ACCEPTED
03-14-00819-cv
5692786
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
6/16/2015 11:49:17 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
CAUSE NO. 03-14-00819-CV
__________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE AUSTIN, TEXAS
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT6/16/2015 11:49:17 AM
AUSTIN DIVISION JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
__________________________________________________________________
Judy Weirich
v.
IESI Corp. and Southside Wrecker, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________
APPELLEE SOUTHSIDE WRECKER, INC.’S BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
THE PETRAS LAW FIRM PLLC
State Bar No. 15850510
George J. Petras IV
1504 San Antonio Street
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 334-9583 Telephone
(512) 334-9709 Facsimile
gpetras@petraslawfirm.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
SOUTHSIDE WRECKER, INC.
APPELLEE REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
1
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 39, TEX. R. APP. P., Appellee respectfully requests oral
argument in this case.
2
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a list of all parties to this appeal and the names and addresses
of those parties’ counsel.
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
Judy Weirich Zachary P. Hudler
Zachary P. Hudler, P.C.
P.O. Box 1728
Johnson City, Texas 78636
(830) 868-7651 Telephone
(830) 868-7636 Facsimile
Zachary@hudlerlaw.com
APPELLEE/DEFFENDANT COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Southside Wrecker, Inc. George J. Petras IV
The Petras Law Firm PLLC
1504 San Antonio Street
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 334-9583 Telephone
(512) 334-9709 Facsimile
gpetras@petraslawfirm.com
IESI Corporation Vaughn Waters
Thornton, Biechlin, Segrato,
Reynolds & Guerra, L.C.
Fifth Floor
One International Centre
100 N.E. Loop 410
San Antonio, Texas 78216
(210) 342-5555 Telephone
(210) 525-0666 Facsimile
vwaters@thorntonfirm.com
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 2
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6
ISSUES PRESENTED 6-7
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS 10-11
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11-12
ARGUMENT 13-21
A. The Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition added no
additional cause(s) of actions for the trial court’s
consideration. 13-16
B. The Weirich Affidavit was based on hearsay
conclusory statements of opinion as to causation,
without either personal knowledge or competence
to testify. 16-19
C. The trial court considered and rejected Plaintiff’s
purported new causes of action when it granted the
summary judgment motions. 19-20
D. The statutory citations now provided in the Brief of
Appellant still fail to provide any court with
competent summary judgment evidence on
causation long after discovery has ended. 20-21
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 22
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24
4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982) 13
Madison v. Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Tex. App. – Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) 19
Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982) 13
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) 11-12
Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995), citing
Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 250 S.W.2d 279, 385
(Tex. 1952) 13-14
Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145
(Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) 19
Yarbrough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. 1971) 14
STATUTES
Rule 39, TEX. R. APP. P. 2
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(d) 5
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) 14
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(a)(i) 19
TEX. R. EVID. 602 15
TEX. R. EVID. 802 15
TEX. R. EVID. 701 16
TEX. R. EVID. 702 16
TEX. R. EVID. 901 15
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellee agrees with Appellant’s statement of the case in terms of her
recitation of the identity of the trial court and “trial court’s actions,” but objects to
that portion entitled “Nature of the Case,” for it discusses the facts in contravention
of TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(d).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Reply to Issue 1: This Court does have standing to consider this appeal
because the Order of the trial court granting Southside’s No-Evidence Motion for
Summary Judgment was final. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition was untimely
where it attempted to assert new causes of action well beyond the expiration of the
Level 2 discovery deadline, and were nonetheless addressed in their entirety in
Defendant Southside’s Reply to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary
Judgment and for Severance (CR 140).
Reply to Issue 2: Issue 2, concerning the hearsay nature and lack of capacity
to testify to expert opinions as a lay person, resulting in the striking of the Plaintiff’s
affidavit constituting her only summary judgment evidence as to causation, was fully
addressed in Defendant Southside Wrecker, Inc.’s Objections to Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment Evidence, CR 149. The trial court properly struck and excluded
Plaintiff Judy Weirich’s affidavit in response to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions
for Summary Judgment.
6
Reply to Issue 3: The trial court correctly ruled in both striking the
Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence and granting Defendants’ No-Evidence
Motions for Summary Judgment.
7
CAUSE NO. 03-14-00819-CV
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
AUSTIN DIVISION
__________________________________________________________________
Judy Weirich
v.
IESI Corp. and Southside Wrecker, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________
APPELLEE SOUTHSIDE WRECKER, INC.’S BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, Appellee Southside Wrecker, Inc. (“Southside”), and files
this, its Brief of Appellee in response to the Brief of Appellant Judy Weirich
(“Weirich”) in support of the appeal from the trial court’s orders granting No-
Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment in favor of IESI Corporation (“IESI”) and
Southside, and in support thereof Appellee Southside would respectfully show unto
the Court the following:
8
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff claims by way of suit that on January 9, 2012 she was travelling
on Texas Highway 290 through Johnson City, Texas and her vehicle was struck by
a wheel that had detached from an IESI garbage truck while being towed by
Southside. The Plaintiff sues for personal injury and property damage. CR 127.
The Plaintiff, by her own admission, has no personal knowledge whatsoever as to
how the tire that struck her vehicle became dislodged from its source and no
information from any other source of any kind as how the tire that struck her vehicle
became dislodged from its source. CR 155.
Following the expiration of the Plaintiff’s chosen level 2 discovery deadline
of September 9, 2013, CR 95, reiterated three times following the Plaintiff’s filing
of her Original Petition on August 2, 2012 (CR 4) in Plaintiff’s First Amended
Original Petition filed on September 12, 2013 (CR 26), Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Original Petition filed on October 22, 2013 (CR 34) and Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Original Petition filed on November 25, 2013 (CR 47), Defendants Southside and
IESI filed No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment on August 21, 2014 (CR
94) and August 22, 2014 (CR 107), respectively. Only one week before the court’s
October 24, 2014 hearing on Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary
Judgment did the Plaintiff file her Fourth Amended Original Petition on October 17,
2014 (CR 127) and requested a level 3 discovery control plan with a docket control
9
order. Through the date of the filing of the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Original
Petition, the only discovery that had been conducted in the case was a service of
written discovery by the Defendants on the Plaintiff and the Defendants’ deposition
of the Plaintiff. At no time prior had the Plaintiff served any written discovery
requests on either Defendant, nor had she made any request for any deposition of
any witness associated with IESI or Southside. CR 96.
Following the hearing on October 24, 2014, the court signed orders granting
IESI’s Motion to Strike the Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence (CR 176) and
Southside’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence (CR 181) and
orders granting IESI’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment (CR 179) and
Southside’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment (CR 183). The Plaintiff
appealed from the grant of these No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment.
10
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly sustained Southside’s Objection to Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment Evidence and IESI’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Affidavit
because anything contained in the Weirich Affidavit as to causation of the accident
made the basis of the lawsuit constituted either hearsay due to the Plaintiff’s lack of
personal knowledge and/or improperly presented expert testimony via opinion
testimony of a lay witness who lacks competence to provide any opinion as to
causation beyond her admitted lack of personal knowledge. The court then properly
granted Southside’s and IESI’s No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment in the
absence of any competent summary judgment evidence as to the cause of the
accident made the basis of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. The court ruled within its
discretion to determine that the case was ripe for consideration of a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment as more than adequate time for discovery had passed
and the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Original Petition added no new true cause of
action against the Defendants to prevent the court from granting the No-Evidence
Motions for Summary Judgment at the time it did. The first citation to any statute
allegedly establishing a standard of care the violation of which would constitute
negligence per se is contained in the Brief of Appellant. The Plaintiff’s injection of
the term res ipsa liquitor in the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Original Petition remains
to date devoid of any evidence of negligence, for at least through October 17, 2014,
11
more than a year after the level 2 discovery deadline, the Plaintiff made no effort to
discover anything from the Defendants as to the cause of the incident made the basis
of this lawsuit.
Therefore, the trial court ruled correctly on all matters made the subject of the
Plaintiff’s appeal.
12
ARGUMENT
A. The Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition added no additional cause(s) of
actions for the trial court’s consideration.
The Plaintiff complains by way appeal that it was improper for the trial court
to grant Southside’s and IESI’s No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment and
thereby dismiss in its entirety the Plaintiff’s lawsuit because the Plaintiff one week
prior to the hearing, on October 17, 2014, filed Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Original
Petition and Request for Production (CR 127). As more than adequately covered in
Defendant Southside’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ No-Evidence
Motions for Summary Judgment and for Severance (CR 140), all the Plaintiff did by
way of Fourth Amended Petition was to add one sentence to her negligence cause of
action in paragraph 10, saying “In the alternative, Defendants are liable under the
legal principles of negligence per se and res ipsa loquitor.” (CR 129). At the time
of the trial court’s determination of the motions made the subject of this appeal, the
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Original Petition added no additional cause(s) of action
for the trial court’s consideration, whether the Plaintiff purports that the mere
injection of the words “negligence per se” and “res ipsa loquitor” constitute
“additional theories of recovery.” As was presented to the trial court, the elements
of a cause of action for negligence per se require the identification by the Plaintiff
of a statute establishing the standard of care owed by a defendant for violation of
which would constitute negligence. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546
13
(Tex. 1985). The Nixon case sets forth four elements of a cause of action for
negligence per se:
1. The plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the statute was designed to
protect, and her injury is of the type the statute was designed to prevent.
2. The statute is one for which tort liability may be imposed when
violated.
3. The defendant violated the statute without excuse.
4. The defendant’s act or omission proximately caused the plaintiff’s
injury.
Nixon at 549.
Separate from failing to identify any statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation establishing a standard of care, just like with respect to her claims of
ordinary negligence, the Plaintiff presented the court with no evidence of the
violation by either Defendant of any statute, with or without any evidence
whatsoever as to the cause of the accident made the basis of the lawsuit. Therefore,
the injection of the term “negligence per se” in the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Original Petition simply did not add any “additional theory of recovery” not already
addressed by the Defendants sufficient to render the granting of the Defendants’ No-
Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment inappropriate by the trial court.
The same is true with respect to the Plaintiff’s inclusion in her Fourth
Amended Original Petition of the term “res ipsa loquitor.” “Res ipsa loquitor” is
simply a rule of evidence by which negligence may be inferred by the jury; it is not
14
a separate cause of action for negligence. Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d
862, 865 (Tex. 1982). As previously pointed out to the trial court (CR 144), the
elements for a res ipsa loquitor claim are as follows:
1. The doctrine is applicable only when two factors are present:
i. The character of the accident is such that it would not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and
ii. The instrumentality causing the injury is shown to have
been under the management and control of the defendant.
Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982). The Plaintiff
presented no evidence to the trial court, even if her own affidavit were admissible
competent summary judgment evidence, to prove that “the character of the accident
is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.” Id. Not only
do the Plaintiff’s alternate theories concerning Defendant IESI’s alleged negligent
maintenance of its vehicle and Defendant Southside’s alleged negligence in
inspecting in towing the vehicle take the case out of the realm of res ipsa loquitor,
the Plaintiff has in no way negated the simple possibility that the accident was just
that – an accident – that occurred due to the negligence of nobody. In Defendant
Southside’s First Amended Original Answer to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Original
Petition, Southside pleaded the affirmative defense of unavoidable accident. (CR
88). “An unavoidable accident is an event not proximately caused by the negligence
of any party to it.” Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995), citing
15
Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 250 S.W.2d 279, 385 (Tex. 1952). The
Reinhart court explains that the “purpose of the instruction is to ensure that the jury
will understand that they do not necessarily have to find that one or the other parties
to the suit was the blame for the occurrence complained of.” Id., quoting Yarbrough
v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. 1971). Regardless of whether simply using
the words res ipsa loquitor in an amended petition constitutes an “additional theory
of recovery,” the denial at the time of the motion hearing by each Defendant that it
was negligent, and the absence of any competent evidence provided by the Plaintiff
of negligence negates any possibility that the Plaintiff had properly presented a
negligence claim utilizing res ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence, as nothing was
before the court, including negation of the possibility of a simple unexpected and
unforeseeable mechanical failure, as the cause of the accident.
B. The Weirich Affidavit was based on hearsay conclusory statements of opinion
as to causation, without either personal knowledge or competence to testify.
Southside does not contend that Weirich as an individual was not competent
to provide sworn testimony in the form of an affidavit. Weirich’s appellate brief
correctly points out, however, pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) that with respect
to form of affidavit, “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.” The Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence, which at the time of the
16
hearing consisted solely of Weirich’s affidavit, was properly excluded by the trial
court for several reasons. As set forth in Defendant Southside’s Objection to
Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence (CR 150), other than what she experienced
at the time of the motor vehicle accident made the subject of the lawsuit, the balance
of Weirich’s affidavit was hearsay in violation of TEX. R. EVID. 802 because she
lacked personal knowledge in violation of TEX. R. EVID. 602 as to the content of
any investigation done by anyone, including her reference to the Johnson City Police
Department Report made following the happening of the accident. Rather than
authenticating the police report pursuant to TEX. R. EVID. 901, Weirich simply
engaged in hearsay testimony constituting inappropriate summary judgment
evidence because it would be inadmissible in evidence at a conventional trial on the
merits. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f).
In addition, as previously pointed out, Weirich has no personal knowledge of
how the tire that struck her vehicle either became dislodged from its source or any
information from any other source of any kind as to how the tire that struck her
vehicle became dislodged from its source. (CR 155). Therefore, for her to express
any opinion, fact or assumption about the cause of the accident is by Weirich’s own
admission beyond her personal knowledge and therefore renders her not competent
to tender an affidavit on the issue of causation.
17
Finally, as also pointed out in Defendant Southside’s Objections to Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment Evidence, Weirich neither identified herself as an expert nor
offered any evidence as to her qualification or competency as an expert, thereby
negating her testimony as admissible pursuant to TEX. R. EVID. 702. (CR 157).
As clearly a “lay witness,” in order for Weirich’s opinion testimony to be considered
admissible in evidence and therefore a proper summary judgment evidence, Weirich
would need to have met the following tests as TEX. R. EVID. 701 read at the time
of the trial court’s decision in this case:
“If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or
determination of fact of issue.”
Given her admission that she has no idea how the tire came off of the IESI garbage
truck, there is nothing within Weirich’s perception that would allow her opinion
testimony pursuant to TEX. R. EVID. 701.
Only that portion of paragraph 2 of the Weirich affidavit, that portion within
in her personal knowledge as to what she experienced at the time of the accident,
was competent summary judgment evidence. However, as confirmed by Weirich’s
deposition testimony, nothing experienced by Weirich at the time of the accident or
learned by Weirich through the date the trial court granted the Defendants’ Motions
18
for Summary Judgment justify consideration of the balance of the Weirich affidavit
as competent summary judgment evidence because those opinions are neither based
on the perception of Weirich nor are helpful to a clear understanding of her testimony
for a determination of the cause of the tire coming off of the IESI truck.
C. The trial court considered and rejected Plaintiff’s purported new causes of
action when it granted the summary judgment motions.
Assuming arguendo, which is expressly denied, that the Plaintiff’s inclusion
of a sentence with the terms “negligence per se” and “res ipsa loquitor” in her Fourth
Amended Original Petition created new causes of action not the subject of or covered
by the Defendants’ respective No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment already
on file with the court, upon review of Defendant Southside’s Reply to Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment and for
Severance (CR 140), as discussed above, the trial court fully considered the viability
of these claims within that pleading. (CR 143). Southside did not simply argue that
Weirich’s purported “additional theories of recovery” were both late and
inadequately pleaded, Southside also addressed both negligence per se and res ipsa
loquitor on their respective merits, thereby affording the trial court the opportunity
to have rejected these claims as well in the absence of competent summary judgment
evidence in response to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, even if this Court were to determine that Weirich successfully amended
her lawsuit one week before the summary judgment hearing, over a year after the
19
discovery deadline, to create new causes of action not the subject of the pending No-
Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment, Southside addressed those “additional
theories of recovery,” thereby providing the trial court with the proper legal basis to
grant the Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment.
D. The statutory citations now provided in the Brief of Appellant still fail to
provide any court with competent summary judgment evidence on causation
long after discovery has ended.
The Plaintiff filed her lawsuit on August 2, 2012 (CR 4). The level 2
discovery deadline period ended on September 9, 2013 (CR 141). The Plaintiff filed
her Fourth Amended Original Petition on October 17, 2014 (CR 127). The Plaintiff
filed her Brief of Appellant originally on April 9, 2015. Notwithstanding assertion
of statutory citations in the Brief of the Appellant for the first time supporting the
alleged establishment of duty, and Weirich’s separate claim of gross negligence on
the part of the Defendants by for the first time in her Brief of Appellant setting forth
conclusory standards of care the sources for which are nowhere identified, the fact
remains that nowhere in the record to date does there exist anything, of a competent
summary judgment or admissible at trial character, constituting evidence of
causation. It simply does not exist. Given the fact that the trial court heard
Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment more than a year after
the end of the level 2 discovery period, and over two months after the filing of the
motions (CR 94 and 107, RR 1), the trial court was well within its discretion to
20
determine that adequate time had been provided for discovery prior to deciding the
No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P.
166(a)(i). The review of the trial court’s determination that an adequate time for
discovery passed in granting a no-evidence summary judgment motion is done under
an abuse of discretion standard. Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140,
145 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). In Defendant Southside’s
Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary
Judgment and for Severance, Appellee has applied the facts of this case to the factors
set forth in Madison v. Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) to more than adequately demonstrate for the trial court that
it was well within its discretion to determine that sufficient time for discovery had
been afforded the plaintiff prior to granting the Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions
for Summary Judgment. (CR 141-142). Accordingly, the trial court was well within
its discretion and did properly grant the Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for
Summary Judgment.
21
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellee Southside Wrecker,
Inc. respectfully requests that this Court overrule Appellant’s issues and affirm the
trial court’s judgment granting the Defendants’ No-Evidence Motions for Summary
Judgment, and for all relief, at law and at equity, to which it may be justly and
equitably entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
THE PETRAS LAW FIRM PLLC
By: /s/ George J. Petras IV
George J. Petras IV
1504 San Antonio Street
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 334-9583 Telephone
(512) 334-9709 Facsimile
State Bar No. 15850510
gpetras@petraslawfirm.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
SOUTHSIDE WRECKER, INC.
22
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) that this document was
generated by a computer using Microsoft Word 2013, which indicates that the word
count of this document is 3930.
23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Appellee Southside Wrecker, Inc.’s Brief of Appellee was delivered to the
attorneys of record via electronically pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.15(b)(1), on this
16th day of June, 2015:
VIA E-FILE
Zachary P. Hudler
Zachary P. Hudler, P.C.
P.O. Box 1728
Johnson City, Texas 78636
zachary@hudlerlaw.com
VIA E-FILE
Vaughn Waters
Thornton, Biechlin, Segrato, Reynolds & Guerra, L.C.
Fifth Floor
One International Centre
100 N.E. Loop 410
San Antonio, Texas 78216
vwaters@thorntonfirm.com
/s/ George J. Petras IV
George J. Petras IV
24