except for Appellant’s expenditure of his separate funds and which she would have lost except for Appellant’s action in borrowing money to preserve it. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF Appellant, Frederick Graham requests that the court reverse the Final Decree of Divorce signed by the presiding judge of the Nacogdoches County Court at Law on September 3, 2014. Appellant further requests that the court render judgment that Appellee has no ownership interest in his residence located at 3704 Raguet Street in the City of Nacogdoches, Texas. Appellant further requests that the court remand the other issues regarding the division of the community property and spousal support of the parties to the Nacogdoches County Court at Law with instructions to (a) consider the evidence with regard to expenditures made by Appellee with community funds, (b) financial benefits received by Appellee during the marriage, including but not limited to payment of Appellee’s student loan debt, (c) the disproportionate division of the tract or parcel of land adjoining Appellant’s residence, and (d) the award to Appellee of temporary spousal support by order of that court on March 31, 2014. 29  Appellant further requests that he be awarded all costs of this appeal, that all costs be taxed against Appellee, and that he have such other relief as he may show himself entitled to receive. Respectfully submitted, Tom Rorie Tom Rorie State Bar No. 17238000 210 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that this brief contains 9,141 words (excluding any caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix). This is a computer-generated document created in WordPerfect, using 12-point typeface for all text. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document. Tom Rorie Tom Rorie 30  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served on counsel for Appellants this 23rd day of April, 2015, by e-file notice, to-wit: Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle Attorney at Law One Riverway, Suite 1700 Houston, TX 77055 jarettlarochelle@yahoo.com Tom Rorie Tom Rorie 31  NO. 12-14-00336-CV ______________________________ IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS AT TYLER, TEXAS ______________________________ FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM VS. DENA MARIE TURNER FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM, RESPONDENT/APPELLANT DENA MARIE TURNER, PETITIONER/APPELLEE ______________________________ Appealed from the County Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas ______________________________ APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF ______________________________ TOM RORIE State Bar No. 17238000 210 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED  APPENDIX No. Document 1. TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01 2. TEXAS PROPERTY CODE §5.072(a) 3. TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , Rule 401 4. TEXAS CONSTITUTION , Article 16, §15 5. Original Petition for Divorce 6. Temporary Orders 7. Final Decree of Divorce 8. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 9. Respondent’s Exhibit 52 - UK Decree of Divorce 10. Respondent’s Exhibit 11 - Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien for Raguet House 11. Respondent’s Exhibit 17 - Cashier’s Check for Raguet House Purchase 12. Respondent’s Exhibit 18 - Wire Transfer to Fund Raguet House Purchase 13. Page 20 of Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 - Email regarding Money Transfer 14. Respondent’s Exhibit 14 - Settlement Charges on Raguet House Purchase 15. Respondent’s Exhibit 19 - Schedule Showing House Payments 16. Respondent’s Exhibit 19a - Bank Statement Showing Pre-Marriage Balance 17. Respondent’s Exhibit 20 - Schedule Showing Transfers From Savings 18. Respondent’s Exhibit 21 - House Payment Transaction History 19. Respondent’s Exhibit 22 - Savings Account Summary 2006-2008 20. Respondent’s Exhibit 23 - Savings Account Summary 2007-2008 21. Respondent’s Exhibit 24 - Savings Account Spreadsheet 22. Respondent’s Exhibit 33 - Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien for Back Lot 23. Respondent’s Exhibit 26 - Real Estate Lien Note to Back Lot 24. Respondent’s Exhibit 27 - Deed of Trust to Back Lot 25. Respondent’s Exhibit 29 - Receipt of Payoff Amount for Back Lot 26. Respondent’s Exhibit 37 - Loans & Taxes Summary on Appellee’s Mother’s Home 27. Respondent’s Exhibit 38a-38i - Checks for Repairs to Appellee’s Family’s Homes 28. Respondent’s Exhibit 39-39e - Tax Receipts for Appellee’s Mother’s House 29. Respondent’s Exhibit 41 - Schedule of Appellee’s Student Loan Payments 30. Respondent’s Exhibit 9 - Spreadsheet of Income and Living Expenses 31. Respondent’s Exhibit 10 - Incoming Pension Wire Transfer 32. Respondent’s Exhibit 5 - Pension Letter from Chevron (2/26/14) 33. Respondent’s Exhibit 6 - Pension Letter from Chevron (7/30/13) 34. Respondent’s Exhibit 7 - Screen Shot of Pension Amount 35. Respondent’s Exhibit 8 - Monthly Payslip 36. Respondent’s Exhibit 54 - Notice of Lis Pendens on Raguet House 37. Respondent’s Exhibit 55 - Notice of Lis Pendens on Back Lot 38. Respondent’s Exhibit 31 - Loan Agreement with Robert & Kathleen McCatty  l(A ,^ -, _ ;.),/1 i "o L|'LL$(015 'v(//,,)- -,a.| l.,- L.:,!, , - IN THE I\IATTER OF rN TtrE l)rsTntc'l'co@ ' THE MARRIACE OF $ s e.^ vtP^ -' DENA MARIIi TURNER ANI) $ N LIW* 4 W- LrlA- .ruDrc'r^L,r,r', .tuDtc'tnl- I)ate: 1 I April 2014 1i:02:53 RST To : " e rn i e grlgz hrl!:r ai I c o nl " . . Subject: FW: Divorce documentation From: Slough County, Enquiries tnAf[aifuSg111eg@SlqUgh.Cpg1irygagd.S5l.SBy.Ukl Sent: 11 April 2014 A7:47 To: Erin Graham Subject: RE: Divorce documentation The flle is currentiy in storage, once the file is received I wili notiiy you of the Cour-t fee The file can take a number cf weeks to be received. I{erm-za tBrougftton Mrs K Broughton Slough County Court Tel 01753 690300 I am not authorised to bind my Department contractually or to make representations or other statements whrch mav brnd the Department in any way via electronrc means. ttrt Hil COURTS &T$A{'NAL$ $€RVICE ffiffiffi Tle fardly ffit *t-Sl.o*gh Thr .Lar'.Cfil,t't: Win&orHoad St€itgft Bsrkshlrs sllzhrE DX 98000 SLOIJG|. 3 BHIGID GRAHAU T Or7&3 690300 34 AZAUAWAY F 01?53 573S{X} GEORGE GREEN tfinicon Vll 0i91 47814?6 (HEfpIns ts th€ deaf snd llard of hsartngl SLOI'GH BERKgHIRE *tw'l5laorffi -rslrloe. gw-uk SI3 6RN Our ret: Vanr rd: srnnlsrvbbn 7BA5& 25thApril2014 Dear Brigidcr*am Case number: Sl.o4DOl14O j4. Gratram vs. Graham !t,F ti\ ' '44e*" - ' ' '} Follsrtpg ysur sna[ dat€d fre l?th of frpfff 2Sl4 the be for a copy d your Becree Absolute iacrmsed trg gr0 6 a r€s-iltdchmgstoffre cerfB syEtern on ihe 22nd of April 2014. Fsrtity Section Exbnsion:  ,rr 'YnP -. 9:;1^ ?r_l - )lo't'ICE ot'CI0NITIDENTIALITY RrGlIl's: Il: You ARE A NAt.tiRAL pnRSoN. yoti o NlAY REI\{0VE OR STRIKE ANY O!'THE FOLLOIVING IN!'OIL\[A.'UON FROII 1 HIS fi, INSI'RU]VIENT BEFORE IT IS FILED FOR RECORD IN ]'HF], PUI}LIC R!]CORDS: YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY \TIMBER OR YOUR TJRIVI.:R'S I"ICI.]NSI] NUI\,IB}:R. li WARRAN'I'Y D[,F],D WITI{ VNNT'OR'S LIEN l,t l)ate: ,\ugust 15, 2$lfi tt Grtntor: S'I-EVF.N LUTZ and wifc, SIL4.NNON l-Ul'Z Grantor's Mailing Address (including ccu nry]: II r:! (lrantee: FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM (irantce's l\lailing Address (including couniv): 3704 Raguet Nacogtloches. 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Ig?r S:-e-r ---'+ RE$PONDENT'S EXHIBIT 17  $rnrpplnNr LIF Acccum 8*le Arlr&w, CDec6ot rfitrment Au$Bt 1, 20oi0 to Augurt 3"1,2O0G Basic Business Checking: 1ss1 1al667 ATM/Iloblt Card transactlons thls etatoment psrlod (confnrnd| BrBS ilo|qnsa 9dr Artgtnf nFfibor Aug i4 .6.{B Vl$A Terget Oo0t9ffi8 Gbndate CO r+{8834{53S A!i$ 15 -1,s0 Pdi ATM thago Fee - Wil) Fm DDA 8+fiEfr0fles A,;g 16 -2.W Other gar* ATU Fee S4SO+0&Sil Aug 15 WDAt556 17th St.,Suite IEO Denrr€r CO 848g0t'Ce$g Aug 16 Vl$A Exenph Phyrician t+eturg03-40g.ggto CO lit+ jj-;, :- 'ti" 488mO584 Ar.rg"f 6 VISA 0056 Wild trsl00005€0 Denrrer CO {jrir f, e48$ggo580 Aug 16 -10.00 Vl$A Ampco Parkhg Eroadway Dorn"er CO e4ES{FOSS2 Aug 2t -40.16 VISA K&g P€tncb5t610042605 Ce*rta Rock CO Asg gr Avg22 ffi -2?.00 Vl$A Fedor $hp 08f15e6 Abr 857-3541b75S9 TN lLir, f r r._i,i{i VISA The Lcoplianltor.r Spgs GO s 8498*8571 ! 8488686?13 s4g$o1+3?d Ar424 .'1.50 Pu'l ATM Usrg€ Fe6 - WD Fm DOA 848SO008s6 Aug ?t -2.00 Othar Bank AIU Fs€ 8{8€000887 Atrg24 -Yro.gg WDAI 555 lnh Et, Suit6 t50 Dorne( CO 8{S000008s Aug zrt -10.oo Vl$A Ampco Pe#ng Broedlray Denror CO s{8e{?9110 Aug ?8 -1.60 Pull ATM tbsge fur, - V{lD Fn DOA 84{Xr00086s Aug 28 "1.50 Full ATM tlugc fuc - WD Frn DDA 84&)00088! 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IoJ l- c C- :E -AOXon I ts": I c .rc!6Y' ::aEgsEslEillI O 6 _ _ ,t _ E F l a :; *i:a '; i- i".l r>: = o '-- tv 7 ?4- iFriEEE=i:iiiE a C . a.:-FFg!! l?-4d€d- : e J == =: (! ci?oa44e1ooeci -+-a*-Fts-c o -o -_.=oloX 7e-*!zr'odoz€d06azdo.= -*- i:=;:f;;=:ff==- cl rl RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 19  'iE 6 '- \J f,s t\ 8Fg \ -**. f;e \\i\6? o 5 oq, 3 cc EE f E.]: Su o OQ ol E .oo <)d 99P !p- .=;.!6 ro{, coco o oo 0000 aQ. N rc CL o O. o oo, OTJ OI {,J !-o BEfrE 4 R e D N rrr F-r rxr s. D TFNThNTNT s- D}S NF rhr &- co- 66@ rrrrhNrtsr €6A66cO.O@O ra E **gR e-k; s.s.'s qg qqs €r+trlqsrq.c= YYYYYYYYY v, 5G .9 8 o Ro xo ooooPQ^Q ,q E 2 c ee oo 8888EHFEU OC)OOHYHYq 60 tsr ppppxi-';K'> N l4 Nts c A-q;r dx NXYO: >6 : A :g n; For tol dO ::::iitii 9.q99fi;3Hft N 0 € F I EK :: R E ER R* .9ii on 88 EHgHggHEi o ro F ad d ! tr e s.? ;E ; R :-i EH€ H5E PsP r (J rr N:IT::RS1 Nrrlt\-lAY t (faox><: E 6> E o F aro{ E -:- &=> 3 F=s {E5o E >: e o * s;; > :;. q ;2: h=; z zz. Tzzzzzzz- E o c o 0 (J 4 F Fq oo:e E:t 999399998 : t oiF-FF! J :J': d JJ c go N oU ododb F FI-FFFFFF€ 3 <4 E5? o, ad odoE.Uo{06o5"6"t? f fE s e*-H dPc rsffreScS = :i ,E  Stnrnmmwr {)r Acsrrsr ao787 ll,,rl,lrlrl'l',,ll,,tl,lr,,l,llr,lt,l,,llr,l,tflrrl FBEOERPK D GRAHAM ?ro ELM $'r N A{)OriDoc H Es TX 79965-2 848 Your llonay Market lnysstrnenf $fatemcnt August eg, 20O8 to $rptanrbcr It, lgOS Aeoouft t numbir 7001 1 iteSeB Your account surnmary Beglnning balence @ Csll on Augrret 25, 2O0€ $186,07O.t1 rr13) 8118'3400 l-learing lmpaitsd ffDD 214 58S4r55) Plua &nolsita lntarpet s406.24 Vlclt d,r rub altr www.oomerka.csn Lss*wlthdrawab Yltltc io ut Electmnic iEFTj wifndrawule €e5,070.a1 COMERICABANK - p.o.Box850282 bd;wi*'d;#; $4,OOO.0O DALLAS, TX 7526$'?82 Feea and eevhr chargos -$1o.oo Entsng balanco on gtptcmbcr 27,2{lOG $157,396.24 @ The Gomerkm Vis Gilt Card b the perlec{ gift tot evefyarle and ersry omaslrn - blrthdaya. Swnmary ol intercgt youle earncd holHays, graduathrn. w€ddkrgts and more. Pick . lnlereel paid io you this statem€nl psriod $,106*?4 up your Vba Gitl Card todqy al any Soamrba r Annual percenlage yiold eamsd thls slat€manl parlad: g-55% locallon or prrcheee or{in€ al trrrn€ric&.€orrr. r Tctal inlsrsst Fid to you this year: 93,935.48 Sorn€ rsstridio&s appry. I@ Thank you lor belng a Comsr*x dlEtofi*r. Wo valua tha lrud andoonfrdene€ that yvu wtfrntJ€ ta ptaca ift us. RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 19a  TRANSFERS FROM SAVINGSFUNDS IRANSF[RR[D TROM SAVINGS ACCOUNT 7CO].142996 REPORT -] F tiNDS TRANSFFR To co A BANK A/c 7aort4297a INVENTORY SUPPORT 4.3 REPORT 3 I].A.TL DETAILS AMOUNT BANK REF{ 30-Mar^06 WEB TRANSFTR FROM AC 7001142996 800 00 w888807324 17'Apr'-06 WiB IRANSFER FROM AC7OOTL42996 8.500,00 w888800292 26-Apr'06 WtB TRANSFER FROM AC7OAN42996 6,0c0.00 w888807604 7-i u n-06 WE B TRANSFER FROM AC7OOL1.4299' 8,000 00 w888808096 7-Juq-OBWt3 TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,C00 00 w888807612 n-06 WtB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 7-l u 2,C00.00 w888801374 6-lul 06 W[B TRANSTTR FROM AC 7001142996 3,500 00 w888804059 13-J u l-C6 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888806871 24-)ui-46 \#LB TRANSFFR FROM AC 70C1142996 r",s00.00 wB88808548 10"Aug"0i; Wt8 TR,qNSFFR FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888801800 -iRANSFER 21-Aug-06 WEB iROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888802796 29-Aug 06 w[B iRANSrt_R FROM AC 7001142996 3,000 00 ow50023399 5'Sep-06 WTB TRANsFER FROM AC 7001142996 3,000.00 ow50073167 1,1"Se p-06 W[B TRANSFTR FROM.qC 7001142996 3,000.00 ow50079976 21-Sep-06 WE3 TRANSFi_R FROM AC 7001142995 12,000.00 ow50062130 20-Dec-06 WEB TR.ANSFIR FROM AC 7OO].142996 6,000.00 0w50082172 Pre House purchase 62,300"00 1-Mar'07 WTB IRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 6,000.00 ow50001709 2B-Mar-07 WEB TRANSFIR FROful AC 70C1142996 1,000.00 ows0009599 3-Apr.07 V/EB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 s,000.0c cw500356lE 3 0-J u l-07 wt 8 TRANSFIR IROM AC 7001142996 5,000.00 ows0082796 30-Aug-07 WEB ] R,AI]SFER FRCM AC 7C01142996 5,000 00 ow5005 2155 10-Scp-C7 WT B TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 s,000 00 olv50038 12 1 7-i'Sep-47 wts rRANS[ER FROM 4C7441,142996 7,500.00 cw50063723 u/tB TRANSTTR FROM AC 7001142995 2,750.00 ow50026027 30-Oct 07 WIB TRANSFFR AC 7001142996 7,000 00 ows0039801 30-Nov 07 WtB IRANSFtR ':ROM FROM AC 7OO1].42996 6,000.00 ow50087670 14'Dec-0 7 WiB TRANSFTR FROM AC 7001142996 3,000.00 cw50049096 24-Dec-Al WEB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 3,O00.00 cw504447247 2 Jan-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 6,500.00 o 8w50002 52 9 2-Jan O8 V\lEB TRAI.JSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,000.00 cw50006201 30-i an'08 WEB TRANSFER FRCM AC 7001142996 5,000.00 ow50076060 d - [ eb-08 WTB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 ow50037633 - 1 i.. ^;-Li3 WEB TRANSFER FROI,/4 AC 7001142996 3,000.c0 ow5001,0336 l, N'i;rr iil WL3 TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 6,000.00 ow50094999 1C-Mar-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001T42996 3,C00 00 ow5c0581"54 2a-Mar-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,000 00 ow50076107 I -Apr ud \ /tB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 5,O00.00 ow50075748 1-4 Apr-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7OO]-142996 1,400,00 ow50029213 18-Apr'08 W[B TRANSFTR i'ROM AC 7001142995 1,OO0 00 ow50014828 :ompletion of house Purchase 92,150.00 28-Apr WTB TRANSFIR ;ROM AC 7CO1I-42996 1,000 001w50064000 6'tu1dy WEB TRANS| FR FROM AC 700114299fi 6C0.C0 ow500374s3 2 3-fv1ay WEB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 200.00 ow5002782 2 27-May WEB TRANSFER FROlvi AC 7001142996 300.00 ow50092365 2f -Mav V/[B TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 300.00 o\ll5c056130 Total 156,850.00 march 06-may 08 C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\lr4y Documents\drvorce hard drive\divorce 3 rourt infomatrr RESpONDENT'S PURCHASE\cOMIRICA ac7AAIL42970 HOUSE PURCHAS xIsx EXHIBIT 20  Fill tE-.frl rrr' IIII Frrst Btni< 1009 N. Universqty Drive O-'TL dg rrust ffi Nn*gOoches, TX7596I (936) ssss100 .ir ' ) ' :riL : i) !;(:'6 Y !r'r:1.r; ', ' !:^., i.,:: t:,,' '-' t:; :..i .. ,i:.r: rrl' ''.;'a, '1a -J, .1 lri, l :r, !i. I j, !?,.' .t i,? t- -:r l:3 11)1- / ^ a:l: )l , )ra,li: .:.!i, i.,;, ll, .; '.: jl t )") : '::: ,-: t' : !,i:,) ,) " .','' ... t:; , .:, ".i. '{ ,::1..i i:,.: ir j _iil 'I;i1,,, .r.rl.i, ;.- i:,.i,lii :;3 :li: : i.i ..),,ii ?), RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 21  PnYr"ielti-C llgse First Bank &T?ust ffi 1009 N. UniversitY Drive Nacogdoches, TX 75961 tDEs) sse-sloo .(nOt.r)crtr\ F c o O- tEdJN(o l--f\NtOO{\l U Eg "3 i*i r *rl NCDNr-{ ; :x lJ6 (u U; e ao qq x 6 Yx :+ E -,tno 35 l! no- sf -/OJI-- .9 r{ l- :o o 'o6 c.) E rUo !_c ,qEr\E 00)0 (o.g 3E Y& ?E 3? 9bo E5 u= o. q 6e 66 m\.o ry F k eeu .Ero tr qoE t3l sro Y c'.1 S .; Rs!9 Eg. EE -r.r;' EiY, E8.gE .Ez F* ao .2 .= a..l FE $$?,5 iE $$ q tu '13 () O f.\ U EEEHEHEg=E..,EE 3 (! :c' .g OJ ac oo > i=gERR;E.'g:fif;RR E E P P a aP E E; P E; P.2. A='^'I', P .: 3 tl c ro grv{-rtrilr.rroHtrfr c -- bsfish OJ I OJ r -c LJ *EE22.- a,S.Err Egi-2 s.Err E{J .2 E U .f (J RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 22  (-) o rrJ AJ 92ro 9eo' d! t r 7 -{r !n fr vrg {-A -l --, o 3 9. :l 0a F 0) q) A afr o(D EqJ o= {./i (D {='J q? d *s f,)(tJvl 8+ oo i r ea fix s3 35 ,oii J f) 6J + = ?:r o (/) O- 3J iL^rt fD oil 3 o- o)o f3 fru1 os. Ft 0.) 6g =3 s qv, -{t w NJ B = o(1 (''! or gq E; 3 9. so qc) oq 5 3 4 (:f xo =r) ;fi =0rD 1P il 7) U 61 ".1 5 e OJ d -T1 *Y qt- P3rr E mF 3. o a v a)- a)frtD Ffi rn i; 6' 0p ) I !gl rt!l a rr6 a u vF. o;n oe x f LJ :t m c lJf gO- ae {r, 3 c: o : ftJ f.l Q t0u Co+ 3& \J+ { - O cof c 3 ! -o 3 o, :t : (9 N € {^) )J o tJl a' L n o o ro {a ! 9,, t f O cq, o o- o lr o -1 :" al o_ g, 3. 5 lv shJ \j {Jl gl (9 (o s. - PO -o d Or s{^3 (D l> w o fr ft o c a I c 3' P tvN t\) c) (o Ol |\J :' J o f I\J f\,1 ()u, itl p9 i) (*l & o ul !n (^, c) o o !^,} m o5 o I P {r, Fr : tv oq) (f C) tI) F r l\| (a r9 cn r?I ? 7 {1 m 9qo rb ll(Do rb lt UJ c6'=.n' l,\ xo P92 ro 3 =OrO) 8 B i H o :t a f. o U x.Drb 6ef o9 3-()fa) frP & o o 6*3 gl.+*J) { Qoro) ;i:lf Fv (DK c 5o)0, 6 (Dx 9. P 5 Vq !3. RA a -\o i('t or ,-O o rs. sP o; !-3 -s o a@ -(f,r nl xX xe ,7 9B RE$POT{DEHT'S EXHIBIT 23  9r'?r: qii. 33 tt33< ??9r,i- FS : TA oo EB33t 313 Pi+? ??sq? a & : 666 odt orF oo t>- h. a EH g ; p 35 2 t z ,.i ,r. ; !! 88 sgsg*5 8389s 'll o; = q P 6 { a : *g? I Ed 7 i o , U-Ll o, 5. iEcq;'H o :q'{*1: s**t h J d6rfi9 oo i: 6;-46;6 o - "2nE !! (D o no I o ". o RESPONDENT'$ EXHIBIT 24  \,F-f-i'r! : ;;Jtr:;; ifo ??> u^Jc*tF c l e -r..jr o acoScooa-- i € 5 ; r ;El-- r Ee!'!bsa:-. :>>>>=il 1 - -3- cYY:!!!a I €?s?eiialili; occaoco :;;:sllgll: - t:r:.: 3 ;;;;l::T o;;--;50 f g f 6 Z 6 6 6 i. P slRl.; s :*:,:.i-e; -lsl=E 'rC--=3- il = ; l:lj - i F i s 3 l;l' i g c ii3333:e €PFPP9€ c :ii'Flil' o o ;; ;; ;;5 3I9:9: !; i;;: - + ltl; - l:ll s lllP 55!q5$A c@ € 6 6. @ D ; l5t '..1=l=l FxEE g a l;l := t't tr c c lrl' tl t=l tltl tl 5 tl il I ;l 6t ,sI I I 6 'lll' rt o il I tl tltl t tl tl o 3 Bi:E€ 5, ll os:J9550 -*XA 3?:ll,l 363i3i llIt '/oO oc006!1:> ooSootc -r + 0 llr tl E tl tlll lt a zx 3 lt . tl j{tl 5 lleE : I lu i n ill.l ill iltl tlt-l 7 z _t3l *l >l i 3l*l ilg= 5 :hiJ' o _q ;bls d o 5 o 1 ;2 a c ::: :> -2 3S -i  Feu!!Frs 3<;<<33; ryN** -avFl{6s- 9F:tf+?? q g f' :::t.2.::! *eF$ast etSeeei 33>>xl* u0drorrrd ;'F; ;r; ;.;- > ; o =:=i s o 6 F 3 ;;YVie-e-e-i 3 F I I x:::::::: 656556U5 8*S*E8r in{{3iii* -n 3 a5a5b$a5 3888SSS 3 ::ii5-:: t888ii3e t ct ssEsstgs FilNPDP!P E6FOOAOO @FF*99@ 85[5;dd -.@es iiirdE:; 0 t 5 @eb65 \ ri N E8 E (a 2t a zI D z !O{s ONUPODO , , s, oooo 38988888 8888888 3S3s8888 o 7 I fi o t -O > z r5 T 8 Sr 3! ,b 5 :. I :E 3 3-i'€ zi c3 EFz 8 :: a?a rii o D o I CL s. o 6 a 5 H  131?55 NOTICE OF CONFIDEN'I.IALITY RIGHTS: IF YOU ARE A NATURAL PERSON, YOU MAY REMO\,'E OR STRIKE AI\{Y OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING IIiTORIUATION o FROM ANY INSTRUMENT TIIAT TRANSFERS AN I}iTERESI'IN REAL PROPERTY F. BEI'ORE lr IS FILED FoR RECORD rN Ttrn puBLIC RECORDS: youR socrAl R SECURITY NUMBER OR YOUR DRII'ER'S LICENSE NiU]VIBER. WARRANTY DEED WITII VE\-DOR'S LIIN l*t Dccember IU 2008 <7 Grantor: ROBERT tv{ll,LER and wifu, ARDAN MILLER 7 Crantor's Mriling Address (including county): 6 10 P:rk St., Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County, TX 7596 I t-t Grantee: FRL,DERjCK D. CR\HAM t-_l l_t Grantee's FIailing Address (including county); 3704 Raguet St., Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches Couag. T}-j5965 Consideration: TEN AND Noi 100 Doi.r.ARS 1s 10.00) ancl orhervaruabre consideration, ancl a nore of evcn date rhat is in the principal alnourr of IrORTy-FOUR THotJiAND and Noi 100 DOLLARS (s44,000.00) and is execured by cranree, payabre to rhe order of FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TEXAS, -ihe n.te is secured ty a vendor,s lien relained in tavor of FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TFXAS in rhis dee Notc: ]. l)aie: Oecemter-ffi-, zoof Anrount: forty-Four llsg-saud urd Noi i00 Dollars 1$44,0{}t}.Qti) \{ake..: Frolhcr cxceptions 10 conve,vnnce *nd warrailtf, urd 3. iicnr ilrtj proreeds of tb.e:.ole, pay, in tiris urdvr; a. exlens€s o f iirreclOsure, rnciud hg a commisSiOn tO TruStee cf 5% Of tlrC bid; b. 1o Bcnciiciary, tlie full amo'unt of prurcipui, intcrest, etk)mcv's ltes, and o'Jra oliargcs due and unpaiti; c. sny all)ounts required b)'law to bc palii beforc payment to Cruntor; arrd d. to Crsnlor, anv ba'lancre. $cnEr'a-l Provisions  l. Ii'Lny of thc propcily is sold undcr this ded oltrust, Cranior 5h3l] irrrngdisl6b sun€ndcr posscssion to the purchascr. If Cranlor t'ails to do so, Grantor shall bccorncl$r;lS#a I suffemncr of t-he purchaser, subject to an 8cliotr fc'r forcible detaincr. 2. Recitals in arry'I'nrstee's deed convcying the properfy will bc presumed to bc truc, (] 3. Procecding uadcr rhis dccd of trust, 6liag suit for forcclosure, or pursuing any othcr rrrnedy will not cottslirule an clection of rernedics. |.- 4. This lien shali remain supcdor to licns later crcated even if the lime of paynxxit of tr all or part ofthe rrote .is extendcd or part ofthe properry is released' 5. If any portion of the note cennot be lawfully secured by this dced of trust, payrnents shali be applied first to d:schargc that portion. 6. Grzurtor assigrs to Bcneficiary all sruls payable to or received by Crarrtor from r-r condcmnatios of sll or part of the pmpqty, tom private salc in lisu of cpndcrnnation, anci frorn 2 damages caused by public works qr consrmction on or ncar thc property. After deducting aly {? cxpenses i:rcured ilcluding artornels fces, Bvneficiary mayreleane aly rernaining sufils to Gmntor or apply such sums to r€duce tlre note. Bcneii<;ir:.ry shall not be iiable for fsilurs lo collect cr to r:xercise diligcnce in coliccting any such sutirs. 7. Grantor assigns to Btneficiary absolutcly not oniy as colialeral, all present asd future rent and other incomc and receipts frolrr tho propsrty. LeBsEs urt not assigtred. Grantor warrants the volidiry and vnlbrd:rta:rtt:Lnia AXERICA) E0elgtA 8SlaEf).FXSq'NlT&r} s$Aif ts3 ofi jdldsn,i€r! lia r ia-Te re sa Lopez Bclbrc rr.c,rbr*uxdaurynefisnkbify, e NutaridL l)r [.icer of thc i,'nited Starcs ot Arnerica residcnt in Singa;rorc, duly comrnissionevi and qualificd, ol this day pa-sonaily npocareC FREDERICK D. Cl{A}lAMr k*{}*9-re{ffi or proven to rn€ 10 be the person who* nunc i: suhscribed lo tic foregolrg iasr.:$rurrt and ackrowlcdgcd to me lliat l''e cxecuted the same ior rhc purpos€s and consrccrajon therein cxpresscd. Civo: undermy hand aod seai of ofice tlris 5tjr day of Decenbe r 2008 lide:=--,\_"13t-i""i 9tjic,er . -,ofrleUnirecO rl O Ea gs 1t1 t +'nOoJZ ? c(' ih u.l E' S'i /- o|'n v, ;cl-cul 6r- Es (u Cl OJ x(u scn bs b i'-.= i E l! - a o- o E >. z. .": )l.-\ ) 59. -c! s-iH.HE-kEf ttl T' E ,;(J - z 2< u trvr oo ? atz Cr! & u tE. o- (E t> q,)> (./) r u < (n F c z tlJ = Q o- C) U - LJ z 3 RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 37 t: (oi :;i j \r ;-:t (tUM - * a! t (f) < ()F l € q : !- qf @ c6 O {.r\ a) al f-i C al c* c *J a.{ w .nl *---I R I -1 I r-{ t zv 3 tr { cE LN € -+* tlli tl* r- $0 rfl N N cf Ft -z -t-\ 5l c] \ct LR -g T 3 s }O J .l Ic. CII rfl CH .f, oc cf $* $ :il tra ra F A -x.lJ tt) (.Jl ' -r{6 e tL) al r (o -rl l{ - = .F J E r.i a,fr KH I 5 d z r"- c3 E xF i o rg a tr"U z ru .t R -i v(J I fr rl.l 3 E6 c)t I ,.| G d8 -(..,-; rh ul 3(9 o is +) 11 -,ga tsl r{ !-f 5* SE RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 3B-A  (\ r: * { = E O f.r F =x vr-H 5X I t I lI) lrH zB - ft1 i { F cf , fr F g {i ii"lU nt rg f'L, I F:EIU Itr 5R R rt.t r-.l gl a 3s lu-o 8A x; 1 rfi { ,{ s1 aa t) ttE? E arZ b€ /t{ E F-f .o - F< RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-c  c.l Y cl ro g $i' t{l eF , q N !r. I 1 ...l g srl B 6 € c .',- a E -- d.{ € t 2 7. ;r{ a - w dj Etr cc ttt n- l_ c- FI CI 3 i- ra z :) cl ai LN ri Ir ro !f, rfi & rI (f cr) ?a Eg ar -? v Z IF ts,E f.Fl t - [f ffiu a rg l't, q R U ru (l)l { ;iJ sI .JO '1q r-i QIc, a, >'9 x; rfl r- .- la '- r- Bg fi5 - c- 'a I I RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-d C O= rn - [: iti ,lt- ,E: Y-n c'' @ I l€ rf n- Ni I ln aJ- !* c {_t (t{ (R l;.' I x{ Ft'. i I I i \E; -1\; I \ 4 it ",i 1 Sl- r.{ I I i I I ii\- I t 6 "\'| I {l uJl €lvl 7! I I cr € lJ-l c0 t\- Ti I ln qi s (L AI \-/l li ll IO N"{ ft .-J ->l q tr *dc] I' -/l 2:, Fl- i 'y'l u u 4dt --.1 -t\ T= i_ rlJ JV.l LYI 'l 7i FSI F d b'i 4zzlx,\J i { ,i I a J E P-l{ d, =-H ftJ ,Efi 3s J; fl 2l T :4 g snE flEE rt S.i -='-i"ri -cr Z ,,iiU C*,,ti H a- -lC{ tr Hlljnn,; Yzf,frui e u, O ft sqotrE at I ,TR ,i:! nr -- E frtrfi18 ol di rn 'f -<(,:rn(, dt=4Q -o ctrOC? >1: Eo-{t fiE i rNl r *\l a s 1-' € c" c- i! ::c. RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 3B-e - ca : :f co 5l :- rf IF E ili g .{ I t €I .i3 ts C.l c/l fr N Sr t H oo F g - lr ;L ? \- ao € , .(r ul E il q z. tr z F & t ! s tr s al cd ctr LN f'* b ac a- rn at s r, FS cl t4 f -z LN a cl € ss- :x rJl a cg ? -S d- g { € a{ - 7. *r* F a.l >x t- cO r{ E.; g;i \- 7 ffE >tr * =! EE$ ef +x C)-Y KH RX z8 It -? - cl AIJ \l Iu V :E{ tr iiu x'v e,2 6 rt.r B & ri ;H3Hfi gqgF rLJ ; s E -a vo o Ot o xt rfi r{ n sl- €, t q) FaaEg {u EI o 'i(6 o- tFufiC \r -i \r* RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 3B.f  a.l (-I ili : f\ c.l : J a.- i II r- lx I di TT l'- s -{ q 2 ll s -l z o o 6 r€a t) c{ a oc s& LN c\- fft cr. hsfi cf Qiu .j r{ z- cf $s$ I-rt g € rL .f F r|| cc $ t\ >x {- c.r g{ r{ t= g,H., >t EX ll HBf = cc (5 C' (J qX 76 qu - c0 ? z a- dfr o cl 5+< ru vYZ J I O(E o I rl-l '{ EF C" GC lrl lI, rfl o lrl 3 ST 4 ,,: G o -t ,n rH :E IL :i ll ,F T ,r RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-g  /-- \* -F C!= zut va.l a- $= O; ?-s ? s l.\I- gl ili € E q \-l tr C '.; cd I : It \Id sl- a --t,, h € vl (a) I f\t" / il q f r') aq ri ; I id A rt $ o\lt ir & z s L \- 3 a r r) r') E fi od x Eo s oc & c\ A n,l TL rrfi c! 6 N -. il : { 7. cJ' c{ F co tn rJl o r: .$ g t; s s F ru co [! \) trl rx ts r - Cl ? +* ai a'l r. fit tt7 x rr 7 X5 lriO.9 f! "{ :t J \n B z il f{F{ 7 Iii o za a. =HF ir€ x5 7 € a. n (l $9' R rLJ r|.t 2. @ ,- 3 d iHEH -\tsE >h \i ;.b E rn { t a & A V 'tr HtrE= sq(i f! a rl I&3 I ,i 'aig -\) s o s RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38,h  ,1re-uso-tg3s i_ '.+-_.-l:--:-:-.*'-.. ji Fnfocnrcx o- cfiaHln lnEDrntct o. cnrr{lc r 187 r!.ilaxrE7 lrD0GGr6. n r:rs *glul ii &ff** .*:'!l 'r ir, ,I tar $,iilryi'":.j ,6 i i ':ltlll l80tt! l18lr.5EtOll?tSt .I i Eranch0 Oate0F04-2010 Acoount00103374g Amount 108.07 Sorisl I 183 TR I 131 22S04 InsuD 0 EmptD 0 DbCr D franCoOe Branch0 Dtt606-03-2010 Account5OrO3374g Anount75.00 gcrirt 1t07 TR tr3jt28o4 Dis{r&utionCode 21 TransmitAccount0 Soqusnccg0l?g6g526 O ..lnrtt0 EmpiO - 0 otb, O Trancode 0 O TrancmitTR 113122804 FxceptionCode0 piyNopay DietributionCods 21 Tran3rntiAccount O Squrndfr I SzSeeqo CgrrtclcdAccount 0 Tnan*mitTR 113124804 ExtxptionCoda O p"VUopaV CorcdodAccount 0 r;l ll t I 160r,r: t l85rr50 toll?[5|. 8r.o€h0 D.te 0$.05-2010 Account SOlO33Z4g Amount56.52 Brsncfi 0 oat! 0&11-a0io Accounr so10g3745 A;"t 3000--.00 Scnd 1185 TR 11312ZA(X InetlD 0 EmptD 0 DbCr O TnnCode 0 0 TB tr0101Og IngtlD 0 Emptp DbtributlonCode 2'l TrangrnitAccount0 Sbqrrsnca g0t26&+72n Ea/ial Ot|trblltigncodc 1 0 Dtcr'C rrendojJiO: TrsnsmitAccount 0' Soq{r€ncc l+OSSStSeO Tr€trrflrtTR 113122e0,4 ExceptionCodo 0 payNopey TranrrnitTR 0 ExcsptionCodo 0 payNopa] CorreaeOacmunt ?vFbdAccount 0 O I I 1 I tt rre:r on&r.r FfiBEmCr rL ,r6ffi:t,tIr'|:t Hl{r--Fr.^re tdp }ry'trr * .F5;o" s t*c. t+w+ea h+ eAtr,.ttYr FUE . _ wr* 6 Ea _ IggIgSH ieii&-'ri'F ,,j!^; ffi| 1 I @I ll^ I r: laoqr: t loqrSo tgtt?L 5r - a _-_=.&&e_ r{J,r0060o t?5oo/ Eonctr 0 Dsb Fl&.?0i0 Account SO103374f Arnount 175 Eranch 0 Dat. 05.05.2010 Account 501033745 Arnount 4i.00 0t s6nrl 1189 rR i 13122904 rnsttD 0 ErnprD o Drcr o rrancode Ssr6i 1184 TR 113122804 tnsrlD0 EmptD0 ObCrD TrFncod60 0 D8ffiutionCode 21 TruNmrtAccount 0 Siqrrancc eOr3{ S6E6 Drctrbstioncodc 2J TrenemitAccount0 Seqtnncr g0i2ggTl0o TranernitTR 1131246&t Excaptioncod. O payXopay TnrnernrlTR 113122804 ExcaptinnCodcO pryHopay ConcddAccount 0 Co.rodedAccouni 0 [$so.cs Finr Brnk &Trurt l* stutrnGrt6, .lll : l80rrr: t lglt 50 tO 31?\9 ll | | ?gol.ri I tg0r 50 I0tl ?\ s t: I Brardr 0 DatsH1-?010 Accounl 5010&3745 Arnount 190.0O Brench 0 Dais 06-2$2010 Acrour( 50i03374i Arnount tO0,0.00 S€risl 1188 TR 1 131228&4 InrUD 0 ErnplD 0 DbCr D TranGode 0 S..i.t 119O TR l t3tZZAO/r Inr$D 0 ErrplD 0 Db0 D f"crCorfc OiatbdbnCodc 21 TrgnmriAount 0 Sqrnnce 9O132OS6E2 Di*hlbutiooCodc ?1 T*rsrnitAccourx 0 Siqirf,€ g0f g50S610 O TroarynitfR 113122804 Excapboncodc0 payxopey TrrnunitTR 1131228&t E'erptonCodc 0 p'fli{JpL- Cor€dsdAcc.ount 0 Cono*dAcslntO - RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-i  DUPLICATE TAX RECEIPI \A(. ()(IDO(:HF,S (,FN'] R^I- ,^,PPR DiST I lb w H(.);cPIt'At- Sl" \.4c( )(;fx-)( -iJ l-..q. .t x j Jqr; I q l6,,5 bij" J 4+7 This is a rcceipt. I)o not pay. fJ* ner ID: R 18218 -f {IRNER 1r4,.\RIORIE l.{NE. 8OI I,,AI;RE],I,,C,NE \At ocl)ocHEs. IX 75964_65 Ii Par;e{ ld/{)rrnerSec 28016 / l Atrsr/Subd jv CIAI{TIIR Sliltr N ,{ccDunr Nr)rrlhcr: I ll- I i1)-:6ti0-0 ll{tO{) Blocl i.or l-t)t:2 Ac rcs (lat ('r,dr /.1 { )rvncr lntcr:sr I oix) i-egais t- I' l2 CARTER Pri'D Address 80 I l_At,rRF.t. LN PnrpCrrviS1./Zip NA(:.)Gt)O(.ili:S.IX-7596.t l-il'i: LrSl'A I i; Llon:r.sierd L i,ilc l car Jurisdiction l'nr Tsr Post Rr te Tsr -l'otnl Vrlur Codr DistltrnlOther Amounl lhlr l'{)sted :109 :lA[ txiDOC]t lF.s c.r,){ iN"iY 0 4_i4100 s3+.6 90 t, 5i01 9l s0 00 !10"!97 t)l,lq,'2()i() 2r)09 \AC(-)CD(,\CltFS isD v&() l. t7f)0cfl $l9.6 90 sjjT P 07 s0 00 slil ,17 ll09 :\./\t.( )(iu(-X.ll.ltiS 1SD t&S 0 200000 $39.690 P $?9 18 50 00 $?9 l3 '.ta)q CIT\',(lt- t\A( a)c{)()cHi:s 0 550000 54.6 C0 s P !.)00.I ir Si) 0{) !;-100.lta) 20ag i.*, tn,ri. s!122.22 50 t)u 5822 t2 Parrel Totrls: t8l2 2.. SC 00 5822 2-l Dl'l Ycrrillonth: lfl I 0i) I paymeni Ref Totrls: s822.22 s0.00 $822-:2 (llcrk: n:ra PTid lt.v: i.RLDERICK D GRAHAM Pavmcnt-type: Checl Prr ment Ref No: l:)2!,/ Crand Totals: 582 2.21 s0.00 s822.r2 a| [^ 1y '.- I - ,'-l RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-a  DUPLICATE TAX RUCEIPT :i,{L.f)CI)OCI{I: S (., LIJTRAL APPR D]S1' I t., w itosPIT.\l- s-i \,,\(l()C;l)()Ct l I i,S. ]-X 7-_s 96 1 't-i 6- J60-.14:l l This is a receipt. Do not pav. ()tl'69r lp, R I8218 iI ]RNER VlAR.IORIE JANE .30] LAURT'"L LANI, N.4('0GDOC}rF_S,'fx 7_(96.1_65 I l i'arcel id,'{)rmrr Str-l 18024 i I At-.st,'Subdiv CAR'THl \u[: N Ac,roirnl )lurnbcr l8- j ii)---q600-0l1o0r) ftiock Lrrt a,)\!Ier ltitercst i 0l 12 -\crcs Lat Code AI L O)1t L.egals: l,l l2 C,\RTLR l'rrp .;1i1,1,.r, tiO I L.\tjp.EL LN i ;,',,p ( ih,;sr,7.p NACOC;DOC,I.rirS.t x_75e64 I IFL ESTATE ill)mestead Codd: I] 'frr p()!t Yerr .furirriiction IllKate 'l 'l i'rlue (ode ar Drs,'Pen,'Othrr otel Amounr Dsrr posted iril C' i!A( r.lUDO(. itES ISD \t&O I I70000 $i9,6.16 A S 168.-s,1 S0 Oil $1685.1 0l l,i2fill lrll0 N,\COCiIX)L'I{LS ISD I&S 0.200000 519.690 A S i9.{rE r.lil 50 s.19 6E 2r)10 \Ac(.)Gix.)Cili:s (-oi,)i]'y t 4-j410{j 5-]4,6q0 A s5: 49 $0 0{l s.s2 49 tiJlo /.-il Y OF NA(:OCjI)O(.HES 0.561167 s54,690 A s 15-5 70 sft 0{) s is-5 ?0 f,O10 Yerr 't otsls 5J 6 .10 1 $0 1r0 s4la 40 Ps rr:cl Tota ls: 5416.40 s0 0() s4t640 I)['l Ytgr'rtl(]nth; l.)l l{il f 'l.otels: I'a.v-mcnt Re s+t6..r0 s0.fr0 141 6..10 (.lerk: Grace Paid By: I)E\A TI,RNER Payment.Iype: Check l'rymcnt Ref \o: II l2 Crpnd Totrls: S'l l6.JlJ St)-00 s,r t6.J0 RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-b Page I rf I  DUPLICATE TAX RECEIPT N.Aalo(iDOC}iES CiiNTR;\t. AppR DIST ]I6WftOSPITALST \ACOGD()c-rtrs, "i-x 7.596 I t)36-56A-1.147 This is B receipt. Do not pay. f)wner ID; R 18218 Ti,rI{NNR MAi{JOIiII: IA\J: 801 l.AtjRiir. t-ANI \ACI)CDOCI IES. t'X ?i964-65 l3 Parcel kl/l.iwner Sert: l8(il6 , AbstiSuhdrv CAIt'itR \[rt. 1 A,iccun'Number N l8-llfr,-s6!lrJ-0ll(){}(l Block ( )\vner Inlcre\t l_or Acre ! ( ill ( odc rr. l | 0()A Lcgals LT l2 CARTER i'rop Addrcss. 80 1 i,Al_ REL L\ I'rip Cilv,Sti Zrp NACr.i(tDCICHLS.TX_7_596.1 LIFF ESTATE [Jrrnrestead L'odc : l:i Ycar ,lurisdiction rnx Rrlr It: Posi -ln r Stut Code r D i r./l'c ni {) th c r f0lrl Amount Drtc postod :OIO NACO(iDOCIi€S ['OITNTY 0 "134100 $1t,690 P $.s2'18 !r E7 .16i1 t j 06 01t2i)i :U1(r CIIY OF NAC(XjD(}('HF,S {} 56q..i61 i s54.6gc P sr55 69 !t3.1,-\ $ l?g i)4 l0l0 \^1CO(iD0Cffirs iSD M&O I I 70t)00 s19.690 r) $l6E 5{ sl.s.j8 ll91 r0li.| \A{-O(lD(_)C'HI-tS jSD t&S 82 t) t00000 sj9,69i) P $.19.70 5s 96 5.1_5 65 loio r;.-r :f"i"i. 5.r ti'r t s62 ,16 $ f7t 8t Pr rcel Totr ls: 54i6 4l $62.,t6 s.178 8r DPI l'e*r;)lonlh: 2(.tl j06 prvmen( Ref l.otals: S{ I 6.,t I 5 62.16 s478.87 {llcrk: mes;hclJc I Paid By: Dt:\A TLiRNijit Pa,!mrnt Tvpe: {.-heck l'almcot R{f loi tili) Gre nd Trilals: 5{16.{l \6:.,16 td? tt.8r RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-c [.19..19t,\  DIJPLICATE TAX RECf II'T \A( (_i{;iXX'llF.S { fNlRAL AppR I)tS'I ": t.' w iti)sPIl ,Ai_ s-r \AC.-)CD{JL litS f X 7i:)6 I 9I6-<61-'i- 1..i,1r' This is s receipt. Do not pay, On'ncr IIJ: R t8318 'l l,lRNl:R \4AR.l0RlF ir\Nt: 8tl LAI.jRI-.l.l.ANF NA( O(in()clJLS. t'X 75961-65 t I Seq. i'arce! ld/()wncr 28()25 | i AbstiSubdrv CAR If:R \u t1t N Ae corrnr \umber I 8- I l0-,:h0ii-1t12(100 Block Lor LOT I2 (,)!1r1er lnlerest. 4.ci es C at (lodr: z\ i I 000 l-egalsr LT 12 C'ARI ER Ilrrrp Address 801 l."Ai.JRf i. LN Prup Crr.v,'Stlzip NAC(X;IX)CHLS.TX-?-5964 LIFE I:S'f:\TI; lilimcs(ead (.odc frv I rar .lurisdiction L\ Ratr .',-: I'o.ct 'flx 'I-otrl Amounr ! ttuc (lodc DistPen 0ther l)ltt Poite(t ).(:l I NAilax y 'l).)Cl'.lL-,S Cu'r}:t () 134$A 514,690 s75.16 s0 00 575.,16 0i,ll:il12 ]i)] i )iA(.](X;JXX]}.ILS ISD V&O L I7(l0tr0 s_r9.6t0 \{} 00 s2l2 t3 2(11 I f.'ff\' a)F N.{L-a)(ji)(x i:lFs .) 569000 s,\,{,690 s15566 50 01j .iiii NA(:(t(itx)( ltEs r!t) I&s !. )l {,b 0100(100 S.19.690 5.19 ir) Stl r'0 sl, i0 l0l l Year Totrls t5f):) 00 50. iio s5{J1.00 P$rrfl 'l 0tsls: $50i 00 50 00 55('3 00 l)Pl I eariUonrh: l0l2f)l paymcnr Rtf I otrls: ss0J.00 s0.00 s50J.00 ( lerk: rncschellc I l'rid fly: FRLI)LTRICK D (iRAHA\{ Palment I ype: (lheck Pa1'.ment Rcf No: I lS I Grrnd Torcls: :is0J.00 5-S03.00 RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-d  DUPLICATT, TAX RECEIPT ?'l,r.f |,1.;1rtn,t tt:S C tlJl RAl,. ,.\ppR DIST : l5 t!' t"10st)lT,\1. st' i!.{(-O.;l)OC l lirS, TX j i96 l q3 6,-( 1r !)- j ".1.1I This is a receipt. Do not pav. Owner ID: R 18218 iirftr;P-Y1 \1n RJQftlii JANF. 8()l l.r\l RI-L t-ANlr l"l:\( (-xil)O(.lJrS. 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E 7 va I E9.s -{ F, t'o IF9E t { hJJ o --t :l b{ x 6 /e l!B= t5 lo -o <{ o d C = m gEg I c! ix x g9 z -l :. 38 dt; z do (,0 o g €8 l7 Es= BT: 2 ! .iO !l O f I Dos HI 3 E Iz ;3* 5€ou J 6 2 F ;as oz 6 3 d zI , FEE 3 F (o TTE aof; F' 3 o>z t , o (1 EE c, II a! :r!tq8 s parricr income loconrg source le&' I Checrcn ti{J'i ptRSior{ pAyAEtt AT THf IST OF EVtRy MO,rH r*To r't.tionrr wesffrrnFtlr bink A/c r.0084681 FROM THT 5TART OF ,4PRII t4:rn'hly sour!e Chryion letter dated 28th February 2014 2Or4 Net Year pension ! 5W6 ended Taratlon receiyed splil as April Annual D€ducted to be Monthly net per UX ilg:r:$i't' 2At4 Pension at Source sbared pension divorce 4,465 27.31 1 2,275.99 13655.7 M! Tontl'!t/ sha.e In,,i.frng p"riis r 1 I J7.97 i.4Eti ffi t.6.813 1.6-i 12015 t ,dr per Maf wire 5r.€ 1855.1jt 1..63120157 cop! rn Ste erpenses estimates 5 .rrm uf, Io tw ! *hich has no !or! cod€ only rculing 1{mber 50 pound5 rterling multiphed )y dollere exahrngc Gte 7 .rE!rr r!rt |,r,r'rr8y !lvtil8 t4 I rsm5 MCho!t air cCndition,hE. Csn not ranage tii5 iummer due to 96r health 150 ;as h6ting not used jurt tor heatrng wate. OL ,,ty water and Earbage coll(tion 5{ )r'operfy laxes currentlV detinou€nt s0c ry to e he.s. Nacodochcs a'u being and ciou6t;.. I'exas. l,ol N0. uctl,g r,t)r r\(). z2 oI rjf ttte ltcplat rll the Kcptat ol'Lgt 2_\-Ll. (.it),tllock l.ot 2-s-L:. (.itr,[]lock 67- 67 aS as ShOwn rr* l)lat shrrw,n Otr i^ *r-.rr,r,,,r in r)r,rr r.ei{:)rclerj v.lLrnrc 9. I'}agc 2-5 o1'rhe r'rai Rcc'rtis, Nacirgcr,,c'r,;r-g6l;;i.l..rr.. f{ sr(;NrD thir$eL&.zotz JFremy'S. 'v\rillis 209 Hughes Slreer Nacogdoches. TX 75961 (936) 56e-7e4J AC'KNOWLEDONIF,NI S]-,\TE OF'I'EXAS CO{ AiT}, OF NACOCI)OC}JES llLt;C)Rlr fufl-. drr: uirdercigncd Notar,r, lrul-rlic- on thi.s da; personall-v- appearcd \\'illis. knorvn to rne lo bc thc pcri,rn Jerenry S. whosc-narrre is subscribcd to thc fbrcrroirrg instrumcnt lrici acknon'ledged ttr me titat lhe sarne has trr:cn cxccutctJ lbr thc purpos{Js and con.sirlcratitirr therein cxprcsscd. (;lVl..N trnder mv irand anf'olllcc tfris I  Lban. {gfeenent Setween: Datod: 22d June 20,13 Frederick D. Graham purclpot oftherb$owingprop€rty in the city of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Texrx and belng-Lotlsc, cnvblock 6?, as shsqm on Plat recorded in volume 9, paae 25 of the {ecords of Nacogdoches courqr, Texss- L€xdipe pat' leine Robert a-nd Mccatty, (JJC citizms) residing atflalficre,-Ellingtorr,Erja4,T,aploq$t$een Buckinghamshirc, Si,6 iigA gngla1j t - - - , The puqrose of the loan to enable lvk Frederick Grahan to repay the outstanding PlVment tn full due tq First Bag& and Trust p.aqt Texas. ThE paymenr in-fufr, ytl fsutt the relinquisbmerit in &e lien curently held by First Bard