Valadez, Alvin Jr.

PD-1308-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 11/6/2015 5:34:31 PM Accepted 11/9/2015 4:42:11 PM NO.  PD-­‐1308-­‐15   ABEL ACOSTA CLERK   IN  THE  COURT  OF  CRIMINAL  APPEALS     OF  THE  STATE  OF  TEXAS     AUSTIN,  TEXAS   ____________________________________     ALVIN  VALADEZ,  JR.,                 Appellant,   vs.     THE  STATE  OF  TEXAS,                       Appellee.                            _____________________________________   PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARY  REVIEW  FROM  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS   FOURTH  COURT  OF  APPEALS  DISTRICT,  SAN  ANTONIO,  TEXAS   CAUSE  NUMBER  04-­‐14-­‐00626-­‐CR    ________________________________________   APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARY  REVIEW        ________________________________________     EDWARD  F.  SHAUGHNESSY  III                         Attorney-­‐at-­‐Law                   206  E.  Locust                   San  Antonio,  Texas  78212                   (210)  212-­‐6700                   (210)  212-­‐2178  (fax)                   SBN  18134500                   Shaughnessy727@gmail.com                       November 9, 2015                 Attorney  for  the  Appellant             TABLE  OF  CONTENTS                           PAGE(S)     TABLE  OF  AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………………………....................iii     TABLE  OF  INTERESTED  PARTIES…………………………………………………………………………………...iv     STATEMENT  REGARDING  ORAL  ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………......v     APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARY  REVIEW………………………………….......................6     AUTHORITIES  IN  SUPPORT  OF  APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DICRETIONARY   REVIEW…………………………………………………………………………...................................................................6     NATURE  OF  THE  CASE……………………………………………………………………………………......................6       PROCEDURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  CASE…………………………………………………....…………………….....7       REASONS  FOR  REVIEW………………………………………………………………....………………........................8       GROUND  FOR  REVIEW………………………………………………………....…………………………………………9       ARGUMENT  AND  AUTHORITIES  IN  SUPPORT   OF  THE  GROUND  FOR  REVIEW…………………………...............………………………………….......................9       CONCLUSION  AND  PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………....................13       CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE………………………………………………………………………………..................14       APPENDIX  …………………………………………………………………………………………………....……………..15                                     ii     TABLE  OF  AUTHORITIES     STATE  CASES   Bonds  v.  State,  403  S.W.3d  867  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2013)…………………………………………………………..10     Gibbs  v.  State,  819  S.W.2d  821  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1991)………………………………………………..…………….12     Gordon  v.  State,  801  S.W.2d  899  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1990)………………………………………………………….12     Janecka  v.  State,  739  S.W.2d  813  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1987)……………………………………………….………..12     Jones  v.  State,  568  S.W.3d  847  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1978)…………………………………………………………….10     McFarland  v.  State,  928  S.W.  482  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1996)………………………………………………………..12     State  v.  McLain,  337  S.W.3d  268  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2011)……………………………………………...………….10     State  v.  Streetman,  93  S.W.3d  102  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2002)……………………………………….....……………10     Federal  Cases     Aguilar  v.  Texas,  378  U.S.  108,  84  S.  Ct.  1509  (1964)…………………………………………….  .....................................10       RULES     Art.  38.23,  Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann.  (West  2014)………………………………..……………………………………10     Art.  15.05,  Tex  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann.  (West  2014)………………………………………………….………………..…9,  13     Tex.  Penal  Code  Ann.  §  71.01  (West  2014)…………………………………………………………………………………….11     Tex.  Penal  Code  Ann.  §  71.02(West  2014)……………………………………………………………………………………..11     Rule  66.3  (c),  Tex.  Rule  App.  Proc…..………………………………………………………………………………………………3                     iii     Table  of  Interested  Parties     TRIAL  COUNSEL  FOR  THE  STATE:   Keith  Henneke  &  Steven  DeLemos   Assistant  Criminal  Distric  Attorneys   25th  Judicial  District   211  W.  Court  St.,  Suite  260   Seguin,  Texas  78155     TRIAL  COUNSEL  FOR  APPELANT:     Rolando  Garcia   800  Dolorosa,  No.  101   San  Antonio,  TX  78207     Edward  F.  Shaughnessy,  III   206  E.  Locust     San  Antonio,  TX  78212     APPELLANT’S  ATTORNEY  ON  APPEAL:     Edward  F.  Shaughnessy,  III   206  E.  Locust     San  Antonio,  TX  78212   (210)  212-­‐  6700   (210)  212-­‐2178  (fax)   SBN:  18134500     TRIAL  JUDGE:     W.C  Kirkendall   25th  Judicial  District   Guadalupe  County,  Texas                     iv     STATEMENT  REGARDING  ORAL  ARGUMENT       Counsel   for   the   appellant   would   submit   that   in   the   event   that   this   petition   is   granted,   oral   argument   would   be   warranted   inasmuch   as   the   issue   to   be   resolved   by   this   Court  is  novel  and  worthy  of  oral  argument  on  the  issue  presented.                                                       v     PD-­‐1308-­‐15           ALVIN  VALADEZ,  JR.,         §       IN  THE  COURT  OF         Appellant           §                   vs.           §       CRIMINAL  APPEALS                 THE  STATE  OF  TEXAS,       §                           AUSTIN,  TEXAS,   Appellee         ARGUMENTS  AND  AUTHORITIES  IN  SUPPORT   OF  THE  APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARYREVIEW   OF  CAUSE  NUMBER  0-­‐14-­‐00626-­‐CR     TO  THE  HONORABLE  COURT  OF  CRIMINAL  APPEALS:       NOW   COMES,   Alvin   Valadez   Jr.,   defendant   in   the   trial   Court   and   appellant   in   the   lower   Court,   by   and   through,   Edward   F.   Shaughnessy,   III,   attorney   at   law,   and   offers   the   following   arguments   and   authorities   in   support   of   his   request   that   this   Court   grant   his   request   for   a   Petition   for   Discretionary   Review   in   the   instant   case,   cause   number   PD-­‐1308-­‐ 15.     NATURE  OF  THE  CASE     The   appellant,   Alvin   Valadez,   Jr.,   was   indicted   by   a   Guadalupe   County   grand   jury   for   the   offense   of   Possession   of   a   Controlled   Substance   (Heroin   1   to   4   grams)   (Habitual)   in   cause  number  13-­‐1568-­‐C.  (C.R.-­‐18)  The  appellant  was  tried  by  a  jury  and  convicted  of  the   offense   as   charged   in   the   indictment.     The   appellant   was   subsequently   sentenced,   by   the     6     jury,   to   Life   in   confinement   in   the   Texas   Department   of   Criminal   Justice-­‐Institutional   Division.    (C.R.-­‐64)     Notice  of  appeal  was  subsequently  filed  in  the  trial  Court  and  an  appeal  to  the  Court   of   Appeals   for   the   Fourth   Court   of   Appeals   District   was   pursued.   (C.R.-­‐60)     That   court   affirmed  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  in  a  published  opinion,  authored  by  Justice  Alvarez,   on  September  16,  2015.    This  court  has  granted  the  appellant  an  extension  of  time  to  file   the  instant  petition  until  November  16,  2015.       PROCEDURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  CASE  IN  THE  LOWER  COURT     On  September  16,  2015,  the  San  Antonio  Court  of  Appeals,  in  an  published  opinion,   authored  by  Justice  Alvarez,  affirmed  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  in  all  respects.  Valadez   v.  State,  (No.  04-­‐14-­‐00626-­‐CR,  Tex.  App.-­‐San  Antonio,  September  16,  2015)  (Appendix  A)  The   appellant   subsequently   filed   a   Motion   for   Extension   of   Time   to   File   a   Petition   for   Discretionary   Review   with   the   Court   of   Criminal   Appeals.     That   motion   was   granted,   and   the  appellant  was  granted  an  extension  of  time  to  file  a  Petition  for  Discretionary  Review   until   November   16,   2015.     This   pleading   is   filed   in   compliance   with   this   Court’s   order   granting  that  extension  of  time.    The  appellant  would  submit  that  there  exists  one  ground   for   review   that   warrants   review   by   this   Court.     It   is   urged   by   the   appellant   that   there   exist,   at   a   minimum,   two   distinct   reasons   for   reviewing   the   action   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   for   the   Fourth  Court  of  Appeals  District.       REASONS  FOR  REVIEW     7     A     The  appellant  respectfully  petitions  this  Honorable  Court  to  grant  this  Petition  for   Discretionary  Review  pursuant  to  Rule  66.3  (c),  Tex.  R.    App.  Proc.  which  states  that  one  of   the  non-­‐exclusive  reasons  for  this  Court  to  grant  a  petition  for  discretionary  review  is  that   the  Court  of  Appeals  has  decided  an  important  question  of  state  law  in  a  way  that  conflicts   with  the  applicable  decisions  of  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals.    The  appellant  would   respectfully  submit  that  the  opinion  of  the  Fourth  Court  of  Appeals  is  in  conflict  with  the   applicable  decisions  of  this  Court.   B     The  appellant  respectfully  petitions  this  Honorable  Court  to  grant  this  Petition  for   Discretionary  Review  pursuant  to  Rule  66.3(b),  Tex.  R.  App.  Proc.  which  states  that,  one  of   the  non-­‐exclusive  reasons  for  this  Court  to  grant  a  discretionary  review,  is  that  the  Court  of   Appeals  has  decided  an  important  question  of  state  law  that  has  not  been,  but  should  be,   settled  by  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals.    The  appellant  would  respectfully  submit  that  the   Court  of  Appeals  has  decided  an  important  question  of  state  law  that  has  not  been,  but   should  be  settled  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals.     C.     The  appellant  respectfully  petitions  this  Honorable  Court  to  grant  this  Petition  for   Discretionary  Review  pursuant  to  Rule  66.3(d),  Tex.  R.  App.  Proc.  which  states  that,  one  of   the  non-­‐exclusive  reasons  for  this  Court  to  grant  a  discretionary  review,  is  that  the  Court  of   Appeals  has  misconstrued  a  statute.    The  appellant  would  respectfully  submit  that  the     8     opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  has  misconstrued  a  relevant  provision  of  the  Texas  Code  of   Criminal  Procedure.                                                                               GROUND  FOR  REVIEW       9     THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS  ERRED  IN  HOLDING  THAT   THE  APPELLANT  WAS  ARRESTED  PURSUANT  TO  A   VALID  ARREST  WARRANT  AND  AS  A  CONSEQUENCE   CONTRABAND  FOUND  ON  HIS  PERSON  WAS  LEGALLY   SEIZED  AND  ADMITTED  INTO  EVIDENCE         ARGUMENT  AND  AUTHORITIES   IN  SUPPORT  OF  THE  GROUND   FOR  REVIEW                      STATEMENT  OF  APPLICABLE  FACTS     Prior  to  the  onset  of  the  trial,  the  appellant  caused  to  be  filed  a  written  “Motion  to   Suppress  Evidence”  in  which  he  sought  to  suppress  the  fruits  of  a  search  of  his  person.     Asserted  therein  was  a  claim  that  the  actions  of  law  enforcement  violated  the  Fourth   Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  along  with  Art.  38.23,  Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.   Ann.  (West  2014)  (C.R.-­‐16  )    The  trial  Court  conducted  an  evidentiary  hearing  on  the   motion,  at  the  conclusion  of  which  the  motion  to  suppress  was  denied  and  findings  of  fact   and  conclusions  of  law  were  entered  by  the  trial  Court.           The  trial  court  conducted  a  hearing  on  that  motion  prior  to  trial.    (R.R.2-­‐4  thru  28)     At  the  hearing  it  was  established  that  the  appellant  was  arrested  on  August  28,  2012  by   Officer  David  Camacho  of  the  Guadalupe  County  Sheriff’s  Department.    The  arrest  of  the   appellant  was  executed  by  means  of  an  arrest  warrant  issued  that  same  day  by  a  Justice  of   the  Peace  for  Guadalupe  County,  alleging  that  the  appellant  had  committed  the  offense  of   Engaging  in  Organized  Criminal  Activity.1    Camacho  related  that  after  verifying  the  validity                                                                                                                             1 The Warrant Of Arrest was admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress as State’s exhibit 1. The supporting complaint/affidavit was admitted into evidence as State’s exhibit 2.   10     of  the  warrant,  he  along  with  a  fellow  officer,  went  to  the  home  of  the  appellant  in  Seguin.     After  locating  the  appellant,  Camacho  conducted  a  “search  incident  to  arrest”  which   resulted  in  the  discovery  and  seizure  of  the  four  balloons  of  heroin  that  formed  the  basis   for  the  appellant’s  indictment.    (R.R.2-­‐12,  13)    Camacho  also  related  that  he  had  no  reason   to  believe  that  the  arrest  warrant  that  formed  the  basis  for  the  appellant’s  arrest  and   subsequent  search  was  lacking  in  probable  cause.2  (R.R.12)     The  warrant  in  question  authorized  the  appellant’s  arrest  for  the  offense  of  “Engage   in  Organized  Criminal  Activity”.      The  warrant  was  supported  by  a  five-­‐page   affidavit/complaint  presented  to  the  magistrate  by  Clint  Halbardier,  of  the  Seguin  Police   Department.    That  affidavit  purported  to  present  a  case  establishing  probable  cause  to   believe  that  six  named  individuals3  had  committed  the  offense  of  Organized  Criminal   Activity  by  committing  the  offense  of  Aggravated  Assault  against  Roberto  Herrera  while   committing  the  assault  in  concert  of  three  or  more  individuals.  4       The  Halbardier  affidavit  went  on  to  detail  an  investigation  conducted  by  members  of   the  Seguin  Police  department  regarding  an  alleged  assault  committed  against  Roberto   Herrera  on  August  26,  2012.    In  support  of  the  allegations  in  the  affidavit  Halbardier  relied   in  substantial  part  on  information  provided  by  four  “unnamed  witnesses”  who  allegedly   witnessed  the  assault  in  question,  or  were  privy  to  certain  circumstantial  evidence  relating   to  the  assault  and  the  alleged  perpetrators  thereof.    The  affidavit  in  question  contains  a   number  a  number  of  assertions  regarding  the  behavior  of  the  other  five  suspects  named  in                                                                                                                             2 Camacho did not relate what the warrant and underlying affidavit/compliant established vis-à- vis probable cause in terms of an offense. 3 The individuals named were as follows: Danny Ramon Gonzales, Roy Martinez, Alvin Valadez (the appellant), Christopher Lopez, Ezekiel Longoria, and Abel Lomas. 4 See: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(a)(1) (West 2014)   11     the  affidavit.    With  respect  to  the  assertions  in  the  affidavit  that  relate  to  the  acts  of  the   appellant  there  are  four  assertions     contained  in  the  affidavit  that  purport  to  establish  probable  cause  to  believe  that  the   appellant  had  committed  the  offense  in  question.    They  are  as  follows:         1)  UW35  stated  that  (the  appellant)  showed  up  after                at  his  residence  after  the  assault  and  threatened                                                UW3.    UW3  also  asserted  that  the  Valadez  threatened                UW3  not  to  tell  anything  to  tell  the  police  anything                about  the  assault;         2)  UW46  purportedly  informed  the  affiant  that  the  appellant                had  made  threats  to  UW4;         3)  Halbardier  also  asserted  that  the  appellant  was  a                              “documented”  member  of  the  Mexican  Mafia;         4)  Halbadier  also  included  a  non-­‐factual  conclusion                                    that  the  appellant  “is  acting  in  concert  with  the  other                    suspects  in  trying  to  threaten  witnesses  not  to  give              their  testimony  to  police  and  to  help  avoid  prosecution              for  the  aggravated  assault  of  the  victim”.       No  other  factual  assertions  contained  in  the  Halbardier  affidavit  relate  to  acts   attributed  to  the  appellant  before,  during,  or  after  the  alleged  assault  against  Roberto   Herrera.       Following  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing  the  trial  Court  denied  the  appellant’s  motion   to  suppress  the  evidence.    (R.R.2-­‐27)  Prior  to  the  onset  of  the  trial,  the  trial  court  made   findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law.    Those  consist  of  the  following:         The  defendant  was  arrested  on  a  warrant  issued         on  August  28th,  2012  by  Justice  of  the  Peace  Precinct         Four,  Guadalupe  County,  based  on  a  probable  cause         affidavit  submitted  by  Detective  Clint  Halbardier.                                                                                                                             5 The affiant described UW3 as a gainfully employed Texas resident with acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia. 6 The affiant described UW4 as a resident of Seguin with no criminal history.   12             The  probable  cause  affidavit  for  said  warrant           contained  information  that  established  probable         cause  for  (the  appellant)  to  be  charged  with  various         offenses,  including  conspiracy  to  commit  aggravated         assault,  aggravated  assault,  aggravated  assault  as  a           party  to  that  offense,  organized  criminal  activity  to         commit  aggravated  assault,  obstruction  or  retaliation,         and  even  possibly  tampering  with  witnesses.                   Because  such  probable  cause  was  established  for  each         offense,  the  Justice  of  the  Peace  could  have  issued  the         warrant  naming  any  of  those  felony  offenses.           The  arresting  officers  were  acting  in  good  faith                 reliance  on  the  warrant.    Even  if  the  probable  cause           was  inadequate  for  organized  criminal  activity,         probable  cause  was  established  for  other  felony         offenses.  (R.R.5-­‐18,  19)       ARGUMENT  IN  THE  LOWER  COURTS       In  the  trial  Court  the  appellant  asserted  that  the  arrest  warrant,  that  formed  the   legal  foundation  for  his  arrest  and  the  subsequent  search  of  his  person,  was  illegal  in  that  it   failed  to  demonstrate  “probable  cause”  to  warrant  a  belief  by  the  issuing  magistrate  that   the  appellant  had  committed  the  offense  of  Organized  Criminal  Activity.    That  argument   formed  the  basis  of  the  appellant’s  sole  point  of  error  in  his  appeal  to  the  San  Antonio  Court   of  Appeals.         The  appellant’s  sole  point  of  error  was  overruled  and  the  appellant’s  conviction  and   sentence  were  affirmed  in  all  respects.   HOLDING  OF  THE  LOWER  COURT       The  lower  Court  reasoned  as  follows:  “In  viewing  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  in   a  common  sense  and  realistic  manner,  we  conclude  the  magistrate  had  a  substantial  basis   for  concluding  that  probable  cause  was  shown  to  issue  the  arrest  warrant  against  Valadez.   …  The  affidavit  provided  sufficient  facts  that,  together  with  reasonable  inferences     13     therefrom,  provided  a  “fair  probability”  or  “substantial  chance”  that  Valadez  was  engaged   in  organized  criminal  activity.”  Valadez  v.  State,  supra,  at  slip  op.  pg.  12.     The  appellant  respectfully  submits  that  the  holding  of  the  Court  below  is  in  conflict   with  the  applicable  opinions  from  this  Court  with  respect  to  what  constitutes  “probable   cause”  for  an  arrest.    The  appellant  also  would  submit  that  what  constitutes  “probable   cause”  to  issue  an  arrest  warrant  for  the  offense  of  Engaging  in  Organized  Criminal  Activity   has  never  been  addressed  by  this  Court  and  as  a  result  an  important  question  of  state  law  is   presented  by  the  instant  case  and  review  of  that  issue  by  this  Court  is  warranted.    Lastly,   the  opinion  of  the  Court  below  appears  to  misconstrue  the  statutory  provision  mandating   that  an  arrest  warrant  must  contain  information  that  demonstrates  that  the  accused  has   committed  some  offense  against  the  laws  of  the  State,  either  directly  or  that  the  affiant  has   good  reason  to  believe  ,  and  does  believe,  that  the  accused  has  committed  such  offense.  See:   Art.  15.05,  Tex  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann.  (West  2014).    These  three  contentions  will  be   addressed  hereinafter  in  the  order  set  forth  above.           I     With  respect  to  what  constitutes  “probable  cause”  this  Court  has  stated  on  a  number   of  occasions  that  “probable  cause”  exists  when  the  affidavit/complaint  provides  the  issuing   magistrate  with  sufficient  information  to  support  an  independent  judgment  that  probable   exists  for  the  warrant.  Jones  v.  State,  568  S.W.3d  847  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1978).    The     14     establishment  of  probable  cause  mandates  that  an  affidavit  in  support  of  an  arrest  warrant   contain  facts  and  circumstances  within  the  affiant’s  knowledge  and  of  which  he  has   reasonably  trustworthy  information,  sufficient  to  warrant  a  prudent  person  to  believe  that   the  subject  of  the  arrest  warrant  has  committed  an  offense.    State  v.  Streetman,  93  S.W.3d   102  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2002).    In  the  case  of  an  arrest  warrant,  such  as  in  the  instant  case,  the   issuing  magistrate,  and  the  reviewing  trial  judge  are  limited  to  the  contents  of  the  affidavit   in  support  of  the  warrant/complaint.    Aguilar  v.  Texas,  378  U.S.  108,  84  S.Ct.  1509  (1964);   State  v.  McLain,  337  S.W.3d  268  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2011).  In  a  case  involving  a  warrant,  and  the   underlying  affidavit,  there  are  no  credibility  issues  to  take  into  account  hence  an  appellate   court  is  to  employ  the  de  novo  standard  of  review  in  passing  on  the  propriety  of  trial  court’s   ruling.  See:  Bonds  v.  State,  403  S.W.3d  867  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2013).       The  opinion  of  the  Court  below  recognized  these  concepts  in  the  course  of  its  review   of  the  trial  Court’s  ruling.    Nevertheless,  it  is  and  was  the  appellant’s  contention  that  even  in   reviewing  the  affidavit  in  a  “common  sense”  manner  as  opposed  to  a  “hypertechnical”   manner  the  four  corners  of  the  affidavit  in  dispute  wholly  fail  to  support  a  finding  by  a   reasonably  prudent  person  that  the  appellant  had  committed  the  offense  of  Engaging  in   Organized  Crime.       The  offense  of  Engaging  in  Organized  Activity  is  defined  in  a  highly  circumscribed   manner,  and  is  limited  in  its  scope.    It  requires  proof  that  the  accused  as  a  member  of  a   criminal  street  gang  committed  or  conspired  to  commit…  aggravated  assault.  See:  Tex.   Penal  Code  Ann.  §§  71.01(d)  &  71.02(a)(1)  (West  2014).  In  the  context  of  the  instant  case,  a   valid  warrant  for  the  named  offense  would  necessitate  factual  assertions,  within  the  four   corners  of  the  affidavit,  that  the  subject  of  the  warrant  that  the  named  suspect  had  acted  as     15     a  member  of  a  criminal  street  gang.7    It  would  also  necessitate  factual  assertions,  within  the   four  corners  of  the  affidavit,  that  the  suspect  person  had  committed  the  offense  of   aggravated  assault8.  Those  are  the  elements  of  the  offense  for  which  the  instant  warrant   was  issued  and  the  arrest  was  perfected.         It  is  the  contention  of  the  appellant  that  the  affidavit  is  question  is  wholly  devoid  of   any  facts  that  would  support  a  finding  by  the  issuing  magistrate  that  the  named  suspect   (the  appellant),  acting  as  a  member  of  a  criminal  street  gang,  as  defined,  had  committed   aggravated  assault  on  the  person  of  Roberto  Machado  Herrera.    The  entirety  of  the  affidavit   in  question  reflects  nothing  more  than  actions  by  the  appellant  after  the  fact.    There  are  no   facts  contained  within  the  four  corners  of  the  affidavit  that  so  much  as  suggest  that  the   appellant  assaulted  the  complainant  or  that  he  aided,  abetted  or  assisted  the  actors  named   in  the  affidavit.    The  implications  contained  in  the  affidavit  suggest  nothing  more  than  the   appellant  acquired  knowledge  of  the  event  in  question  after  the  fact  and  sought  to  assist   the  named  actors  avoid  apprehension  and  or  prosecution.  This  is  a  far  cry  from  presenting   facts  to  the  issuing  magistrate  that  would  support  a  reasonable  belief  that  the  appellant  had   participated  in  the  assault  in  any  fashion.       By  finding  to  the  contrary,  the  court  below  has  issued  an  opinion  that  is  in  conflict   with  the  holdings  of  this  Court  on  the  issue  of  what  constitutes  probable  cause  for  an  arrest   warrant.    See:  McFarland  v.  State,  928  S.W.  482  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1996);  Gibbs  v.  State,  819                                                                                                                             7 “Three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.01(d), supra. 8 The affidavit in dispute did not assert that the facts supported an arrest warrant on the grounds that the appellant had conspired to commit the offense of aggravated assault as a member of a criminal street gang. (State’s exhibit 3, pg. 2)   16     S.W.2d  821  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1991);  Gordon  v.  State,  801  S.W.2d  899  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1990);   Janecka  v.  State,  739  S.W.2d  813  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1987).     The  opinion  of  the  lower  court  is  in  conflict  with  the  applicable  holdings  of  this  court   on  the  question  of  what  constitutes  a  valid  affidavit  in  support  of  an  arrest  warrant.     Review  of  the  holding  of  the  lower  court  is  warranted.   II     The  appellant  would  also  submit  to  this  court  that  the  question  of  what  constitutes  a   valid  and  sufficient  affidavit  to  warrant  the  issuance  of  an  arrest  warrant  for  the  offense  of   Engaging  in  Organized  Crime  has  never  been  addressed  by  this  court  in  any  fashion,     Consequently,  this  case  presents  an  important  question  of  State  law,  that  has  not  been,  but   should  be  decided  by  this  court.    Review  of  the  holding  of  the  lower  court  is  warranted.   III     Lastly  the  appellant  would  submit  that  the  holding  of  the  lower  court  has   misconstrued  the  statute  that  governs  the  sufficiency  of  arrest  warrants.    More  specifically   the  appellant  would  submit  that  the  opinion  of  the  lower  court  has  misconstrued  Art.  15.05   (2),  Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  ann.  (West  2014)  which  sets  forth  the  statutory  requirements  for  a   valid  affidavit  in  support  of  an  arrest  warrant.9    The  opinion  of  the  lower  court  has   misconstrued  that  provision.    Review  of  the  holding  of  the  lower  court  is  warranted.                                                                                                                                 9 The complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it have these substantial requisites:…. It must show that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of the State, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and does believe that the accused has committed such offense.   17     CONCLUSION  AND  PRAYER   It  is  respectfully  requested,  by  the  appellant  that  a  petition  for  discretionary  review   to  the  Fourth  Court  of  Appeals  be  granted  and  that  the  case  be  briefed  on  the  merits  of  the   appellant’s  ground  for  review  with  argument  to  follow.   Respectfully  submitted,     /s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III     EDWARD  F.  SHAUGHNESSY,  III   Attorney  at  Law   206  E.  Locust   San  Antonio,  Texas  78212   (210)  212-­‐6700   (210)  212-­‐2178  (fax)   SBN  18134500   Attorney  for  the  appellant                                           18           CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE     I,  Edward  F.  Shaughnessy,  III.,  certify  that  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  petition  was   mailed  to  Heather  McMinn,  District  Attorney,  25th  Judicial  District,  211  W.  Court  Street,   Suite  260,  Seguin,  Texas  78155,  on  this  the  _6_  day  of  November,  2015.   /s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III                                 CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE     I,  Edward  F.  Shaughnessy,  III  certify  that  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  petition  was  mailed   to  the  office  of  the  State  Prosecuting  Attorney,  P.O.  Box  78711,  Austin,  Texas  78711,  on  this   the  _6_  day  of  November,  2015.   /s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III     CERTIFICATE  OF  COMPLIANCE     I,  Edward  F.  Shaughnessy,  III,  attorney  for  the  appellant  hereby  certify  that  the   instant  pleading  contains  3624  words,  exclusive  of  the  appendix.   /s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III         19     APPENDIX                         20     Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas OPINION No. 04-14-00626-CR Alvin VALADEZ Jr., Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 13-1568-CR-C Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 16, 2015 AFFIRMED This case arises from the conviction of Appellant Alvin Valadez Jr. for felony possession of a controlled substance. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Valadez was convicted by a jury. Valadez entered a plea of true to the State’s allegations regarding prior consecutive felony convictions and the jury assessed punishment at life confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In his sole issue on appeal, Valadez argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the complaint supporting the arrest warrant failed to demonstrate 04-14-00626-CR probable cause he committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Factual Background 1. Valadez’s Arrest On August 28, 2012, a Guadalupe County justice of the peace signed an arrest warrant authorizing the arrest of Alvin Valadez Jr. for the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. The warrant was supported by a complaint asserting Valadez and five other individuals committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity with the underlying offense being the aggravated assault of Roberto Machado Herrera Jr. 2. Arrest Warrant Seguin Police Department Detective Clinton Halbardier signed the five-page complaint 1 based on his investigation and that of the Seguin Police Department. In his application, Detective Halbardier reported he relied on statements provided by four unnamed informants who directly witnessed the assault in question or were privy to certain circumstantial evidence relating to the assault. Detective Halbardier further averred that he believed these witnesses to be credible and the magistrate could rely on them. He cited interviews with the victim, previous investigations of the listed suspects, and Seguin Police Department offense reports and supplemental reports. Detective Halbardier’s complaint asserted that on August 26, 2012, Herrera was approached by five or six men who questioned him about his gang affiliation. After Herrera informed the group he was part of the “Orejones,” the group asserted they were the “EME” or the “Merecido,” common names for the Mexican Mafia. The group further instructed Herrera that he 1 We note Detective Halbardier is the complainant on the application of the arrest warrant. His statement is sworn before the magistrate. The terms complaint and affidavit are, therefore, used interchangeably in this opinion. -2- 04-14-00626-CR should deny being a member of the Orejones because he was in Merecido territory. As Herrera exited his vehicle, one of the individuals waived his arm and Herrera was attacked from behind with a knife. Herrera was stabbed and beaten. Detective Halbardier averred that all six suspects, including Valadez, were confirmed to be active gang members. The officer outlined Valadez’s affiliation as “a documented Mexican Mafia gang member” and a “lieutenant with the Mexican Mafia,” based on national and state database information searches. Detective Halbardier also relied on the statements of four witnesses who asked to be unnamed in the complaint for “personal safety and security reasons.” Two of the witnesses were gainfully employed, had previously provided credible information, and had acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia. The third witness was present during the assault and his statement corroborated Herrera’s statements, and the final witness had no criminal history. Two of the four witnesses reported being threatened not to tell officers about the assault. Additionally, several of the informants reported the assault stemmed from suspicions that Herrera stole drugs from Valadez. Detective Halbardier’s complaint concluded, considering all of the known facts and the current information provided by the witnesses, [Valadez] has been named multiple times in the past as the leader of the Mexican Mafia in Seguin. [Valadez] is acting in concert with the other suspects in trying to threaten witnesses not to give their testimony to police and to help avoid prosecution for the aggravated assault on the victim. A Guadalupe County justice of the peace issued the arrest warrant that same day, authorizing the arrest of Valadez for the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. After locating and securing Valadez, Guadalupe County Sheriff’s Office Investigator David Camacho executed the arrest warrant and conducted a search incident to arrest. During the search, Investigator Camacho discovered four balloons of heroin in Valadez’s pocket. -3- 04-14-00626-CR B. Hearing on the Motion to Suppress the Arrest Warrant On August 20, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Valadez’s motion to suppress the arrest warrant based on the complaint’s failure to establish probable cause. Investigator Camacho testified that on August 28, 2012, he traveled to Valadez’s residence to arrest Valadez. Investigator Camacho was familiar with Valadez and positively identified Valadez at his residence; after a short scuffle, Valadez was taken into custody without further incident. The officer conducted a search incident to arrest and located four balloons of heroin in Valadez’s pocket. Detective Halbardier described the overall structure of the Mexican Mafia and that lieutenants were generally in charge of day-to-day operations in a specific city or county. He also relayed the Mexican Mafia was known for engaging in both sanctioned and unsanctioned assaults. Detective Halbardier testified that, in his opinion, the assault on Herrera was a sanctioned assault by Valadez. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Valadez’s motion to suppress the evidence but did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law at that time. The case was called before a jury on August 25, 2014. After both sides rested and closed their cases, but prior to closing arguments, the trial court stated, on the record, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. [Valadez] was arrested on a warrant issued on August 28th, 2012, by Justice of the Peace Precinct Four, Guadalupe County, based on a probable cause [complaint] submitted by Detective Clint Halbardier. The probable cause [complaint] for said warrant contained information which established probable cause for Alvin Valadez, Jr., to be charged with various offenses, including conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, aggravated assault as a party to that offense, organized criminal activity to commit aggravated assault, obstruction or retaliation, and even possibly tampering with witnesses. Because such probable cause was established for each offense, the Justice of the Peace could’ve issued the warrant naming any of those felony offenses. -4- 04-14-00626-CR The arresting officers were acting in good faith reliance on the warrant. Even if the probable cause was inadequate for organized criminal activity, probable cause was established for other felony offenses. See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient if they are “recorded in some way, whether written out and filed by the trial court, or stated on the record at the hearing”). In his sole issue on appeal, Valadez argues that because the complaint supporting the arrest warrant failed to demonstrate probable cause that Valadez committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity, the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the arrest warrant. SUPPRESSION OF ARREST WARRANT A. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress on a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that depend on credibility choices; we review the court’s application of the law de novo. See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Because we look only within the four corners of the complaint to determine whether probable cause to issue a warrant exists, the trial court is not required to make any credibility choices in inspecting the affidavit. Robuck v. State, 40 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet ref’d). We note this case involves not only the trial court’s determination of probable cause, but also the underlying question of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. In doing so, we use a substantial basis standard of review based on the totality of the circumstances presented to the magistrate. See Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (applying Illinois v. -5- 04-14-00626-CR Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236–39 (1983). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld if there is any valid theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not base its decision on that theory. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). B. Argument of the Parties Valadez contends that because the State failed to demonstrate the arrest warrant was supported by a complaint demonstrating probable cause to arrest on the charge of engaging in organized criminal activity, the trial court erred in denying Valadez’s motion to suppress. Valadez argues that the warrant was devoid of the facts necessary to support a magistrate’s independent judgment that probable cause existed that either Valadez, “or any other named suspects, acted with the intent to establish maintain or participate in the profits of a combination or a criminal street gang.” The State counters that the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause for the offense because the issuing magistrate could reasonably infer that Valadez had conspired with other members of the Mexican Mafia to commit an aggravated assault against Herrera. C. Probable Cause to Support Issuance of the Warrant “An arrest warrant affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to support an independent determination that probable cause exists to believe that the accused has committed a crime.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Gurrusqueita v. State, 244 S.W.3d 450, 452 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). We must, therefore, determine whether the probable cause affidavit in question provided the magistrate with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause existed to issue a warrant for Valadez’s arrest. Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). -6- 04-14-00626-CR 1. Totality of the Circumstances A reviewing court’s assessment of the affidavit’s sufficiency is limited to “a reasonable reading” within the four corners of the affidavit while simultaneously recognizing the magistrate’s discretion to draw reasonable inferences. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); State v. Coker, 406 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d). The magistrate’s probable-cause determination must be upheld if the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of a crime. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). Probable cause requires the affiant to demonstrate there is a probability that the accused committed an offense, not that the evidence proves the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moss v. State, 75 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d). “This is a flexible, nondemanding standard.” Coker, 406 S.W.3d at 396 (citing Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354). A magistrate is enabled to draw reasonable, common-sense inferences from the facts and circumstances contained in the affidavit; however, a magistrate may not merely rubber stamp the bare conclusions of others. See also Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354, Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61. Our review focuses on the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued “to ensure . . . an abdication of the magistrate’s duty does not occur.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Our review must remain realistic and not hyper-technical and we “must uphold the magistrate’s decision so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354; accord State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). An appellate court’s focus cannot be on what other facts “could or should have been included in the affidavit,” but rather must be “on the combined logical force of facts that actually are in the affidavit.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354–55; accord Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 60. The affiant’s reliability, as well as the reliability of his sources, are part of the totality of the -7- 04-14-00626-CR circumstances that the magistrate should evaluate in making a probable-cause determination. See Coker, 406 S.W.3d at 396. We thus turn to the circumstances set out within the four corners of the probable cause affidavit before us. 2. Charge Contained within the Arrest Warrant The complaint alleged that Valadez, on or about the 26th through 27th day of August, 2012, in Guadalupe County, Texas, did then and there commit the offense of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity—Aggravated Assault by intentionally and knowingly causing serious bodily injury to the victim, Roberto Machado Herrera Jr., by punching, kicking and stabbing with a knife or lethal cutting instrument, while committing the act in concert of three or more individuals, against the laws of the State. Detective Halbardier’s affidavit averred that he relied on (1) the Seguin Police Department offense report and supplements, (2) multiple offense investigations involving several of the named suspects, (3) multiple witness interviews, (4) suspect interviews, (5) interviews of other involved persons, and (6) his personal observations. We first address Detective Halbardier’s reliance on unnamed informants. 3. Affidavit’s Reliance On Unnamed Informants “With regard to an informant’s tips, we take into account the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge to determine the value of his assertions, as well as whether his information is stale.” Rivas v. State, 446 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g)). “Corroboration of the details of an informant’s tip through independent police investigation can also be relevant in the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.” Davis, 144 S.W.3d at 197 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–42). The affidavit must also set forth the basis upon which the officer formed the underlying “belief in an informant’s credibility and -8- 04-14-00626-CR veracity.” Id. “‘[A] deficiency in one may be compensated . . . by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability,’ all of which are relevant considerations under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Gates, U.S. at 233). “While information from an unnamed informant alone does not establish probable cause, the informant’s tip combined with an independent police investigation may provide a substantial basis for the probable-cause finding.” Cf. Lowery v. State, 843 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d); Serrano v. State, 123 S.W.3d 53, 62–63 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet ref’d). The unnamed informant’s credibility may be established by allegations that the informant has proven reliable on previous occasions. Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 726 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). “This reliability may be established by the general assertions of the affiant, as stated in the affidavit, concerning the informant’s prior reliability.” Id. Here, Detective Halbardier indicated he relied on four different unnamed witnesses. The first had “acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia and knows the details of the gang”; the second was present when the assault occurred and corroborated the victim’s description of the assault; the third is gainfully employed and has acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia; and the fourth was a resident of Seguin with no criminal history. Detective Halbardier further opined, “I believe the unnamed witnesses are credible and that I and any magistrate can rely on their information in the matters such as these.” Although the third and fourth informants cannot be characterized as eyewitnesses of the assault, both gave first-hand accounts of Valadez’s tactics. Detective Halbardier knew who the informants were and could hold them accountable for their statements and was able to establish each informant’s inherent reliability or basis of knowledge. Additionally, each of the witnesses provided their statements directly to the police, rather than placing an anonymous call or tip, and were unnamed for the sake of their safety. See Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). -9- 04-14-00626-CR 4. Other Information Relied upon by the Officer Information “of unknown reliability must be coupled with facts from which an inference may be drawn that the informant is credible.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 357. However, when the affidavit contains information given by an informant or eyewitness, the affidavit is sufficient if the information adequately suggests direct knowledge on his or her part. Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 894 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d) (“if the named informant is a private citizen whose only contact with the police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act . . . the credibility and reliability of the informant is inherent”). Detective Halbardier relied on another officer’s interview of the victim taken at the hospital. In Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 156 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that “[o]bservations reported to the affiant by other officers engaged in the investigation can constitute a reliable basis for issuing a warrant.” a. Victim’s Statement Herrera told Seguin Police Detective Jaime Diaz that he was with two other individuals when they drove by a party and one of his friends began talking to Ezekiel Longoria, one of the named conspirators. Longoria asked Herrera “what gang he belonged to,” and Herrera replied “Orejones.” When Herrera exited the vehicle, Longoria waived his hand and two other individuals attacked Herrera from behind. Herrera stated “approximately five to six males were assaulting at one time.” The informant also told Detective Diaz the assault was “set up” because Herrera was suspected of stealing narcotics that belonged to Valadez. This statement was corroborated by the third informant’s report that two of the individuals that attacked Herrera, including Valadez, threatened the informant to “keep his mouth shut.” See Davila v. State, No. AP-76,105, 2011 WL 303265, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2011) (not designated for publication) (relying on - 10 - 04-14-00626-CR eyewitness identification of the shooter as support for the arrest warrant); State v. Ozuna, 88 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d). b. National and State Databases and other Officers’ Reports Detective Halbardier confirmed with local, state, and federal officers and with national and state databases that Valdez was a lieutenant with the Mexican Mafia. During the past several months of investigating multiple violent gang-related offenses, working with several Local, State, and Federal officers, it has been confirmed that all of [these] six individuals are active gang members. Detective Halbardier also testified he relied on reports from the Seguin Police Department. The information contained in the affidavit may be based on either direct personal observations of the affiant or on hearsay information. Belton, 900 S.W.2d at 893. In Belton, the appellant claimed that because the affidavit in question reflected no personal knowledge on the part of the affiant, the arrest warrant lacked probable cause. Id. at 894. The court rejected this argument, noting that the affidavit contained a statement that the affiant possessed police reports and sworn statements, as well as information from a witness who had actual knowledge concerning appellant’s participation in a crime. Id. Because Detective Halbardier read the Seguin Police Department offense report and supplements, investigated multiple offenses involving several of the named suspects, and interviewed multiple witnesses, suspects, and other involved persons, his personal observations meet the low threshold illustrated in Belton. Id.; see also Kolbert v. State, 644 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.). Corroboration means, that in light of the circumstances, the officer confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude the information provided is reliable. See State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). We therefore conclude that Detective Halbardier - 11 - 04-14-00626-CR was entitled to rely on the information provided to him by other officers’ investigations and thus entitled to rely upon the information provided by the victim and the unnamed informants. CONCLUSION In viewing the totality of the circumstances in a common sense and realistic manner, we conclude the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause was shown to issue the arrest warrant against Valadez. The officers obtained information from several unnamed informants that corroborated the victim’s statement as well and the information provided by other state, local, and national agencies. Given Detective Halbardier’s training and the stated credibility of the unnamed informants, the magistrate could reasonably infer that Valadez was tied to the assault on Herrera. The affidavit provided sufficient facts that, together with reasonable inferences therefrom, provided a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” that Valadez was engaged in organized criminal activity. See Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702; Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying Valadez’s motion to suppress his arrest warrant. 2 Having overruled Valadez’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice PUBLISH 2 Because we conclude the magistrate had probable cause to issue the arrest warrant based on the allegations that Valadez engaged in organized criminal activity in the assault of Herrera, we need not address Investigator Camacho’s good faith exception. - 12 -