In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-14-00061-CR
________________________
RAHEEM SMITH, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 371st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1319577D; Honorable Mollee Westfall, Presiding
October 27, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Raheem Smith, was convicted by a jury of murder 1 and sentenced to
confinement for life. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by (1) permitting
testimony concerning statements made by third parties at the scene of the crime
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011).
identifying Appellant as the murderer and (2) permitting expert testimony from a lay
witness.2 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2013, a two paragraph indictment was returned alleging (1) that, on or
about May 20, 2013, Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused Natasha McDade’s
death by shooting her with a deadly weapon, a firearm, and (2) that, with intent to cause
serious bodily injury to McDade, he also intentionally committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life, i.e., shooting her with a firearm, which caused her death. A
jury trial was held in January 2014.
At trial, the testimonial and physical evidence established Appellant shot McDade
three times as she lay on the ground and then turned the gun on himself in an
unsuccessful suicide attempt. At the trial’s conclusion, the jury found Appellant guilty of
murder and he was sentenced to confinement for life. This appeal followed.
By his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his
“hearsay” objections to testimony from an investigating officer concerning crime scene
statements made by non-testifying third parties who identified Appellant as the
murderer. Appellant also contends the admission of those statements violated his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation of witnesses. See U. S. CONST. amend. VI. The State
contends the statements were not hearsay and the Confrontation Clause complaint was
not preserved.
2
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this court by
the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001
(West 2013). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and
that of this court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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Appellant’s second issue concerns whether the trial court erred by allowing a lay
person (in this case one of the investigating officers) to testify that deformities in the
bullets recovered from the scene were consistent with the types of deformities seen
when a bullet strikes a hard object. The State contends the objected-to statements
were merely “observational” statements that did not require expert qualification and that
the complaint, if any, was waived when the same information later came in without
objection. Alternatively, as to both issues, the State contends the admission of the
complained-of evidence constitutes harmless error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The trial
court abuses its discretion only when the decision lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2966, 180 L. E. 2d 253 (2011).
If an appellate court determines that the trial court committed error in the
admission or exclusion of evidence, it must then determine whether Appellant was
harmed by that error. Generally, the erroneous admission of evidence is non-
constitutional error subject to harmless error analysis under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d
410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Non-constitutional error does not require reversal
unless it affects the appellant’s substantial rights. An appellant’s substantial rights are
not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence if, after examining the record as a
whole, the appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury,
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or had but a slight effect. Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (disregarding the
erroneous admission of evidence where evidence did not have a substantial or injurious
influence on the jury’s decision). Furthermore, erroneously admitted testimony may
constitute harmless error when it is cumulative of other evidence introduced in the case.
Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 805-06 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)
(admission of evidence was harmless where same evidence was introduced through
several other witnesses).
Certain constitutional errors are also subject to harmless error analysis under
Rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).
Violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is a “non-structural” error
of constitutional dimension that is subject to harmless error analysis. See Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); Langham v.
State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Bibbs v. State, 371 S.W.3d 564,
570 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. ref’d). If the record reveals constitutional error that
is subject to harmless error review, we must reverse the judgment of conviction or
punishment unless we are able to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). In making a
harmless error determination under Rule 44.2(a), appellate courts should ascertain
whether the conviction or punishment would have been the same absent the error,
adhering strictly to the question of whether the error in question contributed to the
verdict obtained in that case. Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011).
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ISSUES ONE AND TWO
By his first issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by permitting Officer
Justin Seabourn to testify that he spoke to two bystanders shortly after arriving at the
scene of the incident and that they told him Appellant shot McDade. He also asserts,
via his second issue, that the trial court erred by permitting Officer Christian Williams to
offer unqualified expert testimony when he stated, “[w]hen a bullet hits an object, it’s
going to deform, sure.”
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the trial court committed error in both
instances, any such error would be harmless because there were two eyewitnesses that
testified they saw Appellant shoot McDade and there was other evidence of Appellant’s
guilt. Claudia Greer testified Appellant’s relationship with McDade did not end well.
Although she did not witness the actual shooting, she did testify that she saw Appellant
chasing McDade around the apartment complex with a gun immediately prior to the
shooting. Bridgett Greer testified she heard McDade screaming for help just prior to the
shooting. LaShonda Jones testified she saw Appellant with the gun and witnessed him
standing over McDade when he shot her three times. Judith Balleza testified she
witnessed Appellant shooting McDade. Officer Mark Ochsendorf testified Appellant told
him he shot himself; John Hamilton, a paramedic who treated Appellant, testified
Appellant confessed to shooting McDade. Therefore, even assuming the trial court
erred in admitting the complained-of testimony, we have a fair assurance that the
evidence in question did not influence the jury’s verdict or had but a slight effect. As to
any constitutional error, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error, if any, did not
contribute to the conviction or punishment. Issues one and two are overruled.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
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