United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT January 11, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-50224
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES JAMES JONES, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(6:04-CR-183-1)
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Before JONES, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, Defendant-
Appellee Charles James Jones, Jr. was convicted of one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Jones appeals the
district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress
evidence.
Jones contends that the warrantless search of his vehicle,
which revealed marijuana under the passenger’s seat, was not based
on probable cause and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. He
argues that the firearm, which was discovered pursuant to a
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
subsequent inventory search of the vehicle, should be suppressed as
the fruit of the poisonous tree. The government responds that the
search of the space under the passenger’s seat was based on
reasonable suspicion and was therefore not in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
An area search of a vehicle is limited to seeking weapons and
requires that the officer conducting the search “have an
articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous.”
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983); see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Whether reasonable suspicion exists
is fact-intensive, and each case is examined in light of the
totality of circumstances known to the agent conducting the search
and his experience in evaluating such circumstances. United States
v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1998).
The testimony at the suppression hearing showed that officers
detected a strong smell of deodorant when they were approaching
Jones’s vehicle after stopping it for traffic violations. In their
experience, such a smell is used to mask other odors. The officers
also saw the passenger bend over and reach under the seat, a space
where weapons may be concealed and are easily accessible. Further,
the passenger was angry and confrontational, and refused to leave
the passenger’s seat until one of the officers produced pepper
spray.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, see United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1314
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(5th Cir. 1993), we conclude that the government met its burden of
showing that this warrantless search of the space under the
passenger’s seat was permissible. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1050;
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); United States
v. Colin, 928 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1991). The judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
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