PD-0765&0766-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 7/9/2015 3:21:59 PM
Accepted 7/9/2015 5:10:10 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
PD-0765-15, PD-0766-15
TO THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
________________
THOMAS LLOYD TAUNTON,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
________________
On Appeal in Cause Nos. CR-12-24098 and CR-13-24755
From the 336th District Court
of Fannin County, Texas
__________________________________________________________________
STATE’S RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
__________________________________________________________________
John B. Setterberg
State Bar No. 24043915
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Fannin County, Texas
101 E. Sam Rayburn Dr., Ste. 301
Bonham, Texas 75418
903-583-7448
903-583-7682 (fax)
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE
July 9, 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ...............................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................1
REPLIES TO QUESTION FOR REVIEW ...............................................................2
1. Petitioner seeks mere correction of what he considers to be error, rather
than resolution of an important and unresolved issue in Texas jurisprudence. ..... 2
2. The court of appeals correctly followed this Court’s precedent in
analyzing the effect of constitutional error in the trial court. ................................ 2
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................2
Petitioner seeks mere correction of what he considers to be error, rather than
resolution of an important and unresolved issue in Texas jurisprudence. ............. 2
The court of appeals correctly followed this Court’s precedent in analyzing
the effect of constitutional error in the trial court. ................................................. 4
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................6
PRAYER ....................................................................................................................6
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .........................................................................7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................8
i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bradley v. State, 235 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .......................................2
Degrate v. State, 712 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ......................................3
Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .....................................3, 4
Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ............................ 3, 4, 5
Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) ...............................................................................................4
TEX. R. APP. P. 66.2 ...................................................................................................2
TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 ...............................................................................................2, 3
ii
PD-0765-15, PD-0766-15
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
________________
THOMAS LLOYD TAUNTON,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
________________
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:
COMES NOW the State of Texas, Appellee, by and through her assistant
criminal district attorney, and respectfully submits this Response to Petition for
Discretionary Review in the above-styled and numbered causes.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not request oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from two convictions, one for the murder of a single
individual and one for the capital murder of multiple persons. The court of appeals
affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences of life and life without parole,
respectively.
1
REPLIES TO QUESTION FOR REVIEW
1. Petitioner seeks mere correction of what he considers to be error, rather than
resolution of an important and unresolved issue in Texas jurisprudence.
2. The court of appeals correctly followed this Court’s precedent in analyzing
the effect of constitutional error in the trial court.
ARGUMENT
Discretionary review by this Court is not a matter of right, but of the Court’s
sound discretion. TEX. R. APP. P. 66.2. The principle role of this Court, as a court
of last resort, is as the caretaker of Texas law. Bradley v. State, 235 S.W.3d 808,
810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not a court of “error correction,” and does not
exist merely to re-consider issues that a court of appeals has already decided. Id.
Rather, the legal issues brought to and considered by this Court should be “of great
importance to the jurisprudence of the state.” Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3.
Otherwise, this Court should not to expend its “scarce judicial resources” to review
an opinion of a court of appeals. Bradley, 235 S.W.3d at 809.
Petitioner seeks mere correction of what he considers to be error, rather than
resolution of an important and unresolved issue in Texas jurisprudence.
In the court below, Petitioner claimed error in the trial court’s decision not to
suppress evidence seized under a warrant. The court of appeals found that the
warrant was unsupported by probable cause and that the trial court’s decision not
to suppress evidence was indeed error. However, it also considered the error to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions.
2
Petitioner now complains that the court of appeals did not properly consider harm
in light of all the evidence presented at trial.
The standard for harm analysis of constitutional error is well settled in
Texas. Appellant does not argue that this standard should be extended or changed,
or that there is a conflict between the lower court’s opinion and that of another
court of appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3. Rather, his complaint asks this Court
to take up the fact-specific question of whether the court of appeals “properly”
considered harm. Although he nominally claims that the lower court decided the
case against this Court’s holding in Snowden v. State, 1 his argument effectively
sets up a straw-man by likening the lower court’s reasoning to that in Harris v.
State, 2 which Snowden partially overruled. In reality, the court never mentioned
Harris or its disavowed standard, and instead based its decision on the totality of
the record and the valid precedent of this Court.
Moreover, even if Petitioner’s argument was correct, at no point does he
explain how his complaint rises to the level that would compel this Court to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The assertion that the court of appeals was in
error as to some point of law, standing alone, is generally insufficient to require
further review. Degrate v. State, 712 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Because Petitioner has done little more than ask for a “re-do” of the lower court’s
1
353 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
2
790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
3
opinion, and because the issue he raises is fact-specific and of little value to the
State’s jurisprudence as a whole, this Court should decline to exercise its
discretionary authority and should deny the petition.
The court of appeals correctly followed this Court’s precedent in analyzing
the effect of constitutional error in the trial court.
When confronted with constitutional error, a reviewing court must reverse
the judgment unless it can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not contribute to the defendant’s conviction or punishment. TEX. R. APP. P.
44.2(a); Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). While
this Court has attempted to delineate factors that a court should consider when
reviewing constitutional harm, 3 it has disavowed any “set formula.” Id. at 822,
n.31. Instead, while certain factors may prove helpful to a reviewing court, they do
not form an exhaustive checklist, and harm analysis for constitutional error should
take into account “any and every circumstance apparent in the record that logically
informs [the] determination” of whether an error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
Petitioner seems to say that Snowden prohibits an appellate court from
considering the remaining strength of the State’s case apart from the suspect
evidence. He complains that the lower court simply resorted to “what it considered
the overwhelming evidence of guilt” in making its determination that the trial
3
See, e.g., Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
4
court’s error was harmless (Pet. at 6). Not only is this a misreading of Snowden,
but it ignores the logic, not to mention the very words, of the opinion.
First, Snowden does not repudiate consideration of the overall strength of the
State’s case as a factor to be considered when addressing constitutional harm.
Indeed, Snowden repeats the Harris Court’s earlier conclusion that the error must
be analyzed “in the context of the trial as a whole” and, if the court finds that the
error was “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the
issue in question, as revealed in the record,” then it can say that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. 353 S.W.3d at 819 and n.15.
Second, the opinion of the court below does not merely rely on the strength
of the State’s case, but takes care to methodically consider all of the circumstances
in the record that impact the question of harm beyond a reasonable doubt. For
example, it notes that the evidence subject to the warrant was largely peripheral
and corroborative of other evidence, and that it had little if any direct relation to
the ultimate question of Petitioner’s guilt. While the opinion does address the
strength of the State’s case – which was, after all, largely supported by the
Petitioner’s own detailed and completely spontaneous confession – it does so as a
means of explaining just why the admission of the seized evidence was not
harmful. Far from simply saying that the Petitioner “would have been convicted in
5
any event,”4 the court’s opinion makes use of the entire record and explains that,
relative to the other evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, the evidence subject to
suppression was so minimal and peripheral that its inclusion did not affect the
outcome of the trial. This is nothing more than the proper application of the Rule
44.2(a) harm standard as announced in Snowden. As such, the petition for
discretionary review should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner asks this Court to review a fact-specific decision of the court of
appeals that has little if any impact on the rest of Texas jurisprudence. Moreover,
he asks this Court to overrule a proper application of constitutional harm analysis
and substitute in its place an illogical and unduly restrictive analysis that would
ignore the totality of evidence presented at trial in favor of a myopic inspection of
a tarnished fraction. Because his complaint is not significant enough to warrant
further review, and because it fails to give sufficient reason for such a drastic
modification of existing law, this Court should decline to exercise discretionary
review and deny the petition.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State of Texas respectfully
prays this Court deny the petition for discretionary review. The State further
4
See Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 585.
6
requests all such additional relief as may be deemed just and appropriate.
Dated: July 9, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John B. Setterberg
John B. Setterberg
State Bar No. 24043915
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Fannin County, Texas
101 East Sam Rayburn Dr., Suite 301
Bonham, Texas 75418
903-583-7448
903-583-7682 (fax)
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document contains 1,193
words, exclusive of the portions described by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (i)(1), as
computed by the computer program used to prepare the document.
/s/ John B. Setterberg
John B. Setterberg
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Fannin County, Texas
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served electronically to the individuals listed below on this the 9th
day of July, 2015.
/s/ John B. Setterberg
John B. Setterberg
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Fannin County, Texas
Steven R. Miears
211 North Main St.
Bonham, Texas 75418
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Lisa McMinn
P.O. Box 12405
Austin, Texas 78711
STATE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
8