ACCEPTED
04-15-00056-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
6/3/2015 3:57:49 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
No. 04-15-00056-CV
th
IN THE 4 DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
GARY HODGE AND 6/3/2015 3:57:49 PM
ROBERT HART III, KEITH E. HOTTLE
Appellants, Clerk
v.
STEPHEN KRAFT INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS MEMBER ON BEHALF OF
GRUPO HABANERO, LLC,
Appellees.
__________________
On appeal from the 225th District Court of Bexar County, Texas
__________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
__________________
Respectfully submitted,
Roderick J. Regan
Attorney for Appellants
BRANSCOMB | PC
711 Navarro St., Suite 500
San Antonio, TX 78205
Phone: (210) 598-5400
Fax: (210) 598-5405
SBN: 16733040
APPELLANTS REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………….…… ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………………….. iii
REFERENCE CITATION GUIDE ………………………………………… iv
ISSUES PRESENTED AND REPLY POINTS……………………………...iv
REPLY ARGUMENT ………………………………………………………. 2
REPLY POINT I TO ISSUES I AND II: Denial of an appraisal
clause that requires arbitration is reviewable under the
Texas Arbitration Act………………………………………………...2
REPLY POINT II TO ISSUES III AND IV: Appellees’ have
failed to provide the only evidence that would support
their argument against strict compliance with the notice
provision, i.e. their own written notice of change of address ……...5
REPLY POINT III TO ISSUE IV: No waiver of legal arguments. ……...6
PRAYER ……………………………………………………………………..7
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Cantella & Co., Inc. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996)……………...3
Crown Constr. Co. v. Huddleston, 961 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1997)………………………………………………………………………………..3
Ellis v. Schlimmer, 337 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2011)……………………………..2
In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 2011 WL 4837869, at * 4 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2011, no pet.)………………………………………………………………..4
In re Trammell, 246 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)………...4
In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999).
Lass v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1125287, at * 5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, rev. denied)……………………………………………3
Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995)………………2
Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998)…………………………...2
Tex. Petrochemicals LP v. ISP Water Mgmt. Servs. LLC, 301 S.W.3d 879, 884
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.)……………………………………………..2
Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith, 999 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1999)………………………………………………………………………………..3
Woodward v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 1186323 (N.D. Tex. 2010) ............ 10
iii
REFERENCE CITATION GUIDE
The Parties:
In lieu of using the full names of the parties, this Brief may refer to the
parties as follows:
Gary Hodge “Hodge” or “Appellant”
Robert Hart III “Hart” or “Appellant”
Gary Hodge and Robert Hart III “Appellants”
Stephen Kraft “Kraft” or “Appellee”
Stephen Kraft Individually “Appellees”
And as member on behalf of
Grupo Habanero, LLC
ISSUES PRESENTED and REPLY POINTS
ISSUE I Whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying
Appellants’ Motion to Compel Appraisal based on the
argument that a condition precedent to initiating appraisal by
appraiser appointed by the American Arbitration Association
has not been met.
ISSUE II Whether Appellees’ receipt of timely notice of option election
to repurchase membership interest satisfying the alleged
condition precedent to initiating appraisal was established as a
matter of law.
REPLY POINT I TO ISSUES I AND II: Denial of an appraisal clause
that requires arbitration is reviewable under the Texas
Arbitration Act.
iv
ISSUE III Whether strict compliance with the alleged condition precedent
to compelling appraisal was excused.
A. Due to original impossibility
B. Due to mutual mistake
C. Due to Appellee’s false representation and/or concealment
of a material fact
ISSUE IV Whether Appellees are estopped from asserting a right to
receive timely notice of Appellants’ exercise of their option to
repurchase stock due to Appellees’ false representation and/or
concealment making any exercise of notice under the strict
contract provisions impossible.
REPLY POINT II TO ISSUES III AND IV: Appellees’ have failed to
provide the only evidence that would support their
argument against strict compliance with the notice
provision, i.e. their own written notice of change of address.
REPLY POINT III TO ISSUE IV: No waiver of legal argument
v
No. 04-15-00056-CV
th
IN THE 4 DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
GARY HODGE AND
ROBERT HART III,
Appellants,
v.
STEPHEN KRAFT INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS MEMBER ON BEHALF OF
GRUPO HABANERO, LLC,
Appellees.
__________________
On appeal from the 225th District Court of Bexar County, Texas
__________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
__________________
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellants Gary Hodge and Robert Hart III (“Appellants”), submit this
Reply Brief. Appellants respectfully show:
1
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I Denial of an appraisal clause that in essence requires
arbitration is reviewable under the Texas Arbitration Act. 1
The appraisal provision in the Employment Contract is in essence an
arbitration provision. The scope of arbitration is broad. A strong presumption
favors arbitration, and courts resolve any doubts about an agreement’s scope,
waiver, and other issues unrelated to its validity in favor of arbitration. Ellis v.
Schlimmer, 337 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). Unless it can be said
with positive assurance than an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an
interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue, a court should not deny
arbitration. Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995).
Whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement includes the trial
court’s legal interpretation of the agreement and is subject to de novo review. Tex.
Petrochemicals LP v. ISP Water Mgmt. Servs. LLC, 301 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.). When reviewed de novo, appellate courts give
absolutely no deference to the trial court’s decision.” Quick v. City of Austin, 7
1
In reply to Appellee’s Issues I and II.
2
S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).2
An appraisal contract provision, whether invoking an appraiser appointed by
the American Arbitration Association or not, “is in essence one requiring
arbitration.” Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith, 999 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 1999). A party seeking arbitration must establish the existence of
an arbitration agreement, and show, that claims raised fall within the scope of the
agreement. Id. (citing Cantella & Co., Inc. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex.
1996)). Once the party establishes a claim within the arbitration agreement, the
trial court must compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings. Id. (citing In re
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999). Appointment of
an arbitrator to resolve a dispute over value is clearly authorized by the Texas
Arbitration Act and the appraisal requirement of a contract “are now generally
considered to be a form of arbitration.” Lass v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
2000 WL 1125287, at * 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, rev. denied).
Appellees’ citation of Crown Constr. Co. vs. Huddleston, 961 S.W.2d 552
(Tex.App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) is misplaced. While Crown addresses the
requirements of personal delivery, it does so in a context where the address in the
2
Thus, Appellees’ “implied finding” argument in its Issue II is moot because the decision is
reviewed de novo. Regardless, no evidence of such an “implied finding” can be found in the
record, nor did Appellees attempt to cite from the record in support of its argument.
3
option agreement was correct. Crown cannot be said to stand for Appellees’
notion that personal delivery remains required where the address is wrong.
Appellees’ claim the address is wrong due to a “scrivener’s error’ but they in fact
provide no evidence whatsoever that the address in the Employment Agreement
was not what they provided for in their written approval of the Employment
Agreement. Appellees’ notion of a “scrivener’s error” is merely nothing but self-
serving surmise.
Appellees did not and cannot provide any authority supporting their
argument against appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order denying
Appellants’ Motion to Compel Appraisal under the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code § 171.098. To the contrary, appraisal clauses “can provide a less
expensive, more efficient alternative to litigation,” analogous to arbitration
provisions and trial courts “have no discretion to ignore a valid appraisal clause
entirely.” In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 2011 WL 4837869, at * 4 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2011, no pet.) (citations omitted). Whether a claim is subject to
arbitration turns on its substance; and, parties cannot evade an arbitration clause
through artful pleading. In re Trammell, 246 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2008, no pet.). The existence of claims unrelated to the arbitrated appraisal does
not remove this case from the Court’s jurisdiction because these claims are subject
4
to a finding that the membership interest in question has value and is owned by Mr.
Kraft. Appellants assert that they have validly executed the option to repurchase
the membership interest and, as such, the only dispute is the value, if the
membership interest maintains any value at all. 3 Therefore, Appellants’ Motion to
Compel Appraisal must be granted, as in essence an arbitration of value, to
determine, as a threshold issue, if Appellee’s can maintain any cause of action in
the trial court. To deny the request is an abuse of discretion and contrary to strong
policy favoring the efficient adjudication of disputes.
POINT II Appellees’ have failed to provide the only evidence that would
support their argument against strict compliance with the notice
provision, i.e. written notice of change of address, choosing
instead to rely on unsupported factual representations. 4
Appellees have failed to show, both to the trial court and now this court, the
only dispositive fact: their written notice changing the address in the Employment
Agreement. Appellees instead argue, contrary to their own demands of strict
compliance, that Appellant should not have strictly complied with Appellees’
address in the Employment Agreement. Appellees instead call for a departure
3
In the event the membership interest has nominal value (as asserted by Appellants), Appellees’
entire case fundamentally lacks jurisdiction in the trial court.
4
Reply to Appellees’ Issues III and IV.
5
from strict compliance in regards to the place notice was to be delivered, because
they concede that their address barred Appellants from strictly complying.
Appellee contends that “a scrivener’s” error imposed a legal burden upon
Appellants to conjure up a different address than the one Appellee specified for
himself in the Employment Agreement. Yet Appellees do not cite any legal
authority for this. But for Appellee’s approval of a wrong address in the
Employment Contract, and his failure to designate an alternative correct address in
writing, the parties would be arbitrating the value of the membership interest and
transferring ownership—ending the dispute. Appellee should not now be heard to
require strict compliance with the language in the Employment Agreement option
as to the timing and manner of notice delivery, but yet call upon the court to excuse
strict compliance in regards to the place of delivery, and require delivery of notice
to an address not provided for in writing by Appellee.
POINT III No waiver of legal arguments. 5
Appellees’ failure to provide evidence of written notice of change of
address, combined with Appellee’s admission that his incorrect address in the
Employment Agreement precluded Appellants’ personal delivery of the notice, are
dispositive of this appeal. Appellants’ timely delivery of notice to the address
5
Further reply to Appellees’ Issue IV.
6
specified by Appellee was all that was required to perfect exercise of the option.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the
trial court’s order denying Appellants’ Motion to Compel Appraisal, remand the
matter for entry of order granting Appellants’ Motion to Compel Appraisal and
grant such other and further relief to which Appellants may show itself to be justly
entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
Roderick J. Regan
Attorney for Appellants
BRANSCOMB | PC
711 Navarro St., Suite 500
San Antonio, TX 78205
Phone: (210) 598-5400
Fax: (210) 598-5405
SBN: 16733040
7
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft
Word 2010 and contains 2,130 words, as determined by the computer software’s
word-count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
Roderick J. Regan
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of June 2015, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant’s Reply Brief has been forwarded to the counsel below via
certified mail, return receipt requested and email pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Richard W. Espey
Matthew Soliday
Espey & Associates, PC
13750 San Pedro Avenue, Suite 730
San Antonio, TX 78232
Fax: (210) 404-0336
Attorneys for Appellees
Roderick J. Regan
8
Gary Hodge and Robert Hart III v. Stephen Kraft Ind. and as Member on Behalf of Grupo Habanero LLC
Combined Opinion