ACCEPTED
06-14-00086-CV
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
3/20/2015 5:03:42 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
No. 06-14-00086-CV
________________________________________ FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
In The TEXARKANA, TEXAS
3/23/2015 8:22:00 AM
Sixth Court of Appeals DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
Texarkana, Texas
________________________________________
Faye Comte & Laura Severt,
Appellants,
v.
Smith County Commissioners Court, Joel Baker,
Cary Nix, Jeff Warr, Joann Hampton & Terry Phillips
Appellees.
__________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 241st District Court
of Smith County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 13-2492-C
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Laura S. Severt
State Bar No. 24051886
lsevert@jbwlawfirm.com
J. BENNETT WHITE, P.C.
P.O. Box 6250
Tyler, Texas 75711
Telephone No. (903) 597-4300
Telecopier No. (903) 597-4330
Appellate Counsel
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Brief of the Argument in Reply .................................................................................................................... 2
A. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 321ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS DOES
NOT REQUIRE AN AMENDMENT OF THE EXPIRED BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR OF 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 2
B. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 321ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS IS NOT
BARRED BY THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE ............................................................................................................................................... 2
C. APPELLANTS HAVE NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW ..................................................... 3
D. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY ........................................................................ 4
E. THIS IS NOT A SUIT FOR MONEY DAMAGES; THEREFORE, GOVERNMENTAL
AND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY DO NOT APPLY. .................................................................. 5
F. IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR SUIT FOR FUNDS WRONGFULLY WITHHELD ................... 8
G. IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR LIABILITY .................................................................................. 8
H. WHEN THE STATE BRINGS SUIT, THE STATE VOLUNTARY WAIVES
IMMUNITY ................................................................................................................................... 10
I. THE FACTS IN KAUFMAN COUNTY V. COMBS ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO
APPELLANTS’ CASE .................................................................................................................. 11
J. SUITS INITIATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE
SERVICES ARE FAR MORE ANALAGOUS TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS THAN
CIVIL, THEREFORE, THE REASONING IN SMITH v. FLACK SHOULD APPLY. ............... 12
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 14
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................................................... 15
Certificate of Service .................................................................................................................................. 16
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alice National Bank v. Edwards, 383 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, ref., n.r.e) ................................... 13
Anderson v. Ashe, 90 S.W. 872 (Tex. 1906) ............................................................................................... 13
Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) ............................ 6
Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. State, 122 Tex. 530, 62 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1933) .......................................... 10
Bryan v. City of Madison MS, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000) ......................................................................... 5
Chrestman v. Tompkins, 5 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1928) ........................................................ 8
City of Mission v. Eureka Fire Hose Co., 67 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1933, writ
dism’d w.o.j.) ............................................................................................................................................ 3
City of San Antonio v. Routledge, 102 S.W. 756, 765 (Tex. Civ App. 1907, writ ref’d) .............................. 4
City of Seagoville v. Lyttle, 227 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2007, no writ) ......................................... 6
Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Salazar, 781 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no
writ) ........................................................................................................................................................... 5
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Davis, 160 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1942, reversed in part 140 Tex. 398,
168 S.W.2d 216) ............................................................................................................................... 10, 16
Denman v. Coffee, 91 S.W. 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) ............................................................................. 13
Garrett v. City of Wichita Falls, 334 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth, 1960, no writ) .................. 4
Gibson v. Honorable Herb March, 710 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986) ....................................... 8
Harris County v. Walsweer, 930 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) .............. 4
Hawthorne v. La-Man Constr., Inc., 672 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1984, no writ) ............... 4
Hinojosa v. Tarrant Cnty, 355 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App. –Amarillo 2011, no writ) ....................................... 6
Hughes v. Tarrant County Texas, 948 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1991) ........................................................... 5
In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003) ............................................................................................. 12
iii
In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex.2001) ................................................................................................ 5
In the Interest of M.V.G., a Child, 285 S.W.3d 576 (Tex.App.—Waco 2009) ........................................... 13
Kaufman County v. Combs, 393 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2012, pet. denied) .............................. 11
Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2000) ............................................................. 8, 9
Mitchell v. Ramfield, 523 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1975, no writ) ............................................ 7
Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ............................................................................ 13
Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Civ.App.1976) writ dism'd w.o.j. .......................................... passim
State v. Martin, 347 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ............................... 10
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) .................................................................................. 12
Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2004) ....................................... 9
Texas Natural Resources Conservation Com’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 856 (Tex. 2002) .................... 6
W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 308 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1958) ................................................................... 8
Waller County v. Freelove, 210 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e) .. 2, 3
Statutes
Tex. Fam. Code § 107.012 ............................................................................................................................ 9
Tex. Fam. Code § 107.015 ............................................................................................................................ 9
Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §§ 107.12, 107.15 (Vernon 2014) .......................................................................... 10
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §669(a) .................................................................................................................... 11
Texas Local Gov’t Code §115.021 ............................................................................................................... 9
Texas Local Gov’t. Code §113.064 .............................................................................................................. 9
Other Authorities
38 Tex.Jur.3rd, Extraordinary Writs, § 115, pp. 240-241 ............................................................................. 7
TEX. ATT’Y GEN. OP. NO. GA-0340 (2005) ............................................................................................ 2
iv
TO THE HONORABLE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS:
The law regarding payment of court appointed attorneys ad litem for
indigent parents and children is clear. The duty of the county auditor to audit and
approve claims and present them to the commissioners court is clear. The duty of
the commissioners court to audit and settle all valid claims is clear. Requiring the
additional step of litigation to obtain payment for services rendered and already
previously ordered by a district court negates the very laws established by the
Texas legislature. Further, to interpret the law as Appellees contend would deprive
any court of jurisdiction to require any governmental body to pay its obligations,
whether incurred through judicial order, established by a lawsuit, or otherwise.
This simply is not and cannot be the law.
Appellants have met the standard for issuance of mandamus. Appellants
have presented to the Smith County Commissioners Court, a valid, fixed, and final
order approved by the auditor. The Texas Constitution, Texas statutes, legislative
immunity, and government immunity do not shield the Smith County
Commissioners Court from the duty to pay court-appointed ad litem attorneys.
BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 321ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT’S
ORDERS DOES NOT REQUIRE AN AMENDMENT OF THE
EXPIRED BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR OF 2013
Appellees contend that payment of the properly presented Ad Litem fees
cannot be made because the 2013 Fiscal Year Budget cannot be amended. An
inability to amend a budget does not extinguish an obligation. In fact, a careful
reading of the Attorney General’s opinion cited by Appellees clearly states that the
inability of a commissioners court to amend an expired budget does not preclude
payment of an unpaid obligation in a later budget. TEX. ATT’Y GEN. OP. NO.
GA-0340 (2005). See generally Waller County v. Freelove, 210 S.W.2d 602, 604
(Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e) (suit by architect for fees not
precluded by county’s failure to include fees in budget).
B. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 321ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT’S
ORDERS IS NOT BARRED BY THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OR
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
Appellees contend that the commissioners are relieved from any obligation
to pay the properly presented and approved Ad Litem fees because the amount
owed to Appellants exceeds the amount budgeted in the 2013 Fiscal Year Budget,
thereby making the amount owed an unconstitutional debt. Although Appellants
do not agree that their fees in any way violate the Texas Constitution, if deemed so,
2
the Commissioners are not relieved of their payment obligation as the County has
received a benefit for the services already performed by Appellants. See generally
Freelove, 210 S.W.2d at 604 (suit by architect for fees not precluded by county’s
failure to include fees in budget). Counties and municipalities will not be
permitted to accept and utilize property or services and evade the payment of
reasonable compensation because of an alleged technical defect in their
procurement. Id. Municipalities should be and are compelled to act with some
degree, at least, of honesty and uprightness in their dealings with the public, and
should not be permitted to evade payment of the obligations on bare technicalities,
when they received full value from the commodities furnished them. City of
Mission v. Eureka Fire Hose Co., 67 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1933, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
C. APPELLANTS HAVE NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW
Appellants have already obtained orders from the 321st District Court of
Smith County requiring the ad litem fees be paid from the county’s general fund.
Those orders were examined and approved for payment by the County Auditor and
deemed to be in compliance with Texas Family Code and the Tex. Loc. Gov’t
Code. (C.R. at 23-28) Appellants have established their right to the fees, yet the
Commissioners Court withholds payment in complete disregard of the applicable
statutes and the District Court’s Orders. The issue is not whether Appellants have
3
an adequate remedy to obtain a judgment; the issue is whether the commissioners
court can evade paying a valid claim. Appellees insist that they cannot be forced
to pay. The fact of the matter here is that without mandamus, Appellants have no
remedy to collect a rightful claim.
A municipal corporation is as much bound to pay a judgment which the law
has authorized against it as is an individual or corporate defendant. See Garrett v.
City of Wichita Falls, 334 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth, 1960, no writ).
No adequate remedy exists for Appellants except mandamus, or possibly the
eventual appointment of a receiver. City of San Antonio v. Routledge, 102 S.W.
756, 765 (Tex. Civ App. 1907, writ ref’d). Where the amount of demand is
absolutely fixed and determined, is here by Judicial Order properly approved by
the County Auditor, and it is the duty of the Commissioners to provide for
payment, mandamus may issue to compel payment. See, id at 766; see also Harris
County v. Walsweer, 930 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ
denied)(citing Hawthorne v. La-Man Constr., Inc., 672 S.W.2d 255, 258
(Tex.App.--Beaumont 1984, no writ).
D. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY
Legislative immunity protects individuals from liability when acting in a
legislative capacity. Thus, the applicability of that defense turns on the nature of
the conduct at issue. See, Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Salazar, 781 S.W.2d 347,
4
349 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (applying immunity to local
water board). An action is legislative in nature when it reflects a discretionary,
policymaking decision of general application rather than an individualized decision
based on particular facts. In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex.2001). Further, if
an action singles out specific individuals and affects them differently from others,
it is not legislative in nature. See Hughes v. Tarrant County Texas, 948 F.2d 918,
920 (5th Cir. 1991).
The decision by the Smith County Commissioners Court to deny payment to
noncontract attorneys was not based on a general policy with regard to all non-
contract attorneys in every court in Smith County, but was specific to only a
handful of attorneys, and the 321st Judicial District. This “policy” is based on
specific acts of a specific judge. Further, it affected non-contract attorneys
differently from contract attorneys who were appointed under the same statutes and
performed the same job. This was not a legislative act, and legislative immunity
does not apply. See, Bryan v. City of Madison MS, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000);
see also, Hughes, 948 F.2d at 920.
E. THIS IS NOT A SUIT FOR MONEY DAMAGES; THEREFORE,
GOVERNMENTAL AND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY DO NOT
APPLY.
Appellees’ mischaracterize Appellants request for mandamus as a
“disguised” claim for money damages. The cases cited by Appellees discuss
5
mandamus where the actual relief sought was the payment of unspecified back pay
money damages. See eg. City of Seagoville v. Lyttle, 227 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. App.--
Dallas 2007, no writ); see also, Hinojosa v. Tarrant Cnty, 355 S.W.3d 812 (Tex.
App. –Amarillo 2011, no writ). In each case, mandamus was being sought to
compel the performance of an act where the underlying claim was barred by
immunity. Private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from
suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a
declaratory-judgment claim. Such a claim would be an impermissible attempt to
control state action by imposing liability on the State. See Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Com’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 856 (Tex. 2002);
Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2007, no
pet.).
Appellants are not seeking damages, but instead seeking enforcement of
valid court orders for payment. Appellants acknowledge that the prayer in their
brief requests that the amount owed be calculated. This request was included in
the prayer simply to account for the fact that there were five attorneys ad litem
seeking relief in the court below but only two of these five are seeking review by
this Court. Appellees have not challenged the amounts or validity of the claims
sought or that any of Appellants’ specific invoices were unreasonable.
6
Appellants have already obtained orders from the 321st District Court of
Smith County requiring the fees to be paid from the county’s general fund, which
were examined and approved for payment by the County Auditor and deemed to be
in compliance with Texas Family Code and the Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code. (C.R. at
23-28.) Appellants are not seeking that this court assess an unknown amount of
damages; Appellants are not seeking damages for work not performed; Appellants
are not seeking attorneys fees in the prosecution of this matter; and Appellants and
not seeking interest applied to the fees wrongfully withheld. Appellants are simply
requesting that Mandamus issue to compel the Commissioners Court to follow the
law and the 321st Judicial District Court’s orders.
"It has been said that mandamus is but the 'means' or 'execution' to enforce
the judgment in favor of those to whom the writ has been awarded, that its function
is to execute, not to adjudicate, and that mandamus does not function to establish
as well as enforce, a claim of uncertain merit." 38 Tex.Jur.3rd, Extraordinary
Writs, § 115, pp. 240-241. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Mitchell v. Ramfield, 523
S.W.2d 456 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1975, no writ); Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d
457 (Tex.Civ.App.1976) writ dism'd w.o.j.
7
F. IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR SUIT FOR FUNDS WRONGFULLY
WITHHELD
Immunity involves two issues; immunity from suit and immunity from
liability. Where statutory or constitutional provisions create an entitlement to
payment, suits seeking to require state officers to comply with the law are not
barred by immunity merely because they compel the state to make those payments.
W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 308 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1958). See, Gibson v.
Honorable Herb March, 710 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986) (mandamus
issued to compel judge to order a reasonable fee for Relator’s appointed service);
see also, Chrestman v. Tompkins, 5 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1928)
(mandamus issued to compel auditor of city to officially countersign warrant upon
county treasurer for $225 for attorney fees rightfully earned and not in
controversy). The statutory provisions entitling Appellants to payment have been
adequately briefed in Appellants’ Brief.
G. IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR LIABILITY
The Supreme Court has found waiver of immunity even without express
“magic language” when the provision in question would be meaningless unless
immunity is waived. Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.
2000) (holding that the anti-retaliation statute had no meaning absent waiver of
sovereign immunity).
8
The legislature stated that an attorney ad litem shall be appointed to
represent children or indigent parents in a suit filed by a governmental entity
requesting termination of the parent-child relationship or to be named conservator
of the child. Tex. Fam. Code § 107.012. Further, the legislature stated that the
attorney ad litem shall be paid from the general fund of the county. Tex. Fam.
Code § 107.015. Further, the auditor must examine each claim and approve it
before the meeting of the Commissioners Court. Texas Local Gov’t. Code
§113.064. The legislature stated that the commissioners court of a county shall
audit and settle all accounts against the county and shall direct payment of those
accounts. Texas Local Gov’t Code §115.021.
Considering whether statutory provisions were intended by the Legislature
to waive immunity, courts may ask whether a statute makes any sense if immunity
is not waived. Kerrville State Hosp., 28 S.W.3d at 6; accord, Tex. Dep't of Transp.
v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2004). Unless the
commissioners court is required to tender payment, the statute becomes
meaningless; therefore, there must be redress for failure to comply. That redress is
mandamus.
9
H. WHEN THE STATE BRINGS SUIT, THE STATE VOLUNTARY
WAIVES IMMUNITY
The fees incurred by Appellants were the result of the actions by the State.
Immunity is waived by the State when it brings suit. State v. Martin, 347 S.W.2d
809, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that when the State
brings suit, it voluntarily waives its immunity from any defenses, including
counterclaims incident to, connected with, arising out of, or germane to the
controversy involved in the State's suit). See also Anderson, Clayton & Co. v.
State, 122 Tex. 530, 62 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1933); Commonwealth of Massachusetts
v. Davis, 160 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1942, reversed in part 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d
216).
All of the fees sought resulted from suits filed by a government entity for the
termination of the parent-child relationship or for the state to be named conservator
of the child. The state’s suits required appointment of ad litems and the fees are
required to be paid out of the general fund of the county. See Tex. Fam. Code.
Ann. §§ 107.12, 107.15 (Vernon 2014). Because these fees were the direct result
of suits filed by a state entity, the state has waived the defense of immunity for the
fees incurred.
10
I. THE FACTS IN KAUFMAN COUNTY V. COMBS ARE NOT
APPLICABLE TO APPELLANTS’ CASE
Appellees’ assertion that Kaufman County v. Combs is in anyway analogous
to this case clearly indicates a misunderstanding of the underlying facts of both
cases. Combs was appointed attorney ad litem and guardian of the estate in a
guardianship proceeding in Kaufman County. Upon completion of the
guardianship, Combs was awarded $143,168.95 in fees and expenses “in
performance of her duties in her Court appointments as Attorney Ad Litem of
WARD and Guardian of the Estate of WARD.” Kaufman County v. Combs, 393
S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2012, pet. denied). The order awarding attorneys
fees in Combs did not order that the fees be paid by the County, which was in
violation of the Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §669(a), stating in relevant part that costs of
the proceeding shall be paid out of the county treasury, and judgment of the court
shall be issued accordingly. Combs, 393 S.W.3d 336, note 2. Combs presented the
Order to the Kaufman County Commissioners Court requesting payment from the
County pursuant to Section 669 of the Texas Probate Code. Id. at 340. Pursuant to
section 113.064(a), of the Texas Local Government Code, the County Auditor
denied approval because he was unable to determine what amount, if any, was the
responsibility of the county. Id. The facts in Combs are distinguishable to
Appellants’ case. Combs did not have an order specifically directing the county to
11
pay for the fees incurred; therefore, the order was not binding on the county. Id.
Further, Combs’ claim was never approved by the auditor, so payment by the
commissioners court could not be made. Id. Moreover, Combs did not comply
with the statutory requirements of either the Probate Code or the Government
Code; therefore, she had no right to payment by the county for the fees incurred.
Although the judgment was overturned, Combs’ award of $143,168.95 for the fee
order, plus interest, and $558,114.62 in attorney’s fees proves that she was seeking
much more than the enforcement of a fixed claim rightfully owed.
J. SUITS INITIATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
PROTECTIVE SERVICES ARE FAR MORE ANALAGOUS TO
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS THAN CIVIL, THEREFORE, THE
REASONING IN SMITH v. FLACK SHOULD APPLY.
Because of the constitutional issues involved in both criminal and DPFS
cases, Courts have routinely applied analysis developed in criminal cases to
parental termination cases governed by section 263.405 of the Family Code. The
statutory right to counsel in parent termination cases embodies the right to
effective counsel. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003)(the two-pronged
analysis employed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), is also
used in termination cases). In the Interest of M.V.G, the appellate court noted that
the legislature clearly gave trial courts the same duty to appoint counsel to
represent indigent defendants, and required the payment of those attorneys fees
12
from the general fund of the county in both criminal and DFPS termination cases;
therefore, the court employed the same analysis as in a criminal case to determine
whether the appellate court or the trial court was to decide if an appointed attorney
was permitted to withdraw. In the Interest of M.V.G., a Child, 285 S.W.3d 576
(Tex.App.—Waco 2009) (order abating appeal) (per curium). Further, Smith v.
Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) relied heavily on a number of civil
cases to determine if mandamus should issue. Anderson v. Ashe, 90 S.W. 872
(Tex. 1906) (district court held to have jurisdiction of a mandamus proceeding to
compel a county auditor to sign a warrant); Denman v. Coffee, 91 S.W. 800 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1905); Alice National Bank v. Edwards, 383 S.W.2d 482
(Tex.Civ.App.1964, ref., n.r.e) (per curium).
13
CONCLUSION
Appellants qualify for mandamus relief, which is not barred by the
Constitution, the statutes of the State of Texas, nor immunity. This Court should
reverse the district court’s decision to deny Appellants’ Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and remand their case to the district court with instructions that the
district court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Smith County
Commissioners Court and its members to direct payment to the Appellants for the
owed amounts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
J. BENNETT WHITE, P.C.
P.O. Box 6250
Tyler, Texas 75711
Telephone No. (903) 597-4300
Telecopier No. (903) 597-4330
LAURA S. SEVERT
lsevert@jbwlawfirm.com
Texas Bar No. 24051886
Attorneys for Appellants
14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this Reply Brief of Appellants includes 2,867 words and
thus complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4.
LAURA S. SEVERT
15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 20, 2015, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served on the following counsel of record via email and U.S. mail,
postage prepaid:
Robert Davis
Flowers Davis, PLLC
1021 ESE Loop 323, Suite 200
Tyler, Texas 75701
LAURA S. SEVERT
16
Faye Comte and Laura Severt v. Smith County Commissioners Court and Joel P. Baker, Cary Nix, Jeff Warr, Joann Hampton, and Terry Phillips, Each in His or Her Official Capacity as a Smith County Commissioner
Combined Opinion