351 315 'OCQ,O’!,O§ cAusE Nn.'aee139-a eamun-B L w L a73521-B a.\t:v( \\.*“L\ ,§ § §§ Mv/\l"“ __5 In The 21131:\119 1 W`[@:rict\"r:“‘m“i't‘* s1 Y§gl,§ of this 1122 ?2%15 HM COU“W’ is tia©@s:a,ll dam 0bjections And Response To The Trial Court's Ruling Pursuant To Texas Eode of Eriminal Procedure Article 1107 (Mest 2013), Under Rule 73.4(29. Ex Parte Eharles Elaude Earlton (0'1¢0'1(03\'0'3¢09 Applicant The report from the Department of Veteranks Affairs (diagnosis of P.T.S.D.) dated December 9, 2013 and attached to Applicant's writ Application clearly shows a New Factual Basis in overcoming the procedural bar to Applicant‘s grounds for relief in this instant habeas proceeding. No mental issue of com- bat;related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was ever known until July 2013, not at trial in 2002 on 1st habeas writ in 2000. Exceptions to the Subaequent writ Bar of Article 11.07, Section h Burden of Proof Necessary Under Article's 11.073 and 11.07, §4 Applicant Earlton's first ground in the instant 11.07 application, incom¥ petency in fact at the time of his guilty pleas on 0ctober 22, 2001, relies upon relevant medical evidence of (P.T.S.D.) which developed after his sentencing; i.e., outside the time frame for a fate claim. Likewise, Applicant's second ground, ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the punishment phase, relies upon (P.T.S.D.) as previously unavailable factual evidence, when his initial 11.07 application was considered on March 19, 2000. 11.073 Burden of Proof Applicability: 11.073(a)(1): Texas Eode of Eriminal Procedure Article 11.073(a)(1) applies to Appli- cant Earlton's combat-related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (P.T.S.D§), dis~ covered in 2013 (See Exhibit 1; attached). Earlton's clinically recognized dis- order was not available to be offered at his trial in 2001, and is relevant to competency. See Bouchillon v Eollins, 907 F.2d 509, 592 n.7 (5th Eir. 1990). Availability: 11.073(b)(1): Habeas Eorpus relief is available for Applicant Earlton‘s Article 11.07 application raising the issue of incompetency in fact, not requested at the time of trial. See Ex parte Tuttle, 445 5.0.2d 19&, 190 (Tex. Erim. App. 1969); Zapata v Estelle, 500 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1979); and 11.073(b)(1)(A): Relevant "soft" scientific evidence of (P.T.E.D.), discovered by psychia- trists at the Veterans Administration Medical 0enter in 2013, was not available at the time of trial in 2001, because Applicant Barlton was not examined for any service-connected disorders before or during his trial. And as an indigent defendant, he was not required to employ/his own expert. 5ee Ake v 0klahoma, 470 U.S. 60 (1965). 11.073(b)(1)(0): Testimony pertaining to Applicant Earlton's suffering from (P.T.S.D.) at the time of his guilty pleas and sentencing would be admissible, as expert opin- ion at a trial held on the date of application, assisting the trier of fact with understanding the evidence or to determine a fact issue. See TEXAS RULES 0F ~; EVIDENCE 702; and l 11.073(b)(2):'}; EvidenceyofsApplicant's (P.T.S.D.), not presented at trial, supports a finding by the trial court that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Carlton would not have been convicted. Here, the plain language of Subsaction (b)(2)'s v phrase "would not have been convicted," like the outcome determination test of Strickland, does not turn on the validity of the result, viz, guilt or inno- cence, but competence: Since to "convict" an incompetent person is a per se due process violation, guilt or innocence is irrelevant. Ef, Ex parte Robbins, No. wr~73, 404-02. 11.073(c) & (d) Diligence: ` For purposes of determining whether Applicant’s claim of incompetence in fact could have been presented in his previously considered 11.07 application, Applicant was diligent in seeking help for his mental condition at the Veterans Administration Medical Eenter in 2000. Too, Applicant informed Mr. Loper of the care he received at (V.A.M.E.). And inspector Eddie Rodriguez informed Judge Eampbell about Earlton's history of mental problems. Again, Mr. Earlton oom- plained on appeal, and appellate counsel, Mark Rubal, obtained affidavits re- garding the lack of expert psychological assistance for trial. Applicant's mother and other family members also testified on his behalf regarding mental issues. Further, in making its findings as to whether relevant scientific evidence was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before Applicant's initial 11.07 application was considered, developments in identify- ing and diagnosing (P.T.S.D.) have greatly improved. Even as recently as 2013, the American Psychological Association has made some majorrchanges to diagnos- ing symptoms of (P.T.S.D.) in its DSM-V manual (5ee online article attached as Exhibit 7'to the application). Those changes were also adopted by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs in 2015 (See online article also attached as Exhibit 7). Pertinently, Applicant Carlton was examined, diagnosed and rou- tinely treated by the (V.A.M.C.) in 2000, according to his mental history: Applicant was evaluated and diagnosed with a depressive disorder as a criminal/ parolee, not as a war veteran. lt is at least hopeful that recent changes in the past decade would prevent the misdiagnosis of (P.T.S.D.) as bipolar depres- sion today. Nonetheless, the Dourt should also consider that Texas law now mandates that combat-related (P.T.S.D.) be included in the (PSI) report. 5ee TEXAS 00DE of ERIMINAL PRUEEDURE Article 42.12, §911). Moreover, Texas Legislators have given commissioner's courts the power to create veteran's courts in Texas, twen- ty-two of which exist, to handle both felony and misdemeanor crimes committed by combat veterans, like Applicant Earlton, who are suffering from (P.T.S.D.). Hence, the instant application contains specific facts indicating that relevant scientific evidence~of (P.T.S.D.), now available, was not available at the time of trial because the evidence was not ascertainable through the exer- Cise of reasonable diligence, and would be admissible under Texas Rules of Evi- ~i dance 702 at a trial held on the date of application. And had evidence of (P.- T.S.D.) been presented at trial on the preponderance of the evidence, if incom- petent, Applicant Carlton would not have been convicted. Furthermore, for pur- poses of section A(a)(1), evidence regarding competency could not have been pre~. sented in Applicant‘s original 11.07 application in 2000, because the claim is based upon relevant sceintific evidence of (P.T.S.D.) from 2013, that was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence by Applicant on or before the date the original application was considered, And in making its find- ing as to whether evidence of (P.T.S.D.) was not ascertainable, improved changes in diagnosing (P.T.S.D.) together with statutory provisions intended: to focus 1 specificallyon1service~ccnnected disabilities, Carlton's competency issue today § would mandate an inquiry. Thusly, the Eourt may address the merits of Applicant Earlton's substantive claim of incompetence in fact. _X_Epplicant Carlton's Burden of Proof Under Sections h(a)(1) & (c) whether the Eourt is barred from considering the merits of Applicant » Carlton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel turns on whether the facts giving rise to the claim presented could not have been presented in the initial application, because they were "not ascentainable through the exercise of rea4 sonable diligence on or before theddatecof the initial application." See §§ parte Lemke, 13 S.w. 3d 791, 793 (Tex. Erim. App. 2000). Facts: As mentioned briefly, on November 7, 2013, representative Eregory Treacy, from Paralized Veterans of America, Inc., approached the Veterans Administration with evidence for deciding Mr. Earlton's claim of combat-related Post~Traumatic Stresa{DisorHer (P.T.S.D.) QMr. Treacy's evidence is itemized on page 2 of the Veterans Administration's December 9, 2013 decision; attached to this applica- tion as Exhibit 1). The Veterans Administraticn's rating decision ultimately reflects results from the personal examination of Mr. Earlton on November 7, 2013, conducted by psychiatrists at (VAME) in Houston. The V.A. rated Mr. Earl- ton‘s disability at: 1. Service connection for mood disorder N05 (claimed post-traumatic stress disorder) (P.T.S.D.) is granted with an evaluation of 50 percent effective July 26, 2013. 2. Service connection for irritable bowel syndrome is granted with an evaluation of 30 percent effective November 29, 2012. Id. Applicant's initial application, raising the issue of ineffective assis- tance of trial counsel, was filed in the 240th District Eourt, Harris Eounty, Texas, on December 13, 2006 (Tr. writ No. 060139-A, 060140-A, 073521§A).'After ordering trial counsel, Robert Kent Loper, to file an affidavit (Affidavit attached&to the application as Exhibit h), the case was resolved without a hearing. Eonsidering the issue presented, and counsel's affidavit, the trial court recommended that the claim be denied. And on March 19, 2000, the Court of Eriminal Appeals denied the application without written order (No. wR-33,013-03, wR-33,813-0u, wR-33,815-05)(white cardm. "Reasonable Diligence" "Reasonable Diligence" within the context of Article 11.07 Section h TEX. EDDE ERIM. PRDE., as explained in Ex parte Lemke, supra, 13 S.w. 3d at 794, "suggests at least some kind of inquiry has been made into the matter at issue." In the instant case, Mr. 0arlton's notice of appeal, motion for new trial and attached affidvits, together with appellate counsel, Mark Rubal's attestation in the appellate brief, and the issue presented in the initial 11.07 application '(each document alleging defense counsel failed to investigate defendant's mental condition despite repeated requests for expert essistance), all suggest various attempts of inquiry into the matter of obtaining expert psychological assistance. In fact, Mr. Loper's own pretrial, 355 motion affirms that Mr. 0arlton‘s mental condition was an issue as early as July 17, 2001 (See Bke_motion attached to the application as Exhibit 5). Thus, the facts in record support a determination, that after making inqui- ries of Mr. Loper, Applicant Earlton exercised "reasonable diligence," in at- tempting to have expert psychological assistance even before trial, and,repeat- edly inquired to the lack thereof immediately thereafterwards. See kemk§) supra, at 794 (holding applicant exercised "reasonable diligence" by making several inquiries of his lawyer as to the existence of plea bargain offers by the State). Given that the record proves Applicant made several inquiries, and thattJudge Campbel granted defense's motion for such, with finding, Mr. Earlton's efforts of diligence were shut down by Mr. Loper's representation, and he has satisfied 5ectionih's requirement of "reasonable diligence." EUnsequently, the instant application "contains sufficient specific facts establishing" that Carlton's claim that Mr. Loper's failure to investigate his mental conditiony contact physicians, and obtain expert psychological assistance for punishment, is one that could not have been presented in the initial appli- cation because the factual basis for the claim, that_Carlton was suffering from (P.T.S.D.), was "unavailable" (in that it was not ascertainable through the exer- cise of reasonable diligence) on March 19, 2000, and the Eourt may therefore address the merits of ground two in the instant application. EERTIFICATE 0F SERVIEE I, Eharles Claude Earlton, undersigned, certify that a true and correct copy of Applicant‘s 0bjections and Response to The Trial EGurt's Ruling, Pursu- ant to Texas Eode of Eriminal Procedure Article 11.07 under rule 73.4(2), was sent to: Eourt of Eriminal Appeals P.0. 00x 12300, Bapitol Station Austin, TX 70711 Bhris Daniel Harris 00unty District Clerk 1201 Franklin, P.0. 0ox 4651 Houston, TX 77210 - h651 un, jeff/sr /07’{ , 2015. . j / Eharles 0;:Earlton Applicant Pro 5a