\ *(“U g w 6'02103 1 ` v " las qu‘,' “w _ . _ ©§§§§§MNHW§§LS wR-41,625-0`3 JUN 08 2015 TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 1 4£@@%&@@§@,©1@?9< Ex parte In the 204 Judicial Lamont Earl Epinger g District Court 4 Dallas County, Texas Re: W93-31914-Q(B) APPLICANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S ORDER To the Honorable Judge of said court: Now comes Applicant Lamont Earl Epinger pro se, by way of objection to the State's order finding no controverted, previously, unrelolved factual issues requiring a hearing for the following reasons. ' (l) The State'storder under writ no. W93-31914Q(A) and no. W93~21553Q(B) failed to base yits denial on the standards set out in the doctrine of Laches or the Common-Law doctrine of Laches due to the lapse of time. As alleged bylthe respondent in its original answer, which Applicant asserts that such findings is contrary in the light of ex parte Alberto 398 S.W.3d. 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) becasue the State has failed under the Texas Common- Law of Laches which typically requires proof by a preponderance Of the eviddnec of two - elements: unreasonable delay by the opposing party and prejudice resulting from the delay whcih the respondent in its original answer only made an outcry and by no means meet the two elements under the Texas Common-Law doctrine as set out in ex parte Alberto 398 S.W.3d. 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Therefore, it would be both unreasonable in the light of the facts asserted by the respondent iniits original answer and contrary to the holding in ex parte Alberto, to adopt these findings. (2) Applicant further asserts that Aplicant has made and supported a strong convincing showing of actual innocence in the light of McQuiggens v. Perkins 133 Sct. 1924 (2013) to overcome limitation Id at 1934-35. Also in light of Bunsley y. UZS. 118 sct. 1604 (1998); Schlup v. Delo 513 U.S. 296, 327-27 115 Sct. 851. 130 L.Ed.2d. 808 (1995) based-on a mis- statement of Law which Applicant alleges that he was truly prejudiced by an admonishment by the court that if he was sentenced and convicted by the court he would serve no less than 2 yrs. and no more than 30 yrs. whcih Applicant asserts that such admonishment led §pelieene~§e%ievezehe,JeeeevweP%d eel¥ eeeeeeee hew t.e ?=ee 30 Yre- when in feet he feeee (1) 5 to 99 years to life therefore rendering Applicants unknowingly and involuntary. Mitschke v. State 129 S.W:Bd. at 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However the court allege that such admonishment was correct and admonishments on parole eligibility which Applicant asserts, is unreasonable becaude during such admonishment the State never made any reference to what the admonishment pertained to. Therefore Applicant was truly misled and harmed by the mis- statement of Law. (3) Applicant further asserts that he has made and supported the allegations that hsi trial counsel providedc Applicant with erroneous advice in regards to his selection to punishment before the court was best from the court in an attempt to receive or have any .chance at the relieving probation for the offenses of aggravated robbery with the use of a deadly weapon as supported with new discovered evidence that was attached in Applicant attached exhbit (1) which was a letter from trial counsel reflecting such erroneous advice, because the trial court was barred from placing Applicant on probation due to the invole- ment of a deadly weapon as set out in ex parte Battle 817 S.W.2d. 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and Tex. Code`Crim. Proc; Art. 42.12 §3g(A)(2) therefore rendering Applicant&s plea invol- untary in lightof ex parte Wilson 724 S.W.2d. 72. 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957) and counsel advice erroneous in as set out in Hill vi Lockhart 474 U.S. 52. 106 Sct. 366. 369. 88 L.Ed. 2d; 203 (1985). (4) Applicant asserts taht the State has committed a reversable error in light of ex parte Jones 367 S.W.3d. 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) because it failed to enter a facts finding and conclusion of Law address Applicant's_allegations. Applicant further asserts that it would be unreasonable and contrary to ex parte Adams 768 S.W.Zd, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.) for the T.C.C.P. to adopt the order of the trial court. Also Applicant should also be allowed to overcome Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.07 4(A) in the light of Bousley v. U.S./McQuiggens v. Perkins. Such denial would be contrary to above cited case ~aw. Prayer Applicant pray that the court would issue an order on remand for the State Cort to make .a finding of fact and conclusion of law addressing all Applicant's allegations. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Lamont Earl Epinger, T.D.C.J.-ID #674574, being presently incarcerated in the insti- tutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal'Justice, declare under penalty of (2) perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed On jylav,e. W , 2015 Lamont Earl Epinger #674574 French Robertson Unit* 12071 FM 3522 Abiiene} Texas 79601 (3) wR -41,625~02v TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Ex parte In the 204 Judicial Lamont Earl Epinger District Court ` Dallas County, Texas Re: W93-21553-Q(A) APPLICANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S ORDER To_the Honorable Judge of said court2 Now comes Applicant Lamont Earl Epinger pro se, by way of objection to the State' s order finding no controverted, previously, unrelolved factual issues requiring a hearing for the following reasons. (1) The State' stdrder under writ no. W93-3l914Q(A) and no. W93~21553Q(B) failed to base its denial on the standards set out in the doctrine of Laches or the Common-Law doctrine of Laches due to the lapse of time. As alleged by-the respondent in its original answer, which Applicant asserts that such findings is contrary in the light of ex parte Alberto 398 S.W.3d. 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) becasue the State has failed under the Texas Common- Law of Laches which typically requires proof by a preponderance of the eviddnec of two - elements: unreasonable delay by the opposing party and prejudice resulting from the delay whcih the respondent in its original answer only made an outcry and by no means meet the two elements under the Texas Common- -Law doctrine as set out in ex parte Alberto 398 S. W. 3d. 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Therefore, it would be both unreasonable in the light of the facts asserted by the respondent in its original answer and contrary to the holding in ex parte Alberto, to adopt these findings. (2) Applicant further asserts that Aplicant has made and supported a strong Convincing showing of actual innocence in the light of McQuiggens v. Perkins 133 Sct. 1924 (2013) to overcome limitation Id at l934-35.A1so in light of Bunsley v. U 9 118 sct. 1604 (1998); Schlup v. Delo 513 U.S. 296, 327-27 115 Sct. 851. 130 L.Ed.2d. 808 (1995) based on a mis- statement of Law which Applicant alleges that he was truly prejudiced by an admonishment by the court that if he was sentenced and convicted by the court he would serve no less than 2 yrs. and no more than 30 yrs. whcih Applicant asserts that such admonishment led Appllrant belleve the Judce would only sentence him to 2 to 30 yrs. when in fact he faced v(1) 5 to 99 years to life therefore rendering Applicants unknowingly and involuntary. Mitschke v. State 129 S.W.3d. at 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However the court allege that such admonishment was correct and admonishments on parole eligibility which Applicant asserts, is unreasonable becaude during such admonishment the State never made any reference to what the admonishment pertained to. Therefore Applicant was truly misled and harmed by the mis- statement of Law. (3) Applicant further asserts that he has made and supported the allegations that hsi trial counsel providedc Applicant with erroneous advice in regards to his selection to punishment before the court was best from the court in an attempt to receive or have any chance at the relieving probation.for the offenses of aggravated robbery with the use of a deadly weapon as supported with new discovered evidence that was attached in Applicant attached exhbit (l) which was a letter from trial counsel reflecting such erroneous advice, because the trial court was barred from placing Applicant on probation due to the invole- ment of a deadly weapon as set out in ex parte Battle 817 S.W.2d. 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and Tex. Code Crim. Proc¢ Art. 42.12 §3g(A)(2) therefore rendering Applicant?s'plea invol- untary in lightof ex parte Wilson 724 S.W.2d. 72. 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957) and counsel advice erroneous in as set out in Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52. 106 Sct. 366. 369. 88 L.Ed. 2a; 203 (1985). (4) Applicant asserts taht the State has committed a reversable error in light of ex parte Jones 367 S.W.3d. 696 (Tex. Crim. App.-2012) because it failed to enter a facts finding and conclusion of Law address Applicant!s_allegations. Applicant further asserts that it would be unreasonable and contrary to ex parte Adams 768 S.W.Zd, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.) for the T.C.C.P. to adopt the order of the trial court. Also Applicant should also be allowed to overcome Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. ll.07 4(A) in the light of Bousley v. U»S./McQuiggens v. Perkins. Such denial would be contrary to above cited case aw. Prayer Applicant pray that the court would issue an order on remand for the State Cort to make va finding of fact and conclusion of law addressing all Applicant's allegations. 4 cERTIFIcATE or sERVICE I, Lamont Earl Epinger, T. D. C. J. -ID #674574, being presently incarcerated in the insti- tutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, declare under penalty of (2) perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on ':Tc~n e ,`, L{_ l 2015 (3) Lamont Earl Epinger #674574 French Robertson Unit 12071 FM 3522 Abilene, Texas 79601 `.