ACCEPTED
04-14-00527-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
3/18/2015 4:56:48 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
NO. 04-14-00527-CV
_________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 03/18/2015 4:56:48 PM
__________________________________________________________________
KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
ANNA MARIA SALINAS SAENZ, ET AL.,
Appellants,
v.
THORP PETROLEUM CORP., ET AL.,
Appellees
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the 229th District Court of Starr County, Texas
No. DC-04-120, Hon. Ana Lisa Garza, Presiding
__________________________________________________________________
APPELLEES’ JOINT BRIEF
SCOTT, DOUGLASS, & JONES GILL LLP
MCCONNICO, L.L.P. Lee S. Gill
Mark W. Hanna State Bar No. 07921360
State Bar No. 24051764 gill@jonesgill.com
mhanna@scottdoug.com 6363 Woodway, Suite 1100
Kennon L. Wooten Houston, Texas 77057
State Bar No. 24046624 (713) 652-4068 Telephone
kwooten@scottdoug.com (713) 651-0716 Facsimile
303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400
Austin, Texas 78701-2589 Attorney for Appellees Thorp
(512) 495-6300 Telephone Petroleum Corporation; El Paso
(512) 495-6399 Facsimile Production Company; El Paso E&P
Company, LP; El Paso Exploration
& Production Management, Inc.;
Attorneys for Appellee Stanco Land Management, LLC, and
Smith Production Inc. Meredith Land & Minerals Company
ORAL ARGUMENT CONDITIONALLY REQUESTED
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. viii
ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................................. ix
RECORD AND APPENDIX .................................................................................... x
OVERVIEW OF THIS APPEAL ............................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................ 2
A. Juan and Ynez Salinas conveyed 17/32 of their mineral interest
to third parties and 150 acres to their son Octavio before
conveying undivided interests in the remaining property to their
12 children—the Salinas Siblings. ....................................................... 2
B. In October 1968, Leoncio deeded his interests in the Subject
Property to Horacio and, in doing so, referenced the partition of
the Subject Property.............................................................................. 3
C. In December 1968, the nine Salinas Siblings who owned
surface interests in the Subject Property entered a Partition
Agreement to divide the surface into nine Parcels and divided
their mineral interests along the same lines.......................................... 4
D. For 36 years, nobody questioned the validity of the Partition
Agreement and everybody acted consistently with the Partition
Agreement’s validity. ........................................................................... 7
E. In 2001, Thorp drilled productive wells on Parcels 5 and 8 and
paid royalties on production in accordance with the Partition
Agreement that had been in place since 1968. ..................................... 9
F. In 2004, the plaintiffs filed suit to try to undo the deal their
parents struck. ..................................................................................... 10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 10
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 13
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A. The trial court properly granted Appellees’ motions for
summary judgment on at least four grounds, any one of which
will suffice to affirm the trial court’s judgment and render
judgment for Appellees in this matter. ............................................... 13
1. The trial court properly granted summary judgment that
the Partition Agreement is valid and enforceable because
the Partition Agreement was signed by all parties whose
interests were affected by it...................................................... 13
a. Texas law does not require all parties with a
mineral interest in property to join in a partition
agreement regarding that property. ................................ 14
b. Juana did not need to sign the Partition Agreement
because it does not affect her mineral interest in
the Subject Property. Indeed, she and her heirs
and assigns have always been treated as undivided
mineral-interest holders and, for that reason, have
no standing to attack the Partition Agreement’s
validity here.................................................................... 16
c. Like Juana, Leoncio did not need to sign the
Partition Agreement because he had already
conveyed all of his interest in the Subject Property
to his brother Horacio. ................................................... 19
d. Appellants cite no authority that actually supports
their claim that the Partition Agreement is invalid
without Juana’s and Leoncio’s signatures. .................... 23
2. Even if the Partition Agreement were ineffective due to
the lack of Juana’s and Leoncio’s signatures, summary
judgment is proper because Appellants accepted benefits
of the Partition Agreement, ratified it, acquiesced in it,
and are estopped to deny its validity now. ............................... 26
3. Summary judgment is also proper because Appellants’
claims are barred by adverse possession. ................................. 32
ii
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a. The portion of the minerals that remain unsevered
from the surface were adversely possessed along
with the surface. ............................................................. 32
b. The summary judgment evidence established all of
the elements of adverse possession, and Appellants
presented no evidence to the contrary............................ 34
c. Even if Ana Saenz “consented” to the use of the
surface by the siblings and their successors, her
consent could not have been granted until after the
10-year statute of limitations had expired...................... 38
4. At a minimum, summary judgment is proper as against
the parties who joined in the Partition Agreement, as well
as their successors. ................................................................... 40
B. Even if there were a fact question relating to the Partition
Agreement, Appellants’ claim for damages in their trespass-to-
try title action should be treated as final because Appellants
have not challenged or briefed the summary judgment ground
that they have no evidence of such damages. ..................................... 41
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER............................................................................. 43
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................................ 45
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 47
iii
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer,
440 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2014)........................................................................... 17
Beets v. Hickok,
701 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1985, no writ) ..................................... 35
Birdwell v. Am. Bonding Co.,
337 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............... 33
Chandler v. Hartt,
467 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.)................. 16
City of San Antonio v. Greater San Antonio Builders Ass’n,
No. 04-12-00745-CV, 2013 WL 2247468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
May 22, 2013, no pet.) .................................................................................. 18
Coker v. Coker,
650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983)......................................................................... 16
Commander v. Winkler,
67 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied) ................................. 39
Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co.,
966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998)......................................................................... 20
DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Inman,
252 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2008)......................................................................... 18
De Rodriguez v. Hinnant,
267 S.W. 471 (Tex. 1925)............................................................................. 31
Dixon v. Henderson,
267 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1954, no writ) ............................. 33
Elliott v. Nelson,
251 S.W. 501 (Tex. 1923)............................................................................. 33
iv
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Garza v. De Montalvo,
217 S.W.2d 988 (Tex. 1949)............................................................. 14, 15, 16
Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
187 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) ....................... 35
Graham v. Prochaska,
429 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. filed) ....................... 20
Hamilton v. Hamilton,
280 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. 1955)................................................................... 16, 21
Hausser v. Cuellar,
345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) .................... 20
Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,
369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012)......................................................................... 19
Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank,
939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996)......................................................................... 20
High v. Tarver,
25 S.W. 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) ............................................................ 29
In re Estate of Forister,
421 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) .................... 19
Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011)......................................................................... 16
J.M. Davidson v. Webster,
128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003)......................................................................... 16
Joyner v. Christian,
113 S.W.2d 1229 (Tex. 1938)................................................................ passim
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,
118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003)......................................................................... 35
Larrison v. Walker,
149 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1941, pet. ref’d) .......................... 22
v
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Lasater v. Ramirez,
212 S.W. 935 (Tex. 1919)............................................................................. 22
Lickel v. White,
819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991)......................................................................... 20
López v. Montemayor,
131 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) ...................... 42
M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak,
52 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2001)........................................................................... 18
Potter v. Kaufman & Broad Home Sys. of Tex., Inc.,
137 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) .......................... 42
Republic Production Co. v. Lee,
121 S.W.2d 973, 262 (Tex. 1938)........................................................... 35, 40
Robinson v. O'Connor,
181 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) .......... 32
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc.,
884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994)......................................................................... 30
Stradt v. First United Methodist Church of Huntington,
573 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1978)............................................................. 23, 24, 25
Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement and Development Company,
123 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1939).................................................................. passim
Villareal v. Chesapeake Zapata, L.P.,
No. 04-08-00171-CV, 2009 WL 1956387 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
July 8, 2009, pet. denied) .............................................................................. 39
Villareal v. Guerra,
446 S.W.3d 4040 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) .................. 34
Waco Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson,
22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000)........................................................................... 18
vi
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Ward v. Ward,
No. 04-12-00703-CV, 2014 WL 470153 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 5, 2014, pet. filed) ................................................................................. 42
Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co.,
62 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) ...................................... 21
Wright v. Wright,
274 S.W.2d 670 (1955) ................................................................................. 27
STATUTES
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.021(1) (West 2002) ................................ 32
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.026(a) (West 2002) .......................... 37, 40
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.021(d) (West 2014) ..................................................... 41
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.022 (West 2014) .......................................................... 41
RULES
Tex. R. Civ. P. 783(f) .............................................................................................. 41
Tex. R. Civ. P. 805 .................................................................................................. 41
vii
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Proceedings: This is a trespass-to-try-title case regarding mineral
interests in land. Plaintiffs/Appellants seek to invalidate
a 1968 partition agreement, claiming it is invalid because
it was not signed by all tenants who owned a mineral
interest in the land at issue.
Trial Court: 229th District Court of Starr County, Texas; Honorable
Ana Lisa Garza Presiding.1
Course of Proceedings: Plaintiffs brought a trespass-to-try-title action regarding
mineral interests in land that was partitioned in 1968 by
an agreement signed by all parties claiming an interest in
the surface.2 The agreement divided the surface into nine
parcels and split the parties’ mineral interests along those
lines.3 It went unchallenged for 36 years. Plaintiffs then
sued the current mineral-interest owners and the mineral
lessees who paid royalties based on the agreement.4
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the agreement was
void and that they continued to own undivided mineral
interests in parcels which the partition did not allot to
their predecessors.5 They also sought damages.6 The
owners and the lessees, Thorp et al. and Smith
Production, moved for summary judgment on several
grounds, including that the partition agreement was valid,
Plaintiffs’ claims were barred, and Plaintiffs were not
entitled to damages.7 The trial court granted the motions
without specifying grounds.8 This appeal followed.9
1
Judge Garza signed the final judgment in this case. See Pl. App. A. Her predecessor, Judge
Alex Gabert, signed the summary judgment orders at issue in this appeal. See Pl. App. C-E.
2
10 CR 3495-96.
3
7 CR 2338-59 (Partition Agreement).
4
1 CR 41 (Original Petition); 10 CR 3479-99 (Ninth Amended Petition).
5
10 CR 3496.
6
10 CR 3495-96.
7
14 CR 5294.
8
9 CR 3316-17; 9 CR 3319.
viii
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ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the trial court properly grant Appellees’ summary judgment motions and
declare the partition agreement valid and enforceable on the ground that the
agreement is signed by all parties whose property interests it affected?
2. Even if the partition agreement were lacking one or more necessary
signatures, is summary judgment proper on the ground that the agreement is
nonetheless binding on Appellants because (a) they cannot accept the
benefits of the partition agreement—a divided surface estate—while
rejecting its burdens—a divided mineral estate; (b) they ratified and
acquiesced in the divisions within the partition agreement and are estopped
to deny the agreement’s binding effect now; (c) adverse possession bars their
ability to challenge the agreement; and/or (d) Appellants whose predecessors
signed the agreement are bound by their predecessors’ signatures thereto?
9
14 CR 5307-09.
ix
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RECORD AND APPENDIX
The record on appeal includes a 14-volume Clerk’s Record and a one-
volume Supplemental Clerk’s Record. Citations to the Clerk’s Record will be to
volume and page number: __ CR __. This Joint Brief does not contain any
citations to the Supplemental Clerk’s Record.
There is also a six-volume Reporter’s Record. This Joint Brief does not
contain any citations to the Reporter’s Record.
Citations to items in the Appendix to Appellants’ Brief will be to “Pl. App.”
Citations to items in the Appendix to this Joint Brief will be to “App.”
The following items are included in the attached Appendix:
App. A Affidavit of Fausto Salinas (8 CR 2770-72)
App. B Warranty Deed (the “Leoncio-Horacio Deed”) (7 CR 2326-27)
App. C Map of Nine Parcels in Partition Agreement (8 CR 2807)
x
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TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
This Joint Brief is filed by Smith Production Inc. (“Smith Production”) and
Thorp Petroleum Corporation; El Paso Production Company; El Paso E&P
Company, LP; El Paso Exploration & Production Management, Inc.; Stanco Land
Management, LLC; and Meredith Land & Minerals Company (together “Thorp et
al.” and collectively with Smith Production, “Appellees”).
OVERVIEW OF THIS APPEAL
In this appeal, the Court needs to resolve only one substantive issue: is the
1968 partition agreement valid and enforceable? That issue should be resolved
affirmatively because all parties affected by the partition agreement joined in the
partition agreement. Moreover, any claim that the partition agreement is invalid is
barred by Appellants’ acceptance of benefits under, ratification of, and
acquiescence in the partition agreement, as well as adverse possession. At a
minimum, the partition agreement binds those who signed it and their successors.
The trial court granted Appellees’ summary judgment motions and entered a
final judgment declaring the partition agreement to be “valid and enforceable for
all purposes as to all parties to this suit” and ordering that the underlying
“Plaintiffs take nothing by their suit against all Defendants.”10 The trial court’s
judgment was correct and should be affirmed by this Court.
10
Pl. App. A at 4, ¶ 3 (14 CR 5294).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in Appellants’ Brief is incomplete and thus potentially
misleading. The following statement of facts is intended to give the Court all of
the facts the Court needs in order to resolve the legal issues properly on appeal.
A. Juan and Ynez Salinas conveyed 17/32 of their mineral interest to third
parties and 150 acres to their son Octavio before conveying undivided
interests in the remaining property to their 12 children—the Salinas Siblings.
The property at issue was originally part of an estate consisting of 1,284
acres in Starr County, Texas, that was owned by spouses Juan and Ynez Salinas.11
They conveyed 17/32 of their mineral interest to third parties between 1932 and
1940,12 and they conveyed 150 acres to their son Octavio Salinas in 1963.13 The
property remaining after the conveyances—the entire surface of 1,134 acres and
the 15/32 mineral interest—is the subject of this appeal (the “Subject Property”).
In 1964, Mr. and Mrs. Salinas conveyed to each of their 12 children (the
“Salinas Siblings”) equal undivided shares in the Subject Property.14 The Salinas
Siblings were (1) Juana Salinas Garcia, (2) Leoncio Salinas,15 (3) Horacio B.
Salinas, (4) Ester Salinas, (5) Octavio Salinas, (6) Adan Salinas, (7) Ascencio
11
7 CR 2297. Ynez is also referred to as “Ines” in some parts of the record. See, e.g., 7 CR
2328.
12
8 CR 2570 (Instruments 2-3 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2582-85 (Deeds).
13
7 CR 2315.
14
7 CR 2320-21.
15
One of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, also named Leoncio Salinas, is one of the sons of Adan
Salinas. The Salinas Sibling named Leoncio Salinas is his uncle and is now deceased.
2
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Salinas, (8) Arnaldo Salinas, (9) Flavio Salinas, (10) Ramiro Salinas, (11) Emma
Salinas Benavides, and (12) Hermila Salinas Flores.16 They became cotenants of
undivided interests in the Subject Property as a result of the 1964 conveyance.17
Between 1964 and the fall of 1968, there were several conveyances of the
Subject Property that are not at issue in this appeal. First, the Salinas Siblings and
their parents joined in deeding 92.699 acres in the Subject Property to sibling
Adan.18 Second, sibling Ester died intestate, unmarried, and without issue, and all
of the Salinas Siblings (except Ascencio) and their mother deeded Ester’s interest
to Ascencio.19 Third, sibling Juana deeded to her brother Octavio all of her interest
in the Subject Property’s surface.20 Juana expressly reserved her mineral interest.21
B. In October 1968, Leoncio deeded his interests in the Subject Property to
Horacio and, in doing so, referenced the partition of the Subject Property.
In or around September 1968, the Salinas Siblings discussed a partition
agreement relating to the Subject Property and orally “agreed that Horacio would
get his acreage in the southeast corner and . . . that Horacio was buying Leoncio’s
interest so that Horacio would be receiving 214 acres, being made up of the 94.5
16
7 CR 2320.
17
7 CR 2320. For ease of identification and for brevity’s sake, the Salinas Siblings will
hereinafter be referred to by their first names.
18
8 CR 2570 (Instruments 16-18 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2592-600 (Deeds).
19
8 CR 2570 (Instrument 26 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2613-22 (Deed) (providing that “Ines”
Salinas was a widow by the time of the conveyance—i.e., Juan Salinas was also deceased).
20
7 CR 2322-25.
21
7 CR 2322-25.
3
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acres he was entitled to [approximately 1/12 of 1,134 acres], the 94.5 acres he was
buying from Leoncio, and the 25 acres of [adjacent] property” that Horacio had
purchased previously from third parties.22 The surface of the Subject Property was
subsequently surveyed in accordance with that oral agreement.23
On October 9, 1968, Leoncio deeded to Horacio a tract of land described as
“[a]ll that certain tract set aside, or to be set aside, to Grantor, under that
Agreement heretofore entered into by and between Grantor and Grantee, and their
brothers and sisters, and more particularly described as follows: . . . Parcel No. 1,
containing 214.164 acres of land,” which is then described by metes and bounds.24
This deed (the “Leoncio-Horacio Deed”) has no mineral reservation and conveyed
Parcel 1 “together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto.”25 It
was intended to convey all of Leoncio’s interest in the Subject Property.26
C. In December 1968, the nine Salinas Siblings who owned surface interests in
the Subject Property entered a Partition Agreement to divide the surface into
nine Parcels and divided their mineral interests along the same lines.
In December 1968, the nine Salinas Siblings who owned a surface interest
(along with their spouses) memorialized an agreement to partition their respective
rights, title, and interests in the Subject Property (the “Partition Agreement”), and
22
8 CR 2770-71 (App. A at ¶¶ 6-8).
23
8 CR 2771 (App. A at ¶ 9); 8 CR 2807 (App. C).
24
7 CR 2326-27 (App. B).
25
See 7 CR 2326-27 (App. B).
26
See 8 CR 2771-72 (App. A at ¶ 11).
4
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they recorded it in the Deed Records of Starr County.27 The Partition Agreement
does not contain signature lines for Juana or Leoncio.28
The Partition Agreement sets aside to Horacio the 214.164 acres—i.e.,
Parcel 1—that was conveyed to him in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed.29 The
description of Parcel 1 in the Partition Agreement matches the description of
Parcel 1 in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed.30 The Partition Agreement does not
partition Juana’s mineral interests.31 In fact, as Appellants have judicially
admitted, Juana “and her heirs and assigns have always been treated as undivided
interest owners under the whole [surface], as it was meant and intended to be.”32
The Partition Agreement divided the surface of the 1,134 acres into nine
parcels33 and split the signatories’ mineral interests along the new lines, providing:
It is strictly understood and herein stipulated that this partition
agreement is a partition not only of the surface to the tracts
hereinafter described, but it is intended by the parties hereto that this
partition agreement shall partition all of the rights, title and interest
of the respective parties to this agreement in and to the tracts
hereinabove described, together with all improvements thereon
situated of every kind, character, and description, and it is intended
that this partition agreement shall cover and include all of the
27
Pl. App. F; see also Appellants’ Brief, n. 29 (explaining that the Partition Agreement was
ultimately signed and filed for recorded in January 1969).
28
See Pl. App. F.
29
Pl. App. F. at 2-3.
30
Compare App. B (Leoncio-Horacio Deed), with Pl. App. F at 3 (Partition Agreement).
31
See Pl. App. F (containing no reference to Juana or her mineral interests).
32
10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 112).
33
Pl. App. F. at 1-14.
5
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minerals of every kind, character and description underlying each of
the tracts hereinabove described, and it being intended that each of
the allottees of a parcel or tract of land as hereinabove described
shall from henceforth be the owner of all of the minerals of every kind
and character in and under the respective parcel and tract of land as
allotted and set apart to the respective allottees, and from henceforth
each allottee shall have the sole and exclusive right, power and
authority to execute and deliver oil, gas and mineral leases, mining
and drilling contracts, and such other development contracts,
covering his or her respective parcel as hereinabove described, and
all bonus money, delay rentals, royalties or other benefits payable
for or under any such lease or leases, or attributable thereto shall be
owned by, paid to and belong to the respective allottee of each parcel
or tract of land. . . .34
The allotment of the nine parcels resulted in the following division:
Parcel No. To Whom Allotted Acres
1 Horacio B. Salinas 214.164 acres
2 Ascencio Salinas 189.164 acres
3 Ramiro Salinas 94.582 acres
4 Arnaldo Salinas 94.582 acres
5 Flavio Salinas 94.582 acres
6 Emma Salinas Benavides 94.582 acres
7 Hermila Salinas Flores 94.582 acres
8 Octavio Salinas 339.164 acres (includes
Octavio’s 150 acres)
9 Adan Salinas 119.583 acres (includes
Adan’s 92.699 acres)
A map of the nine parcels is attached as Appendix C to this Joint Brief.
The nine Salinas Siblings who signed the Partition Agreement cross-
conveyed to each other only what they owned in the Subject Property. This is
evident in the Partition Agreement itself, which refers to the signatories as the
34
Pl. App. F. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
6
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“exclusive owners” of the partitioned tracts35 and (as emphasized above) expressly
partitioned the “rights . . . and interest of the respective parties” to it.36 The
Partition Agreement simply had no impact on the mineral interest of any other
party, like Juana and the third parties who owned the 17/32 mineral interest.
D. For 36 years, nobody questioned the validity of the Partition Agreement and
everybody acted consistently with the Partition Agreement’s validity.
For 36 years, the Salinas Siblings and their successors acted consistently
with the Partition Agreement’s validity, taking mortgages, granting leases, and
occupying the property as nine divided parcels.37 In that regard, Appellants “do
not want to disturb the current surface ownership of the [S]ubject [P]roperty[,]” as
established by the Partition Agreement.38 And the following conduct relating to
the mineral interests is particularly noteworthy, in light of the issues in this appeal:
• In 1971, Ascencio Salinas, predecessor in title to Appellant Romulo
Benavides III with respect to Parcel 2, granted an oil-and-gas lease on a
portion of his Parcel 2 to Bobby M. Burns, describing the tract as part of
“Parcel 2, allotted to Ascencio Salinas (one and the same person as the
lessor herein), in that certain Partition Agreement dated December 27,
1968.”39
35
Pl. App. F at 1.
36
Pl. App. F at 14-15 (emphasis added).
37
See 8 CR 2543-46 (Defendant Thorp et al.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-14)
(detailing the many ways in which the Salinas Siblings and their successors acted consistently
with the Partition Agreement’s validity, both in regard to the surface estate and the mineral
estate); 8 CR 2891, 2394 (Smith Production Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, 5).
38
10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 113).
39
8 CR 2571 (Instrument 31 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2652-53 (Lease).
7
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• In 1995, Appellants and/or their predecessors granted oil-and-gas leases
to Rio Grande Exploration, as follows:
(1) Appellant Leoncio Salinas (the son of Adan Salinas) leased his
interest in Parcel 9, expressly referring to and incorporating the
Partition Agreement.40
(2) Appellant Anna Saenz leased her father Horacio’s Parcel 1,
expressly referring to and incorporating the Partition Agreement.41
(3) Ascencio Salinas, predecessor of Appellant Romulo Benavides III,
leased his Parcel 2, expressly referring to and incorporating the
Partition Agreement;42
(4) Eustacio Flores, Jr., predecessor of Appellant Luisa Ruiz, leased
16.691 acres out of Parcel 7, incorporating by reference a deed to
him from Hermila S. Flores, which referred to and incorporated the
Partition Agreement.43
(5) Appellant Hermelinda Benavides leased her mother Emma
Benavides’ Parcel 6, expressly referring to and incorporating the
Partition Agreement.44
• In 2002, Appellee Norberto Salinas and Appellants Leoncio Salinas,
Romulo Benavides III, Anna Maria Saenz and husband Joel Saenz, Luisa
M. Ruiz, and Hermelinda Benavides joined in a Cross-Conveyance and
Stipulation of Interest Agreement whereby they cross-conveyed their
divided interests in Parcels 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9, so as to create the undivided
interests therein stipulated in those parcels.45 The instrument expressly
refers to the Partition Agreement by its date, volume, and page, and the
Parcels’ correct acreage amounts in the Partition Agreement.46
40
8 CR 2573 (Instrument 142 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2680-84 (Lease).
41
8 CR 2573 (Instrument 143 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2685-88 (Lease).
42
8 CR 2573 (Instrument 147 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2689-92 (Lease).
43
8 CR 2574 (Instrument 150 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2693-96 (Lease).
44
8 CR 2574 (Instrument 154 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2697-700 (Lease).
45
8 CR 2577 (Instrument 268 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2750-55 (Cross-Conveyance).
46
8 CR 2577 (Instrument 268 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2750-55 (Cross-Conveyance).
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• Also in 2002, Appellee Norberto Salinas and Appellants Leoncio Salinas,
Romulo Benavides, Anna Maria Saenz and husband Joel Saenz, Luisa M.
Ruiz, and Hermelinda Benavides joined in leasing their mineral interests
in Parcels 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 to Samson Lone Star.47 The instrument
expressly refers to the Partition Agreement by its date, volume, and page,
and the Parcels’ correct acreage amounts in the Partition Agreement.48
E. In 2001, Thorp drilled productive wells on Parcels 5 and 8 and paid royalties
on production in accordance with the Partition Agreement that had been in
place since 1968.
All of the mineral owners of the Subject Property leased their minerals to
Thorp Petroleum Corporation (“Thorp”) in 2000.49 In 2001, Thorp drilled several
wells on Parcels 5 and 8 of the Subject Property.50 Almost all of the oil-and-gas
production involved in this suit came from the wells drilled on Parcels 5 and 8.51
Royalties on production from these wells were paid to the parties who were
successors of the original grantees of Parcel 5 (Flavio Salinas) and 8 (Octavio
Salinas), and to the successors in interest of Juana Salinas Garcia, whose undivided
1/12 of 15/32 mineral interest was not partitioned in the Partition Agreement.52
47
8 CR 2577 (Instrument 269 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2756-58 (Lease).
48
8 CR 2577 (Instrument 269 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2756.
49
8 CR 2575 (Instruments 200-02 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2836 (Gill Cheesman Aff. at ¶ 4).
El Paso Production Company (“El Paso”) later succeeded to Thorp, and Smith Production later
succeeded to El Paso.
50
8 CR 2836 (Gill Cheesman Aff. at ¶ 6).
51
Id.
52
Id. at ¶ 7.
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F. In 2004, the plaintiffs filed suit to try to undo the deal their parents struck.
On April 15, 2004, some of the Salinas Siblings’ successors filed this suit to
challenge the Partition Agreement’s validity, hoping to undo the deal their parents
struck so they can share in royalties on oil and gas produced from parcels they do
not own. Later, some of Juana Salinas Garcia’s successors joined the suit, hoping
to undo a deal that does not even affect them. This suit has been ongoing for over
ten years now. It is time for the Partition Agreement’s validity to be confirmed
once and for all. For the reasons below, Appellees urge this Court to do so.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Partition Agreement went unchallenged for 36 years. During that time
period, every Salinas Sibling who signed the Partition Agreement, as well as their
successors, acted as though the Partition Agreement were valid. Some of them
conveyed their interests in the parcels that were allotted to them in the Partition
Agreement. Others invested time and money to construct fences and many other
improvements on the parcels that were allotted to them in the Partition Agreement.
In 1995 and 2002, several of them even leased their mineral interests on a divided
basis and, in doing so, incorporated the Partition Agreement into their leases.
But 36 years after the Salinas Siblings signed the Partition Agreement and
agreed to the division of parcels therein, some of their children brought suit to try
to undo the deal their parents struck because successful drilling in 2002 revealed
that the minerals were not distributed evenly among the parcels. Instead, the
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minerals are located primarily in Parcels 5 and 8. Appellants who have no
ownership interests in Parcel 5 or 8 want to reestablish the undivided mineral
interests that existed before the Partition Agreement was signed because the post-
agreement developments have made the mineral division more advantageous to
other parties. But no new facts about the surface have come to light, and
Appellants have no desire to undo the surface division in the Partition Agreement.
So now they are in the untenable position of wanting to reject the burdens of the
Partition Agreement—divided minerals—and retain its benefits—divided surface.
The Partition Agreement is valid and enforceable because it was signed by
all of the property owners it affected. Juana and Leoncio were not affected by it
and thus did not have to sign it. In fact, Appellants admit there has been no effect
on Juana or her heirs and assigns; therefore, even if the Partition Agreement could
be construed to affect Juana, her heirs and assigns lack standing to challenge it.
Leoncio conveyed all of his interests to his brother Horacio before the Partition
Agreement was signed, and the remaining siblings ratified that conveyance in the
Partition Agreement itself and thereby effectuated Leoncio’s attempted partition.
Even if the Partition Agreement were ineffective for lack of certain
signatures, it would nonetheless bind all Appellants, who fall into three categories:
(1) successors to the original parties to the Partition Agreement; (2) successors to
Juana Garcia Salinas; and (3) successors to Leoncio Salinas by virtue of a
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quitclaim deed that Leoncio signed in 1991.53 Anna and Joel Saenz are the only
Appellants in category 3, as Anna is the sole grantee in the 1991 quitclaim deed.54
Appellants in category 1 cannot deny the binding effect of the Partition
Agreement because they are bound by their predecessors’ and their own conduct
confirming the Partition Agreement’s validity, by adverse possession, and by their
predecessors’ signatures on the Partition Agreement. They are also bound because
Texas law does not permit them to accept the benefits of the Partition
Agreement—a divided surface—and reject the burdens of the Partition
Agreement—divided minerals. Appellants in category 1 include: (a) Anna and
Joel Saenz, to the extent they claim through Anna’s father, Horacio; (b) Romulo
Benavides, III, who claims through his uncle Ascencio and his mother, Emma;
(c) Leoncio Salinas, who claims through his father, Adan; (d) Luisa Ruiz, who
claims through her mother, Hermila; and (e) Hermelinda Benavides, Thelma
Benavides Aguilar, and Irma Benavides Cerda, who claim through their mother,
Emma.
Appellants in category 2, which includes all Appellants not listed in the prior
paragraph, cannot deny the Partition Agreement’s validity because it had no impact
on their undivided mineral interest and thus they lack standing to challenge it.
53
8 CR 2573 (Instrument 117 in Thorp’s Abstract).
54
8 CR 2573 (Instrument 117 in Thorp’s Abstract).
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Appellants in category 3—Anna and Joel Saenz, to the extent they claim
through Anna’s uncle Leoncio—cannot deny the Partition Agreement’s validity
because the Partition Agreement did not impact Leoncio’s interest in the Subject
Property. Leoncio conveyed all of his interest in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed,
before the Partition Agreement was signed. Thus, he had no interest to be
partitioned by the Partition Agreement and no interest to convey to Anna in 1991.
It is perhaps for that reason that Leoncio chose to give a quitclaim deed to Anna, as
opposed to giving her a warranty deed like the Leoncio-Horacio Deed.
Finally, in the alternative, even if the Court were to determine there is a fact
issue regarding the Partition Agreement, Appellants’ claim for damages as to
Smith Production should be treated as final because Appellants have not
challenged the summary judgment ground that they have no evidence of damages.
ARGUMENT
A. The trial court properly granted Appellees’ motions for summary judgment
on at least four grounds, any one of which will suffice to affirm the trial
court’s judgment and render judgment for Appellees in this matter.
1. The trial court properly granted summary judgment that the Partition
Agreement is valid and enforceable because the Partition Agreement
was signed by all parties whose interests were affected by it.
Appellants’ sole basis for attacking the Partition Agreement’s validity is that
Juana and Leoncio did not sign it. That argument is wrong for three reasons. First,
Texas law does not require a partition agreement to be signed by all parties who
have a mineral interest under the partitioned acreage. Second, Juana did not have
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to sign the Partition Agreement because it had no effect on her mineral interest.
Indeed, because it has had no impact on her mineral interest, her heirs and assigns
lack standing to challenge it in this suit. Third, Leoncio did not have to sign the
Partition Agreement because he conveyed all of his interest in the Subject Property
in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed, before the Partition Agreement was signed, and the
remaining Salinas Siblings signed the Partition Agreement and thereby ratified his
conveyance.
a. Texas law does not require all parties with a mineral interest in
property to join in a partition agreement regarding that property.
A partition agreement does not have to be signed by all parties who have a
mineral interest under the partitioned acreage in order to be valid and enforceable.
The Supreme Court of Texas addressed this very issue in Garza v. De Montalvo.55
In Garza, ten siblings voluntarily partitioned their interests in land that was
covered by an oil-and-gas lease.56 Their partition agreement did not reference the
oil-and-gas lease, “and Sun Oil Company, which then owned the lease, did not join
in the partition agreement.”57 At the time the agreement was entered (in 1937), “no
wells for oil or gas had been drilled on the leased land.”58 Sun Oil Company began
drilling in 1942 and, in 1943, began paying royalties in accordance with the
55
See Garza v. De Montalvo, 217 S.W.2d 988, 992 (Tex. 1949).
56
Id at 989.
57
Id. at 990.
58
Id. at 989.
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partition agreement’s segregation of tracts.59 This method of royalty payments
continued for approximately two years but was challenged in 1945 by parties to the
partition agreement who claimed that the partition agreement had no effect on the
mineral estate, in part because “a partition of the mineral estate could not take
place without the participation of Sun Oil Company, which as assignee of the
original lessee owned the working interest in the mineral estate.”60
The Garza court upheld the partition agreement’s validity despite the fact
that Sun Oil Company—which owned a possessory mineral interest in the
partitioned property—did not sign the agreement.61 And the court concluded that
“[t]hose who joined in the agreement [could] not attack it under these facts.”62
Just like the Garza partition agreement, the Partition Agreement here is valid
without the joinder of Juana, who had an undivided 1/12 of the 15/32 interest in the
mineral estate. Likewise, the Partition Agreement’s validity is unaffected by the
non-joinder of the third parties with an undivided 17/32 of the mineral interest.
Appellants seemingly concede at least that much, as they have not challenged the
Partition Agreement’s validity on the ground it was not signed by the third parties.
59
Id. at 990.
60
Id. at 992.
61
See id. at 992.
62
Id.
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Juana should not be treated differently from the third parties. Under the Garza
opinion, none of them needed to sign the Partition Agreement to make it valid.
b. Juana did not need to sign the Partition Agreement because it
does not affect her mineral interest in the Subject Property.
Indeed, she and her heirs and assigns have always been treated
as undivided mineral-interest holders and, for that reason, have
no standing to attack the Partition Agreement’s validity here.
Juana did not need to sign the Partition Agreement for an additional reason:
it simply did not impact her undivided mineral interest in the Subject Property.
Partition agreements are binding contracts and, as such, are “subject to the
usual rules of construction to determine their scope and application.”63 Thus, as
with any other contract, “the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true
intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument” itself.64 To achieve this
objective, the entire contract must be examined and considered “in an effort to
harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be
rendered meaningless.”65 In other words, all provisions of the written instrument at
issue “must be considered with reference to the whole instrument.”66
Appellants focus on select provisions of the Partition Agreement to conclude
that the Partition Agreement “purported to convey all of the mineral interests to the
63
Id. at 993; accord Hamilton v. Hamilton, 280 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex. 1955); Chandler v. Hartt,
467 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
64
J.M. Davidson v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003); accord Italian Cowboy Partners,
Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011).
65
J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 229 (emphasis added).
66
Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).
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[Subject Property], which included Juana Salinas’ undivided 1/12 of the 15/32
interest in the mineral estate.”67 Appellants’ construction is simply wrong; the
parties to the Partition Agreement could not have, and did not attempt to, partition
Juana’s mineral interest.
Appellants ignore that the Partition Agreement provision addressing the
division of mineral interests begins as follows:
It is strictly understood and herein stipulated that this partition
agreement is a partition not only of the surface to the tracts
hereinafter described, but it is intended by the parties hereto that this
partition agreement shall partition all of the rights, title and interest
of the respective parties to this agreement in and to the tracts
hereinabove described . . . .68
The language above provides critical context for the remainder of the provision
relating to mineral interests, making it clear that the Salinas Siblings who signed
the Partition Agreement intended to partition only their rights and interests.69 The
fact that they did not include signature lines for Juana or the third parties who
owned a 17/32 mineral interest lends further support for the conclusion that they
did not intend to disturb those interests when partitioning their own interests.
When addressing Juana’s mineral interest, Appellants ask this Court to
disregard their judicial admission that Juana “and her heirs and assigns have
67
Appellants’ Brief at 17-18.
68
Pl. App. F at 14.
69
See Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. 2014) (“To determine the parties'
intent, we examine the express language of their agreement.”).
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always been treated as undivided interest owners under the whole [surface of the
Subject Property], as it was meant and intended to be.”70 In other words,
Appellants want this Court to ignore the fact that reality meshes with Appellees’
construction of the Partition Agreement. But that fact matters, if for no other
reason than that it establishes that the Appellants who are Juana Salinas Garcia’s
successors lack standing in this suit.
For standing to exist, “a plaintiff must be personally aggrieved; his alleged
injury must be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical.”71
The standing requirement “is implicit in the Texas Constitution’s open courts
provision, which contemplates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering
an injury.”72 As this Court has recognized, a plaintiff does not have standing
70
10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 112); see also Appellants’ Brief at 18,
n.81 (“Defendants may argue that Juana Salinas’ mineral interest was not treated as having been
partitioned under the partition agreement. . . . That is irrelevant to whether the partition
agreement purported to partition her mineral interest. . . . How the partition agreement was later
complied with has no bearing on whether the agreement was valid . . . when it was signed.”).
71
DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304-05 (Tex. 2008); see also City of San
Antonio v. Greater San Antonio Builders Ass’n, No. 04-12-00745-CV, 2013 WL 2247468, at *3
(Tex. App.—San Antonio May 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (providing that “[s]tanding exists
when a threat of harm exists such that an injury is likely to occur” but that “‘the threat must be
‘direct and immediate’ rather than conjectural, hypothetical, or remote.’” (quoting Waco Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. 2000)).
72
M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001) (emphasis added); see
also DaimlerChrysler Corp., 252 S.W.3d at 304 (“[T]he Open Courts provision . . . provides
court access only to a person for an injury done him.” (internal quotation omitted)).
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unless the plaintiff has “suffered a ‘concrete injury[,]’ and a ‘real controversy’
must exist between the parties such that it can be resolved by the court.”73
By their own admission, those Appellants who are Juana’s heirs and assigns
have suffered no injury as a result of the Partition Agreement. And regardless of
the outcome of this case, they will be treated as they “have always been treated”—
“as undivided interest owners under the whole [surface of the Subject Property.]”74
The Partition Agreement simply has no impact on their mineral interest; thus, that
interest will be unaffected by a determination of the Partition Agreement’s validity.
c. Like Juana, Leoncio did not need to sign the Partition
Agreement because he had already conveyed all of his interest
in the Subject Property to his brother Horacio.
Leoncio did not need to sign the Partition Agreement because he conveyed
all of his interest in the Subject Property through the Leoncio-Horacio Deed,
before the Partition Agreement was signed. Appellants’ contention that the
Leoncio-Horacio Deed resulted in a conveyance of only 214 acres of the Subject
Property, and thus left Leoncio with an “undivided 1/12 interest in the remaining
73
In re Estate of Forister, 421 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)
(quoting Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012)).
74
10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 112); see also Appellants’ Brief at 18,
n.81 (“Defendants may argue that Juana Salinas’ mineral interest was not treated as having been
partitioned under the partition agreement. . . . That is irrelevant to whether the partition
agreement purported to partition her mineral interest. . . . How the partition agreement was later
complied with has no bearing on whether the agreement was valid . . . when it was signed.”).
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920 acres” therein,75 ignores language in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed and the impact
of its ratification in the Partition Agreement.
When construing a deed, the court’s “primary duty is to ascertain the intent
of the parties as provided in the four corners of the document.”76 The goal is “to
harmonize all of the parts and construe the instrument to give effect to all of its
provisions.”77 Thus, intent must be determined “from the whole document, ‘not by
the presence or absence of a certain provision[,]’”78 and “the language of the deed
should be interpreted so that no provision is rendered meaningless.”79 The terms
within the deed “are given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meanings
unless the deed itself shows them to be used in a technical or different sense.”80
The Leoncio-Horacio Deed provides that, for “good and valuable
considerations,” Leoncio granted, sold, and conveyed “[a]ll that certain tract set
aside, or to be set aside, to Grantor, under Agreement heretofore entered into by
and between Grantor and Grantee and their brothers and sisters[,]” describes that
tract as “Parcel No. 1, containing 214.164 acres of land,” describes Parcel 1 in
75
Appellants’ Brief at 18; see also 10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 113).
76
Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
77
Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. filed).
78
Id. (quoting Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex.
1998)).
79
Hausser, 345 S.W.3d at 466; accord Lickel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991).
80
Graham, 429 S.W.3d at 655 (citing Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121
(Tex. 1996)).
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metes and bounds, and then provides that the conveyance includes the acres,
“together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise
belonging unto[.]”81 Importantly, the metes-and-bounds description refers to
Parcel 1 in relation to Parcels 2 and 3 and describes all three parcels as part “of this
Partition”.82 The phrase “of this Partition” appears five times in the document.83
After reading all provisions of the Leoncio-Horacio Deed together, it is clear
that Leoncio intended to convey to Horacio all of his interest in the Subject
Property and intended his conveyance to be reflected in the Partition Agreement.84
Under Texas law, Leoncio was entitled to convey all of his interest to Horacio
before the Partition Agreement was executed, just as Juana was entitled to convey
her surface interest to Octavio before the Partition Agreement was executed.85
81
7 CR 2326 (App. B).
82
7 CR 2326 (App. B) (emphasis added).
83
7 CR 2326 (App. B).
84
See Hamilton, 280 S.W.2d at 593 (providing that warranty deeds, like the Leoncio-Horacio
Deed, are “the common and accepted way of partitioning lands voluntarily” in Texas).
85
See, e.g., Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 62 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2001, no pet.) (“A deed by one cotenant, without the consent or participation of other
cotenants, may only convey such interest as the maker of the deed possesses. Thomas v. Sw.
Settlement & Development Co., 123 S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. 1939). However, the law does not
require a cotenant to partition the property prior to a conveyance; the nonparticipating cotenants
simply retain their interest until such time as they convey it or seek partition. See id.”).
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The Salinas Siblings who signed the Partition Agreement awarded to
Horacio the precise Parcel 1 that was described in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed.86 In
doing so, they ratified the Leoncio-Horacio Deed as a partition deed.
Under the longstanding equitable-partition doctrine, a deed by one cotenant
(like Leoncio) to part of the common property (like the Subject Property) will be
given effect if it does not prejudice the rights of the other cotenants.87 The rights
of other cotenants were not prejudiced here. As explained above, Juana was not
affected by Partition Agreement.88 It follows naturally that Juana was also
unaffected by the Leoncio-Horacio conveyance that was carried over to the
Partition Agreement. The remaining cotenants who did not join in the Leoncio-
Horacio Deed ratified the deed in the Partition Agreement that they did join, by
awarding to Horacio the same Parcel 1 that was conveyed to him in the Leoncio-
86
Pl. App. F at 1-2 (Partition Agreement).
87
See, e.g., Thomas v. Sw. Settlement & Development Co., 123 S.W.2d 290, 295-99 (Tex. 1939)
(discussing equitable-partition doctrine at length and summarizing cases addressing same);
Lasater v. Ramirez, 212 S.W. 935, 936 (Tex. 1919) (“It is well settled in this state that a deed
from one tenant in common to a specific part of the common property will be recognized, and the
purchaser thereof protected, by setting apart to him the specific part so conveyed, if this can be
done without prejudice to the other owners.”); Larrison v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1941, pet. ref’d) (“The deeds of a tenant in common to specific parcels of land
are not absolutely void. They are always good as against the grantor. Such deeds do not convey
or destroy any of the title of the nonjoining cotenants to their undivided interest to the lands
described in the deeds. The nonjoining cotenants may avoid such deeds, if and to the extent only
they are injured by such deeds.”).
88
See supra pp. 17-20.
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Horacio Deed. In doing so, the remaining cotentants accomplished equity among
themselves, consistent with principles underlying the equitable-partition doctrine.89
Appellants minimize the equitable-partition doctrine by saying that “an
equitable partition only becomes effective when it is entered by a court as part of a
partition decree.”90 Appellants miss the point: this Court, in equity, should not
disturb the equity that the parties intended to effectuate in the Partition Agreement.
d. Appellants cite no authority that actually supports their claim
that the Partition Agreement is invalid without Juana’s and
Leoncio’s signatures.
As support for their claim that the Partition Agreement is invalid without
Juana’s and Leoncio’s signatures, Appellants rely solely on two cases—Stradt v.
First United Methodist Church of Huntington, 573 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1978), and
Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement and Development Company, 123 S.W.2d 290
(Tex. 1939).91 Neither Stradt nor Thomas is factually analogous to this case, and
neither case supports an argument that parties who are unaffected by a partition
agreement must nonetheless sign the partition agreement in order to make it valid.
89
See, e.g., Thomas, 123 S.W.2d at 296 (“[T]he doctrine [of equitable partition] is an equitable
doctrine, which concerns itself primarily in protecting the vendee in the part of the land
conveyed to him, when and to the extent that this can be done without prejudice to the cotenants
of the whole tract, and which in the attainment of such primary object undertakes fairly to adjust
the equities of all of the interested parties.”).
90
Appellants’ Brief at 15, n.69.
91
See Appellants’ Brief at 14-19.
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In Stradt, the plaintiff brought suit for a partition of her interest in 177 acres
of land that her father deeded to the First United Methodist Church of Huntington
without the joinder of his daughter (the plaintiff) or his son.92 The 177 acres were
part of a tract that had been the community property of the father and the children’s
mother.93 When the mother died intestate, the father received a one-half divided
interest, and the children both received a one-fourth undivided interest.”94
The Church filed a trespass-to-try-title cross action and “tried the case on a
theory of parol partition[.]”95 The Church argued that the father’s conveyance of a
separate 1,600 acres to his children in 1946 “was in full settlement of their interest
in their mother’s estate” and that, as a result, they did not have any interest in the
177-acre tract when the father conveyed it to the Church in 1949.96 The trial court
allowed the submission of two special issues on the question of parol partition, and
the question on appeal was whether there was any evidence to support the
submission of or the answers to the special issues.97 The Supreme Court of Texas
held there was no evidence of a parol partition, reasoning in part that there was no
evidence that the plaintiff-daughter or the son consented to any partition and that
92
Stradt, 573 S.W.2d at 188.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 189.
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“[a] voluntary partition of land must be based on the agreement of all parties with a
possessory interest thereto and cannot be the result of a unilateral decision.”98
Unlike the parol partition alleged in Stradt, the Partition Agreement here did
not divest any non-joining parties of their interests. It did not divest Juana of her
mineral interest, did not divest the third parties of their 17/32 mineral interest, and
could not divest Leoncio of any interest because he had already conveyed all of his
interests in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed. The Partition Agreement merely divided
the possessory interests of its signatories, and thus it does not run afoul of Stradt.
In Thomas, the plaintiffs—record owners of a 3/35 interest in the land at
issue—claimed that their cotenant, the Houston Oil Company of Texas, had
“brought about a partition by making a sale of a specific portion of the common
estate, which portion was of a value in excess of the value of its pro rata share of
the estate.”99 The Thomas plaintiffs claimed that the conveyance and partition
bound Houston Oil Company of Texas, and they “invoke[d] the doctrine of
equitable partition as in effect giving them title to that portion of the common
estate that was not conveyed by Houston Oil Company of Texas.”100
After analyzing cases relating to partitions, the Thomas court held that “the
action of one cotenant in conveying a specific parcel of the commonly owned land
98
Id. at 190.
99
Thomas, 123 S.W.2d at 292, 294.
100
Id. at 294-95.
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does not divest the nonjoining content of his interest in the parcel conveyed and is
not an effective partition when made, but it will become effective when the court,
after finding that it can be equitably done, sets apart such tract to the vendee.”101
And for reasons inapplicable to this case, the Thomas court held that “the equities
of the case . . . [did] not . . . justify the application of the equitable rule invoked.”102
Appellants cherry-picked from Thomas a portion of the court’s synopsis of a
rule from a different case—Joyner v. Christian, 113 S.W.2d 1229 (Tex. 1938).
The full synopsis is that “a partition attempted to be made without joinder of all of
the cotenants is ineffective when made but will become binding when ratified by
those who did not participate in it.”103 In fact, a full reading of Joyner, coupled
with other cases, makes clear that, even if the Partition Agreement were ineffective
for lack of Juana’s or Leoncio’s signature (which it is not), the Partition Agreement
would nonetheless be binding on all Appellants, for a number of different reasons.
2. Even if the Partition Agreement were ineffective due to the lack of
Juana’s and Leoncio’s signatures, summary judgment is proper
because Appellants accepted benefits of the Partition Agreement,
ratified it, acquiesced in it, and are estopped to deny its validity now.
Appellants have made it abundantly clear that they “do not want to disturb
the current surface ownership of the [S]ubject [P]roperty.” 104 In fact, they “are
101
Id. at 299; see also id. at 296-99 (analyzing Texas cases relating to partition).
102
Id. at 295.
103
Id. at 299 (emphasis added to identify text omitted from Appellants’ Brief).
104
10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 113).
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willing to stipulate and agree that, even if the [Partition Agreement] . . . is held to
be invalid or unenforceable, they will enter into and sign any necessary agreements
to vest title to the surface into the current alleged owners of the surface.”105
In seeking to uphold the surface division in the Partition Agreement on the
one hand, and seeking to undo the mineral division in the Partition Agreement on
the other hand, Appellants are seeking an outcome that equity does not permit.
The essence of a partition is that it gives the parties full ownership of
something, instead of a prior undivided ownership, and gives it in
exchange for surrender of an undivided interest in something else.
Equitably speaking, one can no more accept the benefits of a partition
while rejecting its burdens than he or she can do so with regard to
any contract, deed, or will.106
For this reason alone, this Court should enforce the Partition Agreement even if it
determines that the Partition Agreement is otherwise unenforceable for lack of
certain signatures.
Moreover, even if Appellants could accept the portions of the Partition
Agreement they like and reject the rest (which they clearly cannot do), they still
cannot escape the legal effect of the many actions they and their predecessors have
taken consistent with the Partition Agreement’s validity. As Appellants
acknowledge, a party is “equitably prohibited from challenging [a] partition under
ratification, estoppel, or acquiescence” if “the party challenging the partition acted
105
Id.
106
Wright v. Wright, 274 S.W.2d 670, 675 (1955) (emphasis added).
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as if the partition were valid.”107 Appellants and their predecessors, many of whom
were parties to the Partition Agreement, have certainly acted as if it were valid.
In Joyner, the Supreme Court of Texas applied ratification, acquiescence,
and estoppel to enforce an invalid partition agreement against parties who had
joined in it and acted as though the partition agreement were valid.108 In that case,
Scurry Christian and his siblings partitioned land by agreement without the joinder
of parties (the plaintiffs) who owned a 1/6 interest in a subset of the property that
was partitioned.109 The Supreme Court of Texas held that, even though the “agreed
partition was void because of nonjoinder of [parties who owned part of the
partitioned property] . . . Scurry and the other defendants holding under him [were]
estopped to deny its binding effect as against them.”110 The court continued:
[T]he . . . allottees ratified as between themselves their voluntary
action in making the partition, by each taking possession of the tract
set apart to him and making improvements thereon, and by executing
ratification deeds to each other respectively, and by severally
executing numerous oil and gas leases, royalty deeds, and other
conveyances, to third persons. The partition and the respective deeds
of confirmation executed by the allottees to each other are void. The
action of the allottees, upon being acquiesced in by the nonjoining
cotenants, is given the effect, upon the principle of estoppel, of
segregating the common lands into separate tracts. This principle
107
Appellants’ Brief at 29-30.
108
Joyner, 113 S.W.2d at 1232-33. Of note, the Joyner court treated estoppel, ratification, and
acquiescence as related concepts and did not define specific elements for any of them. See id.
109
Joyner, 113 S.W.2d at 1230-31.
110
Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
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denies the allottees, including Scurry and those holding under him, the
right to question the binding force of the segregation.111
For 36 years, the Salinas Siblings and their successors acted consistently
with the Partition Agreement’s validity, taking mortgages, granting leases, and
occupying the property as nine divided parcels.112 Appellants tacitly admit the
actions reflecting that the partition of the surface estate was valid, as the section of
their Brief regarding ratification, acquiescence, and estoppel focuses solely on
whether Appellants have acted as if the partition of the mineral estate was valid.113
Their focus is understandable, given that they “do not want to disturb the current
surface ownership of the [S]ubject [P]roperty[.]”114 But again, they cannot ratify
the Partition Agreement’s division of the surface estate and reject its division of the
mineral estate. They simply cannot have it both ways.
Although Appellants suggest they never acted as if the partition of the
mineral estate was valid, the record proves otherwise. Here are some examples.
• First, as addressed further in Section A(4) below, all nine of the Salinas
Siblings who signed the Partition Agreement condoned the division of
the mineral estate therein, and that action binds all Appellants who claim
through them.
111
Id. (emphasis added); see also High v. Tarver, 25 S.W. 1098, 1100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
(“[T]hat the [partition] agreement was not signed by two of the defendants is, we think,
immaterial, as those two defendants insistent upon the enforcement of the agreement . . . .”).
112
See 8 CR 2543-46 (Thorp et al.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-14) (detailing the
many ways in which the Salinas Siblings and their successors acted consistently with the
Partition Agreement’s validity, both in regard to the surface estate and the mineral estate).
113
See Appellants’ Brief at 29-31.
114
10 CR 3493 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 113).
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• Second, even though Leoncio (of the Salinas Siblings) did not sign the
Partition Agreement, he nonetheless acquiesced in its divisions by (a)
acknowledging the partitioning in the Leoncio-Horacio Deed and (b) not
making a claim to any surface or mineral interests in the Subject Property
after executing the Leoncio-Horacio Deed.115 Leoncio’s heirs also are
not challenging the Partition Agreement in this case. Appellants Anna
and Joel Saenz are claiming interests through Leoncio as a result of his
quitclaim deed to Anna in 1991, but that deed (like all quitclaim deeds)
contains no warranty or covenant for the right, title, or interest that it
purports to pass.116 By the deed, Leoncio passed only what he owned in
the Subject Property.117 Owning nothing, he passed nothing to Anna.118
Moreover, Anna and Joel Saenz are bound by Leoncio’s acquiescence in
the Partition Agreement beginning back in 1968.
• Third, all Appellants who referred to and/or incorporated the Partition
Agreement into their oil-and-gas leases in 1971, 1995, and 2002, either
directly or through their predecessors, acted as if the partition was
valid.119
• Fourth, Appellants Leoncio Salinas, Romulo Benavides III, Anna Maria
Saenz and husband Joel Saenz, Luisa M. Ruiz, and Hermelinda
Benavides recognized the validity of the division of the mineral estate
when they joined in a Cross-Conveyance and Stipulation of Interest
Agreement whereby they cross-conveyed their divided interests in
Parcels 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9, so as to create the undivided interests therein
stipulated in those Parcels.120
Appellants attempt to overcome all of the evidence establishing their
acceptance of the validity of the partition of the mineral estate by focusing on the
115
7 CR 2362 (App. A at ¶ 11).
116
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1994).
117
See id.
118
See id.
119
Refer to Section D of the Statement of Facts for a description of these leases.
120
8 CR 2577 (Instrument 268 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2750-55 (Cross-Conveyance).
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fact that two of the 24 Appellants—Anna and Joel Saenz—claimed in affidavits
that, before 2002, unidentified companies (that are not parties in this appeal) paid
Anna and Joel Saenz “bonus money and royalties consistent with [their] ownership
of an undivided interest in the mineral estate of the entire property.”121 What
nonparty oil companies may have done has no bearing on whether Appellants acted
in a manner consistent with the validity of the partition of the mineral estate.122
Appellants have not identified a pre-suit action by them or their
predecessors that is inconsistent with the validity of the partition of the mineral
interests in the Partition Agreement, and they have neither rebutted nor overcome
the evidence of their ratification of and acquiescence in the Partition Agreement.
Appellants acquiesced in the divisions in the Partition Agreement for 36 years, and
they should be estopped from denying the Partition Agreement’s binding effect on
them now.123 Summary judgment is proper on the all of the affirmative defenses
addressed above; therefore, it should be affirmed on appeal.
121
Appellants’ Brief at 30 (citing 9 CR 2931 and 9 CR 2935).
122
Thorp et al. objected to the statements at issue on the grounds that (1) the statements are
irrelevant and (2) neither Anna nor Joel is “qualified to speak on the legal issues of mineral
ownership or interpretation of deeds and other instruments.” 9 CR 3277-79. The trial court
overruled the objections to Anna’s statement and sustained the objections to Joel’s statement. 9
CR 3307, 3309-10.
123
See, e.g., Joyner, 113 S.W.2d at 1232-33; De Rodriguez v. Hinnant, 267 S.W. 471, 473 (Tex.
1925) (“Although the plaintiffs in error were under disability at the time of the partition, and
were represented by one without authority [in joining the partition], yet, having accepted the
portion of the estate set aside to them, which was fair and equitable at the time, and having
acquiesced in the division for forty years, they must be held to have ratified the partition . . . .”);
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3. Summary judgment is also proper because Appellants’ claims are
barred by adverse possession.
The trial court’s summary judgment can also be affirmed on the affirmative
defense of adverse possession, which Appellees’ summary judgment evidence
establishes as a matter of law. From the time the Partition Agreement was signed
in 1968 until this suit was filed in 2004, each of the Salinas Siblings receiving a
parcel under the Partition Agreement (and/or their successors) have maintained
actual and visible possession of the allotted parcel under a claim of right that is
inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of any other person.124 Appellants
attempt to upset that long-settled title, arguing that adverse possession does not
apply because: (i) minerals were severed from the surface, (ii) the elements of
adverse possession have not been met, and (iii) Appellant Anna Saenz consented to
the possession. As discussed below, all of Appellants’ justifications fail.
a. The portion of the minerals that remain unsevered from the
surface were adversely possessed along with the surface.
Appellants assert that, because part of the minerals underlying the Subject
Property were severed, the remaining unsevered minerals could not be adversely
possessed by occupation of the surface and, instead, could only be adversely
possessed by drilling and production. That is not the law in Texas.
Robinson v. O'Connor, 181 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.)
(holding that, “by long acquiescence,” parties ratified a deed an attempted partition preceding it).
124
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.021(1) (West 2002).
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The general rule that possession of the surface will not perfect title to
severed minerals relies on the theory that possession of the surface estate is not a
repudiation of the owner of the mineral estate.125 But that theory does not apply to
any portion of the minerals that has not been severed from the surface.
When, as here, a portion (11/12 of 15/32) of minerals remains unsevered
from the surface estate, adverse possession of the surface perfects title to the
unsevered minerals.126 For example, in Dixon v. Henderson, the court held that a
cotenant perfected title to the surface and to the minerals that remained unsevered
under the tract under the ten-year statute of limitation, without any drilling or
production.127
In this case, a subset of the minerals was severed from the surface of the
Subject Property—the 17/32 interest assigned to third parties in 1932 and 1940,
and the 1/12 of 15/32 interest retained by Juana when she deeded her surface
interest to her brother Octavio. But the remaining mineral estate underlying the
Subject Property—11/12 of 15/32—was not severed and continued to be owned in
common with the surface estate. Thus, as in Dixon, if the Partition Agreement
125
See Elliott v. Nelson, 251 S.W. 501, 504 (Tex. 1923) (“[N]o delay in working or mining the
minerals . . . can be construed into a repudiation[ ] by the owner of the other estate, of the estate
in the minerals reserved . . . .”).
126
See, e.g., Dixon v. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1954, no writ);
Birdwell v. Am. Bonding Co., 337 S.W.2d 120, 130-31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1960, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (“[A]dverse possession of the surface extends to and includes an adverse possession of the
mineral interest thereunder which had never been separated or severed from the surface
estate . . . .”).
127
Dixon, 267 S.W.2d at 873 (citing Thomas, 123 S.W.2d at 291, 300).
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were not binding here, then the unsevered portion of the minerals would be subject
to adverse possession of the surface without the need for drilling and production.
b. The summary judgment evidence established all of the elements
of adverse possession, and Appellants presented no evidence to
the contrary.
Appellants contend that the only summary judgment evidence in support of
adverse possession is the affidavit of Fausto Salinas, which they claim is
conclusory. Appellants disregard the supporting statements in Fausto’s affidavit
and in his deposition testimony, which was also included in the summary judgment
record. Appellants also ignore interrogatory answers that are part of the record
here. A full review of the record shows that adverse possession was established as
a matter of law, with no controverting evidence presented by Appellants.
Adverse possession requires proof of “(1) actual possession of the disputed
property; (2) under a claim of right; (3) that was adverse or hostile to the claim of
another person and that it was consistently and continuously so for the duration of
the statutory period.”128 In addition, “a co-tenant may not adversely possess
against another co-tenant unless it clearly appears he has repudiated the title of his
128
Villareal v. Guerra, 446 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied).
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co-tenant and is holding adversely to it[.]”129 Adverse possession may be
established as a matter of law when, as here, the pertinent facts are undisputed.130
In this case, the Partition Agreement, coupled with the conduct following its
execution, constitutes sufficient repudiation by each possessory cotenant of the
non-possessory cotenants’ interests. In Republic Production Co. v. Lee, for
example, the court held that an attempted partition that lacked a cotenant, when
followed by adverse possession, constituted a repudiation of the cotenancy:
It is a rule of wide application that if two or more tenants in common
of a tract of land enter into a partition of same, and set apart the whole
to the exclusion of a non-participating cotenant, such act of partition,
when followed by adverse possession, even if wholly void as against
the excluded cotenant, constitutes a complete and unequivocal
repudiation of the cotenancy relationship. It is also well settled that
such a partition, even though there be no sufficient record thereof as
will give notice to the excluded cotenant, may be proven as an act
manifesting an intention on the part of the participating cotenant to
oust the other cotenant or repudiate the tenancy relationship with
him.131
129
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 756 (Tex. 2003).
130
Id. at 756 (upholding a summary judgment finding adverse possession among cotenants);
Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 187 S.W.3d 201, 213-16 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet.
denied) (same).
131
Republic Production Co. v. Lee, 121 S.W.2d 973, 262 (Tex. 1938); see also Beets v. Hickok,
701 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1985, no writ) (partition setting aside the full fee to 24
acres out 87.5-acre cotenancy satisfied element of repudiation: “Record of a conveyance by
several cotenants to another cotenant purporting to convey the entire common property, when
followed by possession, constitutes notice of repudiation and amounts to disseizin of the
nonparticipating cotenant.”).
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Here, the Partition Agreement’s execution, followed by each Salinas Sibling taking
immediate possession of the Parcel allotted to him or her in the agreement,
repudiated the cotenancy relationship and started the clock on adverse possession.
Appellants quote select portions of Fausto’s affidavit to claim that the other
elements of adverse possession have not been met. A complete review of the
record establishes each element of adverse possession.
Fausto’s affidavit provides that that the Salinas Sibling took immediate
possession of and “began to construct improvements, fences, wells, and buildings
on their respective parcels.”132 The affidavit also provides that Horacio
immediately sold Parcel 1 to a third party but reserved his mineral rights therein.133
Important to the oil-and-gas production obtained from Parcels 5 and 8,
Fausto’s affidavit provides additional detail about the actions of Fausto’s father,
Octavio, to stake his exclusive claim to Parcel 8, and the actions of Fausto’s uncle,
Flavio, to stake his exclusive claim to Parcel 5.134 They constructed fences and
other improvements, and Fausto and his father have been cultivating, using, and
enjoying Parcel 8 since the Partition Agreement was signed in 1968.135
132
7 CR 2362 (App. A at ¶ 12).
133
8 CR 2571 (Instruments 29 in Thorp’s Abstract); 8 CR 2647-51 (Deed).
134
7 CR 2362 (App. A at ¶¶ 14-15).
135
Id. at ¶ 14.
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In Fausto’s deposition, which is part of the summary judgment record,
Fausto gave testimony that is consistent with his affidavit and provides further
detail about adverse possession. He explained that, after the Partition Agreement
was executed, a dozer was brought in to clear senderos dividing each of the
partitioned blocks.136 Fences were then erected in the senderos along the survey
line of each parcel, as divided by the Partition Agreement.137 Fausto also testified
that, from the time the Partition Agreement was signed in 1968 until this lawsuit
was filed in 2004, title to each parcel was held continuously and peaceably—that
no one ever challenged or questioned the siblings’ or their successors’ individual
title in the allotted parcels claimed under the Partition Agreement.138 Fausto’s
deposition testimony was uncontroverted and establishes adverse possession as a
matter of law under the ten-year adverse possession statute.139
In addition to Fausto’s affidavit and deposition testimony, Appellants’ own
interrogatory responses below provide evidence of adverse possession. In response
to Interrogatory 7, which asked Appellants whether they occupied any portion of
the Subject Property and asked them to describe any such occupation, they wrote:
136
See, e.g., 7 CR 2363-87, at 36:7-13 (going so far as to identify the foreman and dozer driver
who cut the senderos, Lee Walker and Felix Flores). Fausto further identified which of the
siblings drilled water wells on their allotted parcels. Id. at 36:18-37:2.
137
Id. at 39:22-40:6.
138
Id. at 40:7-15.
139
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.026(a) (West 2002).
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Leoncio [son of Adan Salinas], Romulo [nephew of Ascencio
Salinas], and Hermelinda [daughter of Emma Salinas] own and
occupy a portion of the surface. Leoncio and his family have put an
extensive amount of time and hard work . . . into this property . . . .
There have been new fences, lines, sheds, corrals, water
improvements and other projects on the property. Leoncio has been
living on the property since his father passed away in 1998. Romulo’s
surface has a house, corrals, fencing, and water wells. Hermelinda’s
surface has fencing and water well improvements. Surface uses are
residential, agricultural, hunting, livestock and recreational.140
And in response to Interrogatory 8, which asked whether Appellants’ predecessors
ever occupied any portion of the Subject Property, Appellants wrote: “yes, some
predecessors in interest of the Plaintiffs [Appellants] occupied the property dating
all the way back to Juan and Ines Salinas.”141
Tellingly, although Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence,
they offer no rebutting evidence. Indeed, they have asserted repeatedly that they
are not trying to disturb the long-recognized division of the surface.142 But that
surface use is exactly what establishes adverse possession in the event the Partition
Agreement did not bind all of the contested interests in the Subject Property.
c. Even if Ana Saenz “consented” to the use of the surface by the
siblings and their successors, her consent could not have been
granted until after the 10-year statute of limitations had expired.
Appellants contend that the trial court improperly excluded the affidavit of
Appellant Anna Saenz and her claim that she consented to the use of the divided
140
8 CR 2778.
141
8 CR 2779.
142
Appellants’ Brief at 8.
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parcels by her parents’ siblings. But that claim is contradicted by Anna’s own
deposition testimony that nobody asked for her consent to go onto their land.143
She even admitted that she did not own any interest in the surface of the Subject
Property and that people with surface ownership, such as Fausto Salinas (Octavio
Salinas’s son), did not need to share the benefits resulting from their ownership.144
Anna did not obtain any potential interest in any portion of the Subject
Property until 1989, when her father Horacio died intestate and she inherited his
interest in Parcel 1 of the Subject Property.145 Accordingly, any “consent” that
Anna gave before 1989 would have been useless. Indeed, in both of the consent
cases that Appellants cite, the permission to use the property that barred adverse
possession came from a party claiming record title, not a third party.146 Thus,
during the time period that is relevant here, Anna’s “consent” had no effect.
Anna obtained her alleged interest in the Subject Property 21 years after the
Partition Agreement was signed—i.e., approximately 11 years after the 10-year
statute of limitations had expired and the Salinas Siblings and their successors had
143
8 CR 2799.
144
8 CR 2800-02.
145
8 CR 2553, 2792.
146
See Villareal v. Chesapeake Zapata, L.P., No. 04-08-00171-CV, 2009 WL 1956387, at *3-4
(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 8, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[M]y father gave them
permission to cross his tract of land.”); Commander v. Winkler, 67 S.W.3d 265, 269-70 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
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perfected title by adverse possession.147 Therefore, even if the trial court had
considered Anna’s affidavit relating to her consent, it would provide no evidence
to support Appellants’ counter-defense of permissive use in this case.
4. At a minimum, summary judgment is proper as against the parties
who joined in the Partition Agreement, as well as their successors.
A longstanding rule in Texas is that parties who join in a partition agreement
are bound by the agreement, even if the agreement is determined to be void due to
the non-joinder of cotenants in the partitioned property. For example, in Joyner,
the plaintiffs, who were cotenants of partitioned property, sued Scurry Christian,
claiming they were left out of a partition agreement between Scurry and his
siblings.148 The Supreme Court of Texas held that, even though the agreement was
void due to non-joinder of the cotenants, “Scurry and the other defendants holding
under him [were] estopped to deny its binding effect as against them.”149 The court
reinforced and clarified that rule in Republic Production Co. v. Lee, holding: “Even
if the instruments of conveyance [in the partition proceeding at issue] were void,
the partition was nonetheless valid as to those who participated therein.”150
147
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.026(a).
148
Joyner, 131 S.W.3d 2d at 1230-31.
149
Id. at 1232.
150
Republic Production Co., 121 S.W.2d at 979.
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In accordance with the longstanding rule, all of the Salinas Siblings who
joined in the Partition Agreement are bound by it. Likewise, their successors
cannot undo the deal that the Salinas Siblings struck in the Partition Agreement.
Thus, at a minimum, summary judgment is proper against (a) Anna and Joel
Saenz, to the extent they claim through Anna’s father, Horacio; (b) Romulo
Benavides, III, who claims through his uncle Ascencio and his mother, Emma;
(c) Leoncio Salinas, who claims through his father, Adan; (d) Luisa Ruiz, who
claims through her mother, Hermila; and (e) Hermelinda Benavides, Thelma
Benavides Aguilar, and Irma Benavides Cerda, who claim through their mother,
Emma.
B. Even if there were a fact question relating to the Partition Agreement,
Appellants’ claim for damages in their trespass-to-try title action should be
treated as final because Appellants have not challenged or briefed the
summary judgment ground that they have no evidence of such damages.
In the underlying trespass-to-try-title action, Appellants (as plaintiffs) sought
both “an order quieting title to the disputed property and damages to compensate
them for all [alleged] unlawful conduct of defendants, including all actual, special,
consequential, and incidental damages.”151 Smith Production moved for summary
judgment on multiple grounds, including that “Plaintiffs have no evidence . . . of
151
10 CR 3495-96 (Plaintiffs’ Ninth Amended Petition at ¶ 116(e). Plaintiffs in trespass-to-try-
title actions are entitled to seek damages and to recover them if they prove entitlement to them.
See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 22.021(d), 22.022 (West 2014); Tex. R. Civ. P. 783(f), 805.
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any damages.”152 The trial court granted all Appellees’ summary judgment
motions without specifying the grounds on which it was ruling.153 The trial court
then entered a final judgment and ordered that the “Partition Agreement . . . is
hereby declared to be valid and enforceable for all purposes as to all parties to this
suit” and that “Plaintiffs take nothing by their suit against all Defendants.”154
“When, as in the present case, a movant asserts multiple grounds for
summary judgment, and the trial court does not specify in the order the ground on
which summary judgment was granted, the nonmovant must negate all grounds on
appeal.” 155 Appellants have acknowledged this requirement in their own Brief.156
Appellants have not challenged or briefed Smith Production’s summary
judgment ground that Appellants lack evidence of the damages sought in their
trespass-to-try-title action. Thus, they cannot complain about those damages on
appeal, and the trial court’s judgment on those damages should be affirmed even if
this Court determines there is a fact issue relating to the Partition Agreement.157
152
8 CR 2843 (Smith Production’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6).
153
Appellants’ Brief at 13 (citing Pl. App. C-E).
154
Pl. App. A at 4, ¶¶ 1, 3.
155
Ward v. Ward, No. 04-12-00703-CV, 2014 WL 470153, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb.
5, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
156
Appellants’ Brief at 13 (citing Potter v. Kaufman & Broad Home Sys. of Tex., Inc., 137
S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.), for same proposition).
157
See, e.g., Ward, 2014 WL 470153, at *2 (“If the nonmovant fails to challenge all grounds on
which the judgment may have been granted, the appellate court must uphold the summary
judgment.”); López v. Montemayor, 131 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet.
denied) (declining to consider issue that was not raised in appellant’s original brief).
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For all of the reasons above, this Court should not accept Appellants’
invitation to undo the deal that the Salinas Siblings struck over 46 years ago. The
Partition Agreement was signed by all of the parties who were affected. The only
reason Appellants want to undo the Partition Agreement now is because drilling
that began about 34 years after its execution revealed that its division of mineral
interests is more advantageous to other parties than it is to many of the Appellants.
There is no rule of construction that permits the unambiguous language in the
Partition Agreement to be departed from because its application to facts that
developed after its execution results in unequal benefits to some of its signatories’
successors and other parties. Moreover, Texas law prohibits what Appellants seek
here, which is an acceptance of the portions of the Partition Agreement they like—
divided surface—and a rejection of the portions they dislike—divided minerals.
WHEREFORE Appellees pray that this Court affirm the judgment below
and grant to them such further relief to which they may be entitled.
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Respectfully submitted,
SCOTT, DOUGLASS, &
MCCONNICO, L.L.P.
303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400
Austin, Texas 78701-2589
(512) 495-6300
(512) 495-6399 Fax
By: /s/ Kennon L. Wooten
Mark W. Hanna
State Bar No. 24051764
mhanna@scottdoug.com
Kennon L. Wooten
State Bar No. 24046624
kwooten@scottdoug.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
SMITH PRODUCTION INC.
JONES GILL LLP
6363 Woodway, Suite 1100
Houston, Texas 77057
(713) 652-4068
(713) 651-0716 Fax
By: /s/ Lee S. Gill
Lee S. Gill
State Bar No. 07921360
gill@jonesgill.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES THORP
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, EL
PASO PRODUCTION COMPANY; EL
PASO E&P COMPANY, LP; EL PASO
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
MANAGEMENT, INC.; STANCO LAND
MANAGEMENT, LLC, AND
MEREDITH LAND & MINERALS
COMPANY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on all
counsel of record on March 18, 2015, as indicated below:
Via electronic service
Roger S. Braugh, Jr.
SICO, WHITE, HOELSCHER, HARRIS & BRAUGH, LLP
900 Frost Bank Blaza
802 N. Carancahua
Corpus Christi, TX 78470
rbraugh@swbtrial.com
David George
CONNELLY BAKER WOTRING, LLP
700 JPMorgan Chase Tower
600 Travis Street
Houston, TX 77002
dgeorge@connellybaker.com
and
John T. Flood
Flood & Flood
802 N. Carancahua, Suite 900
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
john@floodandflood.com
Attorneys for Appellants Anna Maria Salinas Saenz, et al.
Via Facsimile: 956-687-6125
Rolando Cantu
LAW FIRM OF ROLANDO CANTU, P.C.
4428 S. McColl
Edinburg, TX 78539
Attorney for Alicia Salinas
45
1176340
Via electronic service
Jose Luis Flores
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1111 W. Nolana
McAllen, TX 78504
joe@jlfloreslawfirm.com
Attorney for Eleodora Salinas Del Real, Dalia
Salinas and Jose Manuel Flores
Via electronic service
J. Joseph Vale
O.C. Hamilton, Jr.
ATLAS & HALL, L.L.P.
P.O. Drawer 3725
McAllen, TX 78502
jvale@atlashall.com
och@atlashall.com
Attorneys for Luisa M. Ruiz, Norberto Salinas, Fausto Salinas, Rosalinda
Salinas Balderas, Linda Mandes, Ricardo L. Salinas, Veronica Casas
Campbell, Elda Salinas Ponce, Cindy Casas Reyna, Thelma Salinas, Elodia
Salinas, D-FOX, Ltd., and Cynthia M. Villarreal, f/k/a Cindy Casas Reyna
Via electronic service
Juan J. Hinojosa
LAW OFFICES OF JUAN J. HINOJOSA
612 W. Nolana Loop, Suite 410
McAllen, TX 78504
jjhinojosa@bizrgv.rr.com
Attorney for Arturo Salinas
Via electronic service
C. Frank Wood
Sanchez, Whittington, Zabarte & Wood, L.L.C.
3505 Boca Chica Blvd., Suite 100
Brownsville, TX 78521
fwood@swjz.com
Attorney for Ruben Garcia, et al.
46
1176340
Via electronic service
Daniel Robles
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Westoria Building, 1st Floor
420 S. “F” Street
Harlingen, Texas 78550
noemi@dan-robles.com
Attorney for Oscar Garcia, Jr.
Via electronic service
Ricardo L. Salinas
SALINAS/FLORES
2011 N. Conway
Mission, Texas 78572
rsalinaslaw@yahoo.com
Attorney for Ricardo Salinas
Via electronic service
Rene A. Flores
THE LAW OFFICE OF RENE A. FLORES
2724 W. Canton Road
Edinburg, Texas 78539
rene.flores@yahoo.com
Attorney for Alida Salinas Hernandez, Arnaldo Salinas, Alma Salinas
Munoz, Adelaida Salinas, Aida Salinas Flores, Guadalupe Salinas, Maria
Ester Salinas Cantu, and Maria del Carmen Zamora
/s/ Kennon L. Wooten
Kennon L. Wooten
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the foregoing brief was prepared using Microsoft Word 2010,
and that, according to its word-count function, the sections of the foregoing brief
covered by TRAP 9.4(i)(1) contain 11,670 words.
/s/ Kennon L. Wooten
Kennon L. Wooten
47
1176340
APPENDIX A
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HIDALGO §
AFFIDAVIT
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared FAUSTO
SALINAS, who after being duly sworn by me, deposed and stated as follows:
1. I was born on July 2, 1935. I am, therefore, over 21 years of age, I am competent
to make this affidavit, I have never been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and
I have personal knowledge of all facts stated herein and they are true and correct.
2. References will be made in this affidavit to instruments of record in Starr County,
Texas, as shown on the Abstract of Title filed by Thorp Petroleum Corporation ("Thorp's
Abstract").
3. My father, Octavio Salinas, was one of 12 children of Juan and Ynes Salinas. Juan
N. Salinas and Ynes Salinas owned a tract of approximately 1,284 acres in Porciones 38,
39 and 40, ancient jurisdiction of Reynosa, Starr County, Texas, referred to herein as "the
property." In 1964, my grandparents made a deed (item 12 in Thorp's Abstract) to my
father, Octavio Salinas, of 150 acres in the northeast corner of the property. Later in 1964,
my grandparents made a gift deed to each of their children of an undivided 1/12 interest
in the remainder of the property ("1964 Gift Deed," item 14 in Thorp's Abstract). The net
acreage conveyed was 1,134 acres.
4. There were mineral interests in the property that my grandparents did not own.
Thus, all of the minerals are not owned by Plaintiffs and Defendants.
5. I was employed in the oil field business up until 1966 when I started farming some
of the above referred to property together with my father. My grandfather was aware of the
fact that his children would eventually divide up the 1,134 acres of land, and before he died
in 1967. I remember hearing my grandfather express his desire that the ranch house be
set aside for Esther Salinas and Ascencio Salinas, two of his children, neither of whom
were married, and who lived there.
6. After my grandfather died and before December of 1968, I was present on several
occasions when my aunts and uncles met to discuss how they were going to divide the
1,134 acres. Some of them had expressed desires as to where they wanted their portion
of the 1,134 acres to be located, and essentially, all of my aunts and uncles had no
disagreement where each was to receive his or her part of the 1,134 acres. During those
discussions between my aunts and my uncles, I remember that they discussed the fact
they had always agreed that if Esther died before Ascencio, that her interest would go to
him. My aunt Ester died without a will, unmarried and without ever having had any children.
My grandmother, my father and all surviving aunts and uncles joined in a deed (item 26 in
Thorp's Abstract) to my uncle Ascencio Salinas conveying the interest they inherited from
Ester.
7. In September of 1968, I went with my father to Raymondville, Texas where we met
with Juana Salinas, his sister. My father, Octavio Salinas, had previously made an
agreement with her to buy her 94.5 acres, which was her part of the 1,134 acres.
However, she did not want to sell her minerals. She preferred to retain her mineral interest
under the 1,134 acres. While in Raymondville, Juana Salinas and her husband, signed a
deed to my father and I was a witness to her husband's mark on the deed.
8. I also remember that my uncles, Horacio and Adan Salinas, had each purchased
25 acres from the Margo's, which was located adjacent to the lands which Hermila was to
receive in the partition. All of my aunts and uncles, including Hermila, agreed that Adan
and Horacio would get an additional 25 acres adjacent to their pro rata part of the 1,134
acres and in exchange, Hermila would get the 50 acre Margo tract as part of her 94.5
acres. They agreed that Adan would get his acreage in the northwest corner where he
built his house. Adan had already been deeded 92.6 acres in the northwest corner when
the partition survey was done. The survey of Adan's 94.5 acres, therefore, included the
92.6 acres which he had already acquired, and that with the 25 acres he had purchased
from the Margo's, made his total surveyed acres 119.5 acres. They agreed that Horacio
would get his acreage in the southeast corner and it was understood that Horacio was
buying Leoncio's interest so that Horacio would be receiving 214 acres, being made up of
the 94.5 acres he was entitled to, the 94.5 acres he was buying from Leoncio, and,the 25
acres of the Margo property. They also agreed that Octavio would get his property adjacent
to the 150 acres he already owned, and it was also understood that he had purchased
Juana's interest in the surface. Therefore, he would be getting his 94.5 acres, Juana's 94.5
acres, and the 150 acres which he already owned. He would, therefore, be entitled to 339
acres. Those instructions were given to the surveyor so that those parcels could be
surveyed.
9. After all of my aunts and uncles agreed on where each would receive his or her
property, I heard my uncle Horacio say that he was going to employ the county surveyor,
Elias Aguilar, to survey each tract that each of my aunts and uncles was to receive. I
remember being at the ranch when Elias Aguilar and his crew were there surveying.
10. After the surveys were completed, probably in December 1968, my father and I, and
uncle Horacio, and one or two other uncles went to the office of John Pope III and they
employed John Pope Ili to prepare a partition agreement. Everyone who signed it knew
that Juana and Leoncio were not signing the instrument, and all of them knew the minerals,
except for Juana's, were being divided, I had heard this discussed in the family meetings
and get-togethers I attended. At those meetings, some of the siblings wanted to keep the
minerals undivided, others wanted to divide them along with the surface rights. In the end,
those who wanted to divide up the Salinas mineral rights prevailed, and they signed the
partition agreement, dated December 27, 1968 (item 27 in Thorp's Abstract), in which they
all agreed to divide the minerals so that the minerals were with the surface which each
received.
11. In November of 1968, I, together with Bet° Salinas and a couple of other friends,
had a conversation with Leonicio Salinas. I knew that my father and I were interested in
acquiring as much of the 1,134 acres that we could, so I asked Leonicio if he would be
willing to sell us the acreage which he would be getting in the partition. He told me at that
2
time, that he had already sold everything he would be getting in the partition to my uncle
Horacio and that he had nothing else left to sell. I subsequently learned that in October of
1968, Leonicio had signed a deed to Horacio Salinas. Leoncio has never made a claim to
any of the surface or minerals under the 1,134 acres that I am aware of.
12. After the agreement of partition was signed, the parties immediately began and
continued exclusive possession. Many began to construct improvements, fences, wells,
and buildings on their respective parcels. My uncle Horacio immediately sold his 214-acre
Parcel 1 to Eusebio Solis, reserving all his mineral rights (item 29 in Thorp's Abstract).
13. My uncle Flavio Salinas immediately went into possession of his Parcel 5,
constructing fences and other improvements thereon. His possession and that of his
children (Elodia, since his death has been continuous, actual, visible and hostile to any
other claim to Parcel 5, using and enjoying said parcel exclusively. Before suit was filed
by Anna Saenz in 2004, no one had ever asserted any claim to Parcel 5 except Flavio
Salinas and his heirs and successors.
14. My father immediately went into exclusive possession of his Parcel 8, constructing
fences and other improvements. Since 1968, continuing until the present time, my father,
myself and my sisters have continued to be and remain in continuous, actual, and visible
possession of Parcel 8, cultivating, using and enjoying said parcel exclusively. Our
possession was hostile to and did not recognize any claim to said land as being superior
to our own. Before suit was filed by Anna Saenz in 2004, no one had ever asserted any
claim to Parcel 8 except Octavio Salinas and his heirs and successors.
15. My sisters, Rosalinda Balderas and Elda Salinas Ponce, and my nieces, Cindy
Reyna, Veronica Campbell, and Linda Mandes, and I are now the sole owners and in
exclusive possession of all of the surface of Parcel 8 and all but Juana Salinas Garcia's
share of the Salinas mineral interest therein, and of all of the surface of the 150 acres and
all of the Salinas mineral interest therein.
16. My uncle Adan had already built his house on his tract because a long time before
the partition deed, he knew what tract he was going to eventually get. From the time of the
partition, my aunts and uncles or their heirs or grantees have been in possession of those
tracts. Until the filing of this suit, 36 years after the partition, none of the 12 siblings or their
heirs ever contested the possession or ownership of surface or minerals of those who
signed the partition agreement.
f
ef:->
FAUSTO SALINAS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFOR ME, the undersigned authority, by the
said FAUSTO SALINAS, on this ay of , 2010, to certify
which witness my hand and official seal of office. /
.11, L,tik
NOTA • Y P C, STATE OF TEXAS
3
0 rs4 I—)
.<4
APPENDIX B
EE
Fit.k. NO. 724112
w Oast, WARRANTY DEED Foam
LEONG laal.*INAS TO 1.111BACIO 13. SALINASloim,
Mit °hitt °t altni3° / -*now All film hg Whist Pimento:
flountg of STARR
That I, LEONCIO SALINAS, a single man,
of the County of Hidalgo State of Texas for and in consideration
of the sum of TEN AND NO/100 ( $10.00 )
and other good and valuable considerations, DOLLARS
"to me in hand paid by HORAGIO. B. SALINAS, receipt 'of all of which is
hereby acknowledged,
co4ollows..
have Granted, Sold and Conveyed, and by these preaents do Grant, Sell and Convey unto the said
HORACIO B. SALINAS
of the County of Hidalgo State of Texas all that certain
lot, tract, piece, or parcel of land situated in Starr County, Texas,.
more particularly described as follows:
All that certain tract set aside, or to 'be set aside, to Grantor, under
Agreement heretofore entered into by and between Grantor and Cranteee,
and their brothers and sisters; and more particularly described as follow
The State of Texas,
County of Starr.- ISTcel.No. la containing 214:164 Acres of land,
out of Tracts Woe. 84 sal 85, of Porcion44 Nog*
38-39, lemma Jurisdictions Mexico, now Starr
County. Texas. Tot Remain Salinas.
Negiuning at an Iron Rod, in center line of County Road on the Nest boundary
line of Tract No. 85, same being the 8. 1, corner of said Tract No. 85. the N. 1,
corner of Tract No. 89, of said Pnrcioses Nos. 38■39, for 8. 16 nurser hereof;
Thence following fence and,South Line of said Tract No. 85, N. 8010 271 T.,
410584 feet to an Iron Pipe, under fennel, the 8. 1, corner.of Percel No, 2, of this
Partition, for S. 1. corner hereof; .
Thence with the dividing line between Parcels Nos. 1 and 2, of this Partition.
N. 334 N., 2271.5 feet to an Iron Pipe, the S. Ni.morner of Parcel Noe l, of this
Partition, for N. V. corner hereof:
Thence with the dividing line betimen Percale Woe. 1-and 3, of this Partition,
I. 80* 271 1., 4105.4 feet to a nail in caner lino of County Road and Nast line of
Tract No. 85, the 8. X. corner of Parcel No. 3, of this Partition, for N. N. corner
hereof;
I
Thence with Nest line of said Tract No. 85, Si 8911 331 N.. 2271.5 foot to the
plass of beginning and oentifningwithin those...otos and bounds, 214.184 acres of lam
si EXHIBIT 331/321
ift.....earimaresalnir.a.mwrraftWft■resafte04
322
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described premises, together with all and singular the
rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging unto the said HORAGIO B. SALINAS, his
heirs and assigns forever and I do hereby bind• myself , my —
mire, executors and administrators, to Warrant and !forever Defend, at and singular the said /remises .
unto the said Roues° B. SALINAS, his . •
heirs and assigns, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming,• or to claim.the sante, or any '
. [Art thereof.
WITNESS my hand at Edinburg, Texa s
this 9th , day of October 19 6E).
Witneues at Request of Grantor:
eencio Salinas)
UNCLE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
COUNTY OF HI DALG 0
BEFORE ME. the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for told County and State. an this day personally appeared
LSONGIO SALINAS, a single man,
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing Instrument, and acknowledged to
me that he talented the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFIGE,:t
this the 9th day of October A. D, 19,
foe !••.;.1,;
(L. 5.)
4a ete. AtiA 4,44:2
(Cecil A. Ear
Notary Public in and toe Hidalgo " Ic;•.",;•., county. 'Texas
VithDAY OF JANUARY, A.D. 1969 AT • :11 O'CLOCK 14. ,
FILED FOR RECORD THE O'CLOCK _LM.
THE DAY OF JANUARY, A . D . 1969 AT g
1 r.1,Th
DULY RECORDED
JOSE S. HINOJOSIL,COUNTY CLERK ,
STARR C our= 'TEXAS..
INSTRUMENT NO „ 7 : 11-1 1-71
DEPUTY
•4 .
s,
At%
esi
KW, 4 6(
APPENDIX C
JUAN VEGA ANTONIO VILLAREAL
A-200 A-279
PORCION 38 PORCION 39
/14 9' S 90 • 39'9 -A N 019•11'w 1,041,1*
3,418.3' TR. BO 4,199,0 TR. 84 T
▪tt,SIJ 600,55*. 71/. 84 At,
A. A
1 y
O ti N
44. .4 P-v^ O
O • 4.
A I A 3
99. 33944.
49,9J. 9,4944'
9,039.37 41
3,494.1'
'Lc s f frto.
1.5P P1 7.1.1
4.? ,
31. 47144. •
•rq, .7.7.77* 7%1 O. • -7 944.594.
.0
;hoz es i L.4- --
4 740'
931.0-1.9
pc/.1.1.1 !0.151.44.
29111 .tc. .3,133. • • 1.1.•••• •
I. 4.
• •••• .• 79%. 1..r.; 4,199.1' 5
• ,•••,•• ,r1.19/ 34.
/el.,
94.131 Ar.
I99. S'
O
•
Pe.i.
k 04.311 49. "it 991.4
433.4 ' 94.!12 .4:.
4,109.•'
ti 1,319. 3' 2
fris1pJ
• z
O
ti P.1.1
94.sce Ac.
3.10.34 .
t iO3. • '-"."
A, IP • .ty' 6414
• oo ' il i 4' 'MI. I
TR. TR. hi 11.3019c
06 17 - i-- - ...-- --... ■ 1
1,44.S . , I PH. 1.5
toeTN, Re
ft. eac
i __..____B__ .. 2,....1n..._.....
. N
.0 1
0 or Ad. I-.1
.1` ti 42.11145.
V. VI
, 4- "-\-
•r., .4
#41,3.11. PO. 1.4
• Pct 1. 7 A /03,514 se.
ll. 3 Ae. .4 J,5$0.9'
?clef 94.
J. 90 3 v*,,, - 4,103.4`.....
10. ....-m 00. 3.9 ..9 I 3,141.5' If so. aq't
SALINAS AREA
STARR COUNTY, TEXAS
ATTACHMENT 1
TO
TITLE OPINION
PORCIONES 38 & 39
1334.985 ACRES
Bird &SW Au.