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Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).1 A jury convicted appellant of the charged offense 1 Section 21.02(b) provides "A person commits an offense if: (1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and (2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than 14 years of age." Id. § 21.02(b). and found the enhancement allegation to be true. A jury assessed punishment of life in prison, a fine and court costs. In three issues, appellant contends (1) his constitutional right to due process was violated because he was forced to stand trial after being determined to be incompetent, 1$ the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense, and (3)The jury unanimity charge, as applied to appellant, was erroneous and caused egregious harm. We affirm.2 I. Competency In his first issue, appellant complains he was forced to stand trial after being determined to be incompetent. "A criminal defendant who is incompetent may not be put to trial without violating due process." Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996)). In September 2013, counsel for appellant filed a motion requesting that he be examined by a psychiatrist to determine his competency to stand trial. One month later, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to be committed to the Vernon State Hospital for further evaluation and treatment to determine his competency at a later date. In March 2014, the Texas Department of State Health Services determined that appellant was competent to stand trial, and it provided that information to the trial court. Additionally, prior to the commencement of trial in June 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine which individuals were the outcry witnesses. See 2 This case was transferred to our court from the Beaumont Court of Appeals; therefore, we must decide the case in accordance with its precedent if our decision would be otherwise inconsistent with its precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Neither appellant nor his counsel complained he was incompetent to stand trial, and both the State and appellant announced ready. After appellant's initial examination and finding of incompetence, he was later examined and found to be competent to stand trial. The record does not contain evidence that appellant's mental condition rendered him incompetent to know and understand the charges against him or evidence that he was in any way prevented from meaningfully participating in his trial. Thus, we conclude that appellant was competent to stand trial. See Ex parte Long, 558 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (concluding that even if defendant was incompetent to stand trial four months earlier, there was no evidence to suggest he was incompetent when he pled guilty and no suggestion a separate competency hearing was required); see also Moralez v. State, 450 S.W.3d 553, 559-60 Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist] 2014, pet ref d) (determining that once the defendant has been found restored to competency, he had the burden to prove he was incompetent); Johnson v. State, 429 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding that after defendant was found competent to stand trial, any inappropriate court behavior does not show defendant lacked understanding of the proceedings and require a second competency examination). We overrule appellant's first issue. II. Extraneous offense In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of oral sex upon the complainant when appellant was not provided notice of the extraneous offense of performing oral sex acts upon the complainant. We review the trial court's admission of evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We