ACCEPTED
01-15-00583-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
10/27/2015 1:23:50 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
MARK W. STEVENS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 8118 FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
GALVESTON, TEXAS 77553 HOUSTON, TEXAS
10/27/2015 1:23:50 PM
409.765.6306
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Fax 409.765.6469 Clerk
Email: markwandstev@sbcglobal.net
October 27, 2015
Hon. Christopher A. Prine, Clerk
First Court of Appeals
301 Fannin Street, Suite 245
Houston, Texas 77002
Re: No. 01-15-00583-CV; Henry v. Cox
Reply of Appellee Hon. Lonnie Cox to the Post-Submission
Letter Brief of Appellant Hon. Mark Henry
Dear Sir:
Please circulate copies of this letter to the members of the October 15 panel,
i.e., Justices Jennings, Higley and Brown, and the appropriate members of the
Court’s Staff.
Jurisdiction under Art.. V, Sec. 8 Properly Invoked
Appellant Henry attacks the jurisdiction by reciting a truncated test:
“arbitrarily and capriciously.” Post Submission Letter Brief, p. 5. Appellant
omitted a crucial word: “illegally.” The “supervisory control” of the District
1
Courts clearly extends to situations in which the commissioners court acts
illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously. Texas Department of Transportation v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d
422, 428 (Tex. 1966); Stovall v. Shivers, 103 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1937).
At oral argument, Appellant’s counsel made a stunning claim of raw power.
Asked if a commissioner’s court might retaliate against an unpopular ruling but
cutting the salary of staff of the offending judge, Counsel for Appellant replied
that it could do so even though it might not be “fair” or “moral.” But it might
indeed be an “offense”, e.g., abuse of office, official oppression, etc.
Judicial Independence
The Temporary Injunction makes repeated reference to what is really at
stake in this case—the independence of the judiciary. That independence
ultimately is a matter of public perception, i.e., whether the public can be confident
that judges are truly independent of improper influence. Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 817 (1986)(state supreme court judge recused due to
perception of personal interest in legal issue before his court); Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc. 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009)(disqualification of State
Supreme Court Justice due to extraordinary expenditures by chief officer of a
litigant in his court).
2
Unfinished Business: Instructions on Remand
The Court has apparently carried with the case Appellee’s earlier requests
that this case be remanded under TRAPs 29.3 and 29.4 for appropriate hearings.
Appellee now repeats those requests, with urgency. It has been approximately 15
months since Ms. Quiroga was ostensibly fired. As the Court was informed in
response to questions on October 15, Ms. Quiroga has worked at the direction of
the Judges since June 8 but has been denied pay, computer access, etc. Such
defiance and delay itself raises serious questions about the independence of the
judiciary in Galveston County. Appellee urges the Court to refer this case to the
trial court with instructions to proceed under TRAPs 29.3 and 29.4 on a priority
basis.
Throwing The Skunk Onto the Appellate Bench
Not content with trying his case in the press or media with misleading
accusation, Appellant Henry attempts to sling that material—clearly dehors the
record—onto the appellate bench in his various briefs. Beginning at p. 1 of his
Post Submission Letter Brief, Appellant completes a deliberate sequence of
inappropriate actions. The Channel Two sound bite cited was, of course, no part of
the record below, because it emerged weeks after the July 6 Temporary Injunction
issued. If one were to consult that “news” piece, they would quickly see that it was
generated by the Commissioners themselves, one of whom appears in it. The trial
3
court will have ample opportunity to hear such accusations, if indeed they are even
relevant to the deciding legal issues in this case.
Appellee Cox will leave it to this honorable court to characterize, or
charitably disregard, such maneuvers.
Conclusion—Temporary Injunction Should be Upheld
Under Applicable Standard of Review
This interlocutory appeal does not place in issue—Appellant has
attempted—the job performance of the Director. As the panel observed during oral
argument and as the cases amply demonstrate, in the absence of such conclusive
proof there is no alternative but to affirm the Temporary Injunction and remand for
further proceedings—and to do so promptly lest time, delay and attrition give to
Appellant what the law and this Court cannot--- improper dominance of the justice
courts.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Mark W. Stevens
Mark W. Stevens
TBN 19184300
P. Box 8118
Galveston, Texas 77553
409.765.6306
Fax 409.765.6459
Email: markwandstev@sbcglobal.net
Counsel for The Hon.
th
Lonnie Cox of the 56 Judicial District Court, Appellee
4
Certificate of Compliance
The foregoing instrument in relevant parts contains 642 words in Times
New Roman Type, with 2.0 spacing .
/s/ Mark W. Stevens
Mark W. Stevens
Certificate of Service
The foregoing was efiled and e-mailed PDF to Mr. Edward Friedman on
October 27, 2015 at efriedman@bakerlaw.com, and also to James P. Allison
(j.allison@allison-bass.com) ; J. Eric Magee (e.magee@allison-bass.com); and
Phillip Ledbetter (p.ledbetter@allison-bass.com) and N. Terry Adams, Jr. at the
firm of Beirne Maynard Parsons LLP (tadams@bpmllp.com) . An additional copy
of this instrument has been served via email to Mr. Joseph M. Nixon at the firm of
Bierne, Maynard & Parsons (jnixon@bpmllp.com) and to James P. Allison at
j.allison@allison-bass.com.
A further copy is also being served upon Mr. John B. Dahill via facsimile
512.476.5122 this date, per the corrected fax number given by Mr. Dahill’s Office.
/s/ Mark W. Stevens
Mark W. Stevens
5