Laura Leticia Zepeda Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham Vasquez,Jr. v. Legend Natural Gas III, LP Legend Natural Gas, LLC Lewis Energy Group, LP And Lewis Petro Properties, Inc

ACCEPTED
04-14-00899-cv
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
4/30/2015 5:06:18 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK

04-14-00899-CV

FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
In the Fourth Court of Appeals SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
04/30/2015 5:06:18 PM
KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ, Individually and on
Behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham Vasquez, Jr.,
Appellant,

v.

LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC;
LEWIS ENERGY GROUP, LP; LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.;
ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING CO., INC.; VIRTEX HOLDNGS, LLP;
VIRTEX OPERATING CO., INC. ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS,
LLC; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS COMPANY; and
XTO ENERGY, INC.,
Appellees

On Appeal From the 81st District Court
In La Salle County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 14-07-0019-CVL

APPELLEE ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING CO., INC.’S BRIEF

William A. Abernethy DONNELL, ABERNETHY &
State Bar No. 00809800 KIESCHNICK, P.C.
555 N. Carancahua, Suite 1770
Clay E. Coalson Corpus Christi, Texas 78401-0853
State Bar No. 04422400 Telephone: (361) 888-5551

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................................................ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1

ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................................... 2
ISSUE 1........................................................................................................................ 2
ISSUE 2........................................................................................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 4

ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 4
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY BASIS IN LAW. 4
A. Standard of Review .............................................................................. 4
B. Plaintiff is Essentially Contending That all Ten Defendants
Should be Liable for Collectively and Incrementally Causing Wear
and Tear to the Public Road ............................................................... 5

C. There is No Caselaw That Imposes Liability on Users of Public
Roads for Collectively Causing Wear and Tear to the Road .......... 6

D. Plaintiff’s Reliance on Buchanan v. Rose and Other Cases That
Cite it is Misplaced ............................................................................... 6

E. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Grapotte v. Adams is More
Factually On-Point Than Buchanan v. Rose .................................... 8

ii
 F. Imposing A Legal Duty On Users of Public Roads to Repair the
Road to Prevent Dusty Conditions or Warn Other Drivers of
Dusty Conditions is Fraught With Legal and Practical
Impossibilities and Difficulties, and Therefore Supports the Trial
Court’s Determination That Plaintiff’s Claims Have No Basis in
Law ........................................................................................................ 9

1. The County has the power and duty to repair public roads,
and private citizens have no legal right to repair such
roads ........................................................................................... 9

2. Warning signs and other safety devices are the County’s
responsibility, so private users of the road cannot install
signs and devices to warn other motorists of dusty
conditions ................................................................................ 10

3. There are serious practical problems in having private users
attempt to repair public roads to alleviate dusty conditions
or warn other drivers of such conditions ............................ 10

4. The duty which Plaintiff seeks to impose on users of public
roadways would have negative public policy implications 12

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 12

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................... 13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................................. 14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 14

iii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Buchanan v. Rose,
159 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1942)............................................................................... 6, 7, 8

City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne,
111 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2003) ......................................................................................... 9

Courville v. Home Transportation Co.,
497 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)................... 7

DeVoll v. Demonbreun,
2014 Tex. App. Lexis 13865,
(Texas. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (memorandum opinion) .............. 2, 5

Gaulding v. Celotex Corp.,
772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989) ......................................................................................... 6

General Electric v. Moritz,
257 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2008)..................................................................................... 11

GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
429 S.W. 3d 752 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) ................................ 5

Grapotte v. Adams,
111 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1938)................................................................................... 8, 9

Roland v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.,
33 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) ........................................ 11

Texas Home Management v. Peavy,
89 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2002) ......................................................................................... 12

Statutes

Tex. Transp. Code
§ 251.016 ...................................................................................................................... 9
§ 252.............................................................................................................................. 9
§ 252.005 .................................................................................................................... 10
iv
 § 252.105(b)(1)............................................................................................................. 9
§ 252.205(b)(4)........................................................................................................... 10
§ 252.215 .................................................................................................................... 10
§ 544.006(a)(e) ........................................................................................................... 10

Regulations

Tex. Admin. Code
§ 21.141 ...................................................................................................................... 10
§ 21.401 ...................................................................................................................... 10
§ 22.215 ...................................................................................................................... 10

Rules

Tex. R. Civ. P.
§ 91a .............................................................................................................................. 5
§ 91a.1 ........................................................................................................................... 5

Tex. R. App. P.
§ 9.4 (i)(1) ................................................................................................................... 14
§ 9.4 (i)(3) ................................................................................................................... 14

v
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is brought under the wrongful death and survival acts.

Appellant/Plaintiff Laura Vasquez is the widow of Jose Vasquez, who died when a

cloud of dust obscured his visibility while he was driving on a public road, causing his

vehicle to leave the roadway and go into a ditch. CR 82. Plaintiff has sued ten

Appellees/Defendants, who allegedly own or operate oil and gas wells in the area

around the public road, and therefore use the road. CR 81-82. Plaintiff contends that

the Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent because operating their vehicles

on the public road created a dangerous condition (i.e., dusty conditions) that they

failed to fix or warn other drivers about. CR 82-86.

The Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a, which

authorizes the dismissal of claims that have no basis in law or fact. CR 52, 62, 121.

The trial court granted the motions on the ground that the Plaintiff’s cause of action

had no basis in law, with the exception of a negligence claim against Defendants

Lewis Energy Group, LP and Lewis Petro Properties, Inc. for improperly operating a

vehicle at the scene of the accident, which the trial court found to be separate and

distinct from the claims that it was dismissing, and the trial court therefore severed

that remaining claim against the Lewis Defendants into a separate suit which is abated

until this appeal is resolved. Supp. CR 7-8. Thus, this appeal involves the Rule 91a

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for having no basis in law.

1
 ISSUES PRESENTED

ISSUE 1

Does Texas law recognize a cause of action in favor of a person who has an

automobile accident caused by diminished visibility due to dusty conditions while he

is driving on a public road, against other users of the public road who used the road

on earlier occasions and may have thereby caused wear and tear to the road?

ISSUE 2

Does Texas law impose a duty on users of a public road to either (1) repair the

road so as prevent dusty conditions from occurring on the public road, or (2) warn

other drivers that their visibility might be diminished by dusty conditions on the

public road?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Court has said that when reviewing a Tex. R. Civ. 91a dismissal, the

determination of whether a cause of action has any basis in law is a legal question that

the court reviews de novo, based on the allegations of the live petition and any

attachments thereto. DeVoll v. Demonbreun, 2014 Tex. App. Lexis 13865, 4 (Texas.

App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (memorandum opinion). Thus, we look to the

Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition for this Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff alleges that on August 4, 2012, decedent Jose Vasquez was operating a

vehicle on Krueger Road in LaSalle County. CR 82. Mr. Vasquez was travelling

2
immediately behind Defendant Lewis Energy’s truck, which was “travelling at a high

rate of speed, throwing up dust, and driving recklessly”. CR 84. As a result of this

“reckless driving”, the Lewis Energy truck “caused an excessive amount of dust and

dirt to obstruct the view” of Mr. Vasquez. CR 84. A “cloud of dust” caused Mr.

Vasquez to lose sight of the road, drive into a ditch, and his vehicle flipped over and

killed him. CR 82.

Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges that Krueger Road is a county road that is

maintained by LaSalle County. CR 81-82. Plaintiff asserts that the ten Defendants

own or operate oil or gas wells “in the area around Krueger Road”, and that “every

day” the Defendants sent “numerous loaded and unloaded trucks up and down

Krueger Road…to operate and service the wells.” CR 81-82. Plaintiff claims LaSalle

County could not repair Krueger Road as fast as the Defendants destroyed it, thereby

“creating a dangerous condition”. Plaintiff says that the Defendants “failed to fix the

road” and “failed to provide any warnings to drivers…such as [Mr.] Vasquez”. CR

82, 83. Plaintiff contends that the Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent

because their vehicles, as well as the vehicles from the other companies they “hired,

commissioned and contracted with, “destroyed” the road by driving on it. CR 82-86.

The Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a,

contending that Plaintiff’s claims had no basis in law. CR 52, 62, 121. Plaintiff filed a

response. CR 126. After a hearing, 1 RR 1-34, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s

claims against all Defendants. CR 147. The trial court thereafter signed another order
3
that clarified that the claim against the Lewis Defendants for improperly operating a

vehicle at the scene of the accident was “separate and distinct from Defendants’ 91a

claims” and was therefore severed from the action and assigned a new cause number

which was to be abated until this appeal is resolved. Supp. CR 007-008. This appeal

was thereafter perfected. Supp. CR 001.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Jose Vasquez died when he was blinded by a dust cloud stirred up by a truck

that was immediately in front of him on a county road, thereby causing him to lose

sight of the road and drive into a ditch. CR 82, 84. His widow is suing other users of

the public road for causing wear and tear through their use of the road, and then not

repairing the road or warning other drivers.

The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s claims have no basis in law. The

Defendants did not owe a duty to prevent the dust cloud that blinded Mr. Vasquez

and caused him to drive into the ditch. The Defendants did not have a duty to repair

the public road or warn Mr. Vasquez of dust clouds or other road conditions. Texas

law simply does not impose liability on users of a public road for accidents caused

dusty conditions purportedly resulting from wear and tear of the roadway.

ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY BASIS IN LAW

A. Standard of Review

4
 Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims

because they have no basis in law. Supp. CR 007–008. Rule 91a allows a party to

move to dismiss a baseless cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law

or fact. DeVoll v. Demonbreun, 2014 Tex. App. Lexis 13865, 3 (Tex. App.–San

Antonio 2014 no pet.) (memorandum opinion). “A cause of action has no basis in

law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from

them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. (quoting Rule 91a.1.). The

determination of whether a cause of action has any basis in law is a legal question that

appellate courts review de novo, based on the allegations of the live petition and any

attachments thereto. Id. at 4. In its review, this Court construes the pleadings

liberally in favor of the Plaintiff, looks at the pleader’s intent, and accepts as true the

factual allegations in the pleadings to determine if the cause of action has a basis in

law. Id. The Court considers “whether the petition contains enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face”. GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.

3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied).

B. Plaintiff is Essentially Contending That all Ten Defendants
Should be Liable for Collectively and Incrementally Causing Wear
and Tear to the Public Road

The core facts alleged in this case are that Jose Vasquez died when he was

blinded by a dust cloud stirred up by a truck that was immediately in front of him on a

public road, thereby causing him to lose sight of the road and drive into a ditch. CR

82, 84. Remarkably, the plaintiff fails to even mention those facts in her argument,
5
much less address them. She does not allege any unique conduct as to any of the 10

Defendants (other than the Lewis Energy truck “throwing up dust” by driving

immediately in front of Mr. Vasquez in a “dangerous manner”, a claim that has been

severed and abated and therefore is not before this Court). Instead, Plaintiff merely

complains that the 10 Defendants collectively sent “numerous loaded and unloaded

trucks up and down Krueger Road to operate and service their nearby wells, and that

those trucks “continually” drove at “high rates of speed” and some were “possibly”

overweight. CR 083, 085. Plaintiff does not allege any particular incident that

damaged the road; rather, she is merely complaining about incremental wear and tear

to the road due to significant economic activity in the area by numerous defendants.

C. There is No Caselaw That Imposes Liability on Users of Public
Roads for Collectively Causing Wear and Tear to the Road

Plaintiff does not cite any Texas cases where a group of defendants has been

held liable for collectively causing wear and tear to a public road. In fact, Defendant’s

counsel has conducted a nationwide search on Lexis for such a case, and has not

found any. Such a theory would be contrary to current Texas law, which has not

adopted collective theories of liability such as alternative liability, concert of action,

enterprise liability, or market share liability. Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d

66, 71 (Tex. 1989).

D. Plaintiff’s Reliance on Buchanan v. Rose and Other Cases That
Cite it is Misplaced

6
 Plaintiff contends that Texas courts have long held that if a party creates a

dangerous condition, it either has a duty to repair it (if the condition was created

negligently) or to warn those who may be injured by it (if the condition was created

without being negligent). Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6, 9-10. Of the eight cases Plaintiff

cites for that contention, only two of the cases involved automobile accidents

(Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1942) and Courville v. Home

Transportation Co., 497 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d

n.r.e.) and neither of those cases found that the defendant owed a duty under the facts

presented. The other cases cited involve unrelated situations like drug testing,

embezzlement, oilfield accidents, flooding, and electrocution. And beyond involving

unrelated situations, none of those cases found a duty owed by the defendants under

the rule urged by Plaintiff. So the cases cited by Plaintiff do not support her position.

All of the cases relied on by Plaintiff cite Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109

(Tex. 1942). But Buchanan does not support Plaintiff’s position, but instead rejects it.

Specifically, the Supreme Court observed that the defendant in Buchanan (whose

truck broke a bridge that was already in a defective condition) had no duty to warn

other drivers of the broken bridge because the defendant “was merely the victim of a

defective condition that already existed”, and that “[i]t would be carrying the matter

too far to say that one must give notice of every known defect in a road naturally

resulting from his normal and legitimate use thereof.” Id. 159 S.W.2d at 393-394.

The Court further explained that “[t]o so hold would make the use of the highways
7
too hazardous from the standpoint of public liability.” Id. In our case, Buchanan’s

concern about excessive public liability is even more apparent, as Plaintiff seeks to

impose liability against 10 users of the road. Frankly, under the argument urged by

Plaintiff, she could theoretically sue ever motorist who drove on Krueger Road prior

to Mr. Vasquez’s accident. That potential for rampant public liability for merely using

public roads creates a compelling reason not to impose liability on the Defendants.

E. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Grapotte v. Adams is More
Factually On-Point Than Buchanan v. Rose

Within Buchanan v. Rose, The Texas Supreme Court favorably cites its earlier

decision of Grapotte v. Adams, 111 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1938), which is more factually

on-point than Buchanan v. Rose. In Grapotte, the plaintiff tripped and fell while

walking on a public sidewalk in downtown San Antonio. The plaintiff contended that

she stepped in a depression in the sidewalk, which had been caused by numerous cars

going in and out of the defendant’s parking garage over an extended period of time.

The appellate courts reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme

Court noted that the duty to maintain the sidewalk rested upon the City of San

Antonio, rather than the abutting landowner-defendant. Id., p. 691. In holding that

the defendant was not legally responsible for the plaintiff’s accident, the Supreme

Court determined that numerous cars passing over the sidewalk showed the degree

and quantity of use, rather than an unusual, wrongful or unlawful use. Id., p. 691-692.

8
 Our case is similar to Grapotte in that Plaintiff is attempting to hold the 10

Defendants liable for their rightful use of the public road to conduct their lawful

business activities, which may have ultimately led to wear and tear of the road that the

County had the duty to maintain. Under Grapotte, the Defendants cannot be liable

for Mr. Vasquez’s accident.

F. Imposing A Legal Duty On Users of Public Roads to Repair the
Road to Prevent Dusty Conditions or Warn Other Drivers of Dusty
Conditions is Fraught With Legal and Practical Impossibilities
and Difficulties, and Therefore Supports the Trial Court’s
Determination That Plaintiff’s Claims Have No Basis in Law

1. The County has the power and duty to repair public roads,
and private citizens have no legal right to repair such roads

At the heart of Plaintiff’s position is the belief that the 10 Defendants, as users

of a public road, had a duty to either repair it or warn other drivers of the purported

“dangerous condition”. Appellant’s Brief, 4, 6, 9, 10. Plaintiff’s argument erroneously

assumes that private citizens can repair public roads or install warning signs or similar

devices on them. This is not so. The Texas Transportation Code specifically

provides that county commissioner courts “may exercise general control over all

roads, highways and bridges in the county.” Tex. Transp. Code § 251.016. “By

granting commissioners courts general control over roads, the Legislature imposed on

them a duty to make roadways safe for public travel.” City of San Antonio v. City of

Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 31-32 (Tex. 2003). Chapter 252 of the Texas Transportation

Code creates various systems for county road administration, including adopting a

9
system for laying out, working on, draining and repairing the public roads (Section

252.005) and ensuring that roads are kept in good repair (Sections 252.105(b)(1) and

252.205(b)(4)). Similarly, as the owner or easement holder of Krueger Road, the

County was in control of the road and therefore had a duty to maintain it.

2. Warning signs and other safety devices are the County’s
responsibility, so private users of the road cannot install signs
and devices to warn other motorists of dusty conditions

Just as the Defendants could not repair the public road, they could not place

signs or other warning devices on the public road. See, e.g., Tex. Transp. Code

§ 544.006(a)(e), (prohibiting persons from placing unauthorized signs that attempt to

direct the movement of traffic on or in view of a road); Tex. Admin. Code §

21.141 et. seq., § 21.401, et seq. (regulations governing signage on right of ways); Tex.

Transp. Code § 252.215 (making persons who knowingly damage or misplace a sign

liable to the county and to anyone injured by such conduct). Further, because the

Defendants do not own or control the public road, they do not have any property

interest that would give them the legal right to place signs or devices on it.

3. There are serious practical problems in having private users
attempt to repair public roads to alleviate dusty conditions
or warn other drivers of such conditions

Thus, Plaintiff’s simplistic assertions that the 10 Defendants should have

repaired the public road or warned motorists of the dusty conditions ignores the

complex legal realities of what she is urging. Plaintiff’s bald assertion that the

Defendants should have repaired the road (presumably to make it relatively dust-free)
10
also ignores the practical realities of eliminating dust on an unpaved road in rural

South Texas in early August (when this accident occurred).

The only way to keep an unpaved road dust-free in dry, hot South Texas would

be to pave it. And even then, in a hot and windy locale, dust can still be blown across

the road in considerable volume. So keeping this unpaved road relatively dust-free

would be almost impossible, but would probably require that the Defendants pave the

unpaved road in an attempt to comply with the purported duty that Plaintiff is urging.

To require that private users of public roads pave an unpaved road in order to

effectively “repair” a purported dust problem is absurd.

And as far as the purported duty to warn Mr. Vasquez of the dangers of dust

clouds, a dust cloud is open and obvious, and the fact that it can obscure vision and

lead to accidents is within the common sense and common experience of drivers.

Should Texas law be dramatically expanded to impose liability upon users of public

roadways based on their failure to warn other drivers of something as open and

obvious as a dust cloud? The answer is clearly “no”. There is no duty to warn when

the danger is something that is open and obvious. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v.

Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. 2008) (premises owner has no duty to warn an

independent contractor’s employees of an open and obvious danger); Roland v.

Daimler Chrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469-471 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet.

denied) (“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious

11
dangers”; riding in the bed of a pickup truck is an open and obvious danger as a

matter of law).

4. The duty which Plaintiff seeks to impose on users of public
roadways would have negative public policy implications

Courts must consider public policy implications when imposing a duty of

care. Texas Home Management v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 37 (Tex. 2002). In this case,

expecting users of public roads to somehow conduct repairs or provide warnings to

other motorists has numerous public policy implications. First, how will a given user

even know whether its level of purported wear and tear triggers a duty to repair or

warn? And assuming a user has reason to believe its conduct or use reached the

requisite level of wear and tear, how would it go about fixing the road or placing signs

or devices? Would such a person need governmental approvals, and if so, how would

such be obtained and under what time frame? Or could a user simply barricade the

road and begin making repairs as it saw fit, or install whatever signs/devices it chose

to install? The duty Plaintiff seeks to impose is simply unfair and unworkable. It

would merely lead to worry, chaos and confusion among users of public roads.

CONCLUSION

There is no precedent for creating the duty that the Plaintiff is urging this

Court to impose on users of public roads. Further, such a duty would be completely

unworkable, assuming it was even legally possible, given the statutes that impose

governmental control over public roads. This case was properly dismissed.

12
 PRAYER

Appellee Rosetta Resources Operating Co., Inc. prays that the trial court’s

judgment be affirmed, and that the costs of appeal be taxed against Appellant Leticia

Zepeda Vasquez.

Respectfully submitted,

/S/ Clay E. Coalson
William A. Abernethy
State Bar No. 00809800
E-MAIL: babernethy@dakpc.com
Clay E. Coalson
State Bar No. 04422400
E-MAIL: ccoalson@dakpc.com

DONNELL, ABERNETHY &
KIESCHNICK, P.C.
555 North Carancahua, Suite 1770
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401-0853
Telephone: (361) 888-5551
Facsimile: (361) 880-5618

Attorneys for Appellee Rosetta Resources Operating
Co., Inc.

13
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned
counsel – in reliance upon the word count of the computer program used to prepare
this document – certified that this document contains 2,859 words, excluding the
words that need not be counted under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/S/ Clay E. Coalson
Clay E. Coalson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 30, 2015 a copy of this Appellee’s Opening Brief
was served by electronic filing upon the following counsel of record:
Jeffrey Lee Dorrell
E-mail: jdorrell@hanszenlaporte.com
H. Mark Burck
E-mail: mburck@hanszenlaporte.com
Daniel Dutko
E-mail: ddutko@hanszenlaporte.com
Hanszen Laporte, LLP
11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
Houston, Texas 77079
Attorneys for Appellant Leticia Zepeda Vasquez

Isaac J. Huron
E-mail: ihuron@lawdcm.com
Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc.
McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78213
Attorney for Appellees Legend Natural Gas III, LP, and
Legend Natural Gas, LLC

David L. Ortega
E-mail: dortega@nhsl.com
Naman Howell Smith & Lee, PLLC
1001 Reunion Place, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216
Attorney for Lewis Energy Group, LP, and
Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.
14
Jose E. Garcia
E-mail: jeg@gvlaw.net
Garcia & Villarreal
4311 N. McColl Road
McAllen, Texas 78504
Attorney for Appellee XTO Energy, Inc.

Christopher Lowrance
E-mail: chris.lowrance@roystonlaw.com
Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP
802 Carancahua, Suite 1300
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
Attorney for Virtex Operating Co., Inc., and
Virtex Holdings, LLP

E. Michael Rodriguez
E-mail: mrodriguez@atlashall.com
Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, LLP
P.O. Box 6369 (78523-6369)
50 W. Morrison Road, Suite A
Brownsville, Texas 78520
Attorney for Enterprise Products Holdings,
LLC, and Enterprise Products Co.

15