Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-15-00399-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.D.F., et al., Children
From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2014-PA-01274
Honorable Martha B. Tanner, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Jason Pulliam, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 9, 2015
AFFIRMED
Appellant R.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental
rights to her children L.D.F., B.L.F., J.L.F., and E.M.F. (“the Children”). 1 Mother argues the
evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that (1) Mother engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the Children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the
physical or emotional well-being of the Children; and (2) termination of Mother’s parental rights
is in the best interest of the Children. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the children’s parents as Mother and Father and to the
children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002 (West 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
04-15-00399-CV
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 30, 2014, the Department filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Following an adversary hearing held on June 11, 2014, the trial court signed a temporary order
assigning the Department as temporary managing conservator of the Children and assigning
Mother and W.F. (“Father”) as temporary possessory conservators with limited access.
The trial court held a status hearing and permanency hearings, and the parties tried the case
to the bench between June 15 and June 22, 2015. Mother was present at trial, was represented by
court-appointed counsel, and testified. After receipt of evidence and testimony, the trial court
rendered judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights, based upon the following ground for
termination: Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the Children with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being, pursuant to Texas
Family Code Section 161.001(1)(E). The trial court also found termination of Mother’s parental
rights to be in the best interest of the Children, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 161.001(2).
Mother perfected this appeal.
ANALYSIS
Mother complains the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s finding of a statutory ground for termination of her parental rights pursuant to Texas Family
Code Section 161.001(1)(E), and the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the Children. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 161.001(1)(E), (2) (West Supp. 2014).
Mother argues the Department failed to present evidence Mother demonstrated a voluntary,
deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangering the Children’s physical and emotional
well-being. Additionally, Mother argues any abuse the Children suffered at Father’s hands
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happened outside of Mother’s presence, and she consistently engaged in conduct that supported,
instead of endangered, the Children’s physical or emotional well-being.
Standard of Review
To support termination of parental rights under Family Code Section 161.001, the
Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence one or more of the acts or omissions
enumerated under subsection (1), and termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(1), (2); TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206(a) (West Supp. 2014); In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). Both elements must be established, and termination may not be
based solely on the best interest of the child. Tex. Dep’t of Human Srvs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531,
533 (Tex. 1987).
A parent’s right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of children is a
constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d
18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 273. Consequently, termination proceedings
must be strictly scrutinized, and “involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of
the parent.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Because termination “is complete, final, irrevocable, and
divests for all time that natural right … the evidence in support of termination must be clear and
convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights.” Id.; see In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 264-66. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2014); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
at 265-66. An appellate court must not reweigh issues of witness credibility but “‘must defer to
the [factfinder’s] determinations so long as those determinations are not themselves
unreasonable.’” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004)).
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Under the strict scrutiny implicit in termination cases and the necessity of clear and
convincing evidence, the traditional legal and factual standards of review are inadequate. In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-66. Instead, in conducting a legal sufficiency review in a termination-
of-parental-rights case, an appellate court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable
to the finding and determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that its ultimate findings are true. See id. at 266. In viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment, the appellate court “must assume that the factfinder resolved
disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so,” and “should disregard
all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”
Id. If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of all the evidence, a court determines no
reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction consistent with the final judgment,
then the court must conclude the evidence is legally insufficient. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-
66.
In conducting a factual sufficiency review in a parental-rights termination case, the
appellate court must review and consider the entire record, including evidence contrary to the
judgment, and determine whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could
have formed a firm conviction or belief about the truth of the Department’s allegations. Id. The
appellate court assumes the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
factfinder could do so, and disregards all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved. Id. In reviewing factual sufficiency, we consider whether the disputed evidence is
such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. Id.
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Statutory Grounds for Termination
Termination Based on Section 161:001(E): Endangerment
Under Subsection (E), the trial court was required to find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Mother “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(E). The term “endanger” means that the child was exposed to loss
or injury or jeopardized. In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no
pet.). Endangerment encompasses more “than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill
effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” In re S.M., 389 S.W.3d 483, 491 (Tex. App.—
El Paso, 2012, no pet.). Likewise, while endangerment often entails physical endangerment, the
statute does not require that conduct be directed at a child or cause actual harm, rather, it is
sufficient if the conduct endangers the emotional well-being of the child. Id. Thus, the court’s
inquiry encompasses acts that endanger a child’s physical or emotional well-being or both. Id.
The relevant inquiry for termination under Subsection (E) is whether evidence exists that
the endangerment was the direct result of the parents’ conduct, including acts, omissions, or
failures to act. Id. Termination requires a voluntary, deliberate and conscious course of conduct;
it must be based on more than a single act or omission. Id. It is not necessary that the parents’
conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury. Id; In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d
at 439.
The Evidence
Mother and Father had four children together: L.D.F who was born in 2007; B.L.F. who
was born in 2008; J.L.F. who was born in 2011; and E.M.F. who was born in 2013. Prior to the
instant case, Mother voluntarily relinquished custody of L.D.F. and B.L.F. in 2008, and the
children returned to her custody in 2009. In 2011, the Department removed L.D.F. and B.L.F.
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from the home, and returned the children in 2012 after Mother complied with the Department’s
service plan.
The trial court heard evidence of the Department’s extensive involvement with the family,
which began with an allegation of physical abuse against Father when L.D.F. was just six months
old. Subsequently, the Department received allegations of neglectful supervision regarding
occasions on which L.D.F. or B.L.F. exited the home while unaccompanied and unsupervised.
Mother testified one such allegation, which involved B.L.F. entering a neighbor’s home while
bleeding, was a false report made by the neighbor following a verbal altercation between the
neighbor and Father, but she acknowledged the two children were able to leave the home
undetected. The trial court heard evidence of additional occasions when Mother left the Children
in Father’s sole care, including an incident in which B.L.F. slipped, fell, and injured his lip when
Father left him in the bathtub unattended.
The record reflects the Department also received reports of physical abuse. The
Department submitted photographs depicting various cuts, bruises, and abrasions on the Children.
Mother explained the bruises and other injuries could be attributed to roughhousing, and she
described the injuries as normal bumps and bruises. Mother also testified many of the injuries
sustained by B.L.F. were caused by the child himself because of his “mobility issues” and because
he slammed his body against any available surface when having a tantrum. Mother admitted she
believed some of the injuries were caused by Father’s harsh discipline, but had no explanation for
why she continued to leave the Children in Father’s sole care on weekends.
Mother testified she left the home each weekend to earn fifty dollars by cleaning the home
of Lynn Thompson. Emily Chamberlain, a visitation monitor at the children’s shelter, testified
Mother confessed to using the weekends away as a “break” and to party. Further, Mrs. Thompson
testified she and her husband had an arrangement with Mother in which Mother engaged in sexual
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intercourse with Mr. Thompson while Mrs. Thompson watched. Mother testified she continued
this arrangement despite her concerns regarding the Children’s safety with Father.
The trial court also heard evidence regarding the conditions of Mother’s home. Department
caseworker Nicole Solis testified she worked with the family in 2008 and 2009. Solis visited the
family two or more times a month for several months, and according to Solis, the majority of the
times she visited, the home was filthy and in deplorable condition. Solis reported the home was
consistently dirty with trash and dirty laundry throughout the home, exposed dirty diapers and used
tampons on the floor, and food caked on a high chair that attracted flies. According to Solis,
Mother reported she was overwhelmed caring for two small children.
Mother acknowledged the home had a cockroach problem and was “a little” dirty at the
time of the 2011 removal. Photographs submitted by the Department depicted trash and diapers
littering the floor and a child’s bare feet nearly blackened with dirt. A Department caseworker
made a surprise visit to the home the day before the 2014 removal, and the record reflects the
caseworker found the home in unhealthy and unsafe conditions. Human fecal matter and trash
covered the floor, and the home smelled strongly of cat urine. The Children were found with dirt
and dried food on their faces, and feces on their feet.
The Department presented evidence of its attempts to work with Mother regarding the poor
condition of the home, as well as evidence of the lack of improvement on Mother’s part. Mother
testified she cleaned every day, but the home deteriorated into deplorable conditions when she left
for the weekend. However, Mother also testified she decided not to clean because she was tired
of being the only one who did so. Mother acknowledged the conditions were especially dangerous
for B.L.F. who suffers from Pica disease and put things in his mouth indiscriminately and without
scrutiny.
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L.D.F. made an initial outcry of sexual abuse against Father in August 2014. Her outcry
included statements giving rise to the concern Father sexually abused B.L.F. and J.L.F. as well.
The Department notified Mother, but Mother testified she did not believe the Department’s report.
Mother asserted she knew nothing about the sexual abuse occurring until after L.D.F. made an
outcry against Father directly to Mother at the beginning of October 2014. The trial court heard
other testimony, however, that Mother suspected sexual abuse much earlier. In January 2014,
Mother took L.D.F. and E.M.F. to the hospital for examinations upon the advice of a Department
caseworker and because the two children displayed physical symptoms consistent with sexual
abuse. According to Mother, the results of the exams were negative, and her suspicions were
allayed. However, the trial court heard evidence of yet another incident that caused Mother to
suspect sexual abuse. Chamberlain testified Mother described an incident in which Mother
returned home early to find all four children completely naked, and B.L.F. alone with Father in
bed. Chamberlain testified Mother reported the incident caused her concern. Mother, however,
continued leaving the Children alone with Father overnight when she went to the Thompson’s
home.
We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence in this case. After review of all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could
have formed a firm belief or conviction Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
Children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the Children’s physical or
emotional well-being. The evidence revealed Mother consistently left the Children in Father’s
sole care each weekend so she could have her own time despite the pattern of injuries and incidents
showing the Children were not safe in Father’s care. Mother also continued to leave the Children
in Father’s care despite her suspicions of sexual abuse and fears the Children were not safe with
Father. The evidence further demonstrated a pattern of Mother’s inaction regarding the condition
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of the home she maintained for the Children. The evidence showed the conditions were unsafe
and unhealthy for the Children, and especially dangerous for B.L.F. The evidence is, thus, legally
sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under Family Code Section
161.001(1)(E).
Based upon this same evidence and considering the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that Mother violated Section 161.001(1)(E).
Consequently, based upon the same evidence and conclusions, the evidence is also factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under Section 161.001(1)(E).
We hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to Section
161.001 (1)(E). Thus, we overrule Mother’s appellate issue with regard to this finding.
Best Interest of the Children
Mother next challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the Children.
When considering the best interest of the child, we recognize the existence of a strong
presumption that the child’s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In
re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). However, we also presume that prompt and permanent
placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.307(a) (West 2014). In determining the best interest of the child, the court may consider the
following factors: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child
now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4)
the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals
or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts
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or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a
proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27
(Tex. 2002). “The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a
factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s
best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered
the safety of the child.” Id. In analyzing these factors, the court must focus on the best interest of
the child, not the best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).
Further, the same evidence proving acts or omissions under Family Code Section
161.001(1) may be also probative of best interest of the child. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. A
factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future
if the child is returned to the parent. In re B.K.D., 131 S.W.3d 10, 17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied).
Turning to the evidence regarding the best interest of the child, we consider the Holley
factors as outlined above.
Desires of the Children
As to the first factor, evidence weighs in favor of the trial court’s finding. At the time of
trial, L.D.F. was the only child able to verbally communicate her desires. B.L.F., although seven
years’ old, possessed intellectual disabilities causing the inability to verbally communicate. J.L.F.
and E.M.F. were too young to communicate.
Child Advocate P.R. (“the volunteer”) testified L.D.F. informed her the week before trial
she was looking forward to being a part of a “forever family.” According to the volunteer, during
Mother’s visits, L.D.F. was withdrawn and unexcited. The volunteer further testified L.D.F.
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related she did not trust Mother, did not feel safe around Mother, and did not want to be around
Mother. Eventually, L.D.F. decided she wanted no more visits with Mother. Judith Dickey, a
counselor who worked with L.D.F., testified L.D.F. expressed anger toward Mother for failing to
protect her from Father.
Physical and Emotional Needs
Because of the age and intellectual limitations of the other three children, at the time of
trial, L.D.F. was the only child able to take part in professional counseling. ChildSafe counselor
Adam Campos testified L.D.F. was in the early stages of the therapeutic process despite being in
counseling since August 2014. According to Campos, for L.D.F.’s therapy to progress
successfully, L.D.F. needed a caregiver who would go beyond simply providing basic needs, listen
to her, provide nurturing, make her feel safe, and reinforce the skills L.D.F. learned in therapy.
The trial court heard evidence E.M.F. recently began physical therapy, occupational
therapy, and speech therapy, and was seeing a delayed disability specialist. The volunteer testified
J.L.F exhibited signs of being developmentally delayed. J.L.F. understood some commands, but
did not respond verbally often. The trial court heard evidence indicating J.L.F. and E.M.F. were
exposed to abuse, but there was no way to know how affected by the abuse they may be because
they lack the vocabulary to fully convey their feelings and ideas.
The volunteer testified she observed improved behavior in the younger children the longer
they were removed from Mother’s custody. While J.L.F. and E.M.F. were too young to
communicate effectively, the volunteer testified she observed the two younger children engaging
in healthy and normal behavior in their foster placement. The volunteer testified she observed
healthy conflict such as not wanting to share toys, wanting to be first, and attempting to gain
attention, whereas when the children were first removed from Mother’s custody, their behavior
was atypical in that the children never fought or exhibited healthy conflict among themselves.
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The volunteer also testified B.L.F.’s behavior improved considerably when he was moved
into institutionalized placement to handle his specific needs. 2 Despite B.L.F.’s improvement,
caseworkers testified they did not believe Mother would be able to provide the attention needed to
properly address B.L.F.’s continued needs. Mother admitted she would likely not be able to
provide for B.L.F.’s medical and behavioral needs.
The trial court could infer, from Mother’s past and recent conduct and given the likelihood
all of the Children would require continuing therapy and counseling, as well as Mother’s admission
she would likely not be able to meet the needs of even one child, that Mother was not capable of
meeting the Children’s physical and emotional needs in the future.
Physical and Emotional Danger
Mother testified she would do her best to protect the Children from any future unhealthy
relationships. However, Mother admitted she had poor judgment regarding the people she allowed
in her life. For example, Mother testified she believed Alan “A.J.” Thompson, Jr., the son of Lynn
Thompson and her husband, a man with whom she had a short romantic relationship and then
continued to share an apartment, had “psychiatric issues.” Despite this, Mother allowed A.J. to
accompany her to the supervised visits with the Children.
Caseworkers and counselors testified B.L.F. had not received counseling or therapy for the
abuse he suffered because of his intellectual disabilities. B.L.F. continued acting out and
exhibiting inappropriate sexual behavior. Mother testified she would be able to watch over B.L.F.
and recognize whether he acted out inappropriately against his siblings. Mother admitted,
however, she had not been able to recognize the signs in the past. Campos testified the siblings
2
B.L.F. was diagnosed with Marfan’s syndrome, attention deficit disorder, oppositional defiance disorder, Pica
disease, and “borderline” autism. Marfan’s syndrome is a genetic connective tissue disorder affecting joints and body
tissue, including the eyes, spinal cord, and heart.
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have a history of sexually reacting with each other, and he recommended they should always be
monitored and the four should not share a room, but have individual rooms. With regard to L.D.F.,
Campos testified any instability, reversion to the role of caregiver, or exposure to sexually
inappropriate behavior would cause L.D.F.’s therapy to regress.
The trial court could infer from the evidence regarding Mother’s inability to protect the
Children in the past, as well as her current conduct, that Mother was not capable of protecting the
Children against physical and emotional danger in the future.
Parental Abilities
With regard to the fourth factor, the evidence weighs in favor of the trial court’s finding.
The trial court heard evidence regarding Mother’s parenting skills, or lack thereof. Dickey testified
L.D.F. reported cleaning the home and supervising her younger siblings when she was seven years
old and younger. The volunteer testified L.D.F. would not fully relax or enjoy playing with her
siblings because L.D.F. was too concerned with their physical and emotional needs. According to
the volunteer, L.D.F. cleaned the others, checked their diapers, and comforted the others when
they were upset. While the two younger children were not able to verbally express their
experiences, the volunteer testified she witnessed J.L.F. and E.M.F. treating L.D.F. as a mother
figure even when Mother was present during the visitation.
The volunteer further testified Mother demonstrated lack of engagement with B.L.F. during
visits. According to the volunteer, Mother treated B.L.F. differently, would not play with him,
and would not make eye contact with him. The volunteer testified B.L.F. would attempt to engage
Mother, but Mother would instead focus her attention on her cell phone. Department caseworker
Peydon Sharkey testified Mother did not display interest in B.L.F.’s birthday, although Mother
called the other children and gave them gifts on their birthdays.
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Stability of the Home
The evidence demonstrated that since the Children’s removal, Mother did not maintain
stable employment or stable housing. Mother testified she lived with the Thompsons for
approximately four months following the Children’s removal. She moved into her own residence
for approximately three weeks, but was unable to pay rent at that location when she lost her job at
a convenience store. She then lived with A.J. for approximately nine months. Mother testified
she worked at another convenience store for six months while living with A.J. but reported she
lost her job when she accepted counterfeit money. Counselor Sylvia Vargas testified, however,
Mother related she was terminated because “her roommate was harassing her.”
The volunteer testified she visited the apartment Mother shared with A.J. several times.
According to the volunteer, the floor was dirty and covered with trash, the kitchen counters were
cluttered, and the furniture was soiled with cat urine and feces. She further testified the bathtub
was black and the toilet was stained from not being cleaned. According to the volunteer, a strong
odor permeated the apartment, and the volunteer nearly became ill from the smell in the bathroom.
Sharkey testified there was a noticeable odor of cats in the apartment. According to Sharkey, when
Mother was confronted with the condition of the apartment, she explained she was working long
hours or had been sleeping. At trial, Mother described the apartment’s condition as “fine” with
the exception of the cat odor, but agreed the condition was “unacceptable in CPS’s eyes.”
Mother testified she had been working part-time at a fast food restaurant for three months
and living with coworker Marian Smith and Smith’s boyfriend for a month at the time of trial.
Mother testified she currently used one extra bedroom, but that Smith was going to allow her the
use of an additional room for the Children. According to Mother, the space was large enough for
her and all the children, but it was temporary. Mother planned to place the two boys in one room
and the girls in the other while she slept in the living room.
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The volunteer testified the only furnishings in Smith’s home when she visited were a coffee
table and fish tanks. The volunteer further testified all other belongings were on the floor,
including bedding and clothing. According to the volunteer, Smith’s boyfriend related the
Children were not welcome in the home and Mother was welcome for only another week. Sharkey
testified Smith’s boyfriend informed him Mother was supposed to have moved out the week before
trial. Smith, however, testified Mother and the Children were welcome until Mother was living
independently, which Smith estimated would be within two to three weeks.
The testimony at trial showed the Department had not yet approved Smith’s home because
Smith and her boyfriend were reluctant to provide the Department access to their home and refused
to provide information for purposes of background checks. Mother admitted Smith had a history
of involvement with the Department and Smith’s boyfriend had a criminal background involving
drugs.
In light of Mother’s historic inability to provide a stable home for the Children and the
testimony regarding the current lack of stability in Mother’s employment and living situations, the
trial court could infer that Mother will be unable to meet the Children’s need for stability in the
future.
Plans for the Children
Regarding the final factor, the evidence weighs in favor of the trial court’s finding. Mother
testified she intended to enroll the two older children in public school and after-school care, and
she planned to place the two younger children in daycare. Mother testified she hoped she would
soon be working full-time to afford childcare and housing, and she stated she intended to find an
apartment for her family. However, Mother admitted she had not yet actually contacted any
apartment complexes and had yet to finalize full-time employment.
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Conclusion
After determination and weight of the Holley factors and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the finding, we conclude the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm
conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Thus, the
evidence is legally sufficient to support this finding. Based upon the same evidence and
conclusions, the evidence is also factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
termination was in the Children’s best interest.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we overrule Mother’s points of issue in which she
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
termination of her parental rights was warranted under Texas Family Code Sections 161.001(1)(E)
and termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to
Mother. No costs shall be assessed against Mother in relation to this appeal because she qualifies
as indigent.
Jason Pulliam, Justice
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