Stafford, Curtis Roscoe

PD-1619-14
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 3/6/2015 12:53:21 PM
Accepted 3/6/2015 3:40:08 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
IN THE CLERK
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

CURTIS ROSCOE STAFFORD, §
APPELLANT §
V. § NO. PD-1619-14
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS’
UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION IN CASE NUMBER 02–
13–00060–CR, AFFIRMING THE AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
CONVICTION IN CAUSE NUMBER 1276266D IN THE 432ND DISTRICT
COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE RUBEN
GONZALEZ, PRESIDING.

§§§
STATE'S REPLY
TO
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
§§§

SHAREN WILSON ANNE SWENSON, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County, Texas State Bar No. 19575500
ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com

DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney Criminal District Attorney
Post-Conviction Chief 401 W. Belknap Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
(817) 884-1687
FAX (817) 884-1672
State Bar No. 05254950
March 6, 2015 ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... iv

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .................................. vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................... vii

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................ viii

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 1

I. Appellant’s first ground for review does not comport
with the complaint that he presented to the court of
appeals ................................................................................................ 3

II. Appellant’s first ground for review presents an intensely
fact-bound issue that is unworthy of discretionary review .............. 5

III. Appellant’s second ground for review seeks a prohibited
advisory opinion and/or is based upon a misunderstanding
of the law ............................................................................................. 7

IV. The court of appeals correctly concluded that any error
was harmless ...................................................................................... 8

A. The court of appeals’ theory of harmlessness
was correct ................................................................................. 8

B. Appellant’s subsequent testimony (alleging that the
victim was lying and consented) provides a compelling
alternative basis for a finding of harmlessness ...................... 9

ii
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................. 12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................... 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................... 13

iii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASE(S) PAGE(S)

Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85
(Tex.Crim.App. 1997) .................................................................... 5,12

Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557
(Tex.Crim.App. 2008) ......................................................................... 9

Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) ........................ 9n,10

Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870
(Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ..................................................................... 11n

Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005) .................................................................... 8,10

Dennis v. State, 178 S.W.3d 172
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) ............................. 1n

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637
(Tex.Crim.App. 2006) ....................................................................... 1n

McHenry v. State, 898 S.W.2d 300
(Tex.Crim.App. 1995) ......................................................................... 5

Marlo v. State, 720 S.W.2d 496
(Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ......................................................................... 4

Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005) .................................................................... 9,9n

iv
Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60
(Tex.Crim.App. 1985) .................................................................... 8,8n

People v. MacLeod, 176 P.3d 75
(Colo. 2008) ....................................................................................... 7n

Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487
(Tex.Crim.App. 1985) ....................................................................... 1n

Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29
(Tex.Crim.App. 1993) .................................................................... 6,6n

Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498
(Tex.Crim.App. 1980) ....................................................................... 10

Ex parte Ruiz, 750 S.W.2d 217
(Tex.Crim.App. 1988) ......................................................................... 7

Siqueiros v. State, 685 S.W.2d 68
(Tex.Crim.App. 1985) ....................................................................... 10

Stafford v. State, No. 02–13–00060–CR, 2014 WL 5878066
(Tex. App.--Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2014, pet. filed)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) ......................... viii,1n,2,6

State v. Copeland, 399 S.W.3d 159
(Tex.Crim.App. 2013) ......................................................................... 4

Taylor v. State, 109 S.W.3d 443
(Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ......................................................................... 4

Tucker v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___,
No. 04–12–00602–CR, 2014 WL 5099429
(Tex. App.–San Antonio Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) .................................. 9

v
RULE(S):

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) ...................................................................... 13

TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4(h) ............................................................................... 8

TEX. R. APP. P. 68.9 .................................................................................. vii

vi
 IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

CURTIS ROSCOE STAFFORD, §
APPELLANT §
V. § NO. PD-1619-14
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through Sharen Wilson,

the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, and timely files this the

State’s Reply to Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review. See

generally TEX. R. APP. P. 68.9.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

If review is granted, the State believes that oral argument would not

be helpful.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. CR. I-

1-103.

vii
 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury found Appellant Curtis Roscoe Stafford guilty of Aggravated

Sexual Assault (with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm). RR. VI-6-8

(verdict and polling of jury); CR. I-87 (verdict form signed by jury

foreperson); CR. I-103 (trial court judgment signed on February 8, 2013,

showing jury guilty verdict and deadly weapon finding); see also CR. I-6-7

(indictment). Appellant subsequently pled true to the repeat offender

enhancement, see RR. VII-5, and the jury assessed Appellant a 22-year

sentence. CR. I-101 (punishment verdict form signed by jury foreperson);

CR. I-103 (trial court judgment showing jury assessed Appellant a 22-year

sentence in punishment); RR. VII-32-34.

The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas (Fort Worth)

affirmed Appellant’s Aggravated Sexual Assault conviction in an

unpublished memorandum opinion issued on November 13, 2014. Stafford

v. State, No. 02–13–00060–CR, 2014 WL 5878066 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth

Nov. 13, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

On November 28, 2014, Appellant filed a motion for rehearing that

was denied on January 22, 2015. Appellant requested and received an

extension of time to file his petition seeking discretionary review and
viii
Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review was filed in this Court on

February 19, 2015.

ix
 ARGUMENT

Appellant's petition concerns an extraneous offense that was

admitted during the State’s case-in-chief.1 RR. V-45-46. The extraneous

offense took place in April 1985 when Appellant sexually assaulted Ms. C.

during an armed robbery. RR. V-111-16.2

1 Appellant made no objection at trial that the 1985 sexual assault was not
sufficiently similar to the charged offense. RR. V-39-40. At trial, Appellant’s
main objection was that the only defensive theory which the State is allowed to
rebut is a blanket denial of the defendant being the type of person who would
commit the charged offense. RR. V-19-20.
In any event, the similarity requirement for an extraneous offense offered
on the issue of “intent” is lower than the signature crime requirement for
extraneous offenses offered to prove identity. Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487,
492–93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); see also Dennis v. State, 178 S.W.3d 172, 179
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (similarity required to admit
extraneous offense evidence to rebut appellant's frame-up defense is less than
that required when extraneous offense evidence is used to show defendant's
system). In both the charged offense and the extraneous offense, Appellant used
a weapon to facilitate the sexual assault of an adult woman, who was a stranger
to Appellant.
The State would also point out that Appellant’s protestations of the State’s
need for the extraneous offense evidence, see Pet. at 7, provide strong support for
finding that the extraneous offense was admissible. Gigliobianco v. State, 210
S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (Rule 403 analysis).
2 Appellant testified that he was sentenced to 25 years after pleading guilty
to aggravated robbery and was released on parole in 2009. RR. V-127-28, 146.
Appellant testified that he had “consensual” sex with Ms. C., the extraneous
offense victim, during the aggravated robbery. RR. V-146-47. Such a claim
supports a conclusion that Appellant has an unreasonable definition of the word
“consensual.”
In its harm analysis, the court of appeals refused to consider Appellant’s
ostentatious admissions related to the extraneous offense. Stafford, 2014 WL
5878066, at *5; see RR. V-125-28 (on direct, Appellant testifies {1} that he
1
 The court of appeals declined to address whether this extraneous

offense was properly admitted and instead ruled that any possible error

was harmless. Stafford, 2014 WL 5878066, at *5. The court of appeals

finding of harmlessness was based upon Appellant’s admissions to (1)

being in sex offender counseling, and (2) being in "a life out of control,

mired in illicit sex, drugs, and alcohol." Id. Moreover, the court of appeals

held that Appellant's admission to being in sex offender counseling,

standing alone, opened the door as to why Appellant was in such

counseling. Id. ("[I]n the context of this trial, [Appellant's testimony that

he was in counseling as a sex offender when he encountered the

complainant (Ms. D.)] opens the door to questions about his history of sex

offenses. Additionally, implicit in the fact of treatment as a sex offender is

the inference that Appellant is a sex offender and was a sex offender before

encountering the complainant.").

admitted to police and later, as part of a plea bargain, judicially confessed to
robbing and sexually assaulting extraneous offense victim, Ms. C., {2} that he
agrees with everything Ms. C. testified to, and {3} that he affirms Ms. C. was
correct in what she said except for the part about Appellant threatening to kill
her -- claiming that he did not threaten to kill anyone). Appellant was able in
his closing argument to turn the extraneous offense into a weapon against the
State. RR. V-182; RR. V-190 (“[Appellant] looked at you, and he told you, [‘]Yep,
I messed up real bad, went to prison for it, but when it came to this offense . . . I
did not rape her.[’]”).
2
 In his petition, Appellant complains that (1) the court of appeals

erred in concluding that Appellant’s admission of being in sex offender

counseling (a) fell outside the scope of responding to an allegedly

improperly-admitted 1985 extraneous offense, and (b) supported a finding

of harmless error, see Pet. at iii; and (2) Appellant’s testimony that he took

illegal drugs, drank alcohol and frequented prostitutes while on parole did

not, by itself, justify a finding of harmless error. Pet. at iii.

I. Appellant’s first ground for review does not comport with the
complaint that he presented to the court of appeals.

In his first ground for review, Appellant contends that his testimony

about being in sex offender counseling should have formed no part of the

court of appeals’ harmless error review because Appellant's testimony

somehow mitigated the allegedly improperly-admitted extraneous offense.

Pet. at 7-8.3 Appellant presented no such argument to the court of appeals.

3 Appellant's mitigation theory is unworkable and does not comport with
this Court's precedent. Virtually anything could be pitched as being allegedly
mitigating. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that Appellant has not attempted
to fit his frequent use of drugs and prostitutes (RR. V-129-31) within the
“mitigation” exception that he attempts to create.
In any event, Appellant's mitigation theory – i.e., that he is a changed
person – relates only to issues of punishment. Appellant’s admission to being in
sex offender counseling was presented by Appellant on direct examination
during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. RR. V-129.
3
 Instead (and in the context of trying to establish that his evidentiary

complaint about the admission of the extraneous offense evidence had been

properly preserved below), Appellant’s briefing in the court of appeals

referred nebulously to Appellant having “later testified regarding those

matters . . . .” Appellant's coa br. at 48. Appellant’s allusion to “those

matters” was obviously a reference to the evidence that “[Appellant]

objected to . . . .” Appellant coa br. at 48. And the evidence that Appellant

“objected to” was the extraneous offense evidence – not the evidence that

Appellant gratuitously testified to on direct examination.

An appellant should be required to alert the court of appeals of the

alleged impropriety before he should be heard to attack the appellate court

for its reliance on evidence that was first presented to the jury by the

appellant. See Marlo v. State, 720 S.W.2d 496, 499–500 n.7

(Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (argument first presented in petition for

discretionary review will not be considered); see also State v. Copeland,

399 S.W.3d 159, 162 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (questioning whether theory

not asserted in court of appeals was forfeited); Taylor v. State, 109 S.W.3d

443, 449 n.25 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (“[W]e will not address this potential

4
argument because it was not raised by the parties or addressed by the

Court of Appeals and involves a significantly different type of

harmlessness theory from the ones presented.”).

II. Appellant’s first ground for review presents an intensely fact-bound
issue that is unworthy of discretionary review.

Appellant’s first complaint presents a highly fact-bound issue that is

unworthy of discretionary review. Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357, 360

(Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (“except under compelling circumstances, ultimate

responsibility for the resolution of factual disputes lies elsewhere”),

overruled on other grounds by Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 90

(Tex.Crim.App. 1997). As far as the State can tell, no other Texas

appellant has raised a complaint concerning appellate court consideration

of a defendant’s own guilt-phase testimony admitting to being in sex

offender counseling. Thus, the question that Appellant now invites the

Court to address would have no relevance for any other case. See McHenry

v. State, 898 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (Clinton, J., concurring

in denial of review) (“The only reason we might care whether the court of

appeals identified the correct frame of reference for sufficiency review in

this cause is that we disagree with its conclusion on original submission
5
that the evidence was sufficient to show appellant personally examined the

contraband, as alleged in the indictment. We are ordinarily loathe,

however, to engage in that kind of fact-bound review of lower court

judgments.”).

Moreover, the only theory that the State can decipher in Appellant's

petition for expanding the Rogers exception4 is Appellant’s conclusory

declaration that Appellant's then current (2013) sex offender counseling

was within the scope of responding to a 1985 extraneous sexual assault.

See Pet. at 7-8. Appellant’s assertion addresses only part of the evidence

relied upon by the court of appeals in its harmless error holding. See

Stafford, 2014 WL 5878066, at *4-5. To the extent that Appellant’s

assertion could have any relation to the issues before the jury at guilt-

innocence, Appellant’s theory must relate to character conformity. See Pet.

at 8 (“It was also a showing that . . . [Appellant] is no longer the person

that he was . . . .”). That is, Appellant’s theory would have to be that he

4 Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) ("The general rule
is that error regarding improperly admitted evidence is waived if that same
evidence is brought in later by the defendant or by the State without objection.
However, error is not waived when the evidence is brought in later in an effort to
meet, rebut, destroy, deny or explain the improperly admitted evidence.")
(citations omitted).
6
should be allowed to respond to the extraneous with evidence supporting a

claim that he now lacks a character trait for sexual assault. But the

extraneous offense was not admissible to show that Appellant was a rapist

generally and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. RR. V-119;

CR. I-183-84 (limiting instruction in jury charge).

III. Appellant’s second ground for review seeks a prohibited advisory
opinion and/or is based upon a misunderstanding of the law.

Appellant’s second complaint to this Court is that the non-sex-

offender-counseling evidence discussed in the court of appeals’ harmless

error analysis does not by itself justify a finding of harmlessness. Pet. at

iii, 8-9. Leaving aside Appellant’s peculiar theories about the (alleged)

positive aspects of evidence that he frequently used prostitutes,5

Appellant’s second ground is not a basis for relief. Ex parte Ruiz, 750

S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).

5 Appellant’s petition simultaneously asserts that (1) Appellant is “no longer
the person he was,” Pet. at 8; and (2) Appellant's frequent use of prostitutes is
evidence weighing against a finding of guilt. Pet. at 9. Appellant’s theory seems
to be that rapists are only people who lack the money for, or access to,
prostitutes. Such a view of sexual assault makes little sense. See People v.
MacLeod, 176 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo. 2008) (“The rape shield statute was passed in
the 1970s when the General Assembly, as part of a national trend, changed the
common law understanding of sexual assault as a crime of passion and
recognized it as a hostile crime of violence and domination.”).
7
 Alternatively, Appellant’s assertion that the consideration of this

evidence “conflicts with Maynard as well,” Pet. iii,6 suggests a claim that

everything a defendant says fits within the Rogers exception. If Appellant

is intending to present such a complaint, (1) it is unexplained in his

petition, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4(h), and (2) it is erroneous. See, e.g.,

Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 453-54 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)

(defendant’s testimony rendered prematurely admitted extraneous offense

harmless).

IV. The court of appeals correctly concluded that any error was harmless.

A. The court of appeals’ theory of harmlessness was correct.

Appellant admitted on direct examination that he was in sex offender

counseling at the time of the charged offense. RR. V-129. Such testimony

had no relationship at the guilt-innocence phase to the Rogers "meet, rebut

or destroy" exception and was properly used in the court of appeals' harm

analysis. Appellant makes no contention that the error he alleges was

harmful if this admission can be properly considered. Such an admission

is not only powerful evidence overwhelming the impact of the extraneous

6 Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985).
8
offense, it is also an admission that opened the door as to why Appellant

was in sex offender counseling.

B. Appellant’s subsequent testimony (alleging that the victim was
lying and consented) provides a compelling alternative basis for
a finding of harmlessness.

The State may present extraneous-offense evidence to rebut a theory

of fabrication. Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008);

Tucker v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 04–12–00602–CR, 2014 WL 5099429,

at *6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.).7 The State is also

entitled to rebut a consent (or lack of intent) defensive theory. Martin v.

State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 466-68 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (defendant opened the

door to daughter KT's extraneous-offense testimony where defendant

testified that one of the child victims in the charged aggravated sexual

assault/indecency with a child prosecution, stepdaughter Ka, never

accepted the defendant as part of the family, and money was the

defendant's theory for why everyone, including stepdaughters Ka and Ky,

7 Admittedly, the trial court’s limiting instructions omitted a fabrication
theory. RR. V-119; CR. I-83-84. Nonetheless, the intent theory that was
submitted, see CR. I-83, subsumes the issues of consent and fabrication. See
Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 465-66 & n.1 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Blackwell
v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 12-15 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).
9
had lied); see also Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 10-11 (extraneous offenses

were admissible to rebut the defensive theory that appellant lacked the

intent to have sexual contact with J.H.). When the door is opened by the

defense after the extraneous offense has been admitted any error will be

found to be harmless. Daggett, 187 S.W.3d at 453-54; Siqueiros v. State,

685 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498,

502 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (premature admission of extraneous attempted

sexual assault was rendered harmless when defendant subsequently raised

the defense of consent).

After the extraneous offense was admitted, Appellant effectively

testified that the victim (Ms. D.) was lying.8 RR. V-133-34 (Appellant

8 Appellant’s entire defense was that the victim (Ms. D.) was lying. RR. IV-
15 (Defense opening statement: “[Appellant and Ms. D.] come together in an
agreement, they have sex. She ends up having to go back home to the boyfriend,
and she has to answer for why is it that you have no panties on.”). The defense
reasserted the fabrication/lack of intent defense in its cross examination of the
victim (Ms. D.). RR. IV-49 (“[Y]ou would agree with me that having to talk to
[your boyfriend] about being out, gone and then having sex is -- that was
embarrassing, wasn't it?”); RR. IV-61 (“[W]hen you talk about your boyfriend
being in the waiting room, you would agree with me that he was there to find out
if you really had been raped, wasn't he?”).
The defense’s cross-examination of the victim also accused the victim of:
(1) being a prostitute, see RR. IV-51-54, 56, and (2) attempting an armed robbery
of Appellant. RR. IV-54.
The trial court interpreted Appellant’s cross examination of the victim as:
“[Y]ou're . . . telling the jury, through your questioning, that she is the instigator,
10
claims that victim told him that she wanted to have some fun and directed

him to drive to a secluded spot); RR. V-137 (“[I]t was consensual.”): RR. V-

141 (the sex and drugs were “agreed to”); RR. V-139 (“I gave her 20

bucks.”). Appellant claimed that, during sex, the victim pulled a gun on

him. RR. V-137. Appellant testified that he disarmed the victim. RR. V-

137-38. Finally, Appellant testified that the victim told him that she did

not want her boyfriend to know that “she’d been out having sex.” RR. V-

139.9

Appellant’s closing argument emphasized the consent/lack of intent

based defense that Appellant had been making throughout the trial:

Now, when you look at the Jury Charge,
you're going to see over and over and over when you
begin to look at the pages from pages 5 and 6 and 7
and 8, there's this phrase that you will see and you
will think over and over, without the person's
consent. Without the person's consent. Without
that person's consent. Without the person's -- the
other person's consent.
And it's just repeated over and over. Without
the consent. Without the consent. Without the

she was not raped and she's the one with the weapon, correct?” RR. V-40. Thus,
Appellant had opened the door to rebuttal of his claim of fabrication long before
the extraneous offense was admitted.
9 Appellant’s lying-because-of-boyfriend and prostitute defenses are
remarkably similar to the defenses which were found to have opened the door in
Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 876 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).
11
 consent. Without the consent. That just hasn't been
proven.

RR. V-185-86.

In sum, the court of appeals finding that any error was harmless

should be accepted as correct in light of Appellant’s repeated acts of

opening the door to the extraneous 1985 sexual assault.

Finally, to the extent that Appellant presents a standard argument

that the alleged error was not harmless, see Pet. at 7-8, that argument

does not comport with the issues Appellant presents to the Court. Pet. at

iii. Such an argument is also an intensely fact-bound matter unworthy of

discretionary review. Arcila, 834 S.W.2d at 360.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Premises Considered, the State prays that the Court

refuse Appellant’s petition for discretionary review.

SHAREN WILSON
Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County, Texas

DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
Post-Conviction Chief

/s/ ANNE SWENSON______
12
 ANNE SWENSON, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 19575500
ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com

/s/ DAVID M. CURL______
DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 05254950
401 W. Belknap Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
(817) 884-1687
FAX (817) 884-1672
ccaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The number of words in the portions of the document covered by TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) are 3,132.

/s/ DAVID M. CURL______
DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

One copy of the State's Reply to Appellant's Petition for Discretionary
Review has been electronically sent to: (1) counsel for Appellant Curtis
Roscoe Stafford, Mr. Paul Francis at pfrancis@birch.net, and (2) Ms. Lisa
McMinn, the State Prosecuting Attorney, at information@spa.texas.gov, on
this, the 6th day of March 2015.

/s/ DAVID M. CURL______
DAVID M. CURL, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
13