James E. Guzman v. State

ACCEPTED
01-15-00151-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
6/16/2015 4:54:46 PM
Nos. 01-15-00149-CR, 01-15-00150-CR, 01-15-00151-CR CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
In the
Court of Appeals
For the
First District of Texas FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
At Houston HOUSTON, TEXAS
 6/16/2015 4:54:46 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Nos. 1974171, 1974172, 2001637 Clerk

In the County Criminal Court at Law No. 4
Of Harris County, Texas
 FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
JAMES GUZMAN, pro se
6/16/2015 4:54:46 PM
Appellant
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
V. Clerk
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee


STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF


DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas

PATRICIA MCLEAN
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
mclean_patricia@dao.hctx.net

THOMAS WADDLE
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel.: 713/755-5826
FAX No.: 713/755-5809

Counsel for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1, the State waives oral argument because the

briefs in this case adequately address the issues of fact and law to the Court.

i
 IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

Counsel for the State:

Devon Anderson—District Attorney of Harris County

Thomas Waddle—Assistant District Attorney at trial

Patricia McLean—Assistant District Attorney on appeal

Appellant:

James Guzman

Counsel for Appellant:

Alejandro Macias—Defense counsel at trial

James Guzman—pro se on appeal

Trial Judge:

Hon. John Clinton

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ..................................................i

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .......................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 4

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR .................................. 5

I. Due to substantial noncompliance with TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1, appellant has
not properly presented any issue for appellate review.....................................5

II. Appellant’s point of error is substantively without merit. ..............................7

A. The evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s convictions because
appellant judicially confessed to the offenses. ...........................................8

B. The record is devoid of any information to show appellant’s pleas were
involuntary. .................................................................................................9

1. Appellant failed to establish reversible error occurred under Brady. .....9

2. Appellant failed to show his trial counsel’s actions fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. ................................................... 11

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................. 14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 14

iii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Blanco v. State,
18 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ..................................................................2

Chavez v. State,
183 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ................................................................2

Ex parte Moody,
991 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ..............................................................12

Ex parte Morrow,
952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 810 (1998)......12

Ex parte Williams,
703 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ................................................................8

Hajjar v. State,
176 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) ......................6

Harm v. State,
183 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ..............................................................10

Hill v. State,
No. 14-14-00337-CR, 2015 WL 1736348 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
April 14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ...................12

Keller v. State,
125 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), review dism’d as
improvidently granted, 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 906 (2005) ...........................................................................................8, 9

iv
Little v. State,
991 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ..............................................................10

Mallett v. State,
65 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ..................................................................12

Pena v. State,
353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ..............................................................10

Rylander v. State,
101 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).............................................................. 11

Steffan v. Steffan,
29 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) ...................5

Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................................................. 11

Thierry v. State,
288 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) ........................6

Thomas v. State,
841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)..............................................................10

Thompson v. State,
9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ............................................................ 11, 12

Vanderaa v. LVDVD, L.C.,
314 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) .........................................5, 7

STATUTES

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2013) ..........................................10

v
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 44.02 (West 2013) .............................................2

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2 ...............................................................................................1, 2

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 ........................................................................................ 5, 6, 13
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9 ...................................................................................................6

TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1.................................................................................................... i

vi
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged by information in three cases with misdemeanor

assault. (C.R. I at 7; C.R. II at 7; C.R. III at 6)1 In two cases, the information was

enhanced with a prior conviction for felony assault-family member. (C.R. I at 7;

C.R. II at 7) In his third assault case, the information was enhanced with a prior

conviction for misdemeanor assault. (C.R. III at 6) Appellant pled guilty in all

three cases and was sentenced to 120 days in the Harris County Jail. (C.R. I at 10-

11, 16; C.R. II at 10-11, 16; C.R. III at 10-11, 15) Appellant timely filed a pro se

notice of appeal, however the trial court certified appellant had no right of appeal

in any of his cases. (C.R. I at 19, 22; C.R. II at 19, 22; C.R. III at 18, 21; see C.R. I

at 17, 23; C.R. II at 17, 23; C.R. III at 16, 22)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2), a plea-bargaining

defendant, who pled guilty and received a sentence that did not exceed the agreed-

upon sentence, may appeal only: 1) those matters raised by written motion and

ruled on before trial or 2) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal. See

1
C.R. I refers to the clerk’s record for cause number 1971471 (No. 01-15-00149-CR);
C.R. II refers to the clerk’s record for cause number 1974172 (No. 01-15-00150-CR);
C.R. III refers to the clerk’s record for cause number 2001637 (No. 01-15-00151-CR).
also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 44.02 (West 2013). Additionally, a

defendant’s waiver of appeal in exchange for a sentence for which he bargained

with the State is enforceable. See Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000).

Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced pursuant to a plea bargain between

himself and the State. (C.R. I at 10-11, 16-17; C.R. II at 10-11, 16-17; C.R. III at

10-11, 15-16; see C.R. I at 27; C.R. II at 27; C.R. III at 26) No pre-trial motions

were filed by appellant or his attorney and ruled upon before his pleas.2 Appellant

affirmed he pled guilty and received the sentences for which he bargained with the

State. (See R.R. I at 4-5; R.R. II at 4-5; R.R. III at 4-5) 3 Appellant waived his

right to appeal and the trial court certified he had no right of appeal. (C.R. I at 10,

19; C.R. II at 10, 19; C.R. III at 10, 18) Appellant recalled the trial court’s

admonishment regarding his waiver of appeal and the trial court expressly denied

him permission to appeal. (R.R. I at 5, 8-9; R.R. II at 5, 8-9; R.R. III at 5, 8-9)

Appellant’s waiver of appeal is enforceable and he has not fulfilled the

requirements to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction over his appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 25.2(a)(2) (West 2013); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 44.02 (West 2013);

Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (stating appellate

2
Appellant’s trial counsel appears to have withdrawn from representing appellant once the pleas
were completed. (See C.R. I at 9, 11)
3
R.R. I refers to the reporter’s record for cause number 1974171 (No. 01-15-00149-CR);

2
courts, “must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the

basis for the appeal.”). Therefore, appellant’s appeal should be dismissed for want

of jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant was charged by information with striking one complainant with

his hand on July 14, 2014, striking a second complainant with a tattoo gun on July

14, 2014, and striking a third complainant with a closed fist on December 29,

2014. (C.R. I at 7, C.R. II at 7, C.R. III at 6) From the record, it appears warrants

for appellant’s arrest for the July assaults were issued on July 22, 2014, and

appellant was ultimately arrested for all offenses after the December assault. (C.R.

I at 15; C.R. II at 15; C.R. III at 7) Appellant is an “extended family member” of

the complainants in the July assaults and a cousin of the complainant in the

December assault. (C.R. I at 5-6; C.R. II at 5-6; C.R. III at 7)

Appellant pled guilty to all three cases on January 5, 2015, pursuant to a plea

bargain agreement reached between himself and the State. (C.R. I at 10-11; C.R. II

at 10-11; C.R. III at 10-11) Appellant’s sentences matched the plea bargain

agreements. (C.R. I at 16-17; C.R. II at 16-17; C.R. III at 15-16; see C.R. I at 10;

C.R. II at 10; C.R. III at 10) As part of his pleas of guilty, appellant waived his

R.R. II refers to the reporter’s record for cause number 1974172 (No. 01-15-00150-CR);
R.R. III refers to the reporter’s record for cause number 2001637 (No . 01-15-00151-CR).

3
right of appeal and signed documentation stating he was satisfied with the evidence

disclosed to his counsel and withdrawing requests for further discovery. (C.R. I at

10-14; C.R. II at 10-14; C.R. III at 10-14) The record contains no written motions

filed and ruled upon by the trial court prior to the pleas. The trial court certified

each case was a “plea-bargain case, and [appellant] has NO right of appeal,” signed

by appellant in each case. (C.R. I at 19; C.R. II at 19; C.R. III at 18)

At a hearing held on February 5, 2015, appellant affirmed he signed waivers

of appeal and understood the trial judge’s admonishment that the pleas were final

“and there was no appeal.” (R.R. I at 5, 9; R.R. II at 5, 9; R.R. III at 5, 9) The trial

court denied appellant permission to appeal. (R.R. I at 8; R.R. II at 8; R.R. III at 8)

On February 15, 2015, appellant filed a Pro Se Motion to Reverse and Remand “to

dismissal due to insufficient evidence” that was denied by the trial court. (C.R. I at

24; C.R. II at 24; C.R. III at 23)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Because appellant waived appeal to pled guilty and receive the punishment

agreed upon between himself and the State, the trial court certified appellant had

no right of appeal and expressly denied him permission to appeal, and appellant

filed no pre-trial motions ruled upon prior to his guilty pleas, appellant failed to

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction over his appeal. Therefore, appellant’s appeal

should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

4
 Alternatively, because appellant substantially failed to comply with Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1, his brief is so unclear as to prevent the State

from properly responding to or this Court from evaluating any issues on appeal.

Therefore, appellant’s complaint should be overruled for failure to present any

issues for appellate review. Finally, because the evidence is sufficient to support

appellant’s convictions and he failed to show that ineffective assistance of counsel

or a Brady violation occurred, appellant failed to show his pleas were involuntary.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR

In his sole point of error, appellant seems to assert multiple complaints: 1)

the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, as he is actually innocent of

the charges, and 2) his pleas were involuntary due to either a Brady violation by

the State or ineffective assistance of his defense counsel. (Appellant’s Brief at 2-3)

I. Due to substantial noncompliance with TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1, appellant
has not properly presented any issue for appellate review.

Though appellate courts must construe appellate briefs liberally, pro se

litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with

all applicable rules of procedure. Steffan v. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Vanderaa v. LVDVD, L.C., 314

S.W.3d 116, 117 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (overruling appellants’ issues

as inadequately briefed where appellants’ briefs failed to include several sections

5
mandated by Rule 38.1 and lacked any “arguments, legal analysis, or citations to

the record and legal authority analogous to those contentions . . . .”); TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.9. Additionally, an appellate court is not required “to search through the

record for support of an appellant’s assertion of error.” Thierry v. State, 288

S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing see Hajjar

v. State, 176 S.W.3d 554, 566 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d)).

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 lists the requirements of an

appellant’s brief. Some of the features an appellant’s brief must include are: an

identity of parties and counsel, a table of contents, an index of authorities, a

statement regarding oral argument, issues presented, a statement of facts, and a

summary of the argument. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a)-(c), (e)-(h). Appellant’s brief

contains none of these features.

Additionally, Rule 38.1 mandates that the argument in appellant’s brief

“contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant’s

brief must also give a statement of the case that should be supported by record

references and not discuss the facts. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(d). Appellant’s brief

makes no reference to the record or any legal authority and his argument is unclear.

Specifically, appellant’s argument that “trial counsel was ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to disclose that [the complainants] had intensive family violence

6
cases pending and warrants” and “the outcome of trial would’ve been different had

the arrest records of [the complainants] been made aware to the court by the

ineffective assistance of trial counsel” is unclear as to whether he claims his

defense counsel was ineffective for not informing appellant or “the Court” of

impeachment information regarding the complainants or that the State failed to

disclose impeachment information to appellant’s defense counsel. (Appellant’s

Brief at 2-3) Appellant also fails to explain or support with record and authority

citations how his claim of actual innocence relates to his assertion that “trial

counsel” was ineffective. As appellant failed to move for a new trial or provide

any affidavit from his defense counsel to clarify the issue, the State is unable to

properly respond to appellant’s indistinct assertions.

Therefore, because appellant’s brief complies with almost none of the

mandates of Rule 38.1, he has presented nothing for review to this Court and any

issues should be overruled. See Vanderaa, 314 S.W.3d at 118 (noting appellate

court “will not make [a]ppellants’ arguments for them” when appellants failed to

comply with TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 after the Court’s prior rejection of their brief).

II. Appellant’s point of error is substantively without merit.

Although appellant’s arguments are unclear and intertwined, appellant

appears to complain that: 1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction,

due through an actual innocence claim, and 2) his plea was involuntary due to a

7
failure to disclose some sort of family violence warrants, pending cases, and/or

incarceration regarding the complainants (which also potentially raises either a

claim of a Brady violation by the State or a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellant’s defense counsel). As appellant judicially confessed to the offenses and

the record is silent as to any support for appellant’s contentions regarding his

involuntary plea complaint, his point of error is substantively without merit.

A. The evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s convictions because
appellant judicially confessed to the offenses.

A sufficiency review regarding a defendant who pleads guilty differs from

the traditional Jackson sufficiency analysis. Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 604-

605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 30, 2003), pet. dism’d as improvidently

granted, 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 906

(2005). A guilty plea “waives all non-jurisdictional defenses, including challenges

to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 605 (citing Ex parte Williams, 703

S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). Instead, review is conducted to

determine if there is sufficient evidence supporting a defendant’s judgment of guilt

under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.15. Id.

Here, appellant pled guilty to assault and waived appeal in all three cases.

(C.R. I at 10-11; C.R. II at 10-11; C.R. III at 10-11) Appellant also acknowledged

he understood the trial court’s admonishment regarding his waiver of appeal. (R.R.

8
I at 5, 9; R.R. II at 5, 9; R.R. III at 5, 9) Therefore, appellant’s judicial confessions

are sufficient to support his conviction in each case. See Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605

(finding defendant’s judicial confession sufficient to show he used deadly weapon).

B. The record is devoid of any information to show appellant’s pleas were
involuntary.

Although unclear from his brief, appellant seems to complain that, because

alleged family violence criminal histories of the complainants were not disclosed,

“the outcome of trial would’ve been different,” indicating potentially that his guilty

pleas were involuntary. (Appellant’s Brief at 3) Though extremely vague as to

whether appellant’s contention is that the State never disclosed impeachable

criminal history of the complainants to his defense counsel, or that his defense

counsel failed to disclose any such information “to the Court,” the State will

address both of these complaints in what appears to be the context of a challenge to

the voluntariness of appellant’s pleas. (See Appellant’s Brief at 2-3)

Because appellant failed to meet his burden regarding an alleged Brady

violation by the State or an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he has failed to

show his pleas were involuntary.

1. Appellant failed to establish reversible error occurred under Brady.

To establish reversible error regarding an alleged Brady violation, appellant

has the burden to show: 1) the State suppressed evidence, 2) the suppressed

9
evidence is favorable to appellant, and 3) the suppressed evidence is material.

Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Little v. State,

991 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399,

402-403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). While the State has a duty to disclose material,

exculpatory evidence, it does not have a duty to disclose such information “if the

defendant was actually aware of the exculpatory evidence or could have accessed it

from other sources.” Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Regarding what could be a potential Brady claim of error, appellant recites

in his brief alleged “incarcerat[ions] for family violence,” “intensive family

violence cases pending and warrants” for the listed complainants, yet makes no

assertion that he received such information only after his guilty pleas were entered

or that he was unaware of any such information prior to his pleas. (Appellant’s

Brief at 2-3) Furthermore, the record evidence shows all of the complainants are

family members of appellant, indicating appellant likely knew of any criminal

history they may have had. (See C.R. I at 5-6; C.R. II at 5-6; C.R. III at 7)

Additionally, appellant’s brief gives no specific information regarding any

alleged offenses and makes no assertion as to whether the alleged family violence

“incarcerat[ions],” “cases pending and warrants” were in fact impeachable prior

convictions subject to disclosure under Brady or TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 39.14(h). Because appellant never moved for a new trial or had his attorney

10
provide an affidavit regarding whether any impeachable information was disclosed

to him by the State before appellant’s plea, the record is silent as to any of these

questions. Therefore, appellant failed to establish that: 1) if such family violence

impeachment information did exist, it was undisclosed by the State to appellant’s

defense counsel or unknown to appellant at the time of his pleas, and 2) if there

was a failure to disclose impeachment information, the failure was material, given

the record evidence. (See C.R. I at 5-6; C.R. II at 5-6; C.R. III at 7) Therefore,

appellant failed to show reversible error under Brady and this Court should

overrule this point of error.

2. Appellant failed to show his trial counsel’s actions fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

To show his trial counsel was ineffective, appellant must demonstrate: 1)

trial counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, and 2) a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome existed that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 109-10

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).

When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a plea entered upon the

advice of counsel, contending that his counsel was ineffective, “the voluntariness

11
of the plea depends on (1) whether counsel’s advice was within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and if not, (2) whether there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d

856, 857-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530,

536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 810 (1998)).

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s actions fell within the wide

range of reasonable professional behavior and were motivated by sound trial

strategy, so appellant has the burden to show his attorney’s performance “fell

below a reasonable standard of competence and that [appellant] would, with a

reasonable probability, have pled not guilty and insisted on going to trial had he

been properly advised . . . .” Id. at 858; Hill v. State, No. 14-14-00337-CR, 2015

WL 1736348, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 14, 2015, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813).

Any allegation of ineffectiveness must be “firmly founded in the record, and

the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Mallett v.

State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at

814). Here, the record is completely devoid of any inference or complaint that

appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective in any manner. Therefore, as the record is

12
silent as to any reasoning behind appellant’s trial counsel’s actions, appellant has

not met his burden to demonstrate his counsel was ineffective and this Court

should overrule appellant’s point of error.

Because appellant failed to establish reversible error under Brady or

ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, his point of error is without merit and

should be overruled by this Court.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that this Court dismiss this appeal for want of

jurisdiction. Alternatively, it is respectfully submitted that this Court overrule

appellant’s presented issues due to substantial noncompliance with TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1 or due to appellant’s failure to establish a meritorious claim.

DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas

/s/ Patricia McLean
PATRICIA MCLEAN
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
TBC No. 24081687
mclean_patricia@dao.hctx.net

13
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument will be mailed to
appellant at the following addresses:
James E. Guzman, pro se
TDC# 01023457; SPN 01125709
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Joe F. Gurney Transfer Facility
1385 FM 3328
Palestine, TX 75803
James E. Guzman, pro se
TDC# 01023457; SPN 01125709
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
P.O. Box 99
Huntsville, TX 77342-0099
/s/ Patricia McLean
PATRICIA MCLEAN
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
TBC No. 24081687

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned attorney certifies that this computer-generated document
has a word count of 2,850 words, based upon the representation provided by the
word processing program that was used to create the document.

/s/Patricia McLean
PATRICIA MCLEAN
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
TBC No. 24081687
Date: 6/16/2015

14