Burks, Gene Allen

March 12, 2015 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS GENE ALLEN BURKS, § APPELLANT § § V. § NO. PD-0157-15 § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE § §§§ STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW §§§ SHAREN WILSON Criminal District Attorney Tarrant County, Texas DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant Criminal District Attorney Chief, Post-Conviction TANYA S. DOHONEY, Assistant Criminal District Attorney Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center 401 W. Belknap Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201 (817) 884-1687 FAX (817) 884-1672 State Bar No. 02760900 CCAAppellateAlerts@tarrantcountytx.gov LISA C. MCMINN State Prosecuting Attorney ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED SUBJECT INDEX INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... iv STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ........................................ 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 2 STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE ............. 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................... 3 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW................................................. 4 FIRST QUESTION FOR REVIEW .............................................................. 4 Does a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw conducted pursuant to TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b) violate the Fourth Amendment? SECOND QUESTION FOR REVIEW ......................................................... 4 Are Fourth Amendment warrant-preference exceptions the sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in warrantless scenarios? THIRD QUESTION FOR REVIEW .............................................................. 4 Do exclusionary rule principles mandate suppression of blood evidence seized via a warrantless, nonconsensual, valid-at-the-time mandatory blood draw? TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b). ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES............................................................ 5 I. Valid, compelled statutory blood draw ..................................................... 6 A. Codification of Fourth Amendment principles................................... 7 B. Special-needs framework adds to the reasonableness calculation ............................................................. 9 ii C. Erroneous Consideration of the “Less Intrusive Means” Test ........ 11 II. Implied-Consent Draws Are Reasonable ............................................. 12 III. Exclusionary rule inapplicable and not invoked .................................... 14 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .................................................................. 18 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................ 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................... 19 COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION ............................................... APPENDIX iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ................................................. 15 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)............................................................................... 13 Burks v. State, No. 02-13-00560-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 115964 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth January 8, 2015) ............................................. 2,3 Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) ............................................... 14,15 Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] 2014, pet. granted) ....... 5,6n Ex parte Tharpe, 935 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ................................................ 10 Heien v. North Carolina, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2014 WL 7010684 (2014) ............................................... 16 Holidy v. State, No. 06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL 1722171 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted) ....................................... 6 & n Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ........................................... 12,13 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 342 (1987)........................................................................ 14,15n Karev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App 2009) ............................................... 15n iv Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)............................................................................... 15 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013) ..................................................... 12 McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ................................................ 13 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)............................................................................... 12 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)................................................................................. 16 McGruder v. State, No. 10-13-109-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 3973089 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. granted) ............................................... 6 & n Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .................................................... 7 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) .............................................. passim Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted)........... 6 & 6n Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)............................................................................... 8n Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 828 (2009).......................................................................... 12,13 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)............................................................................ 9-12 v Smith v. State, No. 13-11-00694-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 5901759 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, pet. granted) ................................. 6 & n State v. Reese, 353 Wis.2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396 (Wis. App. 2014) ............................. 16n State v. Villarreal, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reh’g granted Feb. 25, 2015) ......................................................... passim Thornton v. State, 145 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) .............................................. 16n United States v Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)............................................................................. 15n Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. granted) .......... 6 & n Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)................................................................................. 8 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)............................................................................... 11 ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES U.S. CONST. amend. IV .......................................................................... 9,12 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.04................................................................ 9 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.16 ................................................................ 7 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23 ...................................................... 4,15-17 vi TEX. PENAL CODE §1.07 ............................................................................. 15 TEX. PENAL CODE §49.04 ............................................................................. 7 TEX. PENAL CODE §49.00 ............................................................................. 7 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §524.01 ...................................................................... 10 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012 ............................................................. passim TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 .................................................................................... 6 vii IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS GENE ALLEN BURKS, § APPELLANT § § V. § NO. PD-0157-15 § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE § STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: Comes now the State of Texas, by and through her Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney, and respectfully urges this Court to grant discretionary review of this cause in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT The reasonableness of statutory mandatory blood draws merits argument. Likewise, argument should be granted to discuss the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to cases where, at the time of the seizure, the officer’s conduct conformed to ubiquitous, nationally- recognized criterion that did not violate constitutional protections. 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant premised a pretrial suppression claim on the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). (1CR at 14-17). The trial judge rejected the defense argument attacking the validity of blood seized pursuant the Texas implied-consent statute. (2RR at 11-16). Appellant pled guilty to felony driving-while-intoxicated [DWI], and the trial court sentenced him to ten years’ incarceration, probated. (1CR at 5,49-54,56-58). TEX. PENAL CODE §§49.04, 49.091; TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b). STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a published opinion authored by Justice Sue Walker. Burks v. State, No. 02-13-00560-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 115964 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth January 8, 2015). Rehearing was not sought. The State files this petition, due on March 11, 2015, following one extension. 1 Statutory cites throughout are to the current version. 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS The parties stipulated to the case’s facts including those encompassing the stop of Appellant’s vehicle, the factors culminating in his felony DWI arrest, and the mandatory-draw predicate under Texas’ implied-consent statute. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b). (1CR at 48; 2RR at 5-7; 3RR at SX1). When denying the motion to suppress, the judge found that: • the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s offense did not present any factual exigency, (2RR at 12); • officers conducted the blood draw under the authority of Transportation Code Section 724.012(b), (2RR at 12,14); • the totality of the circumstances warranted reliance on the limited provisions of the implied-consent statute, (2RR at 13); • officers could have obtained a warrant, (2RR at 14); • as a licensed driver, Appellant had notice of the implied- consent provisions applied, (2RR at 15); • public safety/welfare considerations supported the judge’s decision to reject suppression, (2RR at 13-16). The Fort Worth Court rejected the trial court’s ruling. Burks, 2015 WL 115964, at *1-3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth January 8, 2015). The court relied on this Court’s decision in Villarreal. State v. Villarreal, ___ 3 S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reh’g granted Feb. 25, 2015). The lower court’s opinion also applied article 38.23(b) and held that the Texas exclusionary rule did not apply to a warrantless seizure. Id. at *3. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW FIRST QUESTION FOR REVIEW Does a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw conducted pursuant to TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b) violate the Fourth Amendment? (2RR at 11-16) SECOND QUESTION FOR REVIEW Are Fourth Amendment warrant-preference exceptions the sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in warrantless scenarios? (2RR at 11-16) THIRD QUESTION FOR REVIEW Do exclusionary rule principles mandate suppression of blood evidence seized via a warrantless, nonconsensual, valid-at-the-time mandatory blood draw? TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b). (2RR at 11-16) 4 ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES This Court is in the midst of deciding the issues presented herein. Whilst a November 2014 decision addressed the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue in one of the several McNeely-related cases pending before this Court at that time, the case is in flux since the Court recently granted rehearing. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reh’g granted Feb. 25, 2015). Per the Court’s docket, Villarreal is now set for submission on March 18, 2015, the same day another McNeely case is set for submission. See Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] 2014, pet. granted Sep. 17, 2014). The State’s petition focuses on two aspects of any McNeely- related consequences: the validity of a statutorily compelled draw and the invalidity of the exclusionary rule. Note that Villarreal only went to the merits of the mandatory-draw issue, not addressing the applicability of the exclusionary rule. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178. However, Douds addressed the exclusionary rule’s applicability. Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861. In other words, this Court has already granted review on the issues presented herein. 5 Review should be granted because this case involves important questions of law that are have not been finally addressed by this Court, matters in conflict in the interim appellate courts, and the misapplication of a Supreme Court decision that does not undermine the validity of the country’s implied-consent statutes. TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3(a)(b)(c)(d)(f). 2 I. Valid, compelled statutory blood draw The State’s appellate stance is in lockstep with that of prosecutors from other counties across the State who have already had cases granted for review on a McNeely-related issue. 3 Hence, the State respectfully asks this Court to dispose of the instant case in a manner consistent with the petitions in Villarreal, Smith, McGruder, Douds, Weems, Holidy, and Reeder. Here, the officer reasonably relied on an existing, ubiquitous statute to obtain a compelled blood 2 See Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 (reh’g granted); Smith v. State, No. 13- 11-00694-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 5901759 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, pet. granted); McGruder v. State, No. 10-13-109-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 3973089 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. granted); Douds, 434 S.W.3d 842 (pet. granted); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. granted); Holidy v. State, No. 06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL 1722171 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted); Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d at 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted); see also McNeely, 133 S.Ct at 1566 & n.9 (referencing nationwide reliance on implied-consent provisions). 3 See cases cited supra note 2. 6 draw. The seizure occurred when the officer—at the time of the offense—possessed probable cause that Appellant’s impaired and intoxicated conduct constituted felony DWI. TEX. PENAL CODE §§49.04, 49.09; TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b). In addition, the State differs with Villarreal’s original-submission reasoning and further asserts that several important arguments should be considered on the merits. A. Codification of Fourth Amendment principles Villarreal failed to consider that the implied-consent statute codified Fourth Amendment principles. For instance, this Court has previously recognized a statutory codification of the exigency exception. See Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 39-40 & n.54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.16). McNeely recognized that every case involving the dissipation of alcohol included some exigency. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561, 1568. This ever-present exigency must be considered when assaying the reasonableness of statutory draws. Combine the static alcohol-evaporation exigency consideration with the Legislature’s clear codification of the gravity-of-the-offense 7 exigency. The implied-consent statute extinguished a defendant’s right to refuse where an officer possesses probable cause to believe that certain enumerated, egregious circumstances exist. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b). Defendants only lose their refusal right under carefully circumscribed scenarios involving felonious intoxication-related offenses and/or resultant injuries necessitating hospitalization. Id. 4 This statutory limitation amounts to a codification of an additional recognized exigency unrelated to blood-alcohol dissipation. Welsh v. Wisconsin held that the Fourth Amendment authorizes common-sense consideration of the underlying offense’s gravity when weighing the existence of an exigency. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1984) (exigency calculations include consideration of a crime’s severity). Consideration of a crime’s gravity is the essence of reasonableness because the state’s interest is greater in a more serious case. Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4 Notably, under the Texas statute, the McNeely and Schmerber defendants would have retained their right to refuse based upon the less serious nature of their crimes. Compare McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556-57 (DWI); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966) (DWI arising from a one-car collision). 8 14.04 (authorizing warrantless arrests for felonies where an officer did not observe the offense). Of course, it almost goes without saying that Texas’ implied- consent legislation codified Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Predicate elements of the implied consent statute codify this well-known quantum-of-evidence as a requirement for a compelled search. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b). Probable cause, along with the exigencies based upon the gravity-of-the-crime and the dissipation-of-alcohol exigency, create a framework that provides a neutral set of guidelines authorizing a narrowly defined seizure from an already-in-custody arrestee. These provisions embrace the essence of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. B. Special-needs framework adds to the reasonableness calculation The now-withdrawn Villarreal decision rejected application of the Supreme Court’s special needs doctrine to the mandatory blood draw framework. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178, at *14-15; see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 9 (1989). However, the Court did not consider that blood drawn pursuant to Chapter 724’s mandate also implicates administrative license revocation [ALR] procedures, a separate regulatory process that focuses on protecting the traveling public by removing offenders from the road. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §524.012(b)(1) (mandating license suspension based upon BAC). “The primary purpose of the administrative license suspension statute is not to deter the licensee or to seek retribution, but to protect the public from the carnage on the public roads of Texas caused by drunk drivers.” Ex parte Tharpe, 935 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Such regulation focuses on the government’s strong interest in removing intoxicated drivers from the road, just as railroad regulation in Skinner sought to increase railway safety by detecting intoxicated employees. Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 with Ex parte Tharpe, 935 S.W.2d at 159. Special needs’ principles recognize the statute’s provision of a neutral, detached vehicle for protecting citizens from impaired drivers and defendants from unfettered discretion. The special-needs exception constitutes another factor to consider in a non-dualistic 10 analysis that renders Texas’ compelled-draw framework reasonable. C. Erroneous Consideration of the “Less Intrusive Means” Test The original Villarreal decision considered the ready availability of warrants when rejecting the validity of Texas’ mandatory draw statute. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178, at *18 (finding no compelling need to uphold warrantless, nonconsensual blood searches where warrants are “often readily available”). However, factors such as electronic warrants and the availability of a magistrate shift the focus away from an officer’s conduct and, instead, weigh considerations of alternative means. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-63. The Supreme Court often rejects arguments applying less- intrusive-alternative-practices attacks in Fourth Amendment cases. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding warrantless, random urine screening of athletes and rejecting an argument for drug testing based upon suspicion of drug use); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (upholding random, suspicionless drug screening of railway employees following safety breaches and rejecting arguments voicing less drastic and equally effective means). One footnote in Skinner flatly rejects the propriety of considering less- 11 drastic alternatives in scenarios that include warrantless and even suspicionless seizures for toxicological testing, similar to Appellant’s facts. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9. Villarreal mistakenly applied this discounted, post-hoc consideration on original submission. II. Implied-Consent Draws Are Reasonable Reasonableness has always been the linchpin of the Fourth Amendment, venerated in the provision’s plain language. U.S. CONST. amend IV; Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 435-36, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Discernment of what is “reasonable” requires courts to consider the balance between an individual’s privacy and the legitimate governmental interests, especially when public safety is of utmost concern. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 828 (2009). Villarreal viewed the choice between applying a Fourth Amendment exception and consideration of a reasonableness balancing approach as mutually exclusive analytical constructs. The State respectfully believes that this black- white consideration of these two concepts is mistaken, especially in 12 light of the fact that this Court has conducted the reasonableness balancing approach to similar issues. See Segundo, 270 S.W.3d at 96-99; McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 434 n.1, 436. Years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that a framework requiring a driver’s consent was anything but nonsensical. The Breithaupt court pointed to then recently adopted implied-consent provisions and wrote: It might be a fair assumption that a driver on the highways in obedience to a policy of the State, would consent to have a blood test made as part of a sensible and civilized system protecting himself as well as other citizens not only from the hazards of the road due to drunken driving, but also from some use of dubious lay testimony. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 n.2 (1957). The State contends that compelled draws under implied-consent provisions are inherently reasonable when all side’s needs are weighed. Indeed, Fourth Amendment reasonableness underpins the statute. The well- known exceptions—as argued in the myriad cases already before this Court—considered individually and in concert with each other, alongside a balancing of the competing interests, all support the 13 continued viability of Texas’ implied-consent framework. III. Exclusionary rule inapplicable and not invoked Statutory mandatory blood-draws are reasonable. But see State v. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 (opinion on original submission; under re-submission). 5 When the ink dries on Villarreal and future McNeely-related decisions and if those cases are adverse to the State on the merits, the rules requiring evidence exclusion should not apply to mandatory blood-draw scenarios that occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s April 2012 pronouncement. Federally, the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement, at the time of the search, acted objectively reasonably by relying on (1) a statute, later declared unconstitutional, or (2) binding judicial precedent, subsequently overruled. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 342, 349-57 (1987) (statutes); Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-34 (2011) (caselaw). Under state law, the Texas exclusionary rule is not invoked because—at the time of the offense—no violation occurred. The 5 See cases cited supra note 2. 14 State recognizes that article 38.23(b)—Texas’ limited good faith exception—requires a warrant. TEX. CODE CRIM. APP. §38.23(b). Notwithstanding, invocation of exclusionary rule principles relies on article 38.23(a). That subsection’s plain language requires a violation for exclusion to be triggered. When Appellant’s blood was drawn, no one credibly questioned the validity of the officer’s statutory authority. 6 In other words, at the time of the seizure, the officer followed then-existing law. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a); see also TEX. PENAL CODE §1.07(a)(30) (defining “law” as meaning the state and federal constitution and statutes, in addition to the written opinions of a court of record); see also Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427-28 (“obtained” applies to unlawfulness at the time of the seizure; exclusion not triggered in an absence of police culpability). Simply put, these circumstances do not invoke exclusion. 7 6 See Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b); see also Karev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App 2009) (statutes presumed constitutional until held otherwise). 7 See also United States v Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1975) (upholding suspicionless, warrantless seizure of individual by roving border patrol agents based upon statutory framework that, at the time, was constitutional); Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50 (exclusionary rule inapplicable when police reasonably rely on a statute later deemed unconstitutional); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (exclusionary rule seeks to deter officers from committing violations of the law to obtain evidence); Thornton v. State, 145 S.W.3d 228, 233-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (exclusion not justified where facts reveal marginal or nonexistent deterrent benefits); accord State v. Reese, 353 Wis.2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Wis. App. 2014) (exclusion inappropriate 15 The Supreme Court mentioned, in dictum, the application of the exclusionary rule versus Fourth Amendment violations in a non- blood-draw scenario decided recently. In Heien, the Court weighed the validity of an investigatory stop where the officer misunderstood the traffic code provision he relied on to support the stop. See Heien v. North Carolina, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2014 WL 7010684, at *6-9 (December 15, 2014). The Supreme Court considered the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake that lead to the stop and arrest when considering remedies. In so doing, the Court pointed out the myriad decisions finding exclusionary-rule invocation inappropriate where the officer’s conduct—valid at the time—was later declared unconstitutional. Id. With only one justice dissenting, the Supreme Court’s decision pondered the exclusionary rule’s limits which had been briefly considered in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,33,37-38 (1979) (suggesting that exclusion might have been appropriate had the provision been “grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional”) (citation omitted). Although the Heien discussion is merely dicta, it reiterates the importance of focusing on the fact that in McNeely scenario because no officer misconduct at the time of the seizure). 16 the instant officer’s conduct fully complied with mandatory, settled law at the time of Appellant’s arrest. McNeely and subsequent caselaw questioning implied-consent blood draws came later. Since, no violation occurred at the time of the Appellant’s 2011 blood draw, article 38.23’s exclusionary provision does not apply. 17 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER Review should be granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed, upholding this felony DWI conviction. Respectfully submitted, SHAREN WILSON Criminal District Attorney Tarrant County, Texas DEBRA WINDSOR Chief, Post-Conviction Assistant Criminal District Attorney /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney TANYA S. DOHONEY Assistant Criminal District Attorney Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center 401 W. Belknap Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201 (817) 884-1687 (817)884-1672 FAX State Bar No. 02760900 CCAAppellateAlerts@tarrantcountytx.gov 18 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document, prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes, complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e). This document also complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (i) because it contains less than 3100 words, excluding any parts exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1), as computed by Microsoft Word10, the computer software used to prepare the document. /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney TANYA S. DOHONEY CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true copy of the State’s petition has been e-served to opposing counsel, Hon. Abe Factor, 5719 Airport Freeway, Fort Worth, Texas 76117 at lawfactor@yahoo.com, and to the State Prosecuting Attorney, Hon. Lisa McMinn, information@spa.texas.gov, P.O. Box 13046, Austin, Texas 78711, on this 11th day of March, 2015. /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney TANYA S. DOHONEY H:\DOHONEY.D11\BRIEFS\011615 burks mcneely post-villarreal.doc 19 (COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION) A