ACCEPTED
01-15-00530-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
6/26/2015 5:01:06 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-15-00530-CV
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
6/26/2015 5:01:06 PM
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTONCHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
In re Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.,
Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
from Cause No. 72817 in the 239th Judicial District
Court of Brazoria County, Texas
(Hon. Patrick Sebesta, Presiding)
GRETHER, PAUL HEINIG, PLANTATION HEALTH CARE, INC., SARA
RICHARDS, AMY STEWART, COUNTRY VILLAGE CARE, INC., AND
GRETHER HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, L.L.C.’S RESPONSE TO
RELATOR’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Breck Harrison
State Bar No. 24007325
bharrison@jw.com
Scott W. Weatherford
State Bar No. 24079554
sweatherford@jw.com
JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.
100 Congress Ave., Ste. 1100
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 236-2000
(512) 236-2002 – Fax
ATTORNEYS FOR REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties before the trial court and the
names and addresses of all trial counsel and appellate counsel:
1. Plaintiff in the trial court (Relator in this Court) and counsel:
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.
Represented by:
Felicia Harris
State Bar No. 24002438
fharris@burlesonllp.com
Burleson L.L.P.
700 Milam, Suite 1100
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 358-1700
Facsimile: (713) 358-1717
Brandy R. Manning
State Bar No. 24029703
brmanning@burlesonllp.com
Burleson L.L.P.
223 W. Wall St., Suite 400
Midland, Texas 79701
Telephone: (432) 253-8600
Facsimile: (432) 253-8601
i
2. Defendants1 in the trial court (Real Parties in Interest in this Court) and
counsel:
Rebecca Ann, Inc.
Donald Grether
Paul Heinig
Plantation Health Care, Inc.
Represented by:
Breck Harrison
State Bar No. 24007325
bharrison@jw.com
Scott W. Weatherford
State Bar No. 24079554
sweatherford@jw.com
JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.
100 Congress Avenue,
Suite 1100
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 236-2000
Facsimile: (512) 236-2002
Justin R. Gilbert
State Bar No. 24043691
justingilbert@gilbertfurey.com
GILBERT & FUREY
222 N. Velasco, Suite A
Angleton, Texas 77515
Telephone: (979) 849-5741
Facsimile: (979) 849-7729
1
Although these parties initiated the underlying lawsuit as plaintiffs, the trial court recently
granted Relator’s Motion to Realign the Parties and re-classified Real Parties in Interest as
Defendants.
ii
3. Former2 Third-Party Defendants in the trial court (Real Parties in Interest in
this Court) and counsel:
Sara Richards
Amy Stewart
Grether Health Care Facilities L.L.C.
Country Village Care, Inc.
Represented by:
Breck Harrison
State Bar No. 24007325
bharrison@jw.com
Scott W. Weatherford
State Bar No. 24079554
sweatherford@jw.com
JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.
100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1100
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 236-2000
Facsimile: (512) 236-2002
Justin R. Gilbert
State Bar No. 24043691
justingilbert@gilbertfurey.com
GILBERT & FUREY
222 N. Velasco, Suite A
Angleton, Texas 77515
Telephone: (979) 849-5741
Facsimile: (979) 849-7729
Stephen Coleman
Represented by:
Zandra Foley
State Bar No. 24038085
zfoley@thompsoncoe.com
2
These parties were dismissed pursuant to the trial court’s May 5, 2015 consolidated order
granting Real Parties’ Motion to Strike (the “Motion”). (R. 2).
iii
Andrew Johnson
State Bar No. 24060025
ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com
THOMPSON, COE, COUSINS & IRONS, L.L.P.
One Riverway, Suite 1400
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone: (713) 403-8210
Facsimile: (713) 403-8299
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .............................................................i
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................................................. xiii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................xiv
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION ..............................................xv
BRIEF REFERENCES ...........................................................................................xvi
REPLY TO ISSUES PRESENTED ..................................................................... xvii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1
A. Relator sought to expand the underlying lawsuit from a
commercial lease dispute to an overarching conspiracy
theory...........................................................................................4
B. Relator engaged in virtually unimpeded discovery
throughout the litigation..............................................................5
C. The trial court correctly granted Real Parties’ Motion to
Strike. ..........................................................................................6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................8
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW......................................10
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................13
I. Relator’s Petition and Accompanying Record Are Procedurally
Deficient. .............................................................................................13
II. Respondent Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Granting Real
Parties’ Motion to Strike Relator’s Amended Pleadings. ...................17
A. Respondent correctly dismissed Relator’s Amended
Pleadings. ..................................................................................17
1. The Amended Pleadings violate Rule 63. ......................17
2. The continuance of the trial date had no effect on the
deadline to amend pleadings...........................................23
3. The Amended Pleading violates Rule 38. ......................26
v
4. Rule 91a did not afford Relator an “absolute right” to
file the Amended Pleadings............................................27
B. Relator has not met its heavy burden of establishing the trial
court clearly abused its discretion by striking the Amended
Pleadings. ..................................................................................28
1. Considering the facts and circumstances of the suit,
the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion..........28
2. Relator has not met its heavy burden of establishing
no adequate remedy by appeal........................................31
III. The Trial Court Has Not Abused Its Discretion in Setting Proper
Limits on Relator’s Abusive and Harassing Discovery Efforts..........33
A. Several issues raised by Relator are moot. ...............................33
B. Relator fails to identify specific orders from which it
requests relief. ...........................................................................35
C. The Court set proper limits on Relator’s request for
immaterial and irrelevant policies and procedures. .................36
D. Relator has not demonstrated that it lacks an adequate
remedy by appeal. .....................................................................38
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................39
RULE 52.3(J) CERTIFICATION............................................................................40
RULE 9.4 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .....................................................41
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................42
APPENDIX ..............................................................................................................43
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Am. Title Co. of Houston v. Bomac Mortgage Holdings, L.P.,
196 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated
w.r.m.) .................................................................................................................18
Axelson v. McIlhany,
798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding) ..................................................33
Bates v. Sunshare RV, Ltd.,
2010 WL 3582487 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 15, 2010, no pet.).............23
Beaumont Bank N.A. v. Buller,
806 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991) ..............................................................................10
Boring & Tunneling Co. v. Salazar,
782 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) ......34
Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med.,
271 S.W.3d 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ...............4, 13
Clanton v. Clark,
639 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1982) ........................................................................11, 26
Crofts v. Court of Civil Appeals,
362 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1962) ..............................................................................36
Daniels v. Yancey,
175 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.)....................................24
Dow Chem. Co. v. Garcia,
909 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995) ..............................................................................34
Ex parte King,
819 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) ................................16
Felker v. Petrolon, Inc.,
929 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied)...............24
vii
First State Bank of Mesquite v. Bellinger & Dewolf, L.L.P.,
342 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) ........................................19
Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.,
130 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)........................21
G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enterprises, Inc. v. Reece Supply Co.,
177 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) ..........................................26
Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co.,
787 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1990) ..............................................................................18
Gunn v. Fuqua,
397 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied)..............................12, 19
Hakemy Bros., Ltd. v. State Bank & Trust Co.,
189 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)..................12, 18, 19, 23
Hardin v. Hardin,
597 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1980) ........................................................................11, 18
In re Arthur Andersen, L.L.P.,
121 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig.
proceeding) ...................................................................................................29, 31
In re Bristol–Myers Squibb Co.,
975 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1998) ..............................................................................15
In re Butler,
270 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding).....................14, 15
In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P.,
164 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) .........................................................11
In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
306 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) .........................................................11
In re Conner,
458 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. 2015) ..............................................................................31
In re CSX Corp.,
124 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2003) ..............................................................................32
viii
In re D. Wilson Constr. Co.,
196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006) ..............................................................................10
In re Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
198 S.W.3d (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).................................................................10
In re Estate of Henry,
250 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) ..........................................11
In re Huag,
No. 14-04-01077-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 587, 2005 WL 171456
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2005, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op. per curiam) ................................................................................................3, 13
In re Kim,
No. 05-14-01344-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11734 (Tex. App.—
Dallas, Oct. 23, 2014, orig. proceeding).............................................................14
In re Laibe Corp.,
307 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) .........................................................10
In re Lewis,
No. 14-15-00122, 2015 Tex. App LEXIS 1620 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Feb. 19, 2015, orig. proceeding)...............................................................35
In re McDonald,
424 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, orig. proceeding).....................15
In re Michelle,
335 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig.
proceeding) .............................................................................................13, 14, 16
In re Noble Drilling (Jim Thompson), L.L.C.,
449 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding) 28, 32
In re Progressive Cty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 05-15-00622-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5009 (Tex. App.—Dallas
May 15, 2015, orig. proceeding) ........................................................................36
In re Stern,
321 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)......................32
ix
In re Tasby,
40 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding) .....................36
In re Taylor,
113 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) ......15
Johnson v. Ingram Readymix, Inc.,
No. 03-09-00568, 2010 Tex. App.—LEXIS 10268 (Tex. App.—Austin
Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.)........................................................................................20
Jones v. Cortes,
No. 02-10-00304-CV, 2011 WL 4008021 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept.
8, 2011, no pet.) ............................................................................................31, 32
Killam Ranch Properties, Ltd. v. Webb Co.,
2008 WL 4958452 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2008, no pet.) .............24
Oistad v. Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P.,
No. 01-05-00493-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1639, 2006 WL 488594
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op) ..................27
Polaris Investment Management Corp. v. Abascal,
892 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) ...................................................13, 38
Rodriguez v. Cuellar,
143 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) .........18, 21
Roskey v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
190 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)....................................12
Ryland Group, Inc. v. White,
723 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) .....................29
Singleton v. Nw. Tex. Healthcare Sys.,
No. 07-03-0552-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1594 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Feb. 28, 2006, no pet.) ........................................................................................19
Smith Detective Agency & Nightwatch Serv., Inc. v. Stanley Smith Sec., Inc.,
938 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied) ...................................11
State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick,
874 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1994) ........................................................................18, 19
x
Torres v. GSC Enterp., Inc.,
242 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) ........................................23
Tucker v. Gayle,
709 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ)...................12
Varme v. Gordon,
881 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) ............29
Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) ......................................... 10, 12, 13, 14, 28, 38, 39
STATUTES
TEX. R. APP. P. 52 ..............................................................................................14, 16
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3 .........................................................................................3, 4, 13
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(d)........................................................................................... xiii
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(g)...............................................................................................1
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j)....................................................................................3, 14, 40
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k).............................................................................................14
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A) ..................................................................................35
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4(b)...............................................................................................1
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(1) ........................................................................................15
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(2) ....................................................................................3, 16
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11(c).............................................................................................1
TEX. R. CIV. P. 38.....................................................................................................26
TEX. R. CIV. P. 38(a) ..........................................................................................26, 27
TEX. R. CIV. P. 40.....................................................................................................28
TEX. R. CIV. P. 40(b) ................................................................................................29
TEX. R. CIV. P. 63................................................................ 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24
xi
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a .........................................................................................7, 27, 28
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b) ...........................................................................................27
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166...................................................................................................11
TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4................................................................................................19
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Practice, Procedure and Review, 33 REV. LITIG. 469, 475 (2014) .........................28
xii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Real Parties provide the following Statement of the Case because Relator,
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc., presented a Statement of the Case that fails to comply
with TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(d) in that it contains argument and certain disputed facts.
Nature of the Breach of lease and guaranty agreements. The
Underlying Suit: underlying suit is styled Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.
v. Rebecca Ann, Inc., Donald Grether, and Paul
Heinig; Cause No. 72817.
Parties: Relator Sunset Nursing Home, Inc. is the Plaintiff in
the underlying suit; Real Parties in Interest Rebecca
Ann, Inc., Donald Grether, and Paul Heinig are
Defendants, Plantation Health Care, Inc. is a Third-
Party Defendant, while Sara Richards, Amy
Stewart, Stephen Coleman, Country Village Care,
Inc., and Grether Health Care Facilities, Inc. were
Third-Party Defendants when the action from which
relief is requested took place.
Respondent: The Honorable Patrick Sebesta, Presiding Judge of
the 239th Judicial District Court, Brazoria County,
Texas.
Actions from which Respondent’s May 5, 2015 order granting Real
Relief Requested: Parties’ Motion to Strike (R. 2); Respondent’s
September 30, 2014 order limiting production of
policies and procedures (R. 37); and Respondent’s
April 6, 2015 order regarding third-party subpoena
to MDS Research Company (R. 58).
Emergency Relief Relators filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Trial
Requested: Court Proceedings simultaneously with its Petition
for Writ of Mandamus, which this Court denied.
xiii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because the issues are clear, Real Parties believe oral argument will not
materially aid the Court’s resolution of Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. If
the Court concludes otherwise, however, Real Parties ask that they be allowed to
present oral argument in response to Relator’s argument.
xiv
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION
This case is currently specially set for trial on August 10, 2015.
Accordingly, Real Parties respectfully request expedited consideration of the
Petition in light of the imminent trial setting.
xv
BRIEF REFERENCES
This brief references the parties as follows:
Relator Sunset Nursing Home, Inc. “Relator”
Real Parties in Interest: “Real Parties”
Rebecca Ann, Inc. “RAI”
Paul Heinig “Heinig”
Donald Grether “Grether”
Plantation Health Care, Inc. “Plantation”
Amy Stewart “Stewart”
Sara Richards “Richards”
Country Village Care, Inc. “CVC”
Grether Health Care Facilities, L.L.C. “GHCF”
This brief references the mandamus record as:
Relator’s Mandamus Record and “R. [Tab]”
Supplemental Mandamus Record3
Real Parties’ Supplemental Mandamus Record “Supp. R. [Tab]”
This brief references Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus and
Supplemental Petition for Writ of Mandamus as the “Petition”
3
By citing to Relator’s Mandamus Record, Real Parties do not intend to waive any argument
that Relator’s Mandamus Record is procedurally and substantively deficient.
xvi
REPLY TO ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Respondent correctly struck Relator’s Amended Pleadings that (i)
sought to add five new parties to the underlying lawsuit less than three months
before trial, (ii) was filed over seven months after the deadline for filing an
amended petition, and (iii) operated to surprise and unfairly prejudice Real Parties.
(2) Although it is unclear from what discovery order Relator seeks
relief—and whether or not that request for relief is now moot—the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in placing appropriate limits on Relator’s efforts to
burden Real Parties with harassing discovery requests seeking irrelevant and
proprietary information outside the scope of the issues presented in this breach of
lease dispute.
xvii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Real Parties take issue with the Relator’s statement of facts, which is neither
concise (i.e., 25 pages) nor without argument (e.g., “Just as the Grethers blatantly
ignored their contractual obligations in an effort to destroy Relator’s business, they
have consistently ignored their discovery obligations in an effort to hide the
truth.”), nor material to this mandamus proceeding.4 Nor are the facts within, for
the most part, supported by citation to competent evidence included in the
Appendix or record.5 In some instances the facts asserted are either grossly
misleading or omit an obviously important material fact.6 The following are just a
few examples of Relator’s deficient factual assertions:
“Critically, the Grethers promised to transfer all licenses and subsidy
contracts to Sunset….” Petition, p. 14. Real Parties did not promise
to transfer all licenses and subsidy contracts. Instead, Real Parties
agreed to effectuate a “change” of licenses and subsidy contracts, of
which there are multiple ways to accomplish apart from a direct
transfer. (R. 69, p. 8) (“Lessee shall cooperate with Lessor in having a
change of al licenses and subsidy contracts”). This obligation is
further limited to requiring only action that is “reasonably requested
by Lessor.” Id.
“[T]he Grethers and their attorney Steve Coleman began actively
sabotaging the Sunset facilities, ultimately causing at least hundreds
of thousands of dollars in damages.” Petition, p. 17. In addition to
being completely immaterial to the issues before the Court, this
argument is unsupported by citation to competent evidence and is a
gross misstatement of “fact.”
4
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4(b).
5
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(g).
6
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11(c).
1
“[T]he Grethers refused to transfer the names. . . removed all of the
computers from both facilities along with hard copies of patient
records, all policy and procedures documentation, equipment, beds,
supplies, and other personal property.” Petition, p. 18. Aside from
being highly disputed, Relator misrepresents the true nature of its
allegations. Relator does not claim that Real Parties removed all
equipment, all beds, and all supplies; rather, Relator alleges Real
Parties removed “certain records of the nursing facilities and medical
equipment,” an allegation that is, again, disputed. (R. 48).
“[T]he Grethers have resisted producing even documents that they
were contractually obligated to deliver under the Leases.” Petition,
p. 25. Real Parties have been compliant with the trial court’s orders
and Relator’s requests for discovery, only resisting and objecting
when reasonable and necessary. For example, Real Parties made
available for Relator’s inspection and copying over twenty bankers
boxes of patient medical records. (Supp. R. 2). In addition, the
“policies and procedures” continually referenced by Relator, despite
being highly proprietary documents, were submitted for the trial
court’s in camera review. (Supp. R. 3).
“[T]he Grethers insisted on deposing Mr. and Mrs. Smith in a
courtroom . . . .” Petition, p. 26. Another misleading assertion, as the
trial court—in response to Relator’s demand that the depositions of
Relator’s representatives be taken in a conference room in the
courthouse as opposed to their counsel’s office or other suitable
location—directed that the depositions of parties occur in a courtroom
because the court’s conference room was too small. (Supp. R. 4).
“[T]he court’s order compelled the production of ‘all responsive
documents,’ but counsel’s letter indicates that he simply turned over
whatever he obtained from MDS, so . . . [Relator] has no way of
knowing exactly what documents . . . may have been withheld by the
Grethers.” Petition, p. 30. Seemingly implying that the Grethers
withheld certain documents produced by MDS in response to the
subpoena, Relator omits that Real Parties’ counsel’s letter states that
“all documents produced by MDS” were enclosed for in camera
review. (R. 57).
2
“At the August 29, 2014 hearing, the court . . . stated that all
deadlines were lifted and that new dates should be set from a new
trial date.” There is no citation to competent evidence to support this
assertion, which is disputed. Relator does not include in the
mandamus record a transcript of this hearing, nor does Relator state
that no such hearing or record occurred.7
“[T]he trial court struck the amended pleadings, essentially freeing
all but the original Grether parties (2 defunct companies and the
uncle and dad of Sara and Amy) from the consequences of the group’s
concerted wrongful conduct.” Petition, p. 28. Because—at its core—
this lawsuit is a commercial lease dispute, Relator initially sued the
lessee (Plantation), the sublessee (RAI), and the two personal
guarantors (Grether and Heinig). (R. 82). These parties remain
defendants in the underlying suit, and Relator will have the
opportunity to try its case against them for alleged breach of the lease
and guaranty agreements. To imply the trial court has somehow
deprived Relator of any potential recourse is as misleading as it is
desperate.
Perhaps the best example of Relator’s misrepresentations and misstatements
in its Statement of Facts is the fact that Relator’s Petition fails to comply with TEX.
R. APP. P. 52.3. Rule 52.3(j) requires that the “person filing the petition must
certify that he or she has reviewed the petition and concluded that every factual
statement in the petition is supported by competent evidence included in the
appendix or record.” Relator wholly failed to include this certification. Relator’s
failure to comply with the applicable procedural rules is, by itself, a sufficient
reason to deny its petition.8
7
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(2).
8
See In re Huag, No. 14-04-01077-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 587, 2005 WL 171456, *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2005, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per curiam) (denying
3
Including, and in addition to the foregoing, Relator makes numerous
unfounded factual assertions that are strongly contested and unsupported by the
mandamus record. Accordingly, Real Parties put those facts at issue and provide
the following Statement of Facts to aid the Court’s resolution.
A. Relator sought to expand the underlying lawsuit from a commercial
lease dispute to an overarching conspiracy theory.
RAI is a family-owned business that has been in the nursing home industry
for over twenty years. Together with Plantation, RAI leased from Relator the two
nursing facilities then known as Village on the Creek, located in Clute, Texas, and
Plantation Health Care Center, located in Lake Jackson, Texas (collectively
referred to as the “Nursing Facilities”). (R. 69). After operating and maintaining
these Nursing Facilities for over twenty years, RAI could no longer afford the
escalating rent charged by Relator and necessary improvements to the Nursing
Facilities, and thus returned operation of the Nursing Facilities to Relator at the
normal expiration of the leases at midnight on April 30, 2011.
In February 2013, almost two years after the transition, and with no prior
complaint or demand, Relator suddenly made demand on RAI and the two lease
guarantors, Paul Heinig and Donald Grether, alleging various breaches of the lease
agreements. (Supp. R. 5). On May 23, 2013, RAI, Grether, and Heinig
petition for the sole reason that it did not comply with Rule 52.3); see also Canton-Carter v.
Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
(same).
4
(collectively referred to as the “Original Plaintiffs”) instituted this suit as a
declaratory judgment action seeking to determine the parties’ rights and
obligations under certain lease agreements. (R. 80). On June 4, 2013, Relator filed
an answer and counterclaim asserting claims for breach of contract and fraud by
misrepresentation. (R. 81). Several months passed, and in October 2013—two
years and five months after the expiration of the lease agreements—Relator filed
its First Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Petition, asserting for the
first time claims against Third-Party Defendant Plantation, along with the
following additional causes of action against the Original Plaintiffs: (1)
conversion; (2) estoppel; (3) misappropriation of confidential information; (4)
promissory estoppel; (5) fraud in a real estate transaction; (6) conspiracy, (7)
ratification; (8) tortious interference with contractual relations; and (9) joint
enterprise. (R. 82).
B. Relator engaged in virtually unimpeded discovery throughout the
litigation.
The trial court entered a Docket Control Order on April 2, 2014 (the
“DCO”), establishing a trial date in October 2014 and the completion of discovery
by August 30, 2014. (R. 60). When the first trial setting was pushed back to April
2015, the parties agreed to continue limited necessary discovery (i.e., depositions)
into March. (Supp. R. 6).
5
Throughout the course of the lawsuit, Relator has taken over 15 depositions
and served over 260 requests for production and 60 interrogatories, in addition to
sending third-party subpoenas to 6 different entities or individuals. Id. Moreover,
Relator has filed over a dozen motions to compel.
Undeterred in its abusive and harassing pursuit of discovery in the
underlying case, Relator continued to serve discovery requests (91 requests for
production and seven interrogatories) even after the discovery deadline passed. Id.
The Original Parties objected to these requests as untimely, unduly burdensome,
and harassing and filed a motion for protection to prevent Relator from conducting
any additional discovery. Id.
Notably, the trial court has not denied any of Relator’s motions to compel.9
To date, the only limitation Respondent has placed on Relator’s discovery efforts
involves the in camera submission of certain documents subject to several of
Relator’s motions to compel, which Relator now protests and contends is an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion. See Petition, pp. 61–74.
C. The trial court correctly granted Real Parties’ Motion to Strike.
The DCO entered in April 2014 established June 12, 2014 as the deadline
for all parties to amend their pleadings and, by necessary implication, add any new
parties. (R. 60). On January 27, 2015, over seven months after the established
9
Presumably, this is why Relator fails to identify a single discovery order from which it asks this
Court to grant relief.
6
deadline to amend pleadings had passed and less than three months prior to the
preferential trial setting, Relator filed its Second Amended Answer, Fifth Amended
Counterclaim and Fourth Amended Third-Party Petition10 (R. 48) and Supplement
(Supp. R. 7) that not only alleged claims against the Original Parties that had
already been dismissed via summary judgment (e.g., conversion, misappropriation
of confidential information, and tortious interference with contractual relations) (R.
37), but also asserted frivolous numerous claims against five new parties: Country
Village Care, Inc., Grether Health Care Facilities, L.L.C., Sara Grether Richards,
Amy Grether Stewart, and Steve Coleman (collectively referred to as the “New
Parties”), all without seeking leave to do so. (R. 48).
Accordingly, Real Parties filed a Motion to Strike the Amended Pleadings.
In a clear effort to use Rule 91a to skirt the established rules of amended pleadings,
Relator then filed its Second Amended Answer, Fifth Amended Counterclaim and
Fourth Amended Third-Party Petition.11 (R. 49). Real Parties filed a Supplemental
Motion to Strike to encompass both untimely and prejudicial pleadings12 (R. 50),
which the trial court appropriately granted. (R. 2).
10
Relator erroneously titled this pleading. It should have been named the “Fourth Amended
Counterclaim and Third Amended Third-Party Petition.”
11
Because Relator erroneously titled the pleading filed on January 27, Relator did not change the
name of this pleading filed on April 21, 2015.
12
Relator’s Second Amended Answer, Fourth Amended Counterclaim and Third Amended
Third-Party Petition and Supplement (erroneously named “Fifth Amended Counterclaim and
Fourth Amended Third-Party Petition”) filed on January 26, 2015 (R. 48) and Relator’s Second
7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This mandamus proceeding demonstrates the extraordinary lengths to which
a party will go in a tactical attempt to prolong and expand the course and burden of
litigation. At its core, this has been and remains a commercial lease dispute arising
from a transition in the operation of two nursing homes upon the expiration of
long-term lease agreements for two nursing facilities located in Brazoria County.
Yet Relator has attempted—at all costs—to inflate its claims with fanciful theories
of fraud, conspiracy, and monopolization. When the trial court properly rejected
Relator’s efforts to grossly distort the true nature of the case, Relator filed this
Petition.
First, Relator attempted to entirely transform the character of this
commercial lease dispute by seeking to add five new parties and thirty-eight new
causes of action less than three months before trial. The trial court properly
rejected this untimely, unfair, and unnecessary pleading and Relator has wholly
failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in that regard.
Similarly, Relator engaged in abundant discovery with little, if any,
limitation by the trial court. Although it is unclear from what discovery order
Relator seeks relief—and whether or not that request for relief is now moot—the
trial court properly exercised its discretion to place appropriate limits on Relator’s
Amended Answer, Fifth Amended Counterclaim and Fourth Amended Third-Party Petition filed
on April 21, 2015 (R. 49) will be collectively referred to as the “Amended Pleadings.”
8
efforts to burden Real Parties with harassing discovery requests seeking irrelevant
and proprietary information belonging to one or more of the Real Parties.
Ultimately, this Petition is a model example of Relator’s conduct throughout
this litigation that seeks to divert this Court’s attention and resources to a
procedurally deficient and ultimately meritless request for mandamus relief that
should be denied.
9
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
To be entitled to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus, the relator
must show that the trial court abused its discretion, and that there is no adequate
remedy by appeal.13 With respect to the resolution of factual issues committed to
the trial court’s discretion, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court.14 Nor may the reviewing court issue mandamus merely
because it disagrees with the trial court’s decision if the decision was within the
trial court’s discretionary authority.15 Instead, the reviewing court must defer to
the trial court’s resolution of factual issues and may not set aside unless the relator
establishes that the trial court could have reasonably reached only one decision.16
Even if the reviewing court would have decided the issue differently, it may not
disturb the trial court’s decision unless that decision is shown to be arbitrary and
unreasonable.17
On the other hand, a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law
is or applying the law to the facts.18 A trial court only abuses its discretion if it
13
In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
14
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
15
Beaumont Bank N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991).
16
In re Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 198 S.W.3d, 778, 780 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40.
17
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
18
In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
10
reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to constitute a clear and
prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law.19
The decision to accept or reject an amended pleading is an inherently
discretionary function of the trial court.20 A party generally has a right to amend
its pleadings freely.21 As the rules of civil procedure reflect, however, this general
freedom to amend pleadings must be balanced against the right of the trial court to
control its docket in a manner that permits the efficient administration of justice.22
Similarly, a trial court has a duty to schedule cases in a manner that will result in
the expeditious resolution of disputes.23 An appellate court must not interfere with
the trial court’s discretion to manage its docket without a clear showing of abuse.24
A trial court’s decision on a motion for leave to amend pleadings must be
evaluated in the context of the record of the entire case, and the potential for delay
in the ultimate disposition of a case caused by a proposed amendment may be
considered in determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion.25 Thus,
19
In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 306 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam); In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam).
20
Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. 1980).
21
Smith Detective Agency & Nightwatch Serv., Inc. v. Stanley Smith Sec., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 743,
747 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied).
22
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 63 (pleadings, responses of pleas offered for filing after such time as may
be ordered under rule 166 shall be filed only after obtaining leave of the judge).
23
Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982) (noting trial court’s dismissal of case was
justified because trial court was experiencing great difficulty in obtaining compliance of
appellant’s attorney with the trial court’s schedule).
24
In re Estate of Henry, 250 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
25
Smith Detective Agency, 938 S.W.2d at 749.
11
an appellate court will review a trial court’s decision whether to grant leave to file
an amended pleading for abuse of discretion.26
In addition, the “trial court has great latitude to order or deny discovery, and
its action cannot be set aside unless there is a clear showing of abuse of
discretion.”27 The denial of discovery will entitle the relator to mandamus relief
only if (1) the relator can establish that the relator’s ability to present a viable claim
or defense is “vitiated or severely compromised” by the trial court’s discovery
order, or (2) the denial of discovery will render it impossible for an appellate court
to evaluate the effect of the trial court’s error because the undiscovered
information cannot be made a part of the record.28 To determine whether
mandamus is appropriate, the reviewing court must carefully consider all relevant
circumstances, such as the claims and defenses asserted, the type of discovery
sought, what the discovery is intended to prove, and the presence or lack of other
discovery.29 Delay, inconvenience, or expense of an appeal are insufficient to
satisfy this requirement. Rather, the relator must demonstrate “the effective denial
of a reasonable opportunity to develop the merits of his or her case, so that the trial
26
See Roskey v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 190 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
The trial court’s enforcement of its scheduling order is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.;
Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d 358, 377 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (citing Hakemy
Bros., Ltd. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 189 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.
denied)).
27
See Tucker v. Gayle, 709 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
28
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843–44 (Tex. 1992).
29
Id. at 844.
12
would be a waste of judicial resources.”30 Moreover, mandamus will not issue
unless the undiscovered information “goes to the heart of a party’s case.”31
ARGUMENT
I. Relator’s Petition and Accompanying Record Are Procedurally
Deficient.
“Those seeking the extraordinary remedy of mandamus must follow the
applicable procedural rules.”32 Here, Relator’s Petition is procedurally deficient in
the following ways, each of which independently supports dismissal.
First, Relator wholly failed to make the requisite certification to this Court
that the factual statements in the petition are all supported by competent evidence
included in the Appendix or record.33 The reason for this is apparent. Relator’s
petition is woven together with half-truths and material omissions that paint a
distorted picture that is unsupported by the facts. Relator’s failure to comply with
this requirement alone is a sufficient reason to deny its petition.34
30
Id. at 843.
31
Id.; see also Polaris Investment Management Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 861–62
(Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (mandamus did not issue because discovery did not go “to the heart” of
relator’s case).
32
In re Michelle, 335 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig.
proceeding).
33
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3.
34
See In re Huag, No. 14-04-01077-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 587, 2005 WL 171456, *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2005, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per curiam)
(denying petition for the sole reason that it did not comply with Rule 52.3); see also Canton-
Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no
pet.) (same).
13
Relator also fails to provide a sworn copy of the mandamus record. With its
Petition, Relator filed its proposed Record on Mandamus consisting of 105
separate documents totaling 2,865 pages, and an additional 10 documents in its
Supplemental Mandamus Record. In an attempt to authenticate this proposed
record, Relator filed an Affidavit of Felicia Harris dated June 12, 2015, and an
Amended Affidavit of Felicia Harris dated June 26, 2015. (R. 1, 1a). However,
these affidavits aver only that the “documents numbered 2–115 and included in
this Record on Mandamus are true and correct copies.” Id. However, the
affidavits do not swear that the identified documents are “true and correct copies of
the pleadings on file in the trial court and the reporter’s transcript of the hearings
conducted in this matter.”35 Instead, the affidavits merely state the documents are
“true and correct copies.” (R. 1, 1a). Chief among Relator’s burden in a
mandamus proceeding is the critical obligation to provide the reviewing court with
a complete and adequate record.”36 Because the record in a mandamus proceeding
is assembled by the parties,37 this Court must strictly enforce the requirements of
Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to ensure the integrity of the
35
See In re Kim, No. 05-14-01344-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11734, *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas, Oct. 23, 2014, orig. proceeding) (noting that authentication requirements in mandamus
proceeding must be strictly enforced); see also In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) (finding affidavit insufficient to authenticate record because it did
not state affiant had “personal knowledge the copy of the order in the appendix is a correct copy
of the original.”).
36
In re Le, 335 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding)
(citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
37
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j), 52.3(k).
14
mandamus record.38 Here, Relator has wholly failed to provide a properly
authenticated record for the Court to review and consider, and the Petition should
be denied on that basis alone.39
Even if Relator properly authenticated its mandamus record, the documents
included within that record violate the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7(a)(1), the Relator must file a “certified or
sworn copy of every document that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and
that was filed in any underlying proceeding.” In original proceedings, the court
focuses on the record before it when the decision was made.40 Here, Relator
erroneously relies on documents that were not part of the trial court record, are not
material to the Relator’s claim for relief, and were not filed in any underlying
proceeding. Specifically, out of the 105 documents Relator included in the record,
only 40 meet those requirements and could be considered part of the mandamus
record.41 For example, Relator includes a 230-page document described as “RAI’s
2010 State Cost Reports for the Clute and Lake Jackson Facilities.” (R. 8). Aside
38
See, e.g., In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding).
39
See In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d at 759 (denying petition for writ of mandamus because “relators’
petition and record are not authenticated as required by the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure”).
40
See In re Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); In
re Taylor, 113 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)
(appellate court will not consider exhibits that were not part of the trial court record at the time of
the hearing on the motion that is subject to the mandamus proceeding); In re McDonald, 424
S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, orig. proceeding) (considering exhibit offered
into evidence).
41
An index of these documents is included in Tab A of the Appendix.
15
from its questionable relevance, there is nothing to indicate this document was
filed in any underlying proceeding, and certainly not the proceedings at issue in
this Petition. Accordingly, to the extent the Court considers Relator’s mandamus
record to be properly authenticated, only a limited subset of 40 of the 105
documents within that record should be considered by this Court.
Finally, a relator seeking extraordinary relief under Rule 52 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure must accompany the petition with either an
authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding
or a statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter.42 In
absence of such a transcript, the court considering the petition for extraordinary
relief presumes that there existed evidence to support the trial court's decision.43
Here, Relator challenges the trial court’s order granting Real Parties’ Motion to
Strike. Yet, Relator fails to provide a statement that no testimony or evidence was
presented to the trial court in connection with Real Parties’ motion. Consequently,
Relator failed to comply with Rule 52.7(a)(2), and this Court must presume that the
trial court had before it evidence to support its decision and deny Relator’s request
for mandamus relief.44
42
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(2).
43
Ex parte King, 819 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (original
proceeding involving a petition for writ of habeas corpus).
44
In re Michelle, 335 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig.
proceeding) (“But, in the final analysis, this court cannot and will not find an abuse of discretion
on an incomplete record.”).
16
II. Respondent Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Granting Real Parties’
Motion to Strike Relator’s Amended Pleadings.
On the very next day following an unsuccessful mediation, Relator filed the
first of its Amended Pleadings, seeking to add five new parties to the underlying
lawsuit less than three months before trial and over seven months after the deadline
for filing amended pleadings. Not only did the trial court correctly strike the
Amended Pleadings and the baseless claims that Relator sought to add at the
eleventh hour, but Relator has failed to meet its heavy burden of establishing the
trial court clearly abused its discretion in doing so. Accordingly, this Petition must
be denied.
A. Respondent correctly dismissed Relator’s Amended Pleadings.
The trial court could have granted Real Parties’ Motion to Strike and
dismissed the Amended Pleadings under any one of a number of different grounds,
all of which are supported by the record.
1. The Amended Pleadings violate Rule 63.
Under Rule 63 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, “Parties may amend
their pleadings . . . at such time as not to operate as a surprise to operate as a
surprise to the opposite party.” Rule 63 contains an important limitation on the
amendment of pleadings—the amended pleading may not unfairly prejudice or
17
operate as a surprise to the opposing party.45 Under Rule 63, a trial court may
refuse an amendment if (1) the opposing party presents evidence of surprise or
prejudice, or (2) the amendment asserts a new cause of action or defense, and thus
is prejudicial on its face, and the opposing party objects to the amendment.46
Relator contends in its Petition that a discussion of “prejudice” has “no place
in a Rule 63 analysis.” Although Rule 63 does not expressly mention “prejudice,”
any assessment of “surprise” must necessarily include an evaluation of
“prejudice.”47 As the Dallas Court of Appeals noted:
Under rules 63 and 66, a trial judge has no discretion to
refuse an amendment unless the opposing party presents
evidence of surprise or prejudice or the amendment
asserts a new cause of action or defense, and thus is
prejudicial on its face, and the opposing party objects to
the amendment.48
Even if the “surprise or prejudice” standard did not apply in a typical Rule
63 analysis, it certainly applies when the challenged pleading is filed after the date
45
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 63; Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 939–41 (Tex.
1990); Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. 1980) (trial court may conclude that
amendment on its face is calculated to surprise).
46
State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1994); Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at
939.
47
See Hakemy Bros. Ltd. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 189 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2006, no pet.) (holding that “the opposing party’s objection is sufficient to show surprise” when
the trial court concludes the amendment is on its face calculated to surprise or that the
amendment would reshape the cause of action, prejudicing the opposing party and unnecessarily
delaying the trial.”) (emphasis added).
48
See Am. Title Co. of Houston v. Bomac Mortgage Holdings, L.P., 196 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (emphasis added); see also Rodriguez
v. Cuellar, 143 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).
18
set in a scheduling order.49 A party may amend its pleadings up to seven days
before trial, or within the time required under a pretrial order.50 After the time for
filing amended pleadings has passed, the trial court abuses its discretion in denying
leave to file an amended pleading unless (1) the party opposing the amendment
presents evidence of surprise or prejudice, or (2) the amendment asserts a new
cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its face, and the opposing
party objects to the amendment.51 Here, the trial court has entered only one DCO,
which necessarily established June 12, 2014 as the deadline to add new parties.52
(R. 60). The June 12, 2014 deadline passed without Relator adding any new
parties or new claims. (R. 60). Although Relator contends the trial court lifted the
deadlines within the DCO, Relator cannot point to a single citation in the record to
49
See Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d 358, 377–79 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (amended
pleading filed after date set in pretrial order was properly denied when amendment was
prejudicial because it asserted new causes of action).
50
TEX. R. CIV. P. 63; Hakemy Bros., Ltd. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 189 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
51
First State Bank of Mesquite v. Bellinger & Dewolf, L.L.P., 342 S.W.3d 142, (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2011, no pet.) (citing State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994) (per
curiam)); see also Hakemy Bros. Ltd. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 189 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that “the opposing party’s objection is sufficient to show
surprise” when the trial court concludes the amendment is on its face calculated to surprise or
that the amendment would reshape the cause of action, prejudicing the opposing party and
unnecessarily delaying the trial.”).
52
Relator asserts that because the DCO did not contain a date for the deadline to add new parties,
there was no such deadline. Courts have rejected that argument. See, e.g., Singleton v. Nw. Tex.
Healthcare Sys., No. 07-03-0552-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1594, *14 n.6 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Feb. 28, 2006, no pet.) (“We do not agree with appellant’s contention that the
scheduling order did not set a deadline for joinder of parties. While the better practice might be
to set out separately each of the deadlines mandated by Rule 190.4, the language in the agreed
order here setting deadlines by which each party “shall file amended pleadings” necessarily
included amended pleadings adding parties.”).
19
support that contention other than the self-serving and post-hoc affidavit of Felicia
Harris. Therefore, whether operating under a typical Rule 63 analysis or a late-
amended pleading analysis, the trial court was correct to apply the “surprise or
prejudice” standard.
Against that backdrop, the record before the trial court reveals the
Amended Pleadings operated to surprise the Real Parties. The thirty-eight new
causes of action asserted in the Amended Pleadings could not have been
anticipated by the Real Parties. (R. 73, 48). For example, the Amended Pleadings
asserted, for the first time, “Violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust
Act” and “Fraudulent Concealment.” (R. 48). These claims—and the factual and
legal theories behind these claims—were not disclosed to the Original Parties in
Relators’ response to the Original Parties’ Request for Disclosure. (R. 73).
Moreover, the Amended Pleadings added five additional parties to the case. (R.
48). Again, these parties were not disclosed to the Original Parties in Relators’
disclosures. (R. 73). Nor did Relator identify any of those parties as a potential
responsible third party. Id. That fact, alone, is enough to support a finding of
surprise.53
53
See Johnson v. Ingram Readymix, Inc., No. 03-09-00568, 2010 Tex. App.—LEXIS 10268,
*17–18 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.) (holding that amended pleading constituted
unfair surprise and prejudice when amending party made no effort to make opposing party aware
of new claims through relevant discovery responses).
20
In addition, the parties participated in a full-day mediation on January 26,
2015 (the day before the Amended Pleadings were filed), yet prior to such time
Relator made no mention of these additional claims and parties at all and issued no
formal demands or other correspondence pertaining to these allegations. (R. 73).
Instead, Relator laid behind the log and filed the first of its Amended Pleadings the
very next day following the unsuccessful mediation. (R. 73). These examples
alone demonstrate the surprise reflected in the record sufficient to allow the trial
court to strike Relator’s Amended Pleadings pursuant to Rule 63.
Just as the record adequately demonstrates surprise, there is ample evidence
of the prejudice caused by the Amended Pleadings. As an initial matter, the
Amended Pleadings are prejudicial on their face.54 It is obvious that the Amended
Pleadings would have detrimentally affected the Real Parties’ presentation of the
case, as they would have been required to adjust their discovery and trial
preparations to include these new claims and new parties in a case that was already
on its third trial setting. (R. 73). In Rodriguez v. Cuellar, the San Antonio Court
of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision to strike an amended pleading where the
“nature of the case would have been reshaped . . . [thereby] requiring a lengthy
trial in which the numerous specific allegations contained in the amended petition
54
Cuellar, 143 S.W.3d at 258 (noting that, in the absence of a showing of surprise or prejudice, a
court can strike a pleading that “asserts a new basis for the contest and is thus prejudicial on its
face.”) (citing Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 130 S.W.3d 76, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).
21
would require testimony from potentially hundreds of individuals on several fact-
intensive issues.”55 The same situation arose here. Relator attempted to
completely transform the true nature of the underlying lawsuit—a commercial
lease dispute—into a whirlwind conspiracy theory involving thirty-eight new
causes of action against five new parties. Further, the matters asserted in the
Amended Pleadings are entirely unrelated to the factual disputes and legal issues
that were litigated for almost two years prior to the amendment. For example,
allegations that the Real Parties “entered into a contract, combination and
conspiracy to restrain trade and/or commerce” and “made plans to monopolize the
skilled nursing facility market in Brazoria County” are entirely unrelated to the
central issue in this lawsuit: whether the Original Parties cooperated with Relator
to effectuate a change of control of the two nursing facilities under the operative
lease agreements, and could not have been reasonably anticipated. (R. 48).
Perhaps the clearest reflection of the prejudice the Amended Pleadings
would have caused is the fact that the discovery deadline and expert disclosure
deadlines expired prior to the filing of the Amended Pleadings, with a preferential
trial setting just two and a half months away. (R. 60). As such, Real Parties would
have had no opportunity to develop a defense to the new allegations of conspiracy,
attempted monopoly and disruption of free enterprise, fraudulent concealment, and
55
Id. at 259.
22
other outlandish claims.56 Accordingly, the Amended Pleadings, which introduced
thirty-eight new causes of action and five new parties, are prejudicial—on their
face and otherwise—and objectionable based on the unfair surprise and prejudice
they caused, and the trial court was correct to strike them from consideration.
2. The continuance of the trial date had no effect on the
deadline to amend pleadings.
Relator erroneously contends that a continuance of a trial date “vitiates the
deadlines in a scheduling order.” See Petition, p. 52. However, Relator construes
this rule too broadly. It is true that, absent language to the contrary, a continuance
nullifies the previous discovery deadlines (such as the deadline to supplement
responses to discovery requests) or other deadlines directly tied to the trial date
(e.g. 30 days before trial).57 However, a continuance of a trial setting has no effect
on deadlines that are not directly tied to the trial date. Every case relied on by
Relator involves deadlines entirely connected to and dependent upon the trial
date.58 Relator does not identify any authority holding that the continuance of a
56
See Hakemy Bros. Ltd. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 189 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2006, no pet.) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking amended petition
filed one month before trial because “appellees had no opportunity, without a continuance, to
designate an expert . . . or conduct additional discovery.”).
57
At least one court of appeals has distinguished “fixed dates established in the scheduling
order” from “deadlines [that] are stated in terms of so many days ‘before trial,’” and eventually
held that “by stating the deadline as 45 days before trial, we believe the parties intended for the
dates to be flexible and to operate from the date of the trial, whether it was held on September 30
or some other date.” See Torres v. GSC Enterp., Inc., 242 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2007, no pet.).
58
See Bates v. Sunshare RV, Ltd., 2010 WL 3582487, *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 15,
2010, no pet.) (continuance of trial setting lifted deadline to submit proposed jury instructions
23
trial date nullifies dates that have already passed and are not discovery-related or
expressly tied to the trial date.
Relator also argues that the conduct of both parties otherwise establishes that
the deadlines had been lifted. However, Relator misrepresents the true facts. Once
the original trial date was postponed to April 2015, the parties attempted to
establish—without instruction from the trial court—a subsequent agreed amended
docket control order.59 (R. 73). Relator sent a proposed amended docket control
order on December 1, 2014. Id. Specifically because Relator attempted to include
a blank date for the deadline to add new parties, Real Parties’ counsel removed the
blank date and sent the revised order back to Relator, stating, “Attached is a
revised version of the Amended DCO. We deleted deadlines that have already
passed or are inapplicable.” Id. Then, in an event typical of Relator’s conduct
throughout the underlying litigation, Relator filed a Motion for Entry of Amended
Docket Control Order that misrepresented to the trial court that Real Parties agreed
previously set for the “Monday preceding the week of the trial date”); Killam Ranch Properties,
Ltd. v. Webb Co., 2008 WL 4958452, *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2008, no pet.)
(continuance of trial setting lifted deadline to supplement discovery responses previously set for
“more than thirty days before the October . . . trial date”); Felker v. Petrolon, Inc., 929 S.W.2d
460, 467 n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (continuance of trial setting
lifted deadline to disclose experts); Daniels v. Yancey, 175 S.W.3d 889, 893 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (noting that the purpose of the “agreed motion for continuance was to
allow discovery after the deadlines previously imposed by the agreed scheduling order.”).
59
Relator argues that, because Relator’s counsel and the Real Parties’ counsel discussed
amending the DCO, and seemed in agreement on a January 30, 2015 deadline for pleading
amendments, that the trial court clearly violated Rule 63 by granting the Motion to Strike. But
Rule 63 concerns pleading amendments, not the joinder of new parties to a lawsuit. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 63. Hence, this argument fails. Moreover, the parties never actually filed a joint motion
asking the trial court to set a January 30, 2015 pleadings deadline.
24
to the dates listed in the first proposed amended docket control order that was
rejected by Real Parties. (Supp. R. 8). Within this motion, Relator misrepresented
that the “parties agree to the dates,” and in the certificate of conference, certified
that Real Parties “are not opposed” to the entry of Relator’s proposed amended
docket control order. Id. Because Real Parties made clear that they never agreed
to that proposed order, Real Parties’ counsel emailed Relator’s counsel in an
attempt to make their position clear:
As for the line item for new parties we are fine leaving
that in so long as we have an agreed understanding that
the prior deadline for adding new parties has passed and
the blank line in your proposed order does not suggest
that is an “open” date.
Id. If anything, Relator’s conduct throughout this episode reveals that it knew the
deadline to add new parties had passed and misled the trial court in an effort to re-
open that deadline.
Relator also contends that the Amended Pleadings should be allowed
because the Original Parties did not object when Relator amended its petition in
September 2014. See Petition, p. 33. Of course, this argument ignores the fact that
the September 2014 Petition was not made three months before the third trial
setting. Nor does the argument consider that the September 2014 Petition was
simply an amendment of existing allegations whereas the January 2015 Petition
added new parties (and new causes of action) to the suit.
25
Put simply, Real Parties never acted inconsistent with their position that the
deadline to add new parties had passed. Id. However, Relator’s allegations to the
contrary, even if true, do not show inconsistency by the trial court in enforcing the
scheduling order.60
The trial court has a duty to schedule its cases in such a manner as to
expeditiously dispose of them.61 For this reason the court is given wide discretion
in managing its docket, and an appellate should not interfere with the exercise of
that discretion absent a showing of clear abuse.62 Because Relator has failed to
show such clear abuse, the Petition must be denied.
3. The Amended Pleading violates Rule 38.
The trial court could have granted the motion to strike based also on Rule 38
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Relator admits that the New Parties should
have been styled ‘additional counter-defendants,’ ‘cross-defendants,’ or something
similar,” but argues that the new claims asserted in the Amended Pleadings are not
third-party claims because “mislabeling them does not change their substantive
role in the litigation.” See Petition, p. 56. However, “[d]ismissal for failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 38(a) is not a dismissal on the
60
G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enterprises, Inc. v. Reece Supply Co., 177 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2005, no pet.) (appellant attempted to argue deadline should not be enforced by the trial court
because the parties did not follow it; court held that appellant did “not explain and cites no
authority showing how the trial court’s enforcement of an order disregarded by the parties
constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”).
61
Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982).
62
Id.
26
merits, but rather an exercise of the trial court’s discretion in a procedural
matter.”63 Relator labeled the Amended Pleadings as “Third-Party Petition[s].”
(R. 48). Relator admits that it “used ‘third-party defendants’ to describe the new
parties.” See Petition, p. 56. The trial court, however, was not required to examine
the merits or the substance of the allegations; rather, the trial court properly
reviewed the procedural requirements of Rule 38(a) and correctly determined that
Relator failed to meet those requirements. (R. 73).
4. Rule 91a did not afford Relator an “absolute right” to file
the Amended Pleadings.
In support of its Petition, Relator makes the argument that, because Coleman
filed a Rule 91a Motion, Relator had the “absolute right” to amend its petition to
add claims and parties. See Petition at pp. 51–52. Relator bases this contention on
Rule 91a.5(b), which provides,
If the respondent amends the challenged cause of action
at least 3 days before the date of the hearing, the movant
may, before the date of the hearing, file a withdrawal of
the motion or an amended motion directed to the
amended cause of action.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b).
Relator’s argument fails because nothing in the language of Rule 91a limits
or negates a trial court’s broad discretion to determine joinder of parties and
amendments of petitions. An interpretation of Rule 91a that decreases a trial
63
See Oistad v. Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., No. 01-05-00493-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1639,
2006 WL 488594, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op).
27
court’s ability to avoid unnecessary delays would be contrary to the purpose of the
Rule, which is to help clear busy dockets congested with spurious claims, thereby
increasing fairness in the legal system.64 Moreover, Relator completely ignores the
fact the Coleman expressly made his Rule 91a motion subject to the Motion to
Strike. (R. 74). Accordingly, Relator failed to demonstrate that the trial court
erred by disallowing amendment pursuant to Rule 91a.
B. Relator has not met its heavy burden of establishing the trial
court clearly abused its discretion by striking the Amended
Pleadings.
1. Considering the facts and circumstances of the suit, the trial
court did not clearly abuse its discretion.
To be entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief, a relator
must demonstrate that (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the
relator has no adequate remedy by appeal.65 Moreover, Relator has the burden to
present the appellate court with a record sufficient to establish the right to
mandamus.66
Relator attempts to rely on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 40 governing the
permissive joinder of parties as defendants to a lawsuit.67 However, Rule 40
64
See Timothy Patton, Motions to Dismiss Under Texas Rule 91a: Practice, Procedure and
Review, 33 REV. LITIG. 469, 475 (2014) (“[A]n early dismissal procedure would, among other
things, protect defendants from frivolous and costly lawsuits, strengthen the economy, and
enhance the fairness of the court system.”).
65
In re Noble Drilling (Jim Thompson), L.L.C., 449 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding).
66
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837–39 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
67
TEX. R. CIV. P. 40.
28
further demonstrates the discretion allotted to the trial court on issues of joinder.
Stated succinctly, a trial court has great discretion to determine joinder of parties.68
This discretion includes the power to make a determination that a party’s joinder
will delay a trial whose date has already been set.69 A trial court’s decision on
joinder should be based on practical considerations with a view to what is fair and
orderly, including whether joinder will unreasonably delay the trial under the facts
and circumstances of the suit.70
Relator’s Amended Pleadings are nothing more than an obvious attempt to
delay trial and avoid an inevitable result. It was certainly foreseeable to Relator
that if it brought Coleman into the suit, he would be represented by his own
counsel, and it would be unmanageable for Coleman’s counsel to catch up on 20
months of litigation in the few months before trial. Although Coleman acted as
legal counsel to certain Real Parties, his interests in this lawsuit are not necessarily
aligned with their interests. It is unreasonable to expect Coleman to mount a
defense to far-fetched claims that he helped orchestrate or implement a conspiracy
to monopolize the market for Medicare-reimbursed services in Brazoria County in
the two and a half months remaining before trial. Coleman could reasonably be
68
See In re Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 121 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, orig. proceeding); Ryland Group, Inc. v. White, 723 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
69
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 40(b); Varme v. Gordon, 881 S.W.2d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
70
In re Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 121 S.W.3d at 483.
29
expected to deem it necessary to retake the depositions of parties and witnesses
who have already been deposed, particularly given the significant change in the
character of the lawsuit and the specter of individual liability. Moreover, Coleman
and his counsel are entitled to sufficient time to review all of the existing discovery
responses and document production and Relator’s experts’ reports to determine
whether to serve additional discovery requests and retain his own experts. All of
these items will take considerable time and add significant expense to the lawsuit
for all parties.
In its Mandamus Petition, Relator attempts to avoid these arguments by
asserting that all opposing parties, erroneously including Coleman, are represented
by the same counsel. See Petition, p. 50. But even among the Real Parties that are
represented by the same counsel, Relator overlooks the fact that two of those
parties were sued in their individual capacities (Sara Richards and Amy Stewart).
(R. 48). Those individual defendants will have separate, distinct, and potentially
adverse defensive strategies. Two other parties (GHCF and CVC) are wholly
separate and distinct companies. The potential for individual exposure of those
individuals and entities on new theories and claims that seek to transform the entire
character of the case, and the commensurate need to analyze, evaluate, and prepare
corresponding defenses, is unreasonable given the near trial setting.
30
Additionally, considering the circumstances and history of the lawsuit, the
trial court reasonably determined it would unfairly and unreasonably delay trial to
permit the joinder of the new parties at this late date.71 As explained above, this
lawsuit was filed in May 2013 and the potential for Coleman, Richards, Stewart,
GHCF, and CVC to be a party was known to Relator at the time. Nevertheless,
Relator did not attempt to add these persons or entities as parties for another 20
months, on the day after a failed mediation and with less than three months before
the second trial setting.
Based on these circumstances, the trial court acted properly—and surely did
not clearly abuse its discretion—by striking the Amended Pleadings, thereby
permitting the case to be tried to the jury at its August 10, 2015 trial setting as the
commercial lease dispute that it has been and remains, without additional
unnecessary delay and expense.72
2. Relator has not met its heavy burden of establishing no
adequate remedy by appeal.
Even assuming Relator could prove the trial court clearly abused its
discretion by striking the pleadings, Relator still is not entitled to mandamus relief
71
See In re Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 121 S.W.3d at 483 (explaining trial court’s decision whether
to permit joinder must be based on circumstances and history of specific case at hand).
72
See In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Tex. 2015) (“Trial courts are generally granted
considerable discretion when it comes to managing their dockets.”); Jones v. Cortes, 02-10-
00304-CV, 2011 WL 4008021, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2011, no pet.) (“We
conclude that the trial court’s concern about adding Carolina as a defendant within sixty days of
the trial was reasonable because doing so could have delayed the trial date, which had already
been rescheduled several times.”).
31
unless Relator has no adequate remedy by appeal.73 The heavy burden of
establishing an inadequate appellate remedy is on Relator.74
Out of 78 pages of argument, Relator gives only scant treatment to the “no
adequate remedy by appeal” requirement. See Petition, pp. 59–60. Relator’s sole
argument in this regard is that “the trial court dismissed parties that have been, for
all practical purposes, equal participants in the case to date.” Id., p. 60. According
to Relator, “if the case proceeds to trial against only a portion of the interrelated
parties, the potential for a subsequent proceeding to correct the court’s error is
tremendous.” Id. In other words, Relator is arguing that there is a tremendous
chance that, because of the trial court’s error in striking the pleadings, an appellate
court will reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. Hence,
Relator acknowledges it will have the opportunity to appeal the trial court’s ruling
on the motion to strike in a few short months after a final judgment is rendered
following the August trial.75 Clearly, Relator has not met its heavy burden of
establish no adequate remedy by appeal. Directly to the contrary, Relator’s
Petition recognizes the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal.
73
In re Noble Drilling (Jim Thompson), L.L.C., 449 S.W.3d at 630.
74
In re Stern, 321 S.W.3d 828, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing In re
CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003)).
75
See, e.g., Jones v. Cortes, 02-10-00304-CV, 2011 WL 4008021, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sept. 8, 2011, no pet.) (determining on appeal from final judgment that trial court did not abuse
discretion by striking petition that added new party).
32
III. The Trial Court Has Not Abused Its Discretion in Setting Proper Limits
on Relator’s Abusive and Harassing Discovery Efforts.
Relator claims that the trial court “erred in restricting Relator’s access to and
use of discovery facts and documents.” See Petition, p. 61. Although Relator fails
to clearly set forth the exact relief it is requesting, any mandamus relief issued by
this Court would be improper for several reasons. First, several issues raised by
Relator have been rendered moot by the trial court’s action. Next, on many issues
Relator fails to identify the written orders from which it seeks relief. To the extent
Relator does identify a written order, that order encompasses proper restrictions set
by the trial court on Relator’s discovery fishing crusade that should not be
disturbed by this Court.
A. Several issues raised by Relator are moot.
First, Relator complains that it has been denied access to documents
produced by non-party MDS Research Company pursuant to a third-party
subpoena. Specifically, Relator states that “whatever MDS documents [that] were
produced remain in camera,”76 and Relator asserts that it “still awaits release of the
documents by the court.” See Petition, p. 69. Curiously, the Petition notes that
76
Relator implies several times that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sua sponte
order documents to be produced for in camera review. Not only do trial courts have the inherent
authority to review documents in camera, but denying discovery of potentially relevant
documents without reviewing them in camera is an abuse of discretion. See Axelson v.
McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding) (holding that it was an abuse of
discretion to deny discovery of potentially relevant documents without reviewing them in
camera).
33
Relator’s counsel was contacted by the trial court “the day before” the Petition was
filed and told that the in camera documents were available for her inspection,
reflecting that Relator’s complaints are both premature and potentially unfounded.
See Petition, p. 70. Indeed, on June 17, 2015, six days after the filing of this
Petition, the court coordinator notified the parties that Relator’s counsel “came
down today and looked at the documents that were submitted for in camera
inspection” and “advised the court that she wants copies of all the documents.”
(Supp. R. 9). The next week, the trial court confirmed on the record that Relator
reviewed and copied the very same MDS Research Company documents at issue in
this Petition. (Supp. R. 1). Accordingly, the relief requested by Relator relating to
the MDS Research Company documents is moot, and the Petition should be denied
in that respect.77
Relator also asserts that the “trial court denied [Relator] the use of a
contemporaneous appraisal of the facilities” after Relator requested the documents
77
See Boring & Tunneling Co. v. Salazar, 782 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1989, orig. proceeding) (denying relator’s petition as moot when trial court judge allowed
production and disclosure of certain disputed documents that had been previously withheld from
production); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Garcia, 909 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1995) (“[W]e will
not issue mandamus if for any reason it would be useless or unavailing). Notwithstanding the
mootness of this issue, Relator’s request is deficient for several other reasons. First—and made
apparent by the trial court’s subsequent ruling—Relator’s request for mandamus relief was
premature. Relator admits that “[j]ust the day before this filing, the trial court indicated that
[Relator’s] counsel could come view the in camera documents, and that he would decide
whether [Relator] could have them after [Relator] told him which ones it wanted.” See Petition,
p. 70. Even so, Relator’s asks this Court to “compel MDS’s full compliance with the subpoena.”
This is a wholly inappropriate demand for relief, as this Court’s only jurisdiction on mandamus
is to order the respondent—in this case, the trial court—to take certain action.
34
and the trial court ordered them produced in camera. See Petition, p. 73. Without
requesting any specific relief, Relator notes that the appraisals “remain in camera
while [Relator] their production [sic].” Id. p. 74. Like the MDS Research
Company records, the trial court confirmed that Relator reviewed and copied the
appraisals on June 17, 2015. For the same reasons, this issue is now moot.
B. Relator fails to identify specific orders from which it requests
relief.
When a relator files a petition for writ of mandamus, the relator must file a
copy of the order which the relator challenges with the petition.78 A relator is not
entitled to mandamus relief unless it the order it challenges is included within the
appendix.79 Here, Relator argues that (1) the “trial court clearly abused its
discretion in refusing to order production of the ‘Discharge books,” (2) “refused to
allow [Relator] to substantiate its claim that the Grethers hired and/or transferred
employees” by failing to order production of “communications between CVC
. . . and any employees of the two leased facilities,” and (3) refused to compel
Gayle Jacobs, a non-party to the underlying action, to “confirm the nature of her
employment.” See Petition, pp. 72–74. However, Relator does not include within
the appendix or anywhere else within the mandamus record any orders reflecting
this alleged denial of discovery. Instead, Relator notes that the “trial court still
78
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A).
79
Id.; see In re Lewis, No. 14-15-00122, 2015 Tex. App LEXIS 1620, *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Feb. 19, 2015, orig. proceeding) (denying petition for writ of mandamus when relator
failed to include a certified or sworn copy of the order he challenged).
35
refuses to rule on the motion” to compel the above documents and information.
Id., p. 73. Because the trial court has “not yet advised the parties of its ruling on
the motion . . . at this juncture, there is no ruling of the trial court that [this Court]
may evaluate for abuse of discretion and adequacy of appellate remedy.”80
It is unclear whether Relators asks this Court to order the trial court to make
a ruling, but even so, because the trial court has not ruled, then a request to rule is
necessarily inconsistent with Relator’s complaint that the trial court has abused its
discretion in failing to rule. While this Court may, by mandamus, direct the trial
court to make a decision, it “may not tell the trial court what that decision should
be.”81 Accordingly, Relator has failed to establish a right to the relief requested
related to the discharge books and employee communications.
C. The Court set proper limits on Relator’s request for immaterial
and irrelevant policies and procedures.
Finally, Relator complains that the trial court’s September 30, 2014 order
“only permitted Relator’s counsel’s review at the courthouse jury room” and
effectively denied “copies to use in depositions, attach as exhibits to motions,
analyze with Relator’s experts, or to read and review with its office staff, or use at
trial.” See Petition, p. 63.
80
See In re Progressive Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-15-00622-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5009,
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 15, 2015, orig. proceeding).
81
Id. at *2 (citing Crofts v. Court of Civil Appeals, 362 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. 1962); In re
Tasby, 40 S.W.3d 190, 191 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding).
36
Relator has made only one argument with respect to the discoverability of
the Real Parties’ policies and procedures: the Real Parties allegedly “contracted to
turn over these documents.” See Petition, p. 64 and (R. 36). Putting aside the fact
that Real Parties dispute that any one of them agreed to surrender highly
proprietary written policies and procedures that were created and customized for
use at the two nursing facilities over twenty years, the substance of the policies
and procedures is not relevant to a single issue in the underlying suit. (Supp. R.
10). Relator does not allege that Real Parties failed to follow their policies and
procedures. It is undisputed that the Real Parties removed their own policies and
procedures from the two facilities upon termination of the lease, and that Relator
purchased its own policies and procedures for use upon the termination of the
leases. The dispute is whether or not Real Parties were entitled to remove their
documents at the expiration of the lease terms, and the necessity for Relator to
purchase their own policies and procedures, but there is no dispute relating to the
specific language or the substance of any of the proprietary documents.
Accordingly, the trial court acted appropriately—and certainly did not abuse
its discretion—when it ordered the policies and procedures produced for in camera
review. (R. 37). By allowing only Relator’s counsel to review them, the trial court
effectively designated the policies and procedures “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” and
prevented the disclosure of the proprietary material therein. Such action is clearly
37
permitted by the protective order entered in the underlying case. (R. 38).
Unsurprisingly, Relator points to no authority that the trial court’s action in this
regard is an abuse of discretion, and the Court should deny the Petition.
D. Relator has not demonstrated that it lacks an adequate remedy by
appeal.
To determine whether mandamus is appropriate in lieu of an appeal, the
reviewing court must carefully consider all relevant circumstances, such as the
claims and defenses asserted, the type of discovery sought, what the discovery is
intended to prove, and the presence or lack of other discovery.82 Delay,
inconvenience, or expense of an appeal are insufficient to satisfy this requirement.
Rather, the relator must demonstrate “the effective denial of a reasonable
opportunity to develop the merits of his or her case, so that the trial would be a
waste of judicial resources.”83 Moreover, mandamus will not issue unless the
undiscovered information “goes to the heart of a party’s case.”84
Here, Relator makes the conclusory assertion that the trial court’s “discovery
rulings (or lack thereof) here have denied [Relator] a reasonable opportunity to
develop the merits of its case.” See Petition, p. 62. Relator alleges nothing more
than inconvenience and delay, and certainly points to no citation or evidence in the
82
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 844 (Tex. 1992).
83
Id. at 843.
84
Id.; see also Polaris Investment Management Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 861–62 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam) (mandamus did not issue because discovery did not go “to the heart” of
relator’s case).
38
record to demonstrate further harm. The Texas Supreme Court has held that the
denial of discovery will entitle a relator to mandamus relief only if (1) the relator
can establish that the relator’s ability to present a viable claim or defense is
“vitiated or severely compromised” by the trial court’s discovery order, or (2) if
the denial of discovery will render it impossible for an appellate court to evaluate
the effect of the trial court’s error because the undiscovered information cannot be
made a part of the record.85 Relator has failed to meet that burden here, and the
Court must deny Relator’s request for mandamus relief.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Real Parties in Interest Rebecca Ann, Inc.,
Donald Grether, Paul Heinig, Plantation Health Care, Inc., Sara Richards, Amy
Stewart, Country Village Care, Inc., and Grether Health Care Facilities, Inc.
respectfully request that the Court deny Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus
and grant Real Parties in Interest such other relief, in law or equity, to which they
may be shown to be justly entitled.
85
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843–44.
39
JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Breck Harrison
Breck Harrison
State Bar No. 24007325
bharrison@jw.com
Scott W. Weatherford
State Bar No. 24079554
sweatherford@jw.com
100 Congress Ave., Ste. 1100
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 236-2000
(512) 236-2002 – Fax
ATTORNEYS FOR REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST, REBECCA ANN, INC.,
DONALD GRETHER, PAUL HEINIG,
PLANTATION HEALTH CARE, INC.,
SARA RICHARDS, AMY STEWART,
GRETHER HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES, L.L.C., AND COUNTRY
VILLAGE CARE, INC.
RULE 52.3(J) CERTIFICATION
I have reviewed this Response to Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus
and conclude that every factual statement is supported by competent evidence the
mandamus record.
/s/ Breck Harrison
Breck Harrison
40
RULE 9.4 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-
point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the
word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains
10,810 words, excluding any parts exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Breck Harrison
Breck Harrison
41
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document was served on the following
counsel of record electronically through the electronic filing manager as well as by
electronic mail delivery on June 26, 2015:
Brandy R. Manning Zandra Foley
Felicia Harris Andrew Johnson
Burleson L.L.P. Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons,
700 Milam, Suite 1100 L.L.P.
Houston, Texas 77002 One Riverway, Suite 1400
brmanning@burlesonllp.com Houston, Texas 77056
fharris@burlesonllp.com zfoley@thompsoncoe.com
ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com
Counsel for Relator
Counsel for Stephen M. Coleman
The Honorable Patrick Sebesta
239th Judicial District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
111 E. Locus, Room 310A
Angleton, Texas 77515
debbies@brazoria-county.com
Respondent
/s/ Breck Harrison
Breck Harrison
42
NO. 01-15-00530-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON
In re Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.,
Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
from Cause No. 72817 in the 239th Judicial District
Court of Brazoria County, Texas
(Hon. Patrick Sebesta, Presiding)
APPENDIX
TAB DOCUMENT
A Revised Index of Record.
13652835v.2
43
TAB A
TAB DOCUMENT
2 Consolidated Order from Judge Sebesta, signed May 5, 2015
Sunset Nursing Home Inc.’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Production of
28
Documents, filed March 14, 2014
31 Order, signed April 2, 2014
Sunset Nursing Home Inc.’s (1) Motion for Sanctions, filed August 25,
2014; (2) Supplemental Motion for Sanctions, filed September 15, 2014;
35
and (3) Second Supplemental Motion for Sanctions, filed September 19,
2014
Sunset Nursing Home Inc.’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff and Counter-
36
Defendants’ Production of Documents, filed May 21, 2014
37 Order, signed September 30, 2014 re: RAI’s policies and procedures
38 Agreed Protective Order, signed November 25, 2013
39 Hearing transcript, March 24, 2015
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Quash Deposition of Steve Coleman, filed July 9,
42
2014
45 Motion to Quash Sara Richards Deposition, filed October 23, 2014
47 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Mediation, filed on December 5, 2014
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s Second Amended Answer, Fifth Amended
48 Counterclaim and Fourth Amended Third-Party Petition, filed on January
26, 2015
Sunset Nursing Home Inc.’s Second Amended Answer, Fifth Amended
49 Counterclaim and Fourth Amended Third-Party Petition, filed on April
21, 2015
Plaintiffs’ and Third-Party Defendants’ Supplemental Motion to Strike
50
and for Sanctions, dated April 22, 2015
Sunset’s Supplemental Combined Motion to Compel, served on January
54
23, 2014
Non-Party Country Village Care, Inc.’s Motion for Protection
55
(Subpoena: MDS Research), filed on February 16, 2015
Hearing transcript (re: subpoena served on MDS Research Company),
56
dated February 24, 2015
Correspondence, dated March 30, 2015, from Scott Weatherford to Judge
57
Sebesta re: MDS Research documents for in camera inspection
Order, signed April 6, 2015, re: MDS Research documents for in camera
58
inspection
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s Motion for Entry of Proposed Docket
59
Control Order, filed March 11, 2014
60 Docket Control Order, signed April 2, 2014
61 Hearing transcript, June 23, 2014
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s Motion to Compel, Supplemental Motion
62 for Amended Docket Control Order and Motion for Continuance, filed
August 21, 2014
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s (1) No Evidence and Traditional Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed February 13, 2015, and (2) Reply in
68
Support of No-Evidence and Traditional Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, filed on February 24, 2015
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s Second Amended Answer, Fourth
69 Amended Counterclaim and Third Amended Third-Party Petition, filed
September 18, 2014
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Quash Amy Stewart Deposition, filed on January
71
26, 2015
Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Strike and for Sanctions,
73
filed February 13, 2015
Third-Party Defendant Stephen M. Coleman’s Rule 91a Motion to
74
Dismiss, filed March 18, 2015
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s Supplemental Opposition to Motion to
75
Strike, filed on April 27, 2015
Third-Party Defendant Stephen M. Coleman’s Notice of Withdrawing
76
Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 22, 2015
80 Plaintiffs’ (RAI, et al.) Original Petition, filed on May 23, 2013
Defendant’s (Sunset) Answer to Plaintiffs’ Original Petition and
81
Counterclaim, filed on June 4, 2013
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s First Amended Answer, Counterclaim and
82
Third-Party Petition, filed on October 29, 2013
Original Answer of Country Village Care, Inc., Grether Health Facilities,
83
L.L.C., Sara Richards and Amy Stewart, filed on February 23, 2015
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s Motion to Reconsider (Policies and
85
Procedures in camera ruling), filed September 17, 2014
Correspondence, dated October 31, 2014, from Felicia Harris to Judge
93
Sebesta re: depositions scheduling
Correspondence, dated September 25, 2014, from Felicia Harris to Judge
94
Sebesta attaching Proposed Order on Motions to Compel
Correspondence, dated December 10, 2014, from Felicia Harris to Judge
95
Sebesta re: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Mediation
Third-Party Defendant Stephen M. Coleman’s Original Answer and
101
Request for Disclosure, filed February 23, 2015
104 Correspondence, dated February 17, 2015, from Felicia Harris to Judge
Sebesta re in camera review of 2010 appraisal documents
Sunset Nursing Home, Inc.’s (1) Consolidated Motion to Compel from
105 the Grethers, filed March 17, 2015 and (2) Supplemental Motion to
Compel, filed March 19, 2015