Auspro Enterprises, LP v. Texas Department of Transportation

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ACCEPTED 03-14-00375-CV 6136719 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/20/2015 1:44:46 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-14-00375-CV In the FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Third Court of Appeals 7/20/2015 1:44:46 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Austin, Texas Clerk _______________ AUSPRO ENTERPRISES, LP, Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee. _______________ On Appeal from the 345th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas _______________ APPELLANT AUSPRO ENTERPRISES, LP’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT & APPENDIX _______________ Meredith B. Parenti State Bar No. 00797202 PARENTI LAW PLLC 7500 San Felipe, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77063 [Tel] (281) 224-5848 [Fax] (281) 605-5677 meredith@parentilaw.com Counsel for Appellant AusPro Enterprises, LP ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL The following is a complete list of the parties, attorneys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of this appeal. Defandant/Appellant: AusPro Enterprises, LP Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Meredith B. Parenti State Bar No. 00797202 PARENTI LAW PLLC 7500 San Felipe, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77063 [Tel] (281) 224-5848 [Fax] (281) 605-5677 meredith@parentilaw.com Plaintiff/Appellee: Texas Department of Transportation Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: Douglas Geyser Assistant Solicitor General Matthew Bohuslav Assistant Attorney General, Transportation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 [Tel] (512) 936-2540 [Fax] (512) 472-3855 douglas.geyser@texasattorneygeneral.gov matthew.bohuslav@texasattorneygeneral.gov i SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert undoubtedly controls this case and requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment, oral argument may benefit the Court by permitting counsel to address Reed’s application to the facts of this case and to answer any questions the Court may have about the record and the extent to which the Texas Highway Beautification Act and its implementing regulations can survive a holding that they impermissibly regulate the content of speech. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................... i Supplemental Statement Regarding Oral Argument .................................................. ii Table of Authorities .................................................................................................... iv Background on Reed v. Town of Gilbert .................................................................... 1 Argument .................................................................................................................... 6 I. The Election Sign Exemption Is a Content-Based Regulation of Speech ........ 7 A. The Act and Its Implementing Regulations Are Not Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny as Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ........... 9 B. The State Cannot Justify the Statute on the Grounds That It Is Aimed at the Secondary Effects of Signs........................................................... 11 C. TxDOT Cannot Satisfy Its Burden to Show That the Election Sign Exemption Is Narrowly Tailored to Further a Compelling Governmental Interest ............................................................................ 11 II. The Court Should Invalidate Both the Act and Its Implementing Regulations ....................................................................................................... 16 III. The Texas Constitution Also Forbids the State’s Regulation of Election Signs ................................................................................................................. 19 Prayer .......................................................................................................................... 20 Appendix iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) ........................................................................................... 17 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) ......................................................................................... 5 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010) ........................................................................................ 12 City of Painesville Building Dep’t v. Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., 89 Ohio St.3d 564 (2000) ................................................................................. 15 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) ........................................................................................... 10 Curry v. Prince George’s County, 33 F.Supp.2d 447 (D. Md. 1999)...................................................................... 15 FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) ......................................................................................... 17 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ........................................................................................... 16-17 Knoeffler v. Town of Mamakating, 87 F.Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) .................................................................. 15 Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) ........................................................................................... 3 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015) ................................................................. passim Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ......................................................................................... 17 iv Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) ............................................................... 3 Texas Department of Transportation v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 2003) .............................................................................. 9-11 Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 1996) ............................................................................... 13, 14 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) ......................................................................................... 11 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (1989) ........................................................................................ 4, 10 Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................ 13, 14, 15 Statutes, Regulations, & Constitutional Provisions 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§21.141–.260 ........................................................................ 18 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §21.146(a)(10) ........................................................................ 8, 16 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.002(b)(1), (2) .................................................................... 12 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005 .................................................................................... passim TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.031(a)(1) ........................................................................... 7 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.031(b)(1), (2), (3), (5) ....................................................... 14 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.037 .................................................................................... 14 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.099 .................................................................................... 14 TEX. CONST. art. I, §8 .................................................................................................. 19 TEX. CONST. art. I, §29 ................................................................................................ 19 U.S. CONST. amend. I.................................................................................................. 10 v TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS: After the parties filed their opening briefs in this case, Appellant AusPro Enterprises, LP moved to stay this appeal pending the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, No. 13-502. AusPro also requested supplemental briefing under TEX. R. APP. P. 38.7 to address the decision in Reed. The Court granted the motion in part and stayed the case, permitting the parties to file supplemental briefs to address Reed. Now that the Supreme Court has issued its decision in Reed, Appellant respectfully submits that the decision controls this case, and requires this Court to reverse the trial court’s judgment and hold that the Texas Highway Beautification Act and its implementing regulations, like the sign code held unconstitutional in Reed, are “content-based regulations of speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2218, slip op. at 1 (2015); App. 1. BACKGROUND ON REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT Petitioners in Reed, a pastor and his church, challenged a Gilbert, Arizona sign code involving durational and other limitations on various categories of signs, including political, ideological, and temporary directional signs, based on the subject matter of the signs. App. 1 at 1-3. The sign code treated ideological signs most favorably, allowing them to be up to 20 square feet in area and placed in all zoning areas without time limits. Id. at 2. 1 Political signs, defined as any “temporary sign designed to influence the outcome of an election called by a public body,” were treated less favorably than ideological signs, with a maximum size of 16 square feet on residential property and 32 square feet on nonresidential property, undeveloped municipal property, and rights of way. Id. Political signs could be displayed up to 60 days before a primary election and up to 15 days after a general election. Id. Temporary directional signs intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and passersby to qualifying events such as assemblies and meetings, were treated even less favorably by the code, with a maximum size of six square feet and a durational limitation on their placement, either on private property or a right of way, of no more than 12 hours before the event and 1 hour afterward. Id. at 3. Petitioners advertised the time and place of their Sunday church services, which were held in a variety of locations, with signs posted early in the day on Saturday and removed around midday on Sunday. Id. at 3-4. After the town cited the church for violating the sign code’s time limits, petitioners challenged the sign code under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 4. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the sign code was content-neutral. Id. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the town, and the court of appeals again affirmed. Id. at 5. The question presented in Reed was: 2 Does Gilbert’s mere assertion of a lack of discriminatory motive render its facially content-based sign code content neutral and justify the code’s differential treatment of Petitioners’ religious signs? Brief for Petitioners, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, No. 13-502 (Sept. 15, 2014). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sign code’s restrictions were “content-based regulations of speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny.” App. 1 at 1. The Court’s analysis began with the fundamental principle that, under the First Amendment, applicable to the states and municipalities through the Fourteenth Amendment, the government “has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Id. at 6 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). Addressing what it means for a regulation of speech to be “content based,” the Court gave the phrase the “commonsense” meaning that “[g]overnment regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. ___, ___–___, 131 S.Ct. 2653, slip op. at 8-9 (2011)). Under the Court’s definition, a court must “consider whether a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” Id. While some distinctions “are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, . . . others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose.” Id. Regardless, 3 “[b]oth are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. The Court also identified a separate category of laws that, “though facially content neutral, will be considered content- based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or that were adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.’” Id. at 6-7 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989)). The Court held that the Gilbert sign code was “content based on its face” because it defined temporary directional signs “on the basis of whether a sign convey[ed] the message of directing the public to church or some other ‘qualifying event.’” Id. at 7. Moreover, the code defined political signs “on the basis of whether a sign’s message was ‘designed to influence the outcome of an election,’” and ideological signs on the basis of whether a sign “‘communicat[ed] a message or ideas’ that d[id] not fit within the Code’s other categories.” Id. Thus, the sign code’s restrictions “depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign.” Id. Because the sign code was a content-based regulation of speech, the Court refused to consider the government’s justifications or purposes for enacting the code in determining whether strict scrutiny applied. Id. The Court rejected several arguments as to why the code should be deemed content neutral. Significantly, the 4 court of appeals had determined that the town did not adopt its regulation based on disagreement with the message conveyed, and its justifications for the regulation were unrelated to the content of the sign. Id. at 8. The Court flatly rejected this logic: But this analysis skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of “animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech. Id. (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 429 (1993)). Thus, “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.” Id. at 9. The Court also rejected the court of appeals’s reasoning that the sign code was neutral because it did not single out any idea or viewpoint for disparate treatment. Id. at 11. The Court explained that this argument “conflates two distinct but related limitations” on regulations of speech—discrimination among viewpoints, which is “more blatant” content discrimination, and prohibitions on entire topics of discussion. Id. at 11-12. “Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” Id. at 12. Because the sign code was content based, the Court applied strict scrutiny, “which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling 5 interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id. at 14 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, it was “the Town’s burden to demonstrate that the Code’s differentiation between temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as political signs and ideological signs, furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end.” Id. at 14-15. The Court held that the town could not demonstrate that the sign code was narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 14-15. The Court concluded that the two proffered governmental interests—aesthetics and traffic safety—were “hopelessly underinclusive” because the code allowed unlimited, larger ideological signs while strictly limiting smaller, directional signs. Id. at 15. Nor did directional signs pose a greater traffic hazard than ideological or political signs. Id. “The signs at issue in this case, including political and ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed from those purposes [of traffic safety]. . . . [T]hey are facially content based and are neither justified by traditional safety concerns nor narrowly tailored.” Id. at 17. Thus, the Court held that the sign code “fail[ed] strict scrutiny.” Id.at 15. 6 ARGUMENT I. THE ELECTION SIGN EXEMPTION IS A CONTENT-BASED REGULATION OF SPEECH. After Reed, there is no doubt that a restriction on the display of election signs is, by definition, a content-based regulation of speech that is subject to strict scrutiny. Reed held that a town sign code that distinguished between signs based on whether they were ideological, political, or directional was “content based on its face.” App. 1 at 7. So, too, are Texas’s Highway Beautification Act and its implementing regulations. The Texas Highway Beautification Act generally prohibits outdoor advertising within 660 feet of the right of way of interstate or primary state highways. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.031(a)(1); App. J; AusPro Br. at 14-15.1 The election sign exemption challenged by AusPro provides that: This chapter does not apply to a sign erected solely for and relating to a public election if the sign: (1) is on private property; (2) is erected not earlier than the 90th day before the date of the election and is removed not later than the 10th day after the election date; (3) is constructed of lightweight material; and (4) has a surface area not larger than 50 square feet. 1 Citations to the lettered portions of the Appendix (App. A–Z) refer to the Appendix filed with Appellant’s opening brief. 7 TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005 (emphasis added); App. D; see also 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §21.146(a)(10); App. E. By singling out speech “erected solely for and relating to a public election” for disparate treatment in TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005, the election sign exemption constitutes the type of “obvious” content-based regulation of speech the Supreme Court in Reed held is subject to strict scrutiny. App. 1 at 6. Like the sign code in Reed, the Act and its implementing regulations distinguish between signs based on their content. The code invalidated in Reed defined political signs “on the basis of whether a sign’s message is ‘designed to influence the outcome of an election.’” App. 1 at 7. The Texas election sign exemption similarly applies to signs “erected solely for and relating to a public election.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005; App. D. Both restrictions “depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign.” App. 1 at 7. Both restrictions are obvious content-based restrictions on speech. As discussed below, the Court in Reed rejected every major argument proffered by TxDOT to justify the Act and its implementing regulations. After Reed, there is simply no basis to apply intermediate scrutiny to the Act and its regulations. Instead, the Act and its regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, which they cannot withstand. 8 A. The Act and Its Implementing Regulations Are Not Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny as Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions. Relying on the Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Texas Department of Transportation v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 2003), TxDOT argues that the Act is content neutral and that it may be justified as a time, place, and manner restriction subject to intermediate scrutiny. TxDOT Br. at 11-16. This analysis cannot stand after Reed, however, because the election sign exemption is undoubtedly content based. On its face, the election sign exemption regulates the duration of election signs based on their content. If the sign relates to an election, the Act strictly limits the speech to a limited window of 90 days prior to, and ten days after, an election. The Act prohibits speech relating to elections along interstate and primary highways at all other times of the year. The Texas Supreme Court in Barber held that the Act’s general prohibition on signs along state highways and interstates was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction as applied to Barber’s billboard. 111 S.W.3d at 89. The election sign exemption was not directly before the Court given that Barber had only challenged the Act as applied to his sign, which was unrelated to any election. Id. at 100. Regardless, the Court recognized that the Act “does make certain distinctions based on subject matter,” such as the exemptions for directional signs, signs relating to natural wonders or scenic or historic attractions, and election signs. Id. at 98. Nevertheless, the Court held the Act was “content neutral because 9 it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Id. at 100 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (adding emphasis)). Moreover, the Court held that although the “election sign exemption is arguably content based, . . . ‘[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.’” Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). The reasoning in Barber is no longer good law. Under Reed, the justification and purposes of the regulation are irrelevant to the threshold question of whether it is content based. App. 1 at 9 (“[W]e have repeatedly considered whether a law is content neutral on its face before turning to the law’s justification or purpose.”). Instead, the Court must first ask whether the regulation “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Id. at 6. As the Supreme Court recognized in Reed, “[i]nnocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the laws—i.e., the ‘abridg[ement] of speech’—rather than merely the motives of those who enacted them.” App. 1 at 10 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). Because the Act and its regulation make “certain distinctions based on subject matter,” as the Texas Supreme Court recognized in Barber, 111 S.W.3d at 10 98, it is content based and subject to strict scrutiny. The sign code invalidated in Reed similarly was content based because it “identifie[d] various categories of signs based on the type of information they convey, then subject[ed] each category to different restrictions.” App. 1 at 1. TxDOT’s justification that the Act and regulations are reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions falls by the wayside, and the regulations must satisfy strict scrutiny. B. The State Cannot Justify the Statute on the Grounds That It Is Aimed at the Secondary Effects of Signs. As established in AusPro’s opening brief, TxDOT cannot justify the Act and its regulations on the grounds that they are aimed at the “secondary effects of billboards and signs along State highways.” CR72; TxDOT Br. at 29; AusPro Br. at 38-42. The lesser scrutiny applied to regulations targeting secondary effects “has no application to content-based regulations targeting the primary effects of protected speech.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000). Because the election sign exemption is obviously content based, Reed, App. 1 at 6, a secondary effects rationale has no application here and strict scrutiny applies. C. TxDOT Cannot Satisfy Its Burden to Show That the Election Sign Exemption Is Narrowly Tailored to Further a Compelling Governmental Interest. TxDOT proffers the same governmental interests—aesthetics and traffic safety—rejected by the Supreme Court in Reed as “hopelessly underinclusive.” 11 App. 1 at 15; TxDOT Br. at 2, 32; CR72 (TxDOT contending that that “[t]he purpose of the HBA is to control the secondary effects of billboards and signs along State highways such as stemming visual clutter on the landscape and promoting travel safety”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 391.002(b) (1), (2) (declaring that purpose of Act is to “promote the health, safety, welfare, morals, convenience, and enjoyment of the traveling public” and to “protect the public investment in the interstate and primary systems”). Even if the proffered interests were compelling, which the Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argument, the Court held they were not narrowly tailored. App. 1 at 15. Likewise, even if TxDOT could demonstrate that its interests in aesthetics and safety are compelling enough to severely restrict core political speech, which AusPro does not concede, AusPro Br. at 42-44,2 the Act and its regulations are not narrowly tailored. The Court in Reed rejected the town’s aesthetics rationale, observing that temporary directional signs were “no greater an eyesore” than ideological or political signs, yet the code strictly limited durational signs while permitting other signs to proliferate. App. 1 at 15. The same is true of the election sign exemption, 2 Given that “[l]aws that burden political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission invalidated an “outright ban” on corporate speech within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election, holding that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” 130 S.Ct. 876, 897-98, 913 (2010). The election sign exemption amounts to an even broader outright ban on speech relating to an election for three-fourths of the year, except for a period 90 days before and ten days after an election. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005; App. D. 12 which places strict time limitations on election signs that does not apply to other signs, which are permitted to remain on display all year. See AusPro Br. at 44-49. This is not narrow tailoring, but the state impermissibly discriminating against core political speech. See Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1407 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “a sign which stated ‘Go Royals’ would not be subjected to the durational limitations while a sign stating ‘Go Ashcroft’ would, even though the signs were made of the same material, installed in the same manner, erected on the same spot, posed the same traffic hazards and detracted from the City’s aesthetic beauty in the same manner”); Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 875, 882 (Ga. 1996) (explaining that city had “not demonstrated that political signs pose a greater danger to the motoring public or detract from the aesthetics of the city any more than other signs, with greater or unlimited durational limitations, permitted in the same zoning districts”). The Supreme Court in Reed also rejected the argument that limiting directional signs was necessary to eliminate threats to traffic safety, reasoning that there was no reason to believe directional signs posed a greater traffic hazard than ideological or political signs. App. 1 at 15. “The signs at issue in this case, including political and ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed from those purposes [of traffic safety]. . . . [T]hey are facially content based and are neither justified by traditional safety concerns nor narrowly tailored.” Id. at 17. 13 Likewise, there is no reason to believe that election signs are more hazardous to public safety than the many other types of signs permitted along state highways and interstates without durational limitations under the Act and its implementing regulations, including (1) directional or official advertising; (2) advertising for the sale or lease of property; (3) on-site commercial advertising promoting an activity on the premises; (4) outdoor advertising for the purpose of protecting life or property; (5) certain signs containing the logo or emblem of an entity that sponsors an agricultural fair, school, or institution of higher education; (6) tourist-oriented directional signs for wineries or businesses related to agriculture or tourism. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§391.031(b)(1), (2), (3), (5), .037, .099; App. J, M, N; see AusPro Br. at 27-30 & n.7; see also Whitton, 54 F.3d at 1407; Union City, 467 S.E.2d at 882. The election sign exemption is not narrowly tailored, and should meet the same fate as the sign code in Reed. The sign code invalidated in Reed limited political signs to 60 days before a primary election and up to 15 days after a general election. See App. 1 at 2. Similarly, Texas’s election sign exemption limits speech relating to an election to 90 days before and up to ten days after an election. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005; App. D. Even before Reed, courts across the country held that such durational limitations on signs are not narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests and amount to unconstitutional limitations 14 on speech. See, e.g., Curry v. Prince George’s County, 33 F.Supp.2d 447, 455 (D. Md. 1999) (“Extended durational bans on political speech for all but 45 days before and 10 days after a political election, are bans nonetheless—in-consistent [sic] with the ‘venerable’ status that the Supreme Court has accorded to individual speech . . . .”); City of Painesville Building Dep’t v. Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., 89 Ohio St.3d 564, 573 (2000) (holding ordinance was “not narrowly tailored to further the governmental interests asserted by the city of Painesville, nor do ample alternative means for communicating the desired message exist for such a property owner”); Knoeffler v. Town of Mamakating, 87 F.Supp.2d 322, 333, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that “durational limits on signs have been repeatedly declared unconstitutional” and holding that ordinance was “not narrowly tailored to” town’s interests in aesthetics and safety); Whitton, 54 F.3d at 1401-02 & n.2, 1409 (holding that city’s durational limitations on campaign signs for 30 days prior and 7 days after election were content-based restrictions that failed to satisfy strict scrutiny and therefore constituted unconstitutional restraints on speech as applied to residential and commercial property); AusPro Br. at 17-18 & n.5 (citing cases). Reed now confirms that a regulation that restricts certain signs based on their content, while allowing other signs to proliferate, is not narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interests of aesthetics and traffic safety. 15 II. THE COURT SHOULD INVALIDATE BOTH THE ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS. AusPro challenges both the election sign exemption contained in §391.005 of the Act and its implementing regulations as unconstitutional regulations of core political speech. AusPro Br. at 15-17. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed, the Court should hold both the Act and its implementing regulations are unconstitutional because they make distinctions between signs on the basis of their content and are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See AusPro Br. at 13-49; supra Part I. Like the Act, the regulations implementing it permit signs that “relate[ ] only to a public election” to be displayed only during the 100-day window around an election. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §21.146(a)(10); App. E; see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE §391.005; App. D. TxDOT argues that AusPro forfeited its challenge to TxDOT’s licensing and permitting regulations as an invalid prior restraint. TxDOT Br. at 35. AusPro challenged both the Act and its implementing regulations throughout this case, as detailed below. On appeal, AusPro specifically detailed how the licensing and permitting regulations operate as an invalid prior restraint in response to TxDOT’s argument that AusPro could simply apply for a permit to display its sign. See CR80; AusPro Br. at 49-55. AusPro has every right to challenge TxDOT’s licensing and permitting regime because it was prosecuted civilly for failure to comply with it. CR5-7, 10-11; see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) 16 (“One who might have had a license for the asking may . . . call into question the whole scheme of licensing when he is prosecuted for failure to procure it.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (“[O]ur decisions have made clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.”).3 Regardless, TxDOT does not argue that AusPro forfeited its broader challenge to TxDOT’s regulations on First Amendment grounds, and for good reason. Without question, AusPro preserved its challenge to the licensing and permitting regulations throughout this case. It did so by asserting in its affirmative defenses and trial briefing that “the statutes and regulations on which Plaintiff relies violate AusPro’s right to free speech” on their face and as applied under the First Amendment and the Texas Constitution. CR14, 63, 65-70. TxDOT itself relied on the licensing and permitting regulations in its petition, summary 3 Although the Court need not reach AusPro’s prior restraint argument if it holds that the Act and its implementing regulations are unconstitutional as content-based regulations of speech, it will be up to the legislature to revisit the Act, and TxDOT to rewrite its regulations. Because AusPro raises significant concerns about how the licensing and permitting regulations chill protected speech and deny judicial review, the Court may wish to caution that any new regulations include an expeditious means for judicial review. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (plurality) (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60 (1965)); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963); AusPro Br. at 49-56. TxDOT argues that judicial review is not required for content-neutral regulations, see TxDOT Br. at 37-38, 45, but that rationale obviously no longer applies if this Court holds that the Act and regulations are content based. 17 judgment motion, and trial brief. See CR3 (citing 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§21.141– .260); CR5 (same); CR16-17, 19, 22, 72-74, 77, 80 (same). Moreover, the parties’ agreed stipulated facts asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the Act “and TxDOT’s related administrative rules, 43 TEXAS ADMIN. CODE §§ 21.141-.260.” CR52. Finally, the trial court specifically ruled in its judgment that the Act and its regulations in “43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§21.141–.260, are not unconstitutional as applied to AusPro.” App. A at 1. The Court should reverse the trial court’s judgment and hold that the Act and TxDOT’s licensing and permitting regulations impermissibly regulate signs based on content, and fail to satisfy strict scrutiny. While the Court could simply strike down the election sign exemption contained in the Act and its regulations and leave the rest of the Act and the regulations intact, it should also more broadly hold that the Act and its regulations are unconstitutional to the extent they regulate signs based on their subject matter. Because AusPro raised both facial and as-applied challenges to the Act and its implementing regulations, both options are available to the Court. See AusPro Br. at 13 & n.2. The Supreme Court in Reed held the sign code as a whole unconstitutional, see App. 1 at 15 (holding that “the Sign Code fails strict scrutiny”), and did not merely invalidate the provision for temporary signs applicable to Petitioners. Id. at 2-3 (discussing three categories of exempt signs under the code, including the temporary directional signs applicable to 18 Petitioners); id. at 7, 14, 17 (same). Holding the Act and its regulations unconstitutional to the extent they regulate signs based on their subject matter not only be would consistent with the broad holding in Reed, but it would also give the Texas Legislature and TxDOT helpful guidance as they rewrite the Act and its implementing regulations. III. THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ALSO FORBIDS THE STATE’S REGULATION OF ELECTION SIGNS. To the extent there is any doubt that Reed governs and requires the Court to hold that the Act and its regulations are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (and there should be no such doubt), they are also unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution for the reasons explained in AusPro’s opening brief. AusPro Br. at 58-64. While TxDOT tries to dodge the Texas Constitution, TxDOT Br. at 46-48, there is no way around its plain text, which unequivocally prohibits laws “curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press.” TEX. CONST. art. I, §§8, 29 (providing that “no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press” and that this right “shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void”); App. G, H. The Act and its implementing regulations violate this simple, yet fundamental guarantee in the Texas Constitution, and should be held unconstitutional on this ground as well. 19 PRAYER For the above reasons, AusPro respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that the Act and its implementing regulations violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 8 and 29 of the Texas Constitution. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Meredith B. Parenti Meredith B. Parenti PARENTI LAW PLLC 7500 San Felipe, Suite 600 Houston, TX 77063 [Tel] (281) 224-5848 [Fax] (281) 605-5677 meredith@parentilaw.com Counsel for Appellant AusPro Enterprises, LP 20 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft® Word for Mac 2011 and contains 5328 words, as determined by the computer software’s word-count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). /s/ Meredith B. Parenti Meredith B. Parenti CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on July 20, 2015, I served a copy of this filing on the following party via email and through the Court’s electronic filing system: Douglas Geyser Assistant Solicitor General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Counsel for Appellee Texas Department of Transportation /s/ Meredith B. Parenti Meredith B. Parenti 21 No. 03-14-00375-CV In the Third Court of Appeals Austin, Texas _______________ AUSPRO ENTERPRISES, LP, Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee. _______________ On Appeal from the 345th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas _______________ APPELLANT AUSPRO ENTERPRISES, LP’S APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT _______________ 1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2218, slip op. (2015). (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus REED ET AL. v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 13–502. Argued January 12, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015 Gilbert, Arizona (Town), has a comprehensive code (Sign Code or Code) that prohibits the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but ex- empts 23 categories of signs, including three relevant here. “Ideolog- ical Signs,” defined as signs “communicating a message or ideas” that do not fit in any other Sign Code category, may be up to 20 square feet and have no placement or time restrictions. “Political Signs,” de- fined as signs “designed to influence the outcome of an election,” may be up to 32 square feet and may only be displayed during an election season. “Temporary Directional Signs,” defined as signs directing the public to a church or other “qualifying event,” have even greater re- strictions: No more than four of the signs, limited to six square feet, may be on a single property at any time, and signs may be displayed no more than 12 hours before the “qualifying event” and 1 hour after. Petitioners, Good News Community Church (Church) and its pas- tor, Clyde Reed, whose Sunday church services are held at various temporary locations in and near the Town, posted signs early each Saturday bearing the Church name and the time and location of the next service and did not remove the signs until around midday Sun- day. The Church was cited for exceeding the time limits for display- ing temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event date on the signs. Unable to reach an accommodation with the Town, petitioners filed suit, claiming that the Code abridged their freedom of speech. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ultimately concluding that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral, and that the Code satisfied the intermediate scrutiny accorded to content-neutral regulations of speech. Held: The Sign Code’s provisions are content-based regulations of 2 REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT Syllabus speech that do not survive strict scrutiny. Pp. 6–17. (a) Because content-based laws target speech based on its commu- nicative content, they are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tai- lored to serve compelling state interests. E.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 395. Speech regulation is content based if a law ap- plies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U. S. ___, ___–___. And courts are required to consider whether a regulation of speech “on its face” draws distinctions based on the message a speak- er conveys. Id., at ___. Whether laws define regulated speech by par- ticular subject matter or by its function or purpose, they are subject to strict scrutiny. The same is true for laws that, though facially con- tent neutral, cannot be “ ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ ” or were adopted by the government “because of disagreement with the message” conveyed. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791. Pp. 6–7. (b) The Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines the cate- gories of temporary, political, and ideological signs on the basis of their messages and then subjects each category to different re- strictions. The restrictions applied thus depend entirely on the sign’s communicative content. Because the Code, on its face, is a content- based regulation of speech, there is no need to consider the govern- ment’s justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny. Pp. 7. (c) None of the Ninth Circuit’s theories for its contrary holding is persuasive. Its conclusion that the Town’s regulation was not based on a disagreement with the message conveyed skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign mo- tive, content-neutral justification, or lack of “animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 429. Thus, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neu- tral. A court must evaluate each question—whether a law is content based on its face and whether the purpose and justification for the law are content based—before concluding that a law is content neu- tral. Ward does not require otherwise, for its framework applies only to a content-neutral statute. The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the Sign Code does not single out any idea or viewpoint for discrimination conflates two distinct but related limitations that the First Amendment places on government regulation of speech. Government discrimination among viewpoints Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 Syllabus is a “more blatant” and “egregious form of content discrimination,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829, but “[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation [also] extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire top- ic,” Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 537. The Sign Code, a paradigmatic example of con- tent-based discrimination, singles out specific subject matter for dif- ferential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter. The Ninth Circuit also erred in concluding that the Sign Code was not content based because it made only speaker-based and event- based distinctions. The Code’s categories are not speaker-based—the restrictions for political, ideological, and temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them. And even if the sign catego- ries were speaker based, that would not automatically render the law content neutral. Rather, “laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference re- flects a content preference.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 658. This same analysis applies to event-based distinctions. Pp. 8–14. (d) The Sign Code’s content-based restrictions do not survive strict scrutiny because the Town has not demonstrated that the Code’s dif- ferentiation between temporary directional signs and other types of signs furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. See Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___. Assuming that the Town has a compelling interest in preserving its aesthetic appeal and traf- fic safety, the Code’s distinctions are highly underinclusive. The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town when other types of signs create the same problem. See Discovery Network, supra, at 425. Nor has it shown that temporary directional signs pose a greater threat to public safety than ideological or political signs. Pp. 14–15. (e) This decision will not prevent governments from enacting effec- tive sign laws. The Town has ample content-neutral options availa- ble to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics, including regulat- ing size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. And the Town may be able to forbid postings on public property, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 817. An ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers—e.g., warning signs marking hazards on private property or signs directing traffic—might also survive strict scrutiny. Pp. 16–17. 4 REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT Syllabus 707 F. 3d 1057, reversed and remanded. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. KA- GAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined   Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  1    Opinion of the Court  NOTICE:   This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the  preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.   Readers  are  requested   to  notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-   ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other   formal  errors,  in  order  that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.          SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________  No. 13–502   _________________  CLYDE REED, ET AL   ., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF    .  GILBERT, ARIZONA, ET AL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT  [June 18, 2015]  JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.    The  town  of  Gilbert,  Arizona  (or  Town),  has  adopted  a  comprehensive code governing the manner in which people  may  display  outdoor  signs.  Gilbert,  Ariz.,  Land  Develop- ment Code (Sign Code or Code), ch. 1, §4.402 (2005).1  The   Sign  Code  identifies  various  categories  of  signs  based  on  the  type  of  information  they  convey,  then  subjects  each category to different restrictions.  One of the categories is  “Temporary  Directional  Signs  Relating  to  a  Qualifying  Event,”  loosely  defined  as  signs  directing  the  public  to  a  meeting of a nonprofit group.  §4.402(P).  The Code imposes  more  stringent  restrictions  on  these  signs  than  it  does  on  signs  conveying  other  messages.    We  hold  that  these   provisions  are  content-based  regulations  of  speech  that  cannot survive strict scrutiny.   ——————  1 The Town’s Sign Code is available online at http://www.gilbertaz.gov/     departments / development - service / planning - development / land -                       development-code  (as  visited  June  16,  2015,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s case file).     2  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  I  A    The  Sign  Code  prohibits  the  display  of  outdoor  signs  anywhere  within  the  Town  without  a  permit,  but  it  then  exempts  23  categories  of  signs  from  that  requirement.   These exemptions include everything from bazaar signs to  flying  banners.  Three  categories  of  exempt  signs  are  particularly relevant here.    The first is “Ideological Sign[s].”  This category includes  any  “sign  communicating  a  message  or  ideas  for  noncom- mercial  purposes  that  is  not  a  Construction  Sign,  Direc- tional  Sign,  Temporary  Directional  Sign  Relating  to  a  Qualifying  Event,  Political  Sign,  Garage  Sale  Sign,  or  a  sign  owned  or  required  by  a  governmental  agency.”  Sign Code,  Glossary  of  General  Terms  (Glossary),  p.  23  (em- phasis  deleted).  Of  the  three  categories  discussed  here,  the Code treats ideological signs most favorably, allowing  them to be up to 20 square feet in area and to be placed in  all “zoning districts” without time limits.  §4.402(J).   The second category is “Political Sign[s].”  This includes  any “temporary sign designed to influence the outcome of  an  election  called  by  a  public  body.”    Glossary  23.2    The   Code  treats  these  signs  less  favorably  than  ideological  signs.  The Code allows the placement of political signs up  to  16  square  feet  on  residential  property  and  up  to  32  square  feet  on  nonresidential  property,  undeveloped  mu- nicipal  property,  and   “rights-of-way.”    §4.402(I).3    These   signs  may  be  displayed  up  to  60  days  before  a  primary  election  and  up  to  15  days  following  a  general  election.   Ibid.  ——————  2 A  “Temporary  Sign”  is  a  “sign  not  permanently  attached  to  the  ground,  a  wall  or  a  building,  and  not  designed  or  intended  for  perma- nent display.”  Glossary 25.   3 The  Code  defines  “Right-of-Way”  as  a  “strip  of  publicly  owned  land  occupied  by  or  planned  for  a  street,  utilities,  landscaping,  sidewalks,  trails, and similar facilities.”  Id., at 18.      Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  3    Opinion of the Court    The  third  category  is  “Temporary  Directional  Signs  Relating to a Qualifying Event.”  This includes any “Tem- porary Sign intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and  other  passersby  to  a  ‘qualifying  event.’ ”  Glossary  25  (emphasis deleted).  A “qualifying event” is defined as any  “assembly,  gathering,  activity,  or  meeting  sponsored, arranged,  or  promoted  by  a  religious,  charitable,  commu- nity service, educational, or other similar non-profit organ-   ization.”  Ibid.    The  Code  treats  temporary  directional  signs even less favorably than political signs.4    Temporary directional  signs  may  be  no  larger  than  six  square  feet.   §4.402(P).  They may be placed on private property or on a  public  right-of-way,  but  no  more  than  four  signs  may  be  placed on a single property at any time.  Ibid.  And, they  may be displayed no more than 12 hours before the “quali- fying event” and no more than 1 hour afterward.  Ibid.  B    Petitioners  Good  News  Community  Church  (Church)  and its pastor, Clyde Reed, wish to advertise the time and location of their Sunday church services.  The Church is a   small,  cash-strapped  entity  that  owns  no  building,  so  it  holds its services at elementary schools or other locations  in or near the Town.  In order to inform the public about  its  services,  which  are  held  in  a  variety  of  different  loca- ——————  4 The Sign Code has been amended twice during the pendency of this   case.    When  litigation   began  in  2007,  the  Code  defined  the  signs  at  issue  as  “Religious  Assembly  Temporary  Direction  Signs.”    App.  75.   The  Code  entirely  prohibited  placement  of  those  signs  in  the  public  right-of-way, and it forbade posting them in any location for more than     two  hours  before  the  religious  assembly  or  more  than  one  hour  after- ward.  Id.,  at  75–76.    In   2008,  the  Town  redefined  the  category  as  “Temporary  Directional  Signs  Related  to  a  Qualifying  Event,”  and  it  expanded the time limit to 12 hours before and 1 hour after the “quali- fying event.”  Ibid.  In 2011, the Town amended the Code to authorize   placement  of  temporary  directional  signs  in  the  public  right-of-way.   Id., at 89.    4  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  tions, the Church began placing 15 to 20 temporary signs  around  the  Town,  frequently  in  the  public  right-of-way  abutting  the  street.    The  signs  typically  displayed  the  Church’s  name,  along  with  the  time  and  location  of  the  upcoming service.  Church members would post the signs  early  in  the  day  on  Saturday  and  then  remove  them   around  midday  on  Sunday.    The  display  of  these  signs  requires little money and manpower, and thus has proved  to be an economical and effective way for the Church to let  the  community  know   where  its  services  are  being  held  each week.    This  practice  caught  the  attention  of  the  Town’s  Sign  Code compliance manager, who twice cited the Church for  violating  the  Code.    The  first  citation  noted  that  the  Church exceeded the time limits for displaying its tempo- rary directional signs.  The second citation referred to the   same  problem,  along  with  the  Church’s  failure  to  include  the  date  of  the  event  on  the  signs.  Town  officials  even  confiscated  one  of  the  Church’s  signs,  which  Reed  had  to  retrieve from the municipal offices.   Reed  contacted  the  Sign  Code  Compliance  Department  in  an  attempt  to  reach  an  accommodation.    His  efforts  proved  unsuccessful.  The  Town’s  Code  compliance  man- ager  informed  the  Church  that  there  would  be  “no  leni-  ency  under  the  Code”  and  promised  to  punish  any  future  violations.     Shortly  thereafter,  petitioners  filed  a  complaint  in  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Arizona,   arguing  that  the  Sign  Code  abridged  their  freedom  of  speech  in  violation  of  the  First  and  Fourteenth  Amend- ments.  The  District  Court  denied  the  petitioners’  motion  for a preliminary injunction.  The Court of Appeals for the  Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Sign Code’s provi- sion  regulating  temporary  directional  signs  did  not  regu- late  speech  on  the  basis  of  content.  587  F. 3d  966,  979  (2009).  It  reasoned  that,  even  though  an  enforcement       Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  5    Opinion of the Court  officer  would  have  to  read  the  sign  to  determine  what  provisions  of  the  Sign  Code  applied  to  it,  the  “ ‘kind    of  cursory  examination’ ”  that  would  be  necessary  for  an  officer  to  classify  it  as  a  temporary  directional  sign  was  “not akin to an officer synthesizing the expressive content  of the sign.”  Id., at 978.  It then remanded for the District   Court to determine in the first instance whether the Sign  Code’s  distinctions  among  temporary  directional  signs,  political  signs,  and  ideological  signs  nevertheless  consti- tuted a content-based regulation of speech.    On  remand,  the  District  Court  granted  summary  judg- ment  in  favor  of  the  Town.    The  Court  of  Appeals  again  affirmed,  holding  that  the  Code’s  sign  categories  were  content  neutral.  The  court  concluded  that  “the  distinc- tions  between  Temporary  Directional  Signs,  Ideological  Signs,  and  Political  Signs  . . .  are  based  on  objective  fac- tors relevant to Gilbert’s creation of the specific exemption  from the permit requirement and do not otherwise consider  the  substance  of  the  sign.”  707  F. 3d  1057,  1069  (CA9   2013).  Relying on this Court’s decision in Hill   v. Colorado,  530 U. S. 703 (2000), the Court of Appeals concluded that  the Sign Code is content neutral.  707 F. 3d, at 1071–1072.    As  the  court  explained,  “Gilbert  did  not  adopt  its  regula- tion  of  speech  because  it  disagreed  with  the  message  conveyed”  and  its  “interests  in  regulat[ing]  temporary  signs are unrelated to the content of the sign.”  Ibid.  Accord-  ingly,  the  court  believed  that  the  Code  was  “content- neutral  as  that  term  [has  been]   defined  by  the  Supreme  Court.”  Id.,  at  1071.  In  light  of  that  determination,  it  applied  a  lower  level  of  scrutiny  to  the  Sign  Code  and  concluded  that  the  law  did  not  violate  the  First  Amend- ment.  Id., at 1073–1076.    We  granted  certiorari,  573  U. S.  ___  (2014),  and  now  reverse.    6  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  II  A    The First Amendment, applicable to the States through  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibits  the  enactment  of  laws  “abridging  the  freedom  of  speech.”    U. S.  Const.,  Amdt.  1.  Under  that  Clause,  a  government,  including  a  municipal government vested with state authority, “has no  power  to  restrict  expression  because  of  its  message,  its  ideas,  its  subject  matter,  or  its  content.”    Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972).  Content-based  laws—those  that  target  speech  based  on  its  communica- tive content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may  be  justified  only  if  the  government  proves  that  they  are  narrowly  tailored  to  serve  compelling  state  interests.   R. A. V.  v.  St. Paul,  505  U. S.  377,  395  (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc.  v.  Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 115, 118 (1991).   Government  regulation  of  speech  is  content  based  if  a  law  applies  to  particular  speech  because  of  the  topic  dis- cussed  or  the  idea  or  message  expressed.    E.g., Sorrell v.   IMS Health, Inc., 564 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011) (slip op., at  8–9);  Carey  v.  Brown,  447  U. S.  455,  462  (1980);  Mosley,  supra,  at  95.    This  commonsense  meaning  of  the  phrase  “content  based”  requires  a  court  to  consider  whether  a  regulation of speech “on its face” draws distinctions based  on  the  message  a  speaker  conveys.    Sorrell,  supra,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  8).  Some  facial  distinctions  based  on  a  mes- sage  are  obvious,  defining  regulated  speech  by  particular  subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regu- lated speech by its function or purpose.  Both are distinc- tions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and,  therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.    Our  precedents  have  also  recognized  a  separate  and  additional  category  of  laws  that,  though  facially  content  neutral,  will  be  considered  content-based  regulations  of  speech: laws that cannot be “ ‘justified without reference to       Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  7    Opinion of the Court  the content of the regulated speech,’ ” or that were adopted  by  the  government  “because  of  disagreement  with  the  message  [the  speech]  conveys,”  Ward  v.  Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989).  Those laws, like those  that  are  content  based  on  their  face,  must  also  satisfy  strict scrutiny.  B    The  Town’s  Sign  Code  is  content  based  on  its  face.    It  defines  “Temporary  Directional  Signs”  on  the  basis  of  whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public  to  church  or  some  other  “qualifying  event.”    Glossary  25.   It defines “Political Signs” on the basis of whether a sign’s  message  is  “designed  to  influence   the  outcome  of  an  elec- tion.”  Id.,  at 24.  And it defines “Ideological Signs” on the  basis  of  whether  a  sign  “communicat[es]  a  message  or  ideas”  that  do  not  fit  within  the  Code’s  other  categories.    Id.,  at  23.  It  then  subjects  each  of  these  categories  to different restrictions.    The  restrictions  in  the  Sign  Code  that  apply  to  any  given  sign  thus  depend  entirely  on  the  communicative  content of the sign.  If a sign informs its reader of the time  and place a book club will discuss John Locke’s Two Trea- tises  of  Government,  that  sign   will  be  treated  differently  from  a  sign  expressing  the  view  that  one  should  vote  for  one of Locke’s followers in an upcoming election, and both  signs will be treated differently from a sign expressing an  ideological  view  rooted  in  Locke’s  theory  of  government.   More  to  the  point,  the  Church’s  signs  inviting  people  to  attend  its  worship  services  are  treated  differently  from  signs conveying other types of ideas.  On its face, the Sign  Code  is  a  content-based  regulation  of  speech.    We  thus  have no need to consider the government’s justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is  subject to strict scrutiny.    8  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  C    In  reaching  the  contrary  conclusion,  the  Court  of  Ap- peals  offered  several  theories  to  explain  why  the  Town’s  Sign  Code  should  be  deemed  content  neutral.    None  is  persuasive.  1    The  Court  of  Appeals  first  determined  that  the  Sign  Code was content neutral because the Town “did not adopt  its regulation of speech [based on] disagree[ment] with the  message  conveyed,”  and  its  justifications  for  regulating  temporary directional signs were “unrelated to the content  of the sign.”  707 F. 3d, at 1071–1072.  In its brief to this   Court,  the  United  States  similarly  contends  that  a  sign  regulation  is  content  neutral—even  if  it  expressly  draws  distinctions based on the sign’s communicative content—if  those  distinctions  can  be  “ ‘justified  without  reference  to  the  content  of  the  regulated  speech.’ ”    Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus Curiae  20,  24  (quoting  Ward,  supra,  at  791; emphasis deleted).    But  this  analysis  skips  the  crucial  first  step  in  the  content-neutrality  analysis:  determining  whether  the  law  is content neutral on its face.  A law that is content based   on  its  face  is  subject  to  strict  scrutiny  regardless  of  the  government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification,  or  lack  of  “animus  toward  the  ideas  contained”  in  the  regulated  speech.    Cincinnati v.  Discovery Network,  Inc.,  507 U. S. 410, 429 (1993).  We have thus made clear that  “ ‘[i]llicit  legislative  intent  is  not  the  sine qua non  of  a  violation of the First  Amendment,’ ” and a party opposing  the government “need adduce ‘no evidence of an improper  censorial  motive.’ ”    Simon & Schuster, supra,  at  117.   Although  “a  content-based  purpose  may  be  sufficient  in  certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content  based,  it  is  not  necessary.”    Turner Broadcasting System,   Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994).  In other words, an        Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  9    Opinion of the Court  innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content- based law into one that is content neutral.    That  is  why  we  have  repeatedly  considered  whether  a  law  is  content  neutral  on  its  face  before  turning  to  the  law’s  justification  or  purpose.  See,  e.g.,  Sorrell,  supra,  at  ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9) (statute was content based “on its  face,”  and  there  was  also  evidence  of  an  impermissible  legislative  motive);  United States  v.  Eichman,  496  U. S.   310,  315  (1990)  (“Although  the  [statute]  contains  no  ex-  plicit  content-based  limitation  on  the  scope   of  prohibited  conduct,  it  is  nevertheless  clear  that  the  Government’s   asserted  interest is  related  to  the  suppression  of  free  ex- pression” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Members of City Council of Los Angeles  v.  Taxpayers for Vincent,  466  U. S.  789,  804  (1984)  (“The  text  of  the  ordinance  is  neu- tral,” and “there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in  the  City’s  enactment  or  enforcement  of  this  ordinance”);   Clark  v.  Community for Creative Non-Violence,  468  U. S.   288,  293  (1984)  (requiring  that  a  facially  content-neutral  ban on camping must be “justified without reference to the  content of the regulated speech”); United States v. O’Brien,  391 U. S. 367, 375, 377 (1968) (noting that the statute “on  its  face  deals  with  conduct  having  no  connection  with  speech,”  but  examining  whether  the  “the  governmental  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  free  expres- sion”).  Because  strict  scrutiny  applies  either  when  a  law  is content based on its face or when the purpose and justi- fication for the law are content based, a court must evalu- ate  each  question  before  it  concludes  that  the  law  is  con- tent neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny.    The  Court  of  Appeals  and  the  United  States  misunder- stand  our  decision  in  Ward  as  suggesting  that  a  govern- ment’s  purpose  is  relevant  even  when  a  law  is  content  based on its face.  That is incorrect.  Ward had nothing to  say  about  facially  content-based  restrictions  because  it  involved  a  facially  content-neutral  ban  on  the  use,  in  a    10  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  city-owned  music  venue,  of  sound  amplification  systems  not  provided  by  the  city.    491  U. S.,  at  787,   and  n. 2.    In   that context, we looked to governmental motive, including  whether the government had regulated speech “because of  disagreement”  with  its  message,  and  whether  the  regula- tion was “ ‘justified without reference to the content of the  speech.’ ”  Id., at 791.  But Ward’s framework “applies only  if  a  statute  is  content  neutral.”  Hill,  530  U. S.,  at  766   (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).  Its    rules thus operate “to  pro- tect speech,” not “to restrict it.”  Id., at 765.    The  First  Amendment  requires  no  less.    Innocent  mo- tives do not eliminate the danger  of censorship presented  by  a  facially  content-based  statute,  as  future  government  officials  may  one  day  wield  such  statutes  to  suppress  disfavored  speech.  That  is  why  the  First  Amendment  expressly  targets  the  operation  of  the  laws—i.e., the  “abridg[ement]  of  speech”—rather  than  merely  the  mo- tives  of  those  who  enacted  them.    U. S.  Const.,  Amdt.  1.   “ ‘The vice of content-based legislation . . . is not that it  is  always  used  for  invidious,  thought-control  purposes,  but  that it lends itself to use for those purposes.’ ”  Hill, supra,  at 743 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).   For instance, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963),  the  Court  encountered  a  State’s  attempt  to  use  a  statute  prohibiting “ ‘improper solicitation’ ” by attorneys to outlaw  litigation-related  speech  of  the  National  Association  for  the Advancement of Colored People.  Id., at 438.  Although  Button predated  our  more  recent  formulations  of  strict  scrutiny,  the  Court  rightly  rejected  the  State’s  claim  that  its  interest  in  the  “regulation  of  professional  conduct”  rendered  the  statute  consistent  with  the  First  Amend- ment,  observing  that   “it  is  no  answer  . . .  to  say  . . .  that  the purpose of these regulations was merely to insure high  professional standards and not to curtail free expression.”   Id., at 438–439.  Likewise, one could easily imagine a Sign  Code  compliance  manager  who  disliked  the  Church’s       Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  11     Opinion of the Court  substantive teachings deploying the Sign Code to make it  more  difficult  for  the  Church  to  inform  the  public  of  the  location  of  its  services.    Accordingly,  we  have  repeatedly  “rejected the argument that ‘discriminatory . . . treatment  is  suspect  under  the  First  Amendment  only  when  the  legislature  intends  to  suppress  certain  ideas.’ ”  Discovery Network, 507 U. S., at 429.  We do so again today.  2    The Court of Appeals next reasoned that the Sign Code  was content neutral because it “does not mention any idea  or  viewpoint,  let  alone  single  one  out  for  differential  treatment.”  587  F. 3d,  at  977.    It  reasoned  that,  for  the  purpose  of  the  Code  provisions,  “[i]t  makes  no  difference  which  candidate  is  supported,  who  sponsors  the  event,  or  what  ideological  perspective  is  asserted.”  707  F. 3d,  at   1069.    The  Town  seizes  on  this  reasoning,  insisting  that  “con- tent  based”  is  a  term  of  art  that  “should  be  applied  flexi- bly” with the goal of protecting “viewpoints and ideas from  government censorship or favoritism.”  Brief for Respond- ents 22.  In the Town’s view, a sign regulation that “does not censor or favor particular viewpoints or ideas” cannot  be  content  based.    Ibid.  The  Sign  Code  allegedly  passes  this  test  because  its  treatment  of  temporary  directional  signs  does  not  raise  any  concerns  that  the  government  is  “endorsing or suppressing ‘ideas or viewpoints,’ ” id., at 27,  and the provisions for political signs and ideological signs  “are  neutral  as  to  particular  ideas  or  viewpoints”  within    those categories.  Id., at 37.    This  analysis  conflates  two  distinct  but  related  limita- tions  that  the  First  Amendment  places  on  government  regulation  of  speech.  Government  discrimination  among  viewpoints—or  the  regulation  of  speech  based  on  “the specific  motivating  ideology  or  the  opinion  or  perspective  of the speaker”—is a “more blatant” and “egregious form of    12  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  content  discrimination.”  Rosenberger  v.  Rector and Visi- tors of Univ. of Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  829  (1995).    But  it  is   well established that “[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to  content-based  regulation  extends  not  only  to  restrictions  on  particular  viewpoints,  but  also  to  prohibition  of  public  discussion of an entire topic.”  Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y.  v.  Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y.,  447  U. S.  530,  537   (1980).   Thus,  a  speech  regulation  targeted  at  specific  subject  matter  is  content  based  even  if  it  does  not  discriminate  among  viewpoints  within  that  subject  matter.    Ibid.    For   example, a law banning the use of sound trucks for politi- cal speech—and only political speech—would be a content- based regulation, even if it imposed no limits on the politi- cal  viewpoints  that  could  be  expressed.  See  Discovery Network, supra,  at  428.    The  Town’s  Sign  Code  likewise  singles  out  specific  subject  matter  for  differential  treat- ment,  even  if  it  does  not  target  viewpoints  within  that  subject  matter.    Ideological  messages  are  given  more  favorable  treatment  than  messages  concerning  a  political  candidate,  which  are  themselves  given  more  favorable  treatment than messages announcing an assembly of like- minded  individuals.  That  is  a  paradigmatic  example  of content-based discrimination.  3    Finally,  the  Court  of  Appeals  characterized  the  Sign  Code’s  distinctions  as  turning  on  “ ‘the  content-neutral  elements of who is speaking through the sign and whether  and  when  an  event  is  occurring.’ ”    707  F. 3d,  at  1069.    That  analysis  is  mistaken  on  both  factual  and  legal  grounds.    To  start,  the  Sign  Code’s  distinctions  are  not  speaker  based.  The restrictions for political, ideological, and tem- porary  event  signs  apply  equally  no  matter  who  sponsors  them.  If  a  local  business,  for  example,  sought  to  put  up       Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  13     Opinion of the Court  signs  advertising  the  Church’s  meetings,  those  signs would  be  subject  to  the  same  limitations  as  such  signs  placed  by  the  Church.    And  if  Reed  had  decided  to  dis-  play  signs  in  support  of  a  particular  candidate,  he  could  have  made  those  signs  far  larger—and  kept  them  up  for  far  longer—than  signs  inviting  people  to  attend  his  church  services.    If  the  Code’s  distinctions  were  truly speaker based, both types of signs would receive the same   treatment.     In any case, the fact that a distinction is speaker based  does not, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe, auto- matically render the distinction content neutral.  Because  “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker  are  all  too  often  simply  a  means  to  control  content,”  Citi- zens United v.  Federal Election Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  340  (2010),  we  have  insisted  that  “laws  favoring  some  speakers  over  others  demand  strict  scrutiny  when  the  legislature’s  speaker  preference  reflects  a  content  prefer- ence,” Turner, 512 U. S., at 658.  Thus, a law limiting the  content  of  newspapers,  but  only  newspapers,  could  not evade strict scrutiny simply because it could be character- ized as speaker based.  Likewise, a content-based law that   restricted the political speech of all corporations would not  become  content  neutral  just  because  it  singled  out  corpo- rations as a class of speakers.  See Citizens United, supra,  at 340–341.  Characterizing a distinction as speaker based  is only the beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.    Nor  do  the  Sign  Code’s  distinctions  hinge  on  “whether  and when an event is occurring.”  The Code does not per- mit citizens to post signs on any topic whatsoever within a     set period leading up to an election, for example.  Instead,  come election time, it requires Town officials to determine  whether a sign is “designed to influence the outcome of an  election” (and thus “political”) or merely “communicating a  message  or  ideas  for  noncommercial  purposes”  (and  thus  “ideological”).  Glossary  24.  That  obvious  content-based    14  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  inquiry  does  not  evade  strict  scrutiny  review  simply  be- cause an event (i.e., an election) is involved.    And,  just  as  with  speaker-based  laws,  the  fact  that  a  distinction  is  event  based  does  not  render  it  content  neu- tral.  The  Court  of  Appeals  cited  no  precedent  from  this  Court supporting its novel theory of an exception from the  content-neutrality  requirement  for  event-based  laws.    As   we have explained, a speech regulation is content based if  the  law  applies  to  particular  speech  because  of  the  topic  discussed  or  the  idea  or  message  expressed.  Supra,  at  6.   A regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea  about  a  specific  event  is  no  less  content  based  than  a  regulation  that  targets  a  sign  because  it  conveys  some  other  idea.  Here,  the  Code  singles  out  signs  bearing  a  particular  message:  the  time  and  location  of  a  specific  event.  This  type  of  ordinance  may  seem  like  a  perfectly  rational  way  to  regulate  signs,  but  a  clear  and  firm  rule  governing  content  neutrality  is  an  essential  means  of  protecting  the  freedom  of  speech,  even  if  laws  that  might  seem “entirely reasonable” will sometimes be “struck down  because  of  their  content-based  nature.”  City of Ladue  v.  Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).   III     Because  the  Town’s  Sign  Code  imposes  content-based  restrictions  on  speech,  those  provisions  can  stand  only  if  they  survive  strict  scrutiny,  “ ‘which  requires  the  Govern- ment  to  prove  that  the  restriction  furthers  a  compelling  interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,’ ”    Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.  Bennett,  564  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2011)  (slip  op.,  at  8)  (quoting    Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 340).  Thus, it is the Town’s    burden  to  demonstrate  that  the  Code’s  differentiation  between  temporary  directional  signs  and  other  types  of  signs, such as political signs and ideological signs, furthers  a  compelling  governmental  interest  and  is  narrowly  tai-     Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  15     Opinion of the Court  lored to that end.  See ibid.    The Town cannot do so.  It has offered only two govern- mental  interests  in  support  of  the  distinctions  the  Sign  Code  draws:  preserving  the  Town’s  aesthetic  appeal  and  traffic  safety.  Assuming  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  those  are  compelling  governmental  interests,  the  Code’s  distinctions fail as hopelessly underinclusive.   Starting  with  the  preservation  of  aesthetics,  temporary  directional  signs  are  “no  greater  an  eyesore,”  Discovery Network,  507  U. S.,  at  425,  than  ideological  or  political  ones.  Yet the Code allows unlimited proliferation of larger ideological  signs  while  strictly  limiting  the  number,  size,  and  duration  of  smaller  directional  ones.    The  Town  can- not  claim  that  placing  strict  limits  on  temporary  direc- tional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at the  same  time  allowing  unlimited  numbers  of  other  types  of  signs that create the same problem.    The Town similarly has not shown that limiting tempo- rary  directional  signs  is  necessary  to  eliminate  threats  to  traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not.   The Town has offered no reason to believe that directional  signs pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or  political  signs.  If  anything,  a  sharply  worded  ideological  sign  seems  more  likely  to  distract  a  driver  than  a  sign  directing the public to a nearby church meeting.    In  light  of   this  underinclusiveness,  the  Town  has  not  met  its  burden  to  prove  that  its  Sign  Code  is  narrowly  tailored  to  further  a  compelling  government  interest.   Because a “ ‘law cannot be regarded as protecting an inter- est  of  the  highest  order,  and  thus  as  justifying  a  re- striction  on  truthful  speech,  when  it  leaves  appreciable  damage  to  that  supposedly  vital  interest  unprohibited,’ ”  Republican Party of Minn. v.  White,  536  U. S.  765,  780   (2002), the Sign Code fails strict scrutiny.     16  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      Opinion of the Court  IV    Our  decision  today  will  not  prevent  governments  from enacting  effective  sign  laws.    The  Town  asserts  that  an   “ ‘absolutist’ ”  content-neutrality  rule  would  render  “virtu- ally all distinctions in sign laws . . . subject to strict scru- tiny,”  Brief  for  Respondents  34–35,  but  that  is  not  the   case.  Not  “all  distinctions”  are  subject  to  strict  scrutiny,   only content-based ones are.  Laws that are content neutral  are  instead  subject  to  lesser  scrutiny.  See  Clark,  468  U. S., at 295.    The  Town  has  ample  content-neutral  options  available  to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics.  For exam- ple, its current Code regulates many aspects of signs that  have  nothing  to  do  with  a  sign’s  message:  size,  building  materials,  lighting,  moving  parts,  and  portability.    See,  e.g., §4.402(R).  And on public property, the Town may go  a long way toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs,  so  long  as  it  does  so  in  an  evenhanded,  content-neutral  manner.  See  Taxpayers for Vincent,  466  U. S.,  at  817  (upholding  content-neutral  ban  against  posting  signs  on public  property).  Indeed,  some  lower  courts  have  long  held  that  similar  content-based  sign  laws  receive  strict  scrutiny,  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  towns  in  those  jurisdictions  have  suffered  catastrophic  effects.  See,  e.g.,  Solantic, LLC v.  Neptune Beach,  410  F. 3d  1250,  1264–  1269  (CA11  2005)  (sign  categories  similar  to  the  town  of  Gilbert’s  were  content  based  and  subject  to  strict  scru-  tiny);  Matthews v.  Needham,  764  F. 2d  58,  59–60  (CA1  1985)  (law  banning  political  signs  but  not  commercial  signs was content based and subject to strict scrutiny).    We  acknowledge  that  a  city   might  reasonably  view  the  general  regulation  of  signs  as  necessary  because  signs  “take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists,  displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems  that  legitimately  call  for  regulation.”    City of Ladue,  512   U. S.,  at  48.  At  the  same  time,  the  presence  of  certain      Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  17     Opinion of the Court  signs may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians,  to guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety.  A   sign  ordinance  narrowly  tailored  to  the  challenges  of  protecting  the  safety  of  pedestrians,  drivers,  and  passen- gers—such  as  warning  signs  marking  hazards  on  private  property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers associ- ated  with  private  houses—well  might  survive  strict  scru- tiny.  The  signs  at  issue  in  this  case,  including  political  and ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed  from those purposes.  As discussed above, they are facially  content  based  and  are  neither  justified  by  traditional  safety concerns nor narrowly tailored.  *    *    *    We  reverse  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  and  remand  the  case  for  proceedings  consistent  with  this  opinion.   It is so ordered.   Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 ALITO, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 13–502 _________________ CLYDE REED, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 18, 2015] JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court but add a few words of further explanation. As the Court holds, what we have termed “content- based” laws must satisfy strict scrutiny. Content-based laws merit this protection because they present, albeit sometimes in a subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech based on viewpoint. Limiting speech based on its “topic” or “subject” favors those who do not want to disturb the status quo. Such regulations may interfere with democratic self-government and the search for truth. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 537 (1980). As the Court shows, the regulations at issue in this case are replete with content-based distinctions, and as a result they must satisfy strict scrutiny. This does not mean, however, that municipalities are powerless to enact and enforce reasonable sign regulations. I will not attempt to provide anything like a comprehensive list, but here are some rules that would not be content based: Rules regulating the size of signs. These rules may distinguish among signs based on any content-neutral criteria, including any relevant criteria listed below. Rules regulating the locations in which signs may be 2 REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT ALITO, J., concurring placed. These rules may distinguish between free- standing signs and those attached to buildings. Rules distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs. Rules distinguishing between signs with fixed messages and electronic signs with messages that change. Rules that distinguish between the placement of signs on private and public property. Rules distinguishing between the placement of signs on commercial and residential property. Rules distinguishing between on-premises and off- premises signs. Rules restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile of roadway. Rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. Rules of this nature do not discriminate based on topic or subject and are akin to rules restricting the times within which oral speech or music is allowed.* In addition to regulating signs put up by private actors, government entities may also erect their own signs con- sistent with the principles that allow governmental speech. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467–469 (2009). They may put up all manner of signs to promote safety, as well as directional signs and signs pointing out historic sites and scenic spots. Properly understood, today’s decision will not prevent cities from regulating signs in a way that fully protects public safety and serves legitimate esthetic objectives. —————— * Of course, content-neutral restrictions on speech are not necessarily consistent with the First Amendment. Time, place, and manner restrictions “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 798 (1989). But they need not meet the high standard imposed on viewpoint- and content-based restrictions.   Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  1    BREYER, J., concurring in judgment      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________  No. 13–502   _________________  CLYDE REED, ET AL   ., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF    .  GILBERT, ARIZONA, ET AL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT  [June 18, 2015]  JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the judgment.     I join JUSTICE  KAGAN’s separate opinion.  Like JUSTICE  KAGAN I believe that categories alone cannot satisfactorily  resolve the legal problem before us.  The First Amendment  requires  greater  judicial  sensitivity  both  to  the  Amend- ment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate  need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories,  such  as  “content  discrimination”  and  “strict  scrutiny,”   would permit.  In my view, the category “content discrimi- nation”  is  better  considered  in  many  contexts,  including  here,  as  a  rule  of  thumb,  rather  than  as  an  automatic  “strict  scrutiny”  trigger,  leading  to  almost  certain  legal  condemnation.    To  use  content  discrimination  to  trigger  strict  scrutiny  sometimes makes perfect sense.  There are cases in which  the Court has found content discrimination an unconstitu- tional  method  for  suppressing  a  viewpoint.    E.g., Rosen- berger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819,   828–829 (1995); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 318–  319  (1988)  (plurality  opinion)  (applying  strict  scrutiny  where the line between subject matter and viewpoint was  not  obvious).    And  there  are  cases  where  the  Court  has  found  content  discrimination  to  reveal  that  rules  govern- ing  a  traditional  public  forum  are,  in  fact,  not  a  neutral  way  of  fairly  managing  the  forum  in  the  interest  of  all  2  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      BREYER, J., concurring in judgment      speakers.  Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92,   96  (1972)  (“Once  a  forum  is  opened  up  to  assembly  or speaking  by  some  groups,  government  may  not  prohibit  others  from  assembling  or  speaking  on  the  basis  of  what  they  intend  to  say”).    In  these  types  of  cases,  strict  scru- tiny  is  often  appropriate,  and  content  discrimination  has  thus served a useful purpose.    But  content  discrimination,  while  helping  courts  to  identify  unconstitutional  suppression  of  expression,  can- not and should not  always trigger  strict scrutiny.  To say  that it is not an automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger is not to  argue  against  that  concept’s  use.  I  readily  concede,  for  example, that content discrimination, as a conceptual tool,  can  sometimes  reveal  weaknesses  in  the  government’s  rationale  for  a  rule  that  limits  speech.    If,  for  example,  a  city looks to litter prevention as the rationale for a prohi- bition  against  placing  newsracks  dispensing  free  adver- tisements  on  public  property,  why  does  it  exempt  other  newsracks  causing  similar  litter?    Cf.  Cincinnati v.  Dis- covery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410 (1993).  I also concede   that,  whenever  government  disfavors  one  kind  of  speech,  it  places  that  speech  at  a  disadvantage,  potentially  inter- fering  with  the  free  marketplace  of  ideas  and  with  an  individual’s ability to express thoughts and ideas that can  help that individual determine the kind of society in which  he wishes to live, help shape that society, and help define  his place within it.   Nonetheless,  in  these  latter  instances  to  use  the  pres- ence  of  content  discrimination  automatically  to  trigger  strict  scrutiny  and  thereby  call  into  play  a  strong  pre- sumption  against  constitutionality  goes  too  far.  That  is   because virtually all government activities involve speech,  many  of  which  involve  the  regulation  of  speech.    Regula- tory programs almost always require content discrimination.   And  to  hold  that  such  content  discrimination  triggers  strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial management    Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  3    BREYER, J., concurring in judgment      of ordinary government regulatory activity.    Consider  a  few  examples  of  speech  regulated  by  gov- ernment  that  inevitably  involve  content  discrimination,  but  where  a  strong  presumption  against  constitutionality  has no place. Consider governmental regulation of securi- ties,  e.g., 15   U. S. C.   §78l  (requirements  for  content  that  must  be  included  in  a  registration  statement);  of  energy  conservation  labeling-practices,  e.g., 42  U. S. C.  §6294 (requirements for content that must be included on labels  of certain consumer electronics); of prescription drugs, e.g., 21  U. S. C.  §353(b)(4)(A)  (requiring  a  prescription  drug  label to bear the symbol “Rx only”); of doctor-patient confi- dentiality, e.g., 38 U. S. C. §7332 (requiring confidentiality    of  certain  medical  records,  but  allowing  a  physician  to  disclose that the patient has HIV to the patient’s spouse or  sexual partner); of income tax statements, e.g., 26 U. S. C.   §6039F (requiring taxpayers to furnish information about foreign  gifts  received  if  the  aggregate  amount  exceeds $10,000);  of  commercial  airplane  briefings,  e.g., 14  CFR  §136.7 (2015) (requiring pilots to ensure that each passen- ger has been briefed on flight procedures, such as seatbelt  fastening);  of  signs  at  petting  zoos,  e.g.,  N. Y.  Gen.  Bus.   Law  Ann.  §399–ff(3)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2015)  (requiring  petting  zoos  to  post  a  sign  at  every  exit  “ ‘strongly  recom- mend[ing] that persons wash their hands upon exiting the  petting zoo area’ ”); and so on.    Nor  can  the  majority  avoid  the  application  of  strict  scrutiny to all sorts of justifiable governmental regulations  by  relying  on  this  Court’s  many  subcategories  and  excep- tions to the rule.  The Court has said, for example, that we  should apply less strict standards to “commercial speech.”  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.  v.  Public Service Comm’n of N. Y.,  447  U. S.  557,  562–563  (1980).    But  I  have  great  concern  that  many  justifiable  instances  of  “content-based”  regulation  are  noncommercial.  And,   worse  than  that,  the  Court  has  applied  the  heightened  4  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      BREYER, J., concurring in judgment      “strict  scrutiny”  standard  even  in  cases  where  the  less  stringent  “commercial  speech”  standard  was  appropriate.  See  Sorrell v.  IMS Health Inc.,  564  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2011)  (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at ___ ).   The Court has  also  said  that  “government  speech”  escapes  First  Amend- ment strictures.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 193–  194  (1991).  But  regulated  speech  is  typically  private  speech,  not  government  speech.  Further,  the  Court  has  said that, “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination  consists  entirely  of  the  very  reason  the  entire  class  of  speech  at  issue  is  proscribable,  no  significant  danger  of idea  or  viewpoint  discrimination  exists.”  R. A. V. v.  St. Paul,  505  U. S.  377,  388  (1992).   But  this  exception  accounts  for  only  a  few  of  the  instances  in  which  content  discrimination is readily justifiable.   I  recognize  that  the  Court  could  escape  the  problem  by  watering  down  the  force  of  the  presumption  against  con- stitutionality  that  “strict  scrutiny”  normally  carries  with  it.  But,  in  my  view,  doing  so  will  weaken  the  First Amendment’s  protection  in  instances  where  “strict  scru- tiny” should apply in full force.  The  better  approach  is  to  generally  treat  content  dis- crimination  as  a  strong  reason  weighing  against  the  con- stitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or  where  viewpoint  discrimination,  is  threatened,  but  else- where treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but  not  determinative  legal  tool,  in  an  appropriate  case,  to  determine  the  strength  of  a  justification.  I  would  use  content  discrimination  as  a  supplement  to  a  more  basic  analysis,  which,  tracking  most  of  our  First  Amendment  cases, asks whether the regulation at issue works harm to  First  Amendment  interests  that  is  disproportionate  in  light of the relevant regulatory objectives.  Answering this  question  requires  examining  the  seriousness  of  the  harm  to speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives,  the  extent  to  which  the  law  will  achieve  those  objectives,    Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  5    BREYER, J., concurring in judgment      and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing  so.  See,  e.g., United States v.  Alvarez,  567  U. S.  ___,  ___–  ___  (2012)  (BREYER, J.,    concurring  in  judgment)  (slip  op.,   at  1–3);  Nixon v.  Shrink Missouri Government PAC,  528  U. S.  377,  400–403  (2000)  (BREYER,   J.,  concurring).  Ad- mittedly,  this  approach  does  not  have  the  simplicity  of  a  mechanical use of categories.  But it does permit the gov- ernment  to  regulate  speech  in  numerous  instances  where  the  voters  have  authorized  the  government  to  regulate  and  where  courts  should  hesitate  to  substitute  judicial  judgment for that of administrators.   Here,  regulation  of  signage  along  the  roadside,  for  pur- poses of safety and beautification is at issue.  There is no  traditional public forum nor do I find any general effort to     censor  a  particular  viewpoint.    Consequently,  the  specific regulation  at  issue  does  not  warrant  “strict  scrutiny.”   Nonetheless,  for  the  reasons  that  JUSTICE  KAGAN  sets  forth, I believe that the Town of Gilbert’s regulatory rules  violate  the  First  Amendment.    I  consequently  concur  in  the Court’s judgment only.     Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  1    KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________  No. 13–502   _________________  CLYDE REED, ET AL   ., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF  GILBERT, ARIZONA, ET AL   .  ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT  [June 18, 2015]  JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  and  JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in the judgment.    Countless cities and towns across America have adopted  ordinances  regulating  the  posting  of  signs,  while  exempt- ing certain categories of signs based on their subject mat- ter.  For  example,  some  municipalities  generally  prohibit  illuminated  signs  in  residential  neighborhoods,  but  lift  that  ban  for  signs  that  identify  the  address  of  a  home  or  the name of its owner or occupant.  See, e.g., City of Truth  or  Consequences,  N. M.,  Code  of  Ordinances,  ch.  16,  Art.  XIII,  §§11–13–2.3,  11–13–2.9(H)(4)  (2014).    In  other  mu- nicipalities, safety signs such as  “Blind Pedestrian Cross- ing”  and  “Hidden  Driveway”  can  be  posted  without  a   permit,  even  as  other  permanent  signs  require  one.    See,  e.g., Code of Athens-Clarke County, Ga., Pt. III, §7–4–7(1)  (1993).  Elsewhere,  historic  site  markers—for  example, “George  Washington  Slept  Here”—are  also  exempt  from  general  regulations.  See,  e.g.,  Dover,  Del.,  Code  of  Ordi- nances,  Pt.  II,  App.  B,  Art.  5,  §4.5(F)  (2012).  And  simi- larly,  the  federal  Highway  Beautification  Act  limits  signs  along interstate highways unless, for instance, they direct  travelers to “scenic and historical attractions” or advertise   free coffee.  See 23 U. S. C. §§131(b), (c)(1), (c)(5).    Given the Court’s analysis, many sign ordinances of that  kind are now in jeopardy.  See ante, at 14 (acknowledging     2  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment    that  “entirely  reasonable”  sign  laws  “will  sometimes  be  struck  down”  under  its  approach  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  Says  the  majority:  When  laws  “single[ ]   out  specific  subject  matter,”  they  are  “facially  content  based”; and when they are facially content based, they are  automatically  subject  to  strict  scrutiny.    Ante,  at  12,  16–  17.  And  although  the  majority  holds  out  hope  that  some  sign laws with subject-matter exemptions “might survive”  that  stringent  review,  ante,  at  17,  the  likelihood  is  that  most will be struck down.  After all, it is the “rare case[] in    which  a  speech  restriction  withstands  strict  scrutiny.”    Williams-Yulee  v.  Florida Bar,  575  U.  S.  ___,  ___  (2015) (slip  op.,  at  9).  To  clear  that  high  bar,  the   government  must  show  that  a  content-based  distinction  “is  necessary  to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn  to  achieve  that  end.”    Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc.  v.  Ragland,  481  U. S.  221,  231  (1987).  So  on  the  majority’s  view,  courts  would  have  to  determine  that  a  town  has  a  compelling  interest  in  informing  passersby  where  George Washington slept.  And likewise, courts would have to find   that a town has no other way to prevent hidden-driveway  mishaps than by specially treating hidden-driveway signs.   (Well-placed  speed  bumps?  Lower  speed  limits?    Or  how  about  just  a  ban  on  hidden  driveways?)    The  conse- quence—unless courts water down strict scrutiny to some- thing  unrecognizable—is  that  our  communities  will  find themselves in an unenviable bind: They will have to either  repeal  the  exemptions  that  allow  for  helpful  signs  on streets  and  sidewalks,  or  else  lift  their  sign  restrictions  altogether and resign themselves to the resulting clutter.*  ——————  * Even  in  trying  (commendably)  to  limit  today’s  decision,  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  concurrence  highlights  its  far-reaching  effects.    According  to   JUSTICE  ALITO,  the  majority  does  not  subject  to  strict   scrutiny  regula- tions  of  “signs  advertising  a  one-time  event.”    Ante,  at  2  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring).  But of course it does.  On the majority’s view, a law with       an  exception  for  such  signs  “singles  out  specific  subject  matter  for       Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  3    KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment      Although  the  majority  insists  that  applying  strict  scru- tiny to all such ordinances is “essential” to protecting First  Amendment freedoms, ante, at 14, I find it challenging to  understand why that is so.  This Court’s decisions articu- late  two  important  and  related  reasons  for  subjecting  content-based  speech  regulations  to  the  most  exacting  standard  of  review.    The  first  is  “to  preserve  an  uninhib-  ited  marketplace  of  ideas  in  which  truth  will  ultimately  prevail.”  McCullen  v.  Coakley,  573  U.  S.  ___,  ___–___   (2014)  (slip  op.,  at  8–9)  (internal  quotation  marks  omit- ted).  The second is to ensure that the government has not  regulated  speech  “based  on  hostility—or  favoritism—  towards  the  underlying  message  expressed.”    R. A. V. v.   St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992).  Yet the subject-matter  exemptions  included  in  many  sign  ordinances  do  not  im- plicate those concerns.  Allowing residents, say, to install a  light  bulb  over  “name  and  address”  signs  but  no  others  does  not  distort  the  marketplace  of  ideas.    Nor  does  that  different  treatment  give  rise  to  an  inference  of  impermis- sible government motive.   We  apply  strict  scrutiny  to  facially  content-based  regu- lations  of  speech,  in  keeping  with  the  rationales  just  de- scribed, when there is any “realistic possibility that official  suppression  of  ideas  is  afoot.”  Davenport  v.   Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, 189 (2007) (quoting R.   A. V., 505  U. S.,  at  390).  That  is  always  the  case  when  the  regula- tion  facially  differentiates  on  the  basis  of  viewpoint.    See  Rosenberger  v.  Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  829  (1995).  It  is  also  the  case  (except  in  non- public or limited public forums) when a law restricts “dis- cussion of an entire topic” in public debate.  Consolidated ——————  differential  treatment”  and  “defin[es]  regulated  speech  by  particular  subject matter.”  Ante, at 6, 12 (majority opinion).  Indeed, the precise   reason  the  majority  applies  strict  scrutiny  here  is  that  “the  Code  singles out signs bearing a particular message: the time and location of  a specific event.”  Ante, at 14.    4  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment    Edison Co. of N. Y.  v.  Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y.,  447   U. S.  530,  537,  539–540  (1980)  (invalidating  a  limitation  on speech about nuclear power).    We have stated that “[i]f  the  marketplace  of  ideas  is  to  remain  free  and  open,  gov- ernments must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues are  worth  discussing  or  debating.’ ”    Id.,  at  537–538  (quoting  Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972)).   And  we  have  recognized  that  such  subject-matter  re- strictions,  even  though  viewpoint-neutral  on  their  face,  may “suggest[ ] an attempt to give one side of a debatable    public  question  an  advantage  in  expressing  its  views  to  the  people.”     First Nat. Bank of Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S. 765, 785 (1978); accord, ante, at 1 (ALITO, J., concur-   ring) (limiting all speech on one topic “favors those who do  not  want  to  disturb  the  status  quo”).  Subject-matter  regulation, in other words, may have the intent or effect of favoring some ideas over others.  When that is realistically  possible—when the restriction “raises the specter that the  Government  may  effectively  drive  certain  ideas  or  view- points from the marketplace”—we insist that the law pass  the  most  demanding  constitutional  test.    R. A. V.,  505   U. S., at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,  502  U. S.  105,  116   (1991)).   But  when  that  is  not  realistically  possible,  we  may  do  well to relax our guard so that “entirely reasonable” laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive.  Ante, at 14.  This   point  is  by  no  means  new.    Our  concern  with  content- based regulation arises from the fear that the government  will skew the public’s debate of ideas—so when “that risk  is  inconsequential,  . . .  strict  scrutiny  is  unwarranted.”    Davenport, 551 U. S., at 188; see R. A. V., 505 U. S., at 388   (approving  certain  content-based  distinctions  when  there  is  “no  significant  danger  of  idea  or  viewpoint  discrimina- tion”).  To do its intended work, of course, the category of  content-based  regulation  triggering  strict  scrutiny  must       Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  5    KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment    sweep  more  broadly  than  the  actual  harm;  that  category  exists  to  create  a  buffer  zone  guaranteeing  that  the  gov- ernment cannot favor or disfavor certain viewpoints.  But   that buffer zone need not extend forever.  We can adminis- ter our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common  sense,  so  as  to  leave  standing  laws  that  in  no  way  impli- cate its intended function.    And indeed we have done just that: Our cases have been  far  less  rigid  than  the  majority  admits  in  applying  strict  scrutiny to facially content-based laws—including in cases  just like this one.  See Davenport, 551 U. S., at 188 (noting  that  “we  have  identified  numerous  situations  in  which  [the] risk” attached to content-based laws is “attenuated”).   In Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers   for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984), the Court declined to apply  strict  scrutiny  to  a  municipal  ordinance  that  exempted address numbers and markers commemorating “historical,  cultural,  or  artistic  event[s]”  from  a  generally  applicable  limit  on  sidewalk  signs.     Id.,  at  792,  n. 1  (listing  exemp- tions);  see  id.,  at  804–810  (upholding  ordinance  under  intermediate  scrutiny).    After  all,  we  explained,  the  law’s  enactment  and  enforcement  revealed  “not  even  a  hint  of   bias  or  censorship.”  Id.,  at  804;  see  also   Renton  v.  Play- time Theatres, Inc.,  475  U. S.  41,  48  (1986)  (applying  intermediate scrutiny to a zoning law that facially distin- guished among movie theaters based on content because it  was  “designed  to  prevent  crime,  protect  the  city’s  retail  trade, [and] maintain property values . . . , not to suppress  the expression of unpopular views”).  And another decision  involving a similar law provides an alternative model.  In  City of Ladue  v.  Gilleo,  512  U.  S.  43  (1994),  the  Court  assumed  arguendo  that  a  sign  ordinance’s  exceptions  for  address  signs,  safety  signs,  and  for-sale  signs  in  residen- tial areas did not trigger strict scrutiny.  See id., at 46–47,  and  n. 6  (listing  exemptions);  id.,  at  53  (noting  this  as- sumption).  We did not need to, and so did not, decide the    6  REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT      KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment    level-of-scrutiny question because the law’s breadth made  it unconstitutional under any standard.    The majority could easily have taken Ladue’s tack here.    The Town of Gilbert’s defense of its sign ordinance—most  notably,  the  law’s  distinctions  between  directional  signs  and others—does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate  scrutiny,  or  even  the  laugh  test.  See  ante,  at  14–15  (dis- cussing  those  distinctions).  The   Town,  for  example,  pro- vides no reason at all for prohibiting more than four direc- tional  signs  on  a  property  while  placing  no  limits  on  the  number  of  other  types  of  signs.    See  Gilbert,  Ariz.,  Land  Development  Code,  ch.  I,  §§4.402(J),  (P)(2)  (2014).    Simi- larly, the Town offers no coherent justification for restrict- ing  the  size  of  directional  signs  to  6  square  feet  while  allowing  other  signs  to  reach  20  square  feet.  See  §§4.402(J), (P)(1).  The best the Town could come up with  at  oral  argument  was  that  directional  signs  “need  to  be  smaller  because  they  need  to  guide  travelers  along  a  route.”  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  40.    Why  exactly  a  smaller  sign  better helps travelers get to where they are going is left a    mystery.  The absence of any sensible basis for these and  other distinctions dooms the Town’s ordinance under even   the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies    to “time, place, or manner” speech regulations.  Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether strict scru- tiny  applies  to  every  sign  ordinance  in  every  town  across  this country containing a subject-matter exemption.    I suspect this Court and others will regret the majority’s  insistence today on answering that question in the affirm- ative.  As  the  years  go  by,  courts  will  discover  that  thou- sands  of  towns  have  such  ordinances,  many  of  them  “en-   tirely reasonable.”  Ante, at 14.    And as  the  challenges to  them  mount,  courts  will  have  to  invalidate  one  after  the  other.  (This  Court  may  soon  find  itself  a  veritable  Su- preme Board of Sign Review.)  And courts will strike down  those  democratically  enacted  local  laws  even  though  no      Cite as:   576 U. S. ____ (2015)  7    KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment    one—certainly  not  the  majority—has  ever  explained  why  the  vindication  of  First  Amendment  values  requires  that  result.  Because  I  see  no  reason  why  such  an  easy  case  calls  for  us  to  cast  a  constitutional  pall  on  reasonable  regulations quite unlike the law before us, I concur only in  the judgment.