PD-1619-14
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 3/6/2015 12:53:21 PM
Accepted 3/6/2015 3:40:08 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
IN THE CLERK
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
CURTIS ROSCOE STAFFORD, §
APPELLANT §
V. § NO. PD-1619-14
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS’
UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION IN CASE NUMBER 02–
13–00060–CR, AFFIRMING THE AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
CONVICTION IN CAUSE NUMBER 1276266D IN THE 432ND DISTRICT
COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE RUBEN
GONZALEZ, PRESIDING.
§§§
STATE'S REPLY
TO
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
§§§
SHAREN WILSON ANNE SWENSON, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County, Texas State Bar No. 19575500
ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com
DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney Criminal District Attorney
Post-Conviction Chief 401 W. Belknap Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
(817) 884-1687
FAX (817) 884-1672
State Bar No. 05254950
March 6, 2015 ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... iv
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .................................. vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................... vii
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................ viii
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 1
I. Appellant’s first ground for review does not comport
with the complaint that he presented to the court of
appeals ................................................................................................ 3
II. Appellant’s first ground for review presents an intensely
fact-bound issue that is unworthy of discretionary review .............. 5
III. Appellant’s second ground for review seeks a prohibited
advisory opinion and/or is based upon a misunderstanding
of the law ............................................................................................. 7
IV. The court of appeals correctly concluded that any error
was harmless ...................................................................................... 8
A. The court of appeals’ theory of harmlessness
was correct ................................................................................. 8
B. Appellant’s subsequent testimony (alleging that the
victim was lying and consented) provides a compelling
alternative basis for a finding of harmlessness ...................... 9
ii
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................. 12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................... 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................... 13
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE(S) PAGE(S)
Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85
(Tex.Crim.App. 1997) .................................................................... 5,12
Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557
(Tex.Crim.App. 2008) ......................................................................... 9
Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) ........................ 9n,10
Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870
(Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ..................................................................... 11n
Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005) .................................................................... 8,10
Dennis v. State, 178 S.W.3d 172
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) ............................. 1n
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637
(Tex.Crim.App. 2006) ....................................................................... 1n
McHenry v. State, 898 S.W.2d 300
(Tex.Crim.App. 1995) ......................................................................... 5
Marlo v. State, 720 S.W.2d 496
(Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ......................................................................... 4
Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005) .................................................................... 9,9n
iv
Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60
(Tex.Crim.App. 1985) .................................................................... 8,8n
People v. MacLeod, 176 P.3d 75
(Colo. 2008) ....................................................................................... 7n
Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487
(Tex.Crim.App. 1985) ....................................................................... 1n
Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29
(Tex.Crim.App. 1993) .................................................................... 6,6n
Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498
(Tex.Crim.App. 1980) ....................................................................... 10
Ex parte Ruiz, 750 S.W.2d 217
(Tex.Crim.App. 1988) ......................................................................... 7
Siqueiros v. State, 685 S.W.2d 68
(Tex.Crim.App. 1985) ....................................................................... 10
Stafford v. State, No. 02–13–00060–CR, 2014 WL 5878066
(Tex. App.--Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2014, pet. filed)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) ......................... viii,1n,2,6
State v. Copeland, 399 S.W.3d 159
(Tex.Crim.App. 2013) ......................................................................... 4
Taylor v. State, 109 S.W.3d 443
(Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ......................................................................... 4
Tucker v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___,
No. 04–12–00602–CR, 2014 WL 5099429
(Tex. App.–San Antonio Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) .................................. 9
v
RULE(S):
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) ...................................................................... 13
TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4(h) ............................................................................... 8
TEX. R. APP. P. 68.9 .................................................................................. vii
vi
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
CURTIS ROSCOE STAFFORD, §
APPELLANT §
V. § NO. PD-1619-14
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through Sharen Wilson,
the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, and timely files this the
State’s Reply to Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review. See
generally TEX. R. APP. P. 68.9.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
If review is granted, the State believes that oral argument would not
be helpful.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. CR. I-
1-103.
vii
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury found Appellant Curtis Roscoe Stafford guilty of Aggravated
Sexual Assault (with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm). RR. VI-6-8
(verdict and polling of jury); CR. I-87 (verdict form signed by jury
foreperson); CR. I-103 (trial court judgment signed on February 8, 2013,
showing jury guilty verdict and deadly weapon finding); see also CR. I-6-7
(indictment). Appellant subsequently pled true to the repeat offender
enhancement, see RR. VII-5, and the jury assessed Appellant a 22-year
sentence. CR. I-101 (punishment verdict form signed by jury foreperson);
CR. I-103 (trial court judgment showing jury assessed Appellant a 22-year
sentence in punishment); RR. VII-32-34.
The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas (Fort Worth)
affirmed Appellant’s Aggravated Sexual Assault conviction in an
unpublished memorandum opinion issued on November 13, 2014. Stafford
v. State, No. 02–13–00060–CR, 2014 WL 5878066 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth
Nov. 13, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
On November 28, 2014, Appellant filed a motion for rehearing that
was denied on January 22, 2015. Appellant requested and received an
extension of time to file his petition seeking discretionary review and
viii
Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review was filed in this Court on
February 19, 2015.
ix
ARGUMENT
Appellant's petition concerns an extraneous offense that was
admitted during the State’s case-in-chief.1 RR. V-45-46. The extraneous
offense took place in April 1985 when Appellant sexually assaulted Ms. C.
during an armed robbery. RR. V-111-16.2
1 Appellant made no objection at trial that the 1985 sexual assault was not
sufficiently similar to the charged offense. RR. V-39-40. At trial, Appellant’s
main objection was that the only defensive theory which the State is allowed to
rebut is a blanket denial of the defendant being the type of person who would
commit the charged offense. RR. V-19-20.
In any event, the similarity requirement for an extraneous offense offered
on the issue of “intent” is lower than the signature crime requirement for
extraneous offenses offered to prove identity. Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487,
492–93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); see also Dennis v. State, 178 S.W.3d 172, 179
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (similarity required to admit
extraneous offense evidence to rebut appellant's frame-up defense is less than
that required when extraneous offense evidence is used to show defendant's
system). In both the charged offense and the extraneous offense, Appellant used
a weapon to facilitate the sexual assault of an adult woman, who was a stranger
to Appellant.
The State would also point out that Appellant’s protestations of the State’s
need for the extraneous offense evidence, see Pet. at 7, provide strong support for
finding that the extraneous offense was admissible. Gigliobianco v. State, 210
S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (Rule 403 analysis).
2 Appellant testified that he was sentenced to 25 years after pleading guilty
to aggravated robbery and was released on parole in 2009. RR. V-127-28, 146.
Appellant testified that he had “consensual” sex with Ms. C., the extraneous
offense victim, during the aggravated robbery. RR. V-146-47. Such a claim
supports a conclusion that Appellant has an unreasonable definition of the word
“consensual.”
In its harm analysis, the court of appeals refused to consider Appellant’s
ostentatious admissions related to the extraneous offense. Stafford, 2014 WL
5878066, at *5; see RR. V-125-28 (on direct, Appellant testifies {1} that he
1
The court of appeals declined to address whether this extraneous
offense was properly admitted and instead ruled that any possible error
was harmless. Stafford, 2014 WL 5878066, at *5. The court of appeals
finding of harmlessness was based upon Appellant’s admissions to (1)
being in sex offender counseling, and (2) being in "a life out of control,
mired in illicit sex, drugs, and alcohol." Id. Moreover, the court of appeals
held that Appellant's admission to being in sex offender counseling,
standing alone, opened the door as to why Appellant was in such
counseling. Id. ("[I]n the context of this trial, [Appellant's testimony that
he was in counseling as a sex offender when he encountered the
complainant (Ms. D.)] opens the door to questions about his history of sex
offenses. Additionally, implicit in the fact of treatment as a sex offender is
the inference that Appellant is a sex offender and was a sex offender before
encountering the complainant.").
admitted to police and later, as part of a plea bargain, judicially confessed to
robbing and sexually assaulting extraneous offense victim, Ms. C., {2} that he
agrees with everything Ms. C. testified to, and {3} that he affirms Ms. C. was
correct in what she said except for the part about Appellant threatening to kill
her -- claiming that he did not threaten to kill anyone). Appellant was able in
his closing argument to turn the extraneous offense into a weapon against the
State. RR. V-182; RR. V-190 (“[Appellant] looked at you, and he told you, [‘]Yep,
I messed up real bad, went to prison for it, but when it came to this offense . . . I
did not rape her.[’]”).
2
In his petition, Appellant complains that (1) the court of appeals
erred in concluding that Appellant’s admission of being in sex offender
counseling (a) fell outside the scope of responding to an allegedly
improperly-admitted 1985 extraneous offense, and (b) supported a finding
of harmless error, see Pet. at iii; and (2) Appellant’s testimony that he took
illegal drugs, drank alcohol and frequented prostitutes while on parole did
not, by itself, justify a finding of harmless error. Pet. at iii.
I. Appellant’s first ground for review does not comport with the
complaint that he presented to the court of appeals.
In his first ground for review, Appellant contends that his testimony
about being in sex offender counseling should have formed no part of the
court of appeals’ harmless error review because Appellant's testimony
somehow mitigated the allegedly improperly-admitted extraneous offense.
Pet. at 7-8.3 Appellant presented no such argument to the court of appeals.
3 Appellant's mitigation theory is unworkable and does not comport with
this Court's precedent. Virtually anything could be pitched as being allegedly
mitigating. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that Appellant has not attempted
to fit his frequent use of drugs and prostitutes (RR. V-129-31) within the
“mitigation” exception that he attempts to create.
In any event, Appellant's mitigation theory – i.e., that he is a changed
person – relates only to issues of punishment. Appellant’s admission to being in
sex offender counseling was presented by Appellant on direct examination
during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. RR. V-129.
3
Instead (and in the context of trying to establish that his evidentiary
complaint about the admission of the extraneous offense evidence had been
properly preserved below), Appellant’s briefing in the court of appeals
referred nebulously to Appellant having “later testified regarding those
matters . . . .” Appellant's coa br. at 48. Appellant’s allusion to “those
matters” was obviously a reference to the evidence that “[Appellant]
objected to . . . .” Appellant coa br. at 48. And the evidence that Appellant
“objected to” was the extraneous offense evidence – not the evidence that
Appellant gratuitously testified to on direct examination.
An appellant should be required to alert the court of appeals of the
alleged impropriety before he should be heard to attack the appellate court
for its reliance on evidence that was first presented to the jury by the
appellant. See Marlo v. State, 720 S.W.2d 496, 499–500 n.7
(Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (argument first presented in petition for
discretionary review will not be considered); see also State v. Copeland,
399 S.W.3d 159, 162 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (questioning whether theory
not asserted in court of appeals was forfeited); Taylor v. State, 109 S.W.3d
443, 449 n.25 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (“[W]e will not address this potential
4
argument because it was not raised by the parties or addressed by the
Court of Appeals and involves a significantly different type of
harmlessness theory from the ones presented.”).
II. Appellant’s first ground for review presents an intensely fact-bound
issue that is unworthy of discretionary review.
Appellant’s first complaint presents a highly fact-bound issue that is
unworthy of discretionary review. Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357, 360
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (“except under compelling circumstances, ultimate
responsibility for the resolution of factual disputes lies elsewhere”),
overruled on other grounds by Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 90
(Tex.Crim.App. 1997). As far as the State can tell, no other Texas
appellant has raised a complaint concerning appellate court consideration
of a defendant’s own guilt-phase testimony admitting to being in sex
offender counseling. Thus, the question that Appellant now invites the
Court to address would have no relevance for any other case. See McHenry
v. State, 898 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (Clinton, J., concurring
in denial of review) (“The only reason we might care whether the court of
appeals identified the correct frame of reference for sufficiency review in
this cause is that we disagree with its conclusion on original submission
5
that the evidence was sufficient to show appellant personally examined the
contraband, as alleged in the indictment. We are ordinarily loathe,
however, to engage in that kind of fact-bound review of lower court
judgments.”).
Moreover, the only theory that the State can decipher in Appellant's
petition for expanding the Rogers exception4 is Appellant’s conclusory
declaration that Appellant's then current (2013) sex offender counseling
was within the scope of responding to a 1985 extraneous sexual assault.
See Pet. at 7-8. Appellant’s assertion addresses only part of the evidence
relied upon by the court of appeals in its harmless error holding. See
Stafford, 2014 WL 5878066, at *4-5. To the extent that Appellant’s
assertion could have any relation to the issues before the jury at guilt-
innocence, Appellant’s theory must relate to character conformity. See Pet.
at 8 (“It was also a showing that . . . [Appellant] is no longer the person
that he was . . . .”). That is, Appellant’s theory would have to be that he
4 Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) ("The general rule
is that error regarding improperly admitted evidence is waived if that same
evidence is brought in later by the defendant or by the State without objection.
However, error is not waived when the evidence is brought in later in an effort to
meet, rebut, destroy, deny or explain the improperly admitted evidence.")
(citations omitted).
6
should be allowed to respond to the extraneous with evidence supporting a
claim that he now lacks a character trait for sexual assault. But the
extraneous offense was not admissible to show that Appellant was a rapist
generally and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. RR. V-119;
CR. I-183-84 (limiting instruction in jury charge).
III. Appellant’s second ground for review seeks a prohibited advisory
opinion and/or is based upon a misunderstanding of the law.
Appellant’s second complaint to this Court is that the non-sex-
offender-counseling evidence discussed in the court of appeals’ harmless
error analysis does not by itself justify a finding of harmlessness. Pet. at
iii, 8-9. Leaving aside Appellant’s peculiar theories about the (alleged)
positive aspects of evidence that he frequently used prostitutes,5
Appellant’s second ground is not a basis for relief. Ex parte Ruiz, 750
S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
5 Appellant’s petition simultaneously asserts that (1) Appellant is “no longer
the person he was,” Pet. at 8; and (2) Appellant's frequent use of prostitutes is
evidence weighing against a finding of guilt. Pet. at 9. Appellant’s theory seems
to be that rapists are only people who lack the money for, or access to,
prostitutes. Such a view of sexual assault makes little sense. See People v.
MacLeod, 176 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo. 2008) (“The rape shield statute was passed in
the 1970s when the General Assembly, as part of a national trend, changed the
common law understanding of sexual assault as a crime of passion and
recognized it as a hostile crime of violence and domination.”).
7
Alternatively, Appellant’s assertion that the consideration of this
evidence “conflicts with Maynard as well,” Pet. iii,6 suggests a claim that
everything a defendant says fits within the Rogers exception. If Appellant
is intending to present such a complaint, (1) it is unexplained in his
petition, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4(h), and (2) it is erroneous. See, e.g.,
Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 453-54 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)
(defendant’s testimony rendered prematurely admitted extraneous offense
harmless).
IV. The court of appeals correctly concluded that any error was harmless.
A. The court of appeals’ theory of harmlessness was correct.
Appellant admitted on direct examination that he was in sex offender
counseling at the time of the charged offense. RR. V-129. Such testimony
had no relationship at the guilt-innocence phase to the Rogers "meet, rebut
or destroy" exception and was properly used in the court of appeals' harm
analysis. Appellant makes no contention that the error he alleges was
harmful if this admission can be properly considered. Such an admission
is not only powerful evidence overwhelming the impact of the extraneous
6 Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985).
8
offense, it is also an admission that opened the door as to why Appellant
was in sex offender counseling.
B. Appellant’s subsequent testimony (alleging that the victim was
lying and consented) provides a compelling alternative basis for
a finding of harmlessness.
The State may present extraneous-offense evidence to rebut a theory
of fabrication. Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008);
Tucker v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 04–12–00602–CR, 2014 WL 5099429,
at *6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.).7 The State is also
entitled to rebut a consent (or lack of intent) defensive theory. Martin v.
State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 466-68 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (defendant opened the
door to daughter KT's extraneous-offense testimony where defendant
testified that one of the child victims in the charged aggravated sexual
assault/indecency with a child prosecution, stepdaughter Ka, never
accepted the defendant as part of the family, and money was the
defendant's theory for why everyone, including stepdaughters Ka and Ky,
7 Admittedly, the trial court’s limiting instructions omitted a fabrication
theory. RR. V-119; CR. I-83-84. Nonetheless, the intent theory that was
submitted, see CR. I-83, subsumes the issues of consent and fabrication. See
Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 465-66 & n.1 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Blackwell
v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 12-15 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).
9
had lied); see also Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 10-11 (extraneous offenses
were admissible to rebut the defensive theory that appellant lacked the
intent to have sexual contact with J.H.). When the door is opened by the
defense after the extraneous offense has been admitted any error will be
found to be harmless. Daggett, 187 S.W.3d at 453-54; Siqueiros v. State,
685 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498,
502 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (premature admission of extraneous attempted
sexual assault was rendered harmless when defendant subsequently raised
the defense of consent).
After the extraneous offense was admitted, Appellant effectively
testified that the victim (Ms. D.) was lying.8 RR. V-133-34 (Appellant
8 Appellant’s entire defense was that the victim (Ms. D.) was lying. RR. IV-
15 (Defense opening statement: “[Appellant and Ms. D.] come together in an
agreement, they have sex. She ends up having to go back home to the boyfriend,
and she has to answer for why is it that you have no panties on.”). The defense
reasserted the fabrication/lack of intent defense in its cross examination of the
victim (Ms. D.). RR. IV-49 (“[Y]ou would agree with me that having to talk to
[your boyfriend] about being out, gone and then having sex is -- that was
embarrassing, wasn't it?”); RR. IV-61 (“[W]hen you talk about your boyfriend
being in the waiting room, you would agree with me that he was there to find out
if you really had been raped, wasn't he?”).
The defense’s cross-examination of the victim also accused the victim of:
(1) being a prostitute, see RR. IV-51-54, 56, and (2) attempting an armed robbery
of Appellant. RR. IV-54.
The trial court interpreted Appellant’s cross examination of the victim as:
“[Y]ou're . . . telling the jury, through your questioning, that she is the instigator,
10
claims that victim told him that she wanted to have some fun and directed
him to drive to a secluded spot); RR. V-137 (“[I]t was consensual.”): RR. V-
141 (the sex and drugs were “agreed to”); RR. V-139 (“I gave her 20
bucks.”). Appellant claimed that, during sex, the victim pulled a gun on
him. RR. V-137. Appellant testified that he disarmed the victim. RR. V-
137-38. Finally, Appellant testified that the victim told him that she did
not want her boyfriend to know that “she’d been out having sex.” RR. V-
139.9
Appellant’s closing argument emphasized the consent/lack of intent
based defense that Appellant had been making throughout the trial:
Now, when you look at the Jury Charge,
you're going to see over and over and over when you
begin to look at the pages from pages 5 and 6 and 7
and 8, there's this phrase that you will see and you
will think over and over, without the person's
consent. Without the person's consent. Without
that person's consent. Without the person's -- the
other person's consent.
And it's just repeated over and over. Without
the consent. Without the consent. Without the
she was not raped and she's the one with the weapon, correct?” RR. V-40. Thus,
Appellant had opened the door to rebuttal of his claim of fabrication long before
the extraneous offense was admitted.
9 Appellant’s lying-because-of-boyfriend and prostitute defenses are
remarkably similar to the defenses which were found to have opened the door in
Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 876 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).
11
consent. Without the consent. That just hasn't been
proven.
RR. V-185-86.
In sum, the court of appeals finding that any error was harmless
should be accepted as correct in light of Appellant’s repeated acts of
opening the door to the extraneous 1985 sexual assault.
Finally, to the extent that Appellant presents a standard argument
that the alleged error was not harmless, see Pet. at 7-8, that argument
does not comport with the issues Appellant presents to the Court. Pet. at
iii. Such an argument is also an intensely fact-bound matter unworthy of
discretionary review. Arcila, 834 S.W.2d at 360.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Premises Considered, the State prays that the Court
refuse Appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
SHAREN WILSON
Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County, Texas
DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
Post-Conviction Chief
/s/ ANNE SWENSON______
12
ANNE SWENSON, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 19575500
ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com
/s/ DAVID M. CURL______
DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 05254950
401 W. Belknap Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
(817) 884-1687
FAX (817) 884-1672
ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The number of words in the portions of the document covered by TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) are 3,132.
/s/ DAVID M. CURL______
DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
One copy of the State's Reply to Appellant's Petition for Discretionary
Review has been electronically sent to: (1) counsel for Appellant Curtis
Roscoe Stafford, Mr. Paul Francis at pfrancis@birch.net, and (2) Ms. Lisa
McMinn, the State Prosecuting Attorney, at information@spa.texas.gov, on
this, the 6th day of March 2015.
/s/ DAVID M. CURL______
DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
13
Stafford, Curtis Roscoe
Combined Opinion