in Re: Christy and Kory Hill

ACCEPTED
12-15-00115-CV
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
5/1/2015 3:10:30 PM
CATHY LUSK
CLERK

NO. ___________________
__________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TWELFTH DISTRICT, TYLER,
TYLER, TEXAS
TEXAS 5/1/2015 3:10:30 PM
__________________________________________________________________
CATHY S. LUSK
Clerk

IN RE CHRISTY AND KORY HILL, Relators
__________________________________________________________________

From the 188th District Court for Gregg County, Texas
Cause No. 2014-2357-A
Honorable David Brabham, Presiding Judge
__________________________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
__________________________________________________________________

Jonathan Wharton
SNOW E. BUSH, JR., P.C.
Texas State Bar No. 24075764
420 N. Center Street
Longview, TX 75601
Tel. (903) 753-7006
Fax (903) 753-7278
jonathanwharton1@sbcglobal.net
ATTORNEY FOR RELATORS
CHRISTY AND KORY HILL

May 1, 2015
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Pursuant to Rule 38.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant

lists the following parties affected by this appeal, and their respective appellate and

trial counsel:

Relators: Christy and Kory Hill

Jonathan Wharton
Snow E. Bush, Jr., P.C.
420 N. Center Street
Longview, TX 75601
Tel. 903.753.7006
Fax 903.753.7278
jonathanwharton1@sbcglobal.net
Trial and Appellate Counsel for Christy and Kory Hill

Respondent: Hon. David Brabham

188th District Court of Gregg County, Texas
101 E. Methvin, Suite 408
Longview, TX 75601
Trial Court

Real Parties in Interest: Andrew Shaw and Daniel Shaw

T. Heath Chamness
White Shaver
205 W. Locust
Tyler, TX 75702
Tel. 903.533.9447
Fax 903.595.3766
hchamness@whiteshaverlaw.com
Trial Counsel for Andrew Shaw and Daniel Shaw

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

NO REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(a) and Rule 52.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Tex. Bus. Prac. & Comm. Code §§ 17.46(b)(5), (6), (7), (13), and (22). . . . . . . . . . .7

Tex. Bus. Prac. & Comm. Code § 17.50(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.011(a)(6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(l). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

RULES

Tex. R. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

CASES

Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 12

Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2006) (fraud). .11

Winkle Chevy-Olds-Pontiac v. Condon, 830 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex.App.—Corpus
Christi 1992, writ dism’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

In re City of Houston, No. 14-12-00861-CV at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (orig. proceeding). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

3
Suntide Sandpit, Inc. v. H&H Sand and Gravel, Inc., No. 13-11-00323-CV at *11
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, pet. denied) (mem. op.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist] 2005, no pet.) (orig. proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.
1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Broomfield v. Parker, No. 12-06-00208-CV (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.)
(mem. op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Relators filed this lawsuit against the Real Parties-in-Interest (operating as

Engines Unlimited) arising out of a dispute over car repairs. Tab 1. Relators pleaded

causes of action for fraud and conversion, among others (including DTPA violations).

Tab 1. They then sought net-worth discovery from the defendants. Tab 3. The

defendants objected with the following: “Defendant objects to providing any

information regarding net worth because § 17.50 of the DTPA does not allow for the

recovery of punitive damages.” Tabs 4 & 5. The defendants also moved to join the

used car dealer as a responsible third party. Tab 6. Relators objected to that

designation and set a hearing for both the net-worth discovery issue and the objection

to the designation of a responsible third party. Tab 7. The trial court refused to allow

Relators discovery on net worth. Tab 10. It also overruled Relators’ objections to the

designation of a responsible third party. Tab 10 at 20.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction in this original proceeding pursuant to Tex. Gov’t

Code § 22.221(a) and Rule 52.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Because the case is guided by simple and well-established rules, oral argument

would not benefit the court’s decision-making.

5
 ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the plaintiff to
conduct discovery on the defendants’ net worth?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing the defendants to
designate a responsible third party without stating a claim for relief against
that third party?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiffs’ filed this case alleging causes of action for fraud and

conversion, among others, against the Defendants. Tab 1. The following facts were

alleged:

In March of 2014, Mr. And Mrs. Hill purchased a 2006 Dodge
Ram for approximately $13,000 from a used car dealer. Within a
couple weeks, it had broken down due to a problem with the engine.
The dealership recommended they take it to Andrew Shaw and Daniel
Shaw, operating as Engines Unlimited, who gave them a $5,500
estimate for the repair. The Hills agreed and gave them the car to fix.
Over the course of five months, the Defendants collected over
$12,000 from the Hills, but instead of fixing the car, they damaged it,
let it sit, and ultimately refused to return the car on request. The Hills
were charged for problems with the car that did not exist at the time
the truck was brought to the Defendants. Unnecessary parts were
ordered and charged to the Hills in order to inflate the bill.
Eventually, when the Hills tried to pick up the truck to take to
another repair shop, the Defendants told the Hills that even though
they had paid the entire bill, and the repairs had not been completed,
the Hills could not take the truck unless they signed a release of
liability for the Shaws and their company.

Tab 1. The petition went on to state the specific claims made: “Defendants ANDREW

6
SHAW D/B/A ENGINES UNLIMITED and DANIEL SHAW are liable for

conversion, trespass to chattel, DTPA violations under Tex. Bus. Prac. & Comm.

Code §§ 17.46(b)(5), (6), (7), (13), and (22), negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and

breach of contract.” Tab 1. The following categories of damages were requested:

“The Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of actual damages, both past and future,

including loss of use, the market value of the car, reasonable attorney’s fees, costs of

court, expenses, punitive damages, and treble damages under the DTPA by Tex. Bus.

Prac. & Comm. Code § 17.50(b).” Tab 1.

The Plaintiffs sent discovery requests on net worth to the Defendants. Tab 3.

The Defendants objected to every request, stating “Defendant objects to providing

any information regarding net worth because § 17.50 of the DTPA does not allow for

the recovery of punitive damages.” Tabs 4 & 5. The Defendants also moved to

designate JCT Auto Sales, the used car lot, as a responsible third party for failing to

disclose the condition of the truck to the Plaintiffs even though it was sold “as is.”

Tab 6.

At the hearing, no testimony or evidence was submitted to the trial court. Tab

10. The Defendants’ attorney reassured the trial court that he has been practicing for

over ten years and knows when the punitive damages issue is applicable and when it

is not. Tab 10 at 5-6. He argued that “The issue in this case is that there are various

7
causes of action that have been filed by the Plaintiff that there's not a recovery for

punitive damages.” Tab 10 at 6. “The other issue is a reasonableness standard, Your

Honor. My client has a million dollar insurance policy. Even if this case -- they could

recover the full cost of the vehicle, which they didn't buy from us, plus all of the cost

of repairs, they would have to get a verdict 40 times the amount of damages before

they would even get into beyond past the policy of insurance that's covered.” Tab 10

at 6-7. “Basically, what it comes down to is, I am not in any way representing to this

Court that there will never come a time where the net worth information would be

relevant and would be discoverable. But at this point in time, based on the fact that

there are various causes of action which you can't even recover punitive damages on,

if this case went to court tomorrow I'm virtually certain I could defeat a conversion

claim.” Tab 10 at 7. He filed the motion to designate just so that he could conduct

discovery. Tab 10 at 7.

The trial court denied the Plaintiffs request for net-worth discovery. Tab 10 at

10. It also granted the Defendants’ motion for leave to designate JCT Auto Sales as

a responsible third party. Tab 10 at 20; Tab 11.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Net-worth discovery is a matter of well-established law. If a plaintiff pleads a

cause of action that allows for the recovery of punitive damages, the plaintiff may

8
conduct discovery on the defendant’s net worth. There is no evidentiary hurdle: so

long as a cause of action is pled, the discovery may be conducted. The only

exceptions would be for excessively burdensome or harassing requests, but no

evidence has been presented on those issues.

An order denying discovery that goes to the heart of a party’s case has no

adequate remedy at law. Because the net worth of the Defendants’ goes to the heart

of the Plaintiff’s punitive damages case, there is no adequate remedy at law for the

trial court’s denial of discovery on the issue.

Additionally, in the interest of judicial economy, if a mandamus is granted, an

appellate court should correct other errors in the case that would normally have an

adequate remedy at law. The designation of JCT Auto Sales as a responsible third

party is clearly improper, since the Defendants’ designation does not plead sufficient

facts to allege responsibility of JCT Auto Sales. Even if JCT Auto Sales had sold the

truck in a broken condition, it was sold “as is.” Without any allegation of fraudulent

inducement of the “as is” clause, the car lot is not liable. Also, the fact that the

Plaintiffs bought a damaged car is the reason repairs were needed, but it has nothing

to do with the Defendants overcharging for work, failing to do any work, damaging

the car further, and then refusing to return the truck. There is no reason why the seller

of the car would be responsible for the damage the Defendants did to the car.

9
 ARGUMENT

I. Discovery of Defendants’ Net Worth

A. Introduction

The Plaintiffs filed this case for a variety of causes of action, including fraud

and conversion. The underlying facts were pled in the “FACTS” section, and those

causes of action were specifically listed in the “LIABILITY” section. Tab 1. Since

that placed net worth at issue, the Plaintiffs served discovery requests seeking net

worth information from the Defendants. Tab 3. The Defendants objected, arguing that

the DTPA (one of several causes of action asserted in the petition) does not allow for

the recovery of punitive damages. Tabs 4 & 5. After the Plaintiffs filed a motion to

compel responses, the trial court ruled that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to discover

net worth information. Tab 10 at 10. The trial court would not allow net worth

discovery unless the Relators met an evidentiary threshhold: “I'm going to deny the

Motion to Compel at this time. It may be later as the trial develops that it would be

more appropriate to order the net worth to be discovered, but I'm going to deny it at

this time.” Tab 10 at 10.

B. Law

“[I]n cases in which punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded, parties

may discover and offer evidence of a defendant's net worth.” Lunsford v. Morris, 746

10
S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding). There is no evidentiary threshhold

hurdle to cross. Id. Plaintiffs do not have to prove that they will recover punitive

damages, they just have to plead it. Id. Fraud and conversion both allow for the

recovery of punitive damages. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299,

304 (Tex. 2006) (fraud); Winkle Chevy-Olds-Pontiac v. Condon, 830 S.W.2d 740,

744 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism’d) (conversion). Those claims have

been pled, as well as punitive damages. Failing to order responses to net-worth

discovery in this situation is a clear abuse of discretion.

Relators have no adequate remedy at law. An order denying discovery that goes

to the heart of the case does not have an adequate remedy at law. Walker v. Packer,

827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992). At least one court of appeals has held that evidence

which must be considered in calculating damages “goes to the heart of the claim for

damages.” In re City of Houston, No. 14-12-00861-CV at *11-12 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (orig. proceeding). That logic

is straightforward: since the evidence in question is required by law to be introduced,

deprivation of discovery on that issue guarantees a new trial on appeal.

In the City of Houston case, the plaintiff’s damage model in an inverse

condemnation case was based on lost profits. Id. at *11. The calculation of lost profits

is done by taking expected profits and subtracting actual profits. Id. at *12.

11
Obviously, finding the “actual profits” requires the accounting of actual income and

actual expenses on the properties. See id. The plaintiff sold one of the lots and was

building a home on another, which would tend to prove actual income and actual

expenses on the properties. Id.

Similarly, net worth evidence goes to the heart of the issue of punitive

damages. “That which could be an enormous penalty to one may be but a mere

annoyance to another.” Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex.1988). It is “as

relevant to the defendant to prove low net worth as it is to the plaintiff to prove the

defendant's high net worth.” Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 109 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). It is explicitly listed as a factor the

trier “shall” consider by staute. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.011(a)(6). Failing

to provide evidence on those statutory factors precludes the recovery of punitive

damages. Suntide Sandpit, Inc. v. H&H Sand and Gravel, Inc., No. 13-11-00323-CV

at *11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

II. Designation of Responsible Third Party

A. Introduction

The Defendants moved for leave to designate the car lot that sold the truck to

the Plaintiffs as a responsible third party even though the truck was sold “as is.” Tab

3. In the motion, the Defendants alleged that the car lot is liable despite the “as is”

12
clause because it was negligent in failing to disclose the pre-existing condition of the

truck. Tab 3. The Defendants alleged that the defects in the car existed before the

sale, but they did not allege that the car lot even knew about them: “Defendants

contend that the truck was sold to Plaintiffs in a defective condition and said defects

were not disclosed to Plaintiffs at the time of the sale.” Tab 3. The Plaintiffs timely

objected, arguing two points. Tab 7. First, the Defendants had not pled sufficient facts

to negate the “as is” clause. Tab 7. Second, the fact that the truck was broken when

purchased has nothing to do with the Defendants’ liability: the truck would not have

needed repairs if it were not broken, but the Defendants are being sued for failing to

fix it properly, not for the fact that it was broken when purchased. Tab 7. The trial

court overruled the objections and granted the Defendants leave to designate the third

party. Tab 11.

B. Law

Ordinarily, the decision to designate a responsible third party would not be

correctable by mandamus, as there are more than adequate remedies at law, such as

a motion to strike. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(l). Nevertheless, in the

interest of judicial economy, if mandamus issues to correct one error, other errors in

the case should be corrected as well. In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938,

943 (Tex. 1998).

13
 In order to designate a responsible third party, a defendant must plead

sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the

pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In other words, the facts

as pled in the motion for leave to designate are reviewed for legal sufficiency. In re

Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2005,

no pet.) (orig. proceeding) (“[I]n determining whether to grant relators' motion for

leave to designate Southwestern Bell as a responsible third party, the trial court was

restricted to evaluating the sufficiency of the facts pleaded by relators and was not

permitted to engage in an analysis of the truth of the allegations or consider evidence

on Southwestern Bell's ultimate liability.”). The Defendants’ designation fails

because it does not state any right to recovery against the alleged responsible third

party. The Defendants designated the car lot that sold the Plaintiffs the truck as a

responsible third party, but they do not explain why that car lot would be responsible

for any damages the Plaintiffs may recover against the Defendants.

First, the Plaintiffs bought the truck “as is,” which is a complete defense

against claims based on the condition of the truck, absent fraudulent inducement of

the “as is” clause. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d

156, 161 (Tex. 1995) (“The ‘as is’ agreement negates causation essential to recovery

on all the theories Goldman asserts—DTPA violations, fraud (excluding, of course,

14
fraud in the inducement of the ‘as is’ agreement, which Goldman does not assert),

negligence, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”); Broomfield v.

Parker, No. 12-06-00208-CV (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because

Parker purchased the vehicle ‘as is,’ she was precluded from proving that any acts by

the Broomfields were a producing cause of her damages. Furthermore, the record

contains no evidence that the Broomfields committed any acts that were false,

misleading, or deceptive. Therefore, the evidence was legally insufficient to support

the trial court's judgment [for the plaintiff].”) (citatons omitted). The Defendants did

not allege fraudulent inducement of the “as is” agreement, so their designation does

not plead sufficient facts to allege responsibility for the car lot.

Second, the fact that the Plaintiffs bought a damaged car is the reason repairs

were needed, but it has nothing to do with the Defendants overcharging for work,

failing to do any work, damaging the car further, and then refusing to return the truck.

There is no reason why the seller of the car would be responsible for the damage the

Defendants did to the car.

C. Conclusion

Even though the Defendants did not plead sufficient facts concerning the

alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure, they still must be given leave to replead. See Tex. R. Civ.

15
Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g). The Defendants must be given that opportunity; if

they do not plead sufficient facts on their second try, their motion to designate must

be denied. See id.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Relator, Christy and Kory Hill,

respectfully request that this court issue a Writ of Mandamus ordering the Honorable

David Brabham to allow Relators to conduct discovery on the issue of net worth and

to deny the Real Parties-in-Interest their motion for leave to designate JCT Auto Sales

as a responsible third party unless they are able to replead sufficient facts to satisfy

the pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respectfully submitted,

SNOW E. BUSH, JR., P.C.
420 N. Center Street
Longview, TX 75601
Tel. (903) 753-7006
Fax. (903) 753-7278
E-mail: jonathanwharton1@sbcglobal.net
/s/ Jonathan Wharton
By:___________________________
JONATHAN WHARTON
STATE BAR NO. 24075764
ATTORNEY FOR RELATORS,
CHRISTY AND KORY HILL

16
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has
been delivered to Heath Chamness, counsel for the Real Parties-in-Interest, on this
the 1st day of May, 2015.
/s/ Jonathan Wharton

JONATHAN WHARTON

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the Petition for Writ of Mandamus (as measured under
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1)) contains 2,627 words as counted by Microsoft WordPerfect
on this the 1st day of May, 2015.
/s/ Jonathan Wharton

JONATHAN WHARTON

17
 NO. ___________________
__________________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TWELFTH DISTRICT, TYLER,
TEXAS
__________________________________________________________________

IN RE CHRISTY AND KORY HILL, Relators
__________________________________________________________________

From the 188th District Court for Gregg County, Texas
Cause No. 2014-2357-A
Honorable David Brabham, Presiding Judge
__________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
__________________________________________________________________

Original Petition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tab 1

Defendants’ Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 2

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tab 3

Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Second Request for Production . . . . . . . . Tab 4

Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories . . . . . . . . . Tab 5

Motion to Designate Responsible Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 6

Plaintiffs’ Objection to Designation of Responsible Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . .Tab 7

Plaintiffs’ Supplement to its Motion to Compel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tab 8

Affidavit of Jonathan Wharton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 9

Transcript of Hearing on March 30, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 10

18
Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Designate Responsible Third Party . . Tab 11

19