ACCEPTED
01-15-00542-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
7/29/2015 8:22:30 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-15-00542CV
IN THE
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 7/29/2015 8:22:30 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
HOUSTON, TEXAS Clerk
__________________________________________________________________
BRAZORIA COUNTY
Appellant
vs.
EUGENE ELDRIDGE, ET AL
Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 69510
149TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
HONORABLE TERRI HOLDER, JUDGE PRESIDING
__________________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
__________________________________________________________________
JERI YENNE RAETHELLA JONES
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Assistant Criminal District Attorney
BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS 111 E. Locust, Suite 408A
Angleton, Texas 77515
(979) 864-1233
(979) 864-1712 (Fax)
Bar Card No. 75007981
rjones@brazoria-county.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT No Oral Argument Requested
DATE: JULY 29, 2015
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COURSE
APPELLANT: BRAZORIA COUNTY
Attorney for Appellant at Trial:
Name: Raethella Jones
Assistant District Attorney
Address: Brazoria County Courthouse
111 E. Locust, Suite 408A
Angleton, Texas 77515
(979) 864-1233
(979) 864-1712 (Fax)
rjones@brazoria-county.com
Attorney for Appellant on Appeal:
Name: Raethella Jones
Assistant District Attorney
Address Brazoria County Courthouse
111 E. Locust, Suite 408A
Angleton, Texas 77515
(979) 864-1233
(979) 864-1712 (Fax)
rjones@brazoria-county.com
APPELLEE: EUGENE ELDRIDGE, ET AL.
Attorney for Appellee at Trial:
Name: Savannah Robinson
Address: 1822 Main
Danbury, Texas 77534
(979) 922-8825
(979) 922-8857 (Fax)
ii
Attorney for Appellee at Appeal:
Name: Savannah Robinson
Address: 1822 Main
Danbury, Texas 77534
(979) 922-8825
(979) 922-8857 (Fax)
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COURSE ......................................................... ii, iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................iv
RECORD REFERENCES .........................................................................................v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. vi,vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................1
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................1
(A) Introduction ......................................................................................................1
(B) Factual Background ..........................................................................................3
(1) The Advance Funding Agreement .............................................................. 3
(2) Plaintiff’s Evidence .....................................................................................5
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.................................................................... 7
III. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................8
(A) Standard of Review ..........................................................................................8
(B) Duty of the County .........................................................................................10
(C) Control of the Premises Determines Duty......................................................11
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................16
iv
RECORD REFERENCES
The Record citing convention contained below is used throughout
Appellant’s Brief.
CR.___ CLERK’S RECORD
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Rodriguez v. Carson,
519 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.- Amarillo 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.)........ 3,7,9,10
Harris County v. Sykes,
136 S.W.3d 635, 638(Tex.2004)................................................................................7
Bland Independent School District v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547, 554(Tex.2000)..................................................................................7
Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., LLC v. Murillo,
449 S.W.3d 583, Tex.App.- Houston [1 Dist.], 2014) ...............................................8
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
113 S.W.3d 217, 226(Tex.2004)................................................................................9
City of El Paso v. Mazie’s L.P.,
408 S.W.3d 13, 18(Tex.App.- El Paso 2012, pet denied)..........................................9
Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833, 837(Tex 1992)................................................................................9
El Chico Corp. v. Poole,
732 S.W.2d 306, 311(Tex.1987)..............................................................................10
Rodriguez v. Ed Hicks Imports,
767 S.W.2d 187, 192 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) ...........................10
Coleman v. Hudson Gas and Oil Corp,
455 S.W.2d 701(Tex.1970) ......................................................................................10
Redinger v. Living Inc.,
689 S.W.2d at 415, 417 (Tex 1985) .........................................................................12
Sem v. State,
821 S.W.2d 411, 414-15 (Tex.App.- Fort Worth 1991, no writ) ............................12
vi
Chevron U.S. A., Inc. v. Lara,
786 S.W.2d 48, 49(Tex.App.- El Paso 1990, writ denied) ......................................12
Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown,
80 S.W.3d 549,556 (Tex 2002)................................................................................12
City of Denton v. Van Page,
701 S. W.2d 831, 835 (Tex 1986)............................................................................12
Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright,
89 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex.2002)...............................................................................13
Olivarez v. Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc.,
401 S.W.3d 363, 367-69 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ...............13
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Isom,
143 S.W.3d 486, 489-90 (Tex.App. – Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) ......................14
Roberts v. Friendswood Dev. Co.,
886 S.W.2d 363,367 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist]1994,writ denied) ...................14
STATE STATUTES
Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.021 ..................................................................3,7
Tex. Tran. Code §§ 201.103 and 222.052 .................................................................3
FEDERAL STATUTES
Title 23 USC §144 .....................................................................................................3
SECONDARY AUTHORITY
Restatement (Second) Torts §328e (1965) .............................................................6,8
vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant,
Brazoria County’s, Plea to the Jurisdiction.
ISSUE PRESENTED
1. Did the trial court err in denying Brazoria County’s plea to the jurisdiction in
a premises liability claim when the County was not the legal possessor of the
premises at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Introduction
On or about 4:00 A.M. on April 23, 2012, Eugene Eldridge as driver and
Raymond Perry as passenger, were traveling along CR 128 in Brazoria County.
Also occurring on the same road during this period of time was the Texas
Department of Transportation’s (TxDOT) reconstruction of a bridge. Mr. Eldridge
alleges that he did not see the warning signs posted by TxDOT and he drove off
the road into an adjacent ditch in order to avoid driving into the gap created by the
removal of the bridge.
On September 6, 2012, Eldridge and Perry filed suit naming only against
Brazoria County (“the County”) as a defendant. Moreover, they did not allege the
County was the legal owner or possessor of the property. They simply claimed,
1
without any assertion or identification of who the property owner was, that
the County had been negligent in placing or replacing signs that warned of the
bridge’s construction. Further Plaintiffs asserted that this was a premises/special
defect since the claim arose as a result of a defect in real property After some brief
discovery, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that the alleged
property damage and injuries did not arise from an act or omission of negligence
of a County employee acting within the scope of their employment. The trial court
granted the plea; however, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling,
finding that employee involvement was not an element of a premises liability
claim. The appellate court also noted that they were not implying or deciding that
the County could not successfully raise future jurisdictional challenges to
Appellants’1 claims. CR. 75.
On March 16, 2015, the County filed a second Plea to the Jurisdiction
asserting that at the time of the incident in question; the County did not have legal
ownership, nor was it a possessor of the property giving rise to the alleged injury.
Moreover, the County asserted that since it was not the legal possessor/owner of
the property at the time of the incident in question, it had no duty to plaintiffs.
That duty lay with the legal owner/possessor, The State of Texas CR. 11.
1
Eldridge and Perry were Appellants in the 2014 appeal.
2
Plaintiffs responded to the Plea to the Jurisdiction asserting that premises
liability is based on an owner’s failure to take measures to make the property safe
CR. 52. The court held a hearing; however, no testimony was taken nor was the
hearing recorded. CR. 84. The Court later issued an order denying the Plea to the
Jurisdiction. CR. 75.
This case is governed by TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.021
(CPRC) referred to hereinafter as the Texas Tort Claims Act (“The Act”). The
Act creates governmental liability when the personal injury is caused by a
condition or use or tangible or real property if the governmental unit would, were
it a private person, be held liable under Texas law. Id. For a private person to have
a right of recovery, under Texas law, it is fundamental that a legal duty of some
character was owed to the individual seeking recovery. Rodriguez v. Carson, 519
S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The Advance Funding Agreement
The State under the authority of TEX. TRAN. CODE §§ 201.103 and
222.052 establishes the plans and policies for the construction of a comprehensive
system of state highways and public roads in cooperation with local governments.
The funding for the State to implement these plans and policies is authorized by
Title 23 USC §144. As the bridges and highways within the off-state federal-aid
3
system need replacement or rehabilitation, the State enters into agreements with
local agreements for such work. Under the Highway Bridge Replacement and
Rehabilitation Program, the Texas Transportation Commission by Order number
110109, dated June 30, 2005 authorized the state to enter into an Advanced
Funding Agreement (“Agreement”) with Brazoria County, whereby the bridge
located on CR 128 would be replaced by the State. CR. 19.
The express provisions of the Agreement stated the effective period of the
Agreement was from the date signed, October 21, 2005, until terminated, October
11, 2012, when under the terms of the Agreement, the County issued a Notice of
Acceptance of the bridge. CR 29, 40.
Under the terms of the Agreement, the State assumed all construction
responsibilities including advertising for construction bids, awarding and
administering the contract as well as traffic control through detour plans and
signage. CR. 22¶11, 45-47. Only upon completion of the project was the County
allowed to accept full ownership and operate and maintain the facility. CR. 22 ¶12
Explicit in the Agreement were terms that no party is an agent, servant, or
employee of the other and each party agrees it is responsible for its individual acts
and deeds. CR. 25 ¶16.
The exact date the State begin replacing the bridge is unknown to the County
because under the terms of the Agreement, the State had taken custody and control
4
of the project and the premises. The only information the County received
regarding construction was a notice, dated March 23, 2010, from the State to the
County’s engineer that “the contract for the bridges (sic) is expected to be let in
July 2010. A construction schedule and traffic detour layouts are attached for your
use”. CR. 41.
It was clearly evident that the State controlled and occupied the premises
and was the possessor of the land for the purpose of defining a legal duty in tort;
therefore, the County cannot be a liable tortfeasor.
2. Plaintiffs’ Evidence
Plaintiffs attached to their petition an affidavit of an individual who lived
adjacent to the area where the alleged accident occurred and who had observed the
construction as well as communicated with the construction engineer/supervisor
during the project. This individual stated that he had “several conversations with
the construction company and the TxDOT supervisor”. He informed them about
the other detour signs on the north and south directions of Hwy. 35 as well as those
along CR 99. He also stated that “once the road was closed, the company
(emphasis added) placed flashing lights to show traffic the bridge was out”.
Plaintiffs’ witness specifically names, Rozco Contracting Company, assistant vice
president, Martin Gottselig and TxDOT representative, Jared Williams, as the
individuals he spoke to “many times” about traffic concerns and signs. Noticeably
5
absent was any reference to any County agent, employee or representative. CR. 48,
49.
Plaintiffs also allege that “Exhibit A, behind page 12, page 3 of 3, paragraph
three” of the Agreement states that the County agreed to be responsible for the
bridge construction. CR. 34. That assertion is a mischaracterization of what the
paragraph actually says. The paragraph actually reads “ THEREFORE BE IT
RESOLVED that the Local Government perform, or cause to be performed the
following equivalent match projects (emphasis added) in return for waiver of the
local match fund participation requirement on the approved federal off-system
bridge program (participation waived) project not yet awarded. CR 34 ¶1. Further,
the paragraph Plaintiff cites to expressly states, “In performing, or causing to be
performed, the equivalent match project(s) the Local Government assumes all
responsibility for engineering…” CR 34, ¶3. The responsibility the County was
assuming was for the match project not the project on CR 128. The evidence
Plaintiffs attach to their pleading to support the alleged accident occurred due to
the fact that the County placed inadequate warning signs in facts reinforces the
County’s position that they were not the legal possessors at the time of the
accident. Liability can only be attributed to the County if they had a duty as an
owner, defined as legal possessor of the premises. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 328E (1965).
6
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Absent narrow exceptions carved out by The Act, a governmental entity
retains immunity from suit. CPRC§ 101.021. One such exception is found in
CPRC §101.021(2) wherein a governmental entity may be held liable for personal
injury caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property, if the
governmental unit would, were it a private person, be held liable under Texas law.
When a suit against a governmental entity is filed that does not fall within the
exception of CPRC §101.021(2); the governmental entity must file a plea to the
jurisdiction to challenge the court’s authority to determine the subject matter of the
filed action. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.2004); Bland
Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000). The County
challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction asserting that although Plaintiffs alleged an
injury caused by real property, the County would not, under Texas law, be liable
were it a private person. CR.11. For liability to attach, the Plaintiff would have
had to have sustained an injury due to the conduct of the County founded upon
some legal duty of the County to the Plaintiff. Rodriguez v. Carson, 519 S.W.2d
214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the present case, the
Plaintiffs allege they suffered personal injuries because the County was negligent
in placing adequate signs warning of bridge reconstruction. They never allege that
the property in question was owned or possessed by the County thus giving rise to
7
a duty by the County to place warning signs. They simply assert, although
contradicted by their witnesses’ affidavit, that the County placed warning signs;
therefore when those signs were lost or destroyed, it was the duty of the County to
replace them. CR. 7,8; ¶1,2,3. The duty to act, in this case, place warning signs,
would be the responsibility of the possessor of the land. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co.,
LLC v. Murillo 449 S.W.3d 583, Tex.App.–Houston [1 Dist.], 2014.
If by implication, Plaintiffs are asserting that the County held legal title to
the property; therefore they are the possessor of the property; this assertion is not
supported by case law. The question of legal title for real property purposes does
not define whether a possessor of property has a legal duty to answer in tort for
premises defects it creates. The important thing in the law of torts is the possession
and not whether it is or is not rightful between the possessor and some third
person. Id., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 328E (1965).
Although the State was the legal possessor of the land and the State placed
and exercised control over the warning signs thus creating the existence and
violation of a duty to Plaintiffs on the State, the trial court denied, the County’s
plea to the jurisdiction.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
8
The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Whether undisputed
evidence of jurisdictional facts establishes a trial court's jurisdiction is a question
of law subject to de novo review. Miranda, 183 S.W.3d at 224. Moreover, whether
or not a legal duty does exist under a given state of facts and circumstances is
essentially a question of law to be determined by the court. Rodriguez v. Carson at
216. Further a determination whether a party has alleged facts that affirmatively
demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law which is
subject to de novo review. Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004); City of El Paso v. Mazie's, L.P., 408 S.W.3d 13, 18
(Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, pet. denied). A trial court has no “discretion” in
determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure
by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of
discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.1992).
Even when construing the Plaintiffs’ pleading liberally in favor
jurisdiction, there exists undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts that TxDOT
was the possessor of the property; therefore, any duty to Plaintiffs was the
responsibility of TxDOT. Further, when examining the evidence offered by
Plaintiffs, TxDOT managed, controlled, and had custody of the premises at all
times incident to the alleged accident. The trial court therefore abused its discretion
in denying the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction.
9
B. Duty of the County
It is fundamental that the right of recovery for an injury sustained by a
plaintiff as a result of the conduct of a defendant be founded upon a legal duty of
some character owed to the plaintiff and a violation of that duty by the defendant.
Rodriguez v. Carson, at 216. The three elements of actionable negligence are: (1) a
legal duty owed by one person to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3)
damage proximately resulting from such breach. Each of the elements must coexist
in order that there can be any recovery. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306,
311 (Tex.1987); Rodriguez v. Ed Hicks Imports, 767 S.W.2d 187, 192 (Tex.App.—
Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). A plaintiff must prove the existence and violation
of a legal duty owed to him by the defendant to establish tort liability. Coleman v.
Hudson Gas and Oil Corp., 455 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.1970). Step one in establishing
the existence of a legal duty in Plaintiffs’ premises liability claim is the
determination of who the legal possessor of the premises is. Plaintiffs never allege
or offer any evidence that the County was the legal owner or possessor of the
property in question. The premise of their negligence claim is found in their
Second Amended Original Petition; wherein they allege:
The County posted warning signs for the hazardous condition posed
by the missing bridge. On April 20, 12, the area experienced severe
storms, with gusting winds. All warning signs were blown over, or
10
lost in the storm. The County was notified of the dangerous
condition posed by the bridge being removed, and the absence of
warning signs… The negligence of the Defendants consisted
of...carelessly and negligently failing to provide any warning of the
hazardous condition…failing to replace road signs and warning
devices after notice and a reasonable time.
Plaintiffs completely disregard who the legal possessor of the premises is and
move straight to the assumption that it was the County. Based on that assumption,
they presume the County had, prior to the incident, posted warning signs. They
make this assertion in spite of the fact their witnesses’ statement expressly
identified TxDOT or the construction company contracted by TxDOT as the entity
who placed the warning signs. CR. 48, 49. Further support of Plaintiffs’ witness
statement, that TxDOT placed the warning signs, is found in the documents
provided by, TxDOT. Specifically the “Detour and Traffic Control Plans”, which
identify TxDOT as the author of the plans and the Agreement whereby TxDOT
assumed all responsibility for the construction responsibilities. The County does
not accept full ownership and operate and maintain the facility until the project has
been completed, it is obvious that TxDOT, not the County was the legal possessor
of the premises and any duty of care lay with TxDOT. CR. 45-47; 22, ¶¶11, 12
C. Control of the Premises Determines Duty
11
Who controls the premises is the essential question in determining who owes
the duty to warn or make safe. This duty only arises; however, for an occupier with
control of the premises. See Redinger v. Living, 689 S.W.2d at 415, 417; Sem v.
State, 821 S.W.2d 411, 414–15 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Lara, 786 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied).
“[a] premises-liability defendant may be held liable for a dangerous condition on
the property if it ‘assum[ed] control over and responsibility for the premises,’ even
if it did not own or physically occupy the property.” Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown,
80 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex.2002) (concluding that, for purposes of premises-liability
claim, county assumed sufficient control over state-owned causeway because it had
maintenance contract with state that included responsibilities over causeway's
streetlight system) (quoting City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835
(Tex.1986)). The facts of this case are analogous to Brown, In that case, the
State held legal title to the section of the roadway where the accident occurred;
however, the Court found Cameron County assumed sufficient control over the
part of the premises that presented the alleged danger such that Cameron County
had a duty to remedy it. In the current case, even if the Plaintiffs had alleged that
the County held legal title to the premises at the time of the alleged incident, the
State, operating through TxDOT, assumed control over the part of the roadway that
presented the alleged danger. The elements of control can be proven by a
12
contractual agreement assigning a right of control or evidence of actual control
Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex.2002); see also Olivares v.
Brown & Gay Eng'g, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 363, 367–69 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, no. pet.). The Funding Agreement entered into between TXDOT and
the County state the following: “the State, defined in the agreement as, the State of
Texas acting by and through the Texas Department of Transportation, will be
responsible for all construction responsibilities from construction bids through
construction completion; “ownership of the project does not pass to the Local
Government [Brazoria County] until the project has been completed and the
County accepts full ownership”. CR. 22 ¶¶11, 12. The contractual language clearly
establishes that TxDOT assumed control over the premises. Further evidence of the
County’s lack of control of the premises is established by its Notice of Acceptance
of the project dated, October 12, 2012. CR. 40. The County would not need to
accept a project it had possession and control of. Additionally, TxDOT, developed
the construction plan as well as the traffic control plan for the bridge at CR 128.
TxDOT provided the County a copy of its construction and detour plans; however,
as identified clearly on the plans, those belong to and were developed for use by
TxDOT. CR. 45-47. These plans confirm the statement in the Funding Agreement
that TxDOT will be responsible for all construction responsibilities; [this included
the placement of any warning signs]. The statement of plaintiffs’ witness that he
13
had conversations with the construction company, hired by TxDOT and with the
TxDOT supervisor regarding the placement of the signs and the signs being blown
down by the wind further evidences the control of the premise by TxDOT. The
witness, never identifies or even implies that he ever saw or spoke with any
representative for the County, only those for TxDOT. CR. 48,49.
As further evidence of the County’s physical absence and lack of control
of the premises, the County attached to its plea to the jurisdiction, the affidavit of
Assistant County Engineer, Michael Shannon 2, who stated that the County did not
participate in any manner in the demolition/reconstruction of the bridge nor in the
placement of any signage. Further, Mr. Shannon’s , statement that the County did
not receive any notices or complaints regarding warning signs in the
construction/demolition area during the relevant time period supports Plaintiffs’
witness statement that he complained to TxDOT representatives. CR. 50-51; 48-49
“The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant assumed sufficient control over the
part of the premises that presented the alleged danger such that the defendant had
the responsibility to remedy it.” see Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Isom, 143 S.W.3d
486, 489–90 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (analyzing case in which
injury occurred from unmarked guy wire on utility company's right-of-way as
premises-liability claim); Roberts v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 886 S.W.2d 363, 367
2
The County Engineer at the time of the incident had retired and was not available; however, the Assistant County
Engineer was in that position at the time of the incident and as a part of his duties participated in or was aware of
the day to day activities of the Engineer’s office.
14
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that easement holder
has duty to use ordinary care regarding use and maintenance of easement). It is
sufficiently clear from the contractual agreement, conduct of the parties, witness
statements and the affidavit of the assistant county engineer that TxDOT assumed
control of the premises; therefore, any duty under a negligence premises defect
theory belonged to TxDOT.
CONCLUSION
The County requests that this Court hold that the trial court erred in denying
the County’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Further, the County requests such other relief to which it may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
JERI YENNE
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
SBN 04240950
/s/ Raethella Jones________
by:RAETHELLA JONES
Assistant District Attorney
SBN 75007981
111 East Locust, Suite 408A
Angleton, Texas 77515
(979) 864-1233
(979) 864-1712 (Fax)
ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPELLANT
15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that Appellant Brief, as calculated under Appellate Rule
9.4(i), contains 3,476 words as determined by the Word program used to prepare
this document.
/s/ Raethella Jones _____
RAETHELLA JONES
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Attorney for the Appellant certifies that a true copy of this
motion was served in compliance with Article 9.5 of the Rules of Appellate
procedure on Savannah Robinson, attorney for the Appellee, by email to
savannahrobinson@gmail.com this 29th day of July 2015.
/s/ Raethella Jones
RAETHELLA JONES
16