Valadez, Alvin Jr.

PD-1308-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 11/6/2015 5:34:31 PM
Accepted 11/9/2015 4:42:11 PM
NO.
 PD-­‐1308-­‐15
  ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK

IN
 THE
 COURT
 OF
 CRIMINAL
 APPEALS

  OF
 THE
 STATE
 OF
 TEXAS

AUSTIN,
 TEXAS

____________________________________

ALVIN
 VALADEZ,
 JR.,

  Appellant,

vs.

THE
 STATE
 OF
 TEXAS,

  Appellee.

 _____________________________________

PETITION
 FOR
 DISCRETIONARY
 REVIEW
 FROM
 THE
 COURT
 OF
 APPEALS

FOURTH
 COURT
 OF
 APPEALS
 DISTRICT,
 SAN
 ANTONIO,
 TEXAS

CAUSE
 NUMBER
 04-­‐14-­‐00626-­‐CR

 ________________________________________

APPELLANT’S
 PETITION
 FOR
 DISCRETIONARY
 REVIEW

 ________________________________________

EDWARD
 F.
 SHAUGHNESSY
 III

  Attorney-­‐at-­‐Law

  206
 E.
 Locust

  San
 Antonio,
 Texas
 78212

  (210)
 212-­‐6700

  (210)
 212-­‐2178
 (fax)

  SBN
 18134500

  Shaughnessy727@gmail.com

  November 9, 2015

  Attorney
 for
 the
 Appellant

 TABLE
 OF
 CONTENTS

  PAGE(S)

TABLE
 OF
 AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………………………....................iii

TABLE
 OF
 INTERESTED
 PARTIES…………………………………………………………………………………...iv

STATEMENT
 REGARDING
 ORAL
 ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………......v

APPELLANT’S
 PETITION
 FOR
 DISCRETIONARY
 REVIEW………………………………….......................6

AUTHORITIES
 IN
 SUPPORT
 OF
 APPELLANT’S
 PETITION
 FOR
 DICRETIONARY

REVIEW…………………………………………………………………………...................................................................6

NATURE
 OF
 THE
 CASE……………………………………………………………………………………......................6

PROCEDURAL
 HISTORY
 OF
 THE
 CASE…………………………………………………....…………………….....7

REASONS
 FOR
 REVIEW………………………………………………………………....………………........................8

GROUND
 FOR
 REVIEW………………………………………………………....…………………………………………9

ARGUMENT
 AND
 AUTHORITIES
 IN
 SUPPORT

OF
 THE
 GROUND
 FOR
 REVIEW…………………………...............………………………………….......................9

CONCLUSION
 AND
 PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………....................13

CERTIFICATE
 OF
 SERVICE………………………………………………………………………………..................14

APPENDIX
 …………………………………………………………………………………………………....……………..15

  ii

 TABLE
 OF
 AUTHORITIES

STATE
 CASES

Bonds
 v.
 State,
 403
 S.W.3d
 867
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 2013)…………………………………………………………..10

Gibbs
 v.
 State,
 819
 S.W.2d
 821
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1991)………………………………………………..…………….12

Gordon
 v.
 State,
 801
 S.W.2d
 899
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1990)………………………………………………………….12

Janecka
 v.
 State,
 739
 S.W.2d
 813
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1987)……………………………………………….………..12

Jones
 v.
 State,
 568
 S.W.3d
 847
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1978)…………………………………………………………….10

McFarland
 v.
 State,
 928
 S.W.
 482
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1996)………………………………………………………..12

State
 v.
 McLain,
 337
 S.W.3d
 268
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 2011)……………………………………………...………….10

State
 v.
 Streetman,
 93
 S.W.3d
 102
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 2002)……………………………………….....……………10

Federal
 Cases

Aguilar
 v.
 Texas,
 378
 U.S.
 108,
 84
 S.
 Ct.
 1509
 (1964)…………………………………………….
 .....................................10

RULES

Art.
 38.23,
 Tex.
 Code
 Crim.
 Proc.
 Ann.
 (West
 2014)………………………………..……………………………………10

Art.
 15.05,
 Tex
 Code
 Crim.
 Proc.
 Ann.
 (West
 2014)………………………………………………….………………..…9,
 13

Tex.
 Penal
 Code
 Ann.
 §
 71.01
 (West
 2014)…………………………………………………………………………………….11

Tex.
 Penal
 Code
 Ann.
 §
 71.02(West
 2014)……………………………………………………………………………………..11

Rule
 66.3
 (c),
 Tex.
 Rule
 App.
 Proc…..………………………………………………………………………………………………3

  iii

 Table
 of
 Interested
 Parties

TRIAL
 COUNSEL
 FOR
 THE
 STATE:

Keith
 Henneke
 &
 Steven
 DeLemos

Assistant
 Criminal
 Distric
 Attorneys

25th
 Judicial
 District

211
 W.
 Court
 St.,
 Suite
 260

Seguin,
 Texas
 78155

TRIAL
 COUNSEL
 FOR
 APPELANT:

Rolando
 Garcia

800
 Dolorosa,
 No.
 101

San
 Antonio,
 TX
 78207

Edward
 F.
 Shaughnessy,
 III

206
 E.
 Locust

San
 Antonio,
 TX
 78212

APPELLANT’S
 ATTORNEY
 ON
 APPEAL:

Edward
 F.
 Shaughnessy,
 III

206
 E.
 Locust

San
 Antonio,
 TX
 78212

(210)
 212-­‐
 6700

(210)
 212-­‐2178
 (fax)

SBN:
 18134500

TRIAL
 JUDGE:

W.C
 Kirkendall

25th
 Judicial
 District

Guadalupe
 County,
 Texas

  iv

 STATEMENT
 REGARDING
 ORAL
 ARGUMENT

  Counsel
  for
  the
  appellant
  would
  submit
  that
  in
  the
  event
  that
  this
  petition
  is

granted,
  oral
  argument
  would
  be
  warranted
  inasmuch
  as
  the
  issue
  to
  be
  resolved
  by
  this

Court
 is
 novel
 and
 worthy
 of
 oral
 argument
 on
 the
 issue
 presented.

  v

 PD-­‐1308-­‐15

ALVIN
 VALADEZ,
 JR.,

  §

  IN
 THE
 COURT
 OF

Appellant

  §

  vs.

  §

  CRIMINAL
 APPEALS

THE
 STATE
 OF
 TEXAS,

  §

  AUSTIN,
 TEXAS,

Appellee

ARGUMENTS
 AND
 AUTHORITIES
 IN
 SUPPORT

OF
 THE
 APPELLANT’S
 PETITION
 FOR
 DISCRETIONARYREVIEW

OF
 CAUSE
 NUMBER
 0-­‐14-­‐00626-­‐CR

TO
 THE
 HONORABLE
 COURT
 OF
 CRIMINAL
 APPEALS:

  NOW
  COMES,
  Alvin
  Valadez
  Jr.,
  defendant
  in
  the
  trial
  Court
  and
  appellant
  in
  the

lower
  Court,
  by
  and
  through,
  Edward
  F.
  Shaughnessy,
  III,
  attorney
  at
  law,
  and
  offers
  the

following
  arguments
  and
  authorities
  in
  support
  of
  his
  request
  that
  this
  Court
  grant
  his

request
  for
  a
  Petition
  for
  Discretionary
  Review
  in
  the
  instant
  case,
  cause
  number
  PD-­‐1308-­‐

15.

NATURE
 OF
 THE
 CASE

  The
  appellant,
  Alvin
  Valadez,
  Jr.,
  was
  indicted
  by
  a
  Guadalupe
  County
  grand
  jury
  for

the
  offense
  of
  Possession
  of
  a
  Controlled
  Substance
  (Heroin
  1
  to
  4
  grams)
  (Habitual)
  in

cause
 number
 13-­‐1568-­‐C.
 (C.R.-­‐18)
 The
 appellant
 was
 tried
 by
 a
 jury
 and
 convicted
 of
 the

offense
  as
  charged
  in
  the
  indictment.

  The
  appellant
  was
  subsequently
  sentenced,
  by
  the

  6

jury,
  to
  Life
  in
  confinement
  in
  the
  Texas
  Department
  of
  Criminal
  Justice-­‐Institutional

Division.

 (C.R.-­‐64)

  Notice
 of
 appeal
 was
 subsequently
 filed
 in
 the
 trial
 Court
 and
 an
 appeal
 to
 the
 Court

of
  Appeals
  for
  the
  Fourth
  Court
  of
  Appeals
  District
  was
  pursued.
  (C.R.-­‐60)

  That
  court

affirmed
 the
 judgment
 of
 the
 trial
 court
 in
 a
 published
 opinion,
 authored
 by
 Justice
 Alvarez,

on
 September
 16,
 2015.

 This
 court
 has
 granted
 the
 appellant
 an
 extension
 of
 time
 to
 file

the
 instant
 petition
 until
 November
 16,
 2015.

PROCEDURAL
 HISTORY
 OF
 THE
 CASE
 IN
 THE
 LOWER
 COURT

  On
 September
 16,
 2015,
 the
 San
 Antonio
 Court
 of
 Appeals,
 in
 an
 published
 opinion,

authored
 by
 Justice
 Alvarez,
 affirmed
 the
 judgment
 of
 the
 trial
 court
 in
 all
 respects.
 Valadez

v.
 State,
 (No.
 04-­‐14-­‐00626-­‐CR,
 Tex.
 App.-­‐San
 Antonio,
 September
 16,
 2015)
 (Appendix
 A)
 The

appellant
  subsequently
  filed
  a
  Motion
  for
  Extension
  of
  Time
  to
  File
  a
  Petition
  for

Discretionary
  Review
  with
  the
  Court
  of
  Criminal
  Appeals.

  That
  motion
  was
  granted,
  and

the
 appellant
 was
 granted
 an
 extension
 of
 time
 to
 file
 a
 Petition
 for
 Discretionary
 Review

until
  November
  16,
  2015.

  This
  pleading
  is
  filed
  in
  compliance
  with
  this
  Court’s
  order

granting
 that
 extension
 of
 time.

 The
 appellant
 would
 submit
 that
 there
 exists
 one
 ground

for
  review
  that
  warrants
  review
  by
  this
  Court.

  It
  is
  urged
  by
  the
  appellant
  that
  there
  exist,

at
  a
  minimum,
  two
  distinct
  reasons
  for
  reviewing
  the
  action
  of
  the
  Court
  of
  Appeals
  for
  the

Fourth
 Court
 of
 Appeals
 District.

REASONS
 FOR
 REVIEW

  7

 A

  The
 appellant
 respectfully
 petitions
 this
 Honorable
 Court
 to
 grant
 this
 Petition
 for

Discretionary
 Review
 pursuant
 to
 Rule
 66.3
 (c),
 Tex.
 R.

 App.
 Proc.
 which
 states
 that
 one
 of

the
 non-­‐exclusive
 reasons
 for
 this
 Court
 to
 grant
 a
 petition
 for
 discretionary
 review
 is
 that

the
 Court
 of
 Appeals
 has
 decided
 an
 important
 question
 of
 state
 law
 in
 a
 way
 that
 conflicts

with
 the
 applicable
 decisions
 of
 the
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals.

 The
 appellant
 would

respectfully
 submit
 that
 the
 opinion
 of
 the
 Fourth
 Court
 of
 Appeals
 is
 in
 conflict
 with
 the

applicable
 decisions
 of
 this
 Court.

B

  The
 appellant
 respectfully
 petitions
 this
 Honorable
 Court
 to
 grant
 this
 Petition
 for

Discretionary
 Review
 pursuant
 to
 Rule
 66.3(b),
 Tex.
 R.
 App.
 Proc.
 which
 states
 that,
 one
 of

the
 non-­‐exclusive
 reasons
 for
 this
 Court
 to
 grant
 a
 discretionary
 review,
 is
 that
 the
 Court
 of

Appeals
 has
 decided
 an
 important
 question
 of
 state
 law
 that
 has
 not
 been,
 but
 should
 be,

settled
 by
 the
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals.

 The
 appellant
 would
 respectfully
 submit
 that
 the

Court
 of
 Appeals
 has
 decided
 an
 important
 question
 of
 state
 law
 that
 has
 not
 been,
 but

should
 be
 settled
 the
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals.

C.

  The
 appellant
 respectfully
 petitions
 this
 Honorable
 Court
 to
 grant
 this
 Petition
 for

Discretionary
 Review
 pursuant
 to
 Rule
 66.3(d),
 Tex.
 R.
 App.
 Proc.
 which
 states
 that,
 one
 of

the
 non-­‐exclusive
 reasons
 for
 this
 Court
 to
 grant
 a
 discretionary
 review,
 is
 that
 the
 Court
 of

Appeals
 has
 misconstrued
 a
 statute.

 The
 appellant
 would
 respectfully
 submit
 that
 the

  8

opinion
 of
 the
 Court
 of
 Appeals
 has
 misconstrued
 a
 relevant
 provision
 of
 the
 Texas
 Code
 of

Criminal
 Procedure.

GROUND
 FOR
 REVIEW

  9

 THE
 COURT
 OF
 APPEALS
 ERRED
 IN
 HOLDING
 THAT

THE
 APPELLANT
 WAS
 ARRESTED
 PURSUANT
 TO
 A

VALID
 ARREST
 WARRANT
 AND
 AS
 A
 CONSEQUENCE

CONTRABAND
 FOUND
 ON
 HIS
 PERSON
 WAS
 LEGALLY

SEIZED
 AND
 ADMITTED
 INTO
 EVIDENCE

ARGUMENT
 AND
 AUTHORITIES

IN
 SUPPORT
 OF
 THE
 GROUND

FOR
 REVIEW

 STATEMENT
 OF
 APPLICABLE
 FACTS

  Prior
 to
 the
 onset
 of
 the
 trial,
 the
 appellant
 caused
 to
 be
 filed
 a
 written
 “Motion
 to

Suppress
 Evidence”
 in
 which
 he
 sought
 to
 suppress
 the
 fruits
 of
 a
 search
 of
 his
 person.

Asserted
 therein
 was
 a
 claim
 that
 the
 actions
 of
 law
 enforcement
 violated
 the
 Fourth

Amendment
 to
 the
 United
 States
 Constitution
 along
 with
 Art.
 38.23,
 Tex.
 Code
 Crim.
 Proc.

Ann.
 (West
 2014)
 (C.R.-­‐16
 )

 The
 trial
 Court
 conducted
 an
 evidentiary
 hearing
 on
 the

motion,
 at
 the
 conclusion
 of
 which
 the
 motion
 to
 suppress
 was
 denied
 and
 findings
 of
 fact

and
 conclusions
 of
 law
 were
 entered
 by
 the
 trial
 Court.

  The
 trial
 court
 conducted
 a
 hearing
 on
 that
 motion
 prior
 to
 trial.

 (R.R.2-­‐4
 thru
 28)

At
 the
 hearing
 it
 was
 established
 that
 the
 appellant
 was
 arrested
 on
 August
 28,
 2012
 by

Officer
 David
 Camacho
 of
 the
 Guadalupe
 County
 Sheriff’s
 Department.

 The
 arrest
 of
 the

appellant
 was
 executed
 by
 means
 of
 an
 arrest
 warrant
 issued
 that
 same
 day
 by
 a
 Justice
 of

the
 Peace
 for
 Guadalupe
 County,
 alleging
 that
 the
 appellant
 had
 committed
 the
 offense
 of

Engaging
 in
 Organized
 Criminal
 Activity.1

 Camacho
 related
 that
 after
 verifying
 the
 validity

1
The Warrant Of Arrest was admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress as
State’s exhibit 1. The supporting complaint/affidavit was admitted into evidence as State’s
exhibit 2.

  10

of
 the
 warrant,
 he
 along
 with
 a
 fellow
 officer,
 went
 to
 the
 home
 of
 the
 appellant
 in
 Seguin.

After
 locating
 the
 appellant,
 Camacho
 conducted
 a
 “search
 incident
 to
 arrest”
 which

resulted
 in
 the
 discovery
 and
 seizure
 of
 the
 four
 balloons
 of
 heroin
 that
 formed
 the
 basis

for
 the
 appellant’s
 indictment.

 (R.R.2-­‐12,
 13)

 Camacho
 also
 related
 that
 he
 had
 no
 reason

to
 believe
 that
 the
 arrest
 warrant
 that
 formed
 the
 basis
 for
 the
 appellant’s
 arrest
 and

subsequent
 search
 was
 lacking
 in
 probable
 cause.2
 (R.R.12)

  The
 warrant
 in
 question
 authorized
 the
 appellant’s
 arrest
 for
 the
 offense
 of
 “Engage

in
 Organized
 Criminal
 Activity”.

 The
 warrant
 was
 supported
 by
 a
 five-­‐page

affidavit/complaint
 presented
 to
 the
 magistrate
 by
 Clint
 Halbardier,
 of
 the
 Seguin
 Police

Department.

 That
 affidavit
 purported
 to
 present
 a
 case
 establishing
 probable
 cause
 to

believe
 that
 six
 named
 individuals3
 had
 committed
 the
 offense
 of
 Organized
 Criminal

Activity
 by
 committing
 the
 offense
 of
 Aggravated
 Assault
 against
 Roberto
 Herrera
 while

committing
 the
 assault
 in
 concert
 of
 three
 or
 more
 individuals.
 4

  The
 Halbardier
 affidavit
 went
 on
 to
 detail
 an
 investigation
 conducted
 by
 members
 of

the
 Seguin
 Police
 department
 regarding
 an
 alleged
 assault
 committed
 against
 Roberto

Herrera
 on
 August
 26,
 2012.

 In
 support
 of
 the
 allegations
 in
 the
 affidavit
 Halbardier
 relied

in
 substantial
 part
 on
 information
 provided
 by
 four
 “unnamed
 witnesses”
 who
 allegedly

witnessed
 the
 assault
 in
 question,
 or
 were
 privy
 to
 certain
 circumstantial
 evidence
 relating

to
 the
 assault
 and
 the
 alleged
 perpetrators
 thereof.

 The
 affidavit
 in
 question
 contains
 a

number
 a
 number
 of
 assertions
 regarding
 the
 behavior
 of
 the
 other
 five
 suspects
 named
 in

2
Camacho did not relate what the warrant and underlying affidavit/compliant established vis-à-
vis probable cause in terms of an offense.
3
The individuals named were as follows: Danny Ramon Gonzales, Roy Martinez, Alvin Valadez
(the appellant), Christopher Lopez, Ezekiel Longoria, and Abel Lomas.
4
See: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(a)(1) (West 2014)

  11

the
 affidavit.

 With
 respect
 to
 the
 assertions
 in
 the
 affidavit
 that
 relate
 to
 the
 acts
 of
 the

appellant
 there
 are
 four
 assertions

contained
 in
 the
 affidavit
 that
 purport
 to
 establish
 probable
 cause
 to
 believe
 that
 the

appellant
 had
 committed
 the
 offense
 in
 question.

 They
 are
 as
 follows:

  1)
 UW35
 stated
 that
 (the
 appellant)
 showed
 up
 after

 at
 his
 residence
 after
 the
 assault
 and
 threatened

 UW3.

 UW3
 also
 asserted
 that
 the
 Valadez
 threatened

 UW3
 not
 to
 tell
 anything
 to
 tell
 the
 police
 anything

 about
 the
 assault;

  2)
 UW46
 purportedly
 informed
 the
 affiant
 that
 the
 appellant

 had
 made
 threats
 to
 UW4;

  3)
 Halbardier
 also
 asserted
 that
 the
 appellant
 was
 a

 “documented”
 member
 of
 the
 Mexican
 Mafia;

  4)
 Halbadier
 also
 included
 a
 non-­‐factual
 conclusion

 that
 the
 appellant
 “is
 acting
 in
 concert
 with
 the
 other

 suspects
 in
 trying
 to
 threaten
 witnesses
 not
 to
 give

 their
 testimony
 to
 police
 and
 to
 help
 avoid
 prosecution

 for
 the
 aggravated
 assault
 of
 the
 victim”.

  No
 other
 factual
 assertions
 contained
 in
 the
 Halbardier
 affidavit
 relate
 to
 acts

attributed
 to
 the
 appellant
 before,
 during,
 or
 after
 the
 alleged
 assault
 against
 Roberto

Herrera.

  Following
 the
 conclusion
 of
 the
 hearing
 the
 trial
 Court
 denied
 the
 appellant’s
 motion

to
 suppress
 the
 evidence.

 (R.R.2-­‐27)
 Prior
 to
 the
 onset
 of
 the
 trial,
 the
 trial
 court
 made

findings
 of
 fact
 and
 conclusions
 of
 law.

 Those
 consist
 of
 the
 following:

  The
 defendant
 was
 arrested
 on
 a
 warrant
 issued

  on
 August
 28th,
 2012
 by
 Justice
 of
 the
 Peace
 Precinct

  Four,
 Guadalupe
 County,
 based
 on
 a
 probable
 cause

  affidavit
 submitted
 by
 Detective
 Clint
 Halbardier.

5
The affiant described UW3 as a gainfully employed Texas resident with acquaintances involved
in the Mexican Mafia.
6
The affiant described UW4 as a resident of Seguin with no criminal history.

  12

  The
 probable
 cause
 affidavit
 for
 said
 warrant

  contained
 information
 that
 established
 probable

  cause
 for
 (the
 appellant)
 to
 be
 charged
 with
 various

  offenses,
 including
 conspiracy
 to
 commit
 aggravated

  assault,
 aggravated
 assault,
 aggravated
 assault
 as
 a

  party
 to
 that
 offense,
 organized
 criminal
 activity
 to

  commit
 aggravated
 assault,
 obstruction
 or
 retaliation,

  and
 even
 possibly
 tampering
 with
 witnesses.

  Because
 such
 probable
 cause
 was
 established
 for
 each

  offense,
 the
 Justice
 of
 the
 Peace
 could
 have
 issued
 the

  warrant
 naming
 any
 of
 those
 felony
 offenses.

  The
 arresting
 officers
 were
 acting
 in
 good
 faith

  reliance
 on
 the
 warrant.

 Even
 if
 the
 probable
 cause

  was
 inadequate
 for
 organized
 criminal
 activity,

  probable
 cause
 was
 established
 for
 other
 felony

  offenses.
 (R.R.5-­‐18,
 19)

ARGUMENT
 IN
 THE
 LOWER
 COURTS

  In
 the
 trial
 Court
 the
 appellant
 asserted
 that
 the
 arrest
 warrant,
 that
 formed
 the

legal
 foundation
 for
 his
 arrest
 and
 the
 subsequent
 search
 of
 his
 person,
 was
 illegal
 in
 that
 it

failed
 to
 demonstrate
 “probable
 cause”
 to
 warrant
 a
 belief
 by
 the
 issuing
 magistrate
 that

the
 appellant
 had
 committed
 the
 offense
 of
 Organized
 Criminal
 Activity.

 That
 argument

formed
 the
 basis
 of
 the
 appellant’s
 sole
 point
 of
 error
 in
 his
 appeal
 to
 the
 San
 Antonio
 Court

of
 Appeals.

  The
 appellant’s
 sole
 point
 of
 error
 was
 overruled
 and
 the
 appellant’s
 conviction
 and

sentence
 were
 affirmed
 in
 all
 respects.

HOLDING
 OF
 THE
 LOWER
 COURT

  The
 lower
 Court
 reasoned
 as
 follows:
 “In
 viewing
 the
 totality
 of
 the
 circumstances
 in

a
 common
 sense
 and
 realistic
 manner,
 we
 conclude
 the
 magistrate
 had
 a
 substantial
 basis

for
 concluding
 that
 probable
 cause
 was
 shown
 to
 issue
 the
 arrest
 warrant
 against
 Valadez.

…
 The
 affidavit
 provided
 sufficient
 facts
 that,
 together
 with
 reasonable
 inferences

  13

therefrom,
 provided
 a
 “fair
 probability”
 or
 “substantial
 chance”
 that
 Valadez
 was
 engaged

in
 organized
 criminal
 activity.”
 Valadez
 v.
 State,
 supra,
 at
 slip
 op.
 pg.
 12.

  The
 appellant
 respectfully
 submits
 that
 the
 holding
 of
 the
 Court
 below
 is
 in
 conflict

with
 the
 applicable
 opinions
 from
 this
 Court
 with
 respect
 to
 what
 constitutes
 “probable

cause”
 for
 an
 arrest.

 The
 appellant
 also
 would
 submit
 that
 what
 constitutes
 “probable

cause”
 to
 issue
 an
 arrest
 warrant
 for
 the
 offense
 of
 Engaging
 in
 Organized
 Criminal
 Activity

has
 never
 been
 addressed
 by
 this
 Court
 and
 as
 a
 result
 an
 important
 question
 of
 state
 law
 is

presented
 by
 the
 instant
 case
 and
 review
 of
 that
 issue
 by
 this
 Court
 is
 warranted.

 Lastly,

the
 opinion
 of
 the
 Court
 below
 appears
 to
 misconstrue
 the
 statutory
 provision
 mandating

that
 an
 arrest
 warrant
 must
 contain
 information
 that
 demonstrates
 that
 the
 accused
 has

committed
 some
 offense
 against
 the
 laws
 of
 the
 State,
 either
 directly
 or
 that
 the
 affiant
 has

good
 reason
 to
 believe
 ,
 and
 does
 believe,
 that
 the
 accused
 has
 committed
 such
 offense.
 See:

Art.
 15.05,
 Tex
 Code
 Crim.
 Proc.
 Ann.
 (West
 2014).

 These
 three
 contentions
 will
 be

addressed
 hereinafter
 in
 the
 order
 set
 forth
 above.

I

  With
 respect
 to
 what
 constitutes
 “probable
 cause”
 this
 Court
 has
 stated
 on
 a
 number

of
 occasions
 that
 “probable
 cause”
 exists
 when
 the
 affidavit/complaint
 provides
 the
 issuing

magistrate
 with
 sufficient
 information
 to
 support
 an
 independent
 judgment
 that
 probable

exists
 for
 the
 warrant.
 Jones
 v.
 State,
 568
 S.W.3d
 847
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1978).

 The

  14

establishment
 of
 probable
 cause
 mandates
 that
 an
 affidavit
 in
 support
 of
 an
 arrest
 warrant

contain
 facts
 and
 circumstances
 within
 the
 affiant’s
 knowledge
 and
 of
 which
 he
 has

reasonably
 trustworthy
 information,
 sufficient
 to
 warrant
 a
 prudent
 person
 to
 believe
 that

the
 subject
 of
 the
 arrest
 warrant
 has
 committed
 an
 offense.

 State
 v.
 Streetman,
 93
 S.W.3d

102
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 2002).

 In
 the
 case
 of
 an
 arrest
 warrant,
 such
 as
 in
 the
 instant
 case,
 the

issuing
 magistrate,
 and
 the
 reviewing
 trial
 judge
 are
 limited
 to
 the
 contents
 of
 the
 affidavit

in
 support
 of
 the
 warrant/complaint.

 Aguilar
 v.
 Texas,
 378
 U.S.
 108,
 84
 S.Ct.
 1509
 (1964);

State
 v.
 McLain,
 337
 S.W.3d
 268
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 2011).
 In
 a
 case
 involving
 a
 warrant,
 and
 the

underlying
 affidavit,
 there
 are
 no
 credibility
 issues
 to
 take
 into
 account
 hence
 an
 appellate

court
 is
 to
 employ
 the
 de
 novo
 standard
 of
 review
 in
 passing
 on
 the
 propriety
 of
 trial
 court’s

ruling.
 See:
 Bonds
 v.
 State,
 403
 S.W.3d
 867
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 2013).

  The
 opinion
 of
 the
 Court
 below
 recognized
 these
 concepts
 in
 the
 course
 of
 its
 review

of
 the
 trial
 Court’s
 ruling.

 Nevertheless,
 it
 is
 and
 was
 the
 appellant’s
 contention
 that
 even
 in

reviewing
 the
 affidavit
 in
 a
 “common
 sense”
 manner
 as
 opposed
 to
 a
 “hypertechnical”

manner
 the
 four
 corners
 of
 the
 affidavit
 in
 dispute
 wholly
 fail
 to
 support
 a
 finding
 by
 a

reasonably
 prudent
 person
 that
 the
 appellant
 had
 committed
 the
 offense
 of
 Engaging
 in

Organized
 Crime.

  The
 offense
 of
 Engaging
 in
 Organized
 Activity
 is
 defined
 in
 a
 highly
 circumscribed

manner,
 and
 is
 limited
 in
 its
 scope.

 It
 requires
 proof
 that
 the
 accused
 as
 a
 member
 of
 a

criminal
 street
 gang
 committed
 or
 conspired
 to
 commit…
 aggravated
 assault.
 See:
 Tex.

Penal
 Code
 Ann.
 §§
 71.01(d)
 &
 71.02(a)(1)
 (West
 2014).
 In
 the
 context
 of
 the
 instant
 case,
 a

valid
 warrant
 for
 the
 named
 offense
 would
 necessitate
 factual
 assertions,
 within
 the
 four

corners
 of
 the
 affidavit,
 that
 the
 subject
 of
 the
 warrant
 that
 the
 named
 suspect
 had
 acted
 as

  15

a
 member
 of
 a
 criminal
 street
 gang.7

 It
 would
 also
 necessitate
 factual
 assertions,
 within
 the

four
 corners
 of
 the
 affidavit,
 that
 the
 suspect
 person
 had
 committed
 the
 offense
 of

aggravated
 assault8.
 Those
 are
 the
 elements
 of
 the
 offense
 for
 which
 the
 instant
 warrant

was
 issued
 and
 the
 arrest
 was
 perfected.

  It
 is
 the
 contention
 of
 the
 appellant
 that
 the
 affidavit
 is
 question
 is
 wholly
 devoid
 of

any
 facts
 that
 would
 support
 a
 finding
 by
 the
 issuing
 magistrate
 that
 the
 named
 suspect

(the
 appellant),
 acting
 as
 a
 member
 of
 a
 criminal
 street
 gang,
 as
 defined,
 had
 committed

aggravated
 assault
 on
 the
 person
 of
 Roberto
 Machado
 Herrera.

 The
 entirety
 of
 the
 affidavit

in
 question
 reflects
 nothing
 more
 than
 actions
 by
 the
 appellant
 after
 the
 fact.

 There
 are
 no

facts
 contained
 within
 the
 four
 corners
 of
 the
 affidavit
 that
 so
 much
 as
 suggest
 that
 the

appellant
 assaulted
 the
 complainant
 or
 that
 he
 aided,
 abetted
 or
 assisted
 the
 actors
 named

in
 the
 affidavit.

 The
 implications
 contained
 in
 the
 affidavit
 suggest
 nothing
 more
 than
 the

appellant
 acquired
 knowledge
 of
 the
 event
 in
 question
 after
 the
 fact
 and
 sought
 to
 assist

the
 named
 actors
 avoid
 apprehension
 and
 or
 prosecution.
 This
 is
 a
 far
 cry
 from
 presenting

facts
 to
 the
 issuing
 magistrate
 that
 would
 support
 a
 reasonable
 belief
 that
 the
 appellant
 had

participated
 in
 the
 assault
 in
 any
 fashion.

  By
 finding
 to
 the
 contrary,
 the
 court
 below
 has
 issued
 an
 opinion
 that
 is
 in
 conflict

with
 the
 holdings
 of
 this
 Court
 on
 the
 issue
 of
 what
 constitutes
 probable
 cause
 for
 an
 arrest

warrant.

 See:
 McFarland
 v.
 State,
 928
 S.W.
 482
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1996);
 Gibbs
 v.
 State,
 819

7
“Three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable
leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities. Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 71.01(d), supra.
8
The affidavit in dispute did not assert that the facts supported an arrest warrant on the grounds
that the appellant had conspired to commit the offense of aggravated assault as a member of a
criminal street gang. (State’s exhibit 3, pg. 2)

  16

S.W.2d
 821
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1991);
 Gordon
 v.
 State,
 801
 S.W.2d
 899
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1990);

Janecka
 v.
 State,
 739
 S.W.2d
 813
 (Tex.
 Crim.
 App.
 1987).

  The
 opinion
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 is
 in
 conflict
 with
 the
 applicable
 holdings
 of
 this
 court

on
 the
 question
 of
 what
 constitutes
 a
 valid
 affidavit
 in
 support
 of
 an
 arrest
 warrant.

Review
 of
 the
 holding
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 is
 warranted.

II

  The
 appellant
 would
 also
 submit
 to
 this
 court
 that
 the
 question
 of
 what
 constitutes
 a

valid
 and
 sufficient
 affidavit
 to
 warrant
 the
 issuance
 of
 an
 arrest
 warrant
 for
 the
 offense
 of

Engaging
 in
 Organized
 Crime
 has
 never
 been
 addressed
 by
 this
 court
 in
 any
 fashion,

Consequently,
 this
 case
 presents
 an
 important
 question
 of
 State
 law,
 that
 has
 not
 been,
 but

should
 be
 decided
 by
 this
 court.

 Review
 of
 the
 holding
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 is
 warranted.

III

  Lastly
 the
 appellant
 would
 submit
 that
 the
 holding
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 has

misconstrued
 the
 statute
 that
 governs
 the
 sufficiency
 of
 arrest
 warrants.

 More
 specifically

the
 appellant
 would
 submit
 that
 the
 opinion
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 has
 misconstrued
 Art.
 15.05

(2),
 Tex.
 Code
 Crim.
 Proc.
 ann.
 (West
 2014)
 which
 sets
 forth
 the
 statutory
 requirements
 for
 a

valid
 affidavit
 in
 support
 of
 an
 arrest
 warrant.9

 The
 opinion
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 has

misconstrued
 that
 provision.

 Review
 of
 the
 holding
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 is
 warranted.

9
The complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it have these substantial
requisites:…. It must show that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of the
State, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and does believe that the
accused has committed such offense.

  17

 CONCLUSION
 AND
 PRAYER

It
 is
 respectfully
 requested,
 by
 the
 appellant
 that
 a
 petition
 for
 discretionary
 review

to
 the
 Fourth
 Court
 of
 Appeals
 be
 granted
 and
 that
 the
 case
 be
 briefed
 on
 the
 merits
 of
 the

appellant’s
 ground
 for
 review
 with
 argument
 to
 follow.

Respectfully
 submitted,

/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III

EDWARD
 F.
 SHAUGHNESSY,
 III

Attorney
 at
 Law

206
 E.
 Locust

San
 Antonio,
 Texas
 78212

(210)
 212-­‐6700

(210)
 212-­‐2178
 (fax)

SBN
 18134500

Attorney
 for
 the
 appellant

  18

  CERTIFICATE
 OF
 SERVICE

  I,
 Edward
 F.
 Shaughnessy,
 III.,
 certify
 that
 a
 copy
 of
 the
 foregoing
 petition
 was

mailed
 to
 Heather
 McMinn,
 District
 Attorney,
 25th
 Judicial
 District,
 211
 W.
 Court
 Street,

Suite
 260,
 Seguin,
 Texas
 78155,
 on
 this
 the
 _6_
 day
 of
 November,
 2015.

/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III

  CERTIFICATE
 OF
 SERVICE

  I,
 Edward
 F.
 Shaughnessy,
 III
 certify
 that
 a
 copy
 of
 the
 foregoing
 petition
 was
 mailed

to
 the
 office
 of
 the
 State
 Prosecuting
 Attorney,
 P.O.
 Box
 78711,
 Austin,
 Texas
 78711,
 on
 this

the
 _6_
 day
 of
 November,
 2015.

/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III

CERTIFICATE
 OF
 COMPLIANCE

  I,
 Edward
 F.
 Shaughnessy,
 III,
 attorney
 for
 the
 appellant
 hereby
 certify
 that
 the

instant
 pleading
 contains
 3624
 words,
 exclusive
 of
 the
 appendix.

/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III

  19

 APPENDIX

  20

 Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-14-00626-CR

Alvin VALADEZ Jr.,
Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,
Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 13-1568-CR-C
Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 16, 2015

AFFIRMED

This case arises from the conviction of Appellant Alvin Valadez Jr. for felony possession

of a controlled substance. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Valadez was

convicted by a jury. Valadez entered a plea of true to the State’s allegations regarding prior

consecutive felony convictions and the jury assessed punishment at life confinement in the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

In his sole issue on appeal, Valadez argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion

to suppress evidence because the complaint supporting the arrest warrant failed to demonstrate
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probable cause he committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. We affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Valadez’s Arrest

On August 28, 2012, a Guadalupe County justice of the peace signed an arrest warrant

authorizing the arrest of Alvin Valadez Jr. for the offense of engaging in organized criminal

activity. The warrant was supported by a complaint asserting Valadez and five other individuals

committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity with the underlying offense being

the aggravated assault of Roberto Machado Herrera Jr.

2. Arrest Warrant

Seguin Police Department Detective Clinton Halbardier signed the five-page complaint 1

based on his investigation and that of the Seguin Police Department. In his application, Detective

Halbardier reported he relied on statements provided by four unnamed informants who directly

witnessed the assault in question or were privy to certain circumstantial evidence relating to the

assault. Detective Halbardier further averred that he believed these witnesses to be credible and

the magistrate could rely on them. He cited interviews with the victim, previous investigations of

the listed suspects, and Seguin Police Department offense reports and supplemental reports.

Detective Halbardier’s complaint asserted that on August 26, 2012, Herrera was

approached by five or six men who questioned him about his gang affiliation. After Herrera

informed the group he was part of the “Orejones,” the group asserted they were the “EME” or the

“Merecido,” common names for the Mexican Mafia. The group further instructed Herrera that he

1
We note Detective Halbardier is the complainant on the application of the arrest warrant. His statement is sworn
before the magistrate. The terms complaint and affidavit are, therefore, used interchangeably in this opinion.

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should deny being a member of the Orejones because he was in Merecido territory. As Herrera

exited his vehicle, one of the individuals waived his arm and Herrera was attacked from behind

with a knife. Herrera was stabbed and beaten.

Detective Halbardier averred that all six suspects, including Valadez, were confirmed to

be active gang members. The officer outlined Valadez’s affiliation as “a documented Mexican

Mafia gang member” and a “lieutenant with the Mexican Mafia,” based on national and state

database information searches.

Detective Halbardier also relied on the statements of four witnesses who asked to be

unnamed in the complaint for “personal safety and security reasons.” Two of the witnesses were

gainfully employed, had previously provided credible information, and had acquaintances

involved in the Mexican Mafia. The third witness was present during the assault and his statement

corroborated Herrera’s statements, and the final witness had no criminal history. Two of the four

witnesses reported being threatened not to tell officers about the assault. Additionally, several of

the informants reported the assault stemmed from suspicions that Herrera stole drugs from

Valadez. Detective Halbardier’s complaint concluded,

considering all of the known facts and the current information provided by the
witnesses, [Valadez] has been named multiple times in the past as the leader of the
Mexican Mafia in Seguin. [Valadez] is acting in concert with the other suspects in
trying to threaten witnesses not to give their testimony to police and to help avoid
prosecution for the aggravated assault on the victim.

A Guadalupe County justice of the peace issued the arrest warrant that same day, authorizing the

arrest of Valadez for the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. After locating and

securing Valadez, Guadalupe County Sheriff’s Office Investigator David Camacho executed the

arrest warrant and conducted a search incident to arrest. During the search, Investigator Camacho

discovered four balloons of heroin in Valadez’s pocket.

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B. Hearing on the Motion to Suppress the Arrest Warrant

On August 20, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Valadez’s motion to suppress the

arrest warrant based on the complaint’s failure to establish probable cause.

Investigator Camacho testified that on August 28, 2012, he traveled to Valadez’s residence

to arrest Valadez. Investigator Camacho was familiar with Valadez and positively identified

Valadez at his residence; after a short scuffle, Valadez was taken into custody without further

incident. The officer conducted a search incident to arrest and located four balloons of heroin in

Valadez’s pocket.

Detective Halbardier described the overall structure of the Mexican Mafia and that

lieutenants were generally in charge of day-to-day operations in a specific city or county. He also

relayed the Mexican Mafia was known for engaging in both sanctioned and unsanctioned assaults.

Detective Halbardier testified that, in his opinion, the assault on Herrera was a sanctioned assault

by Valadez.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Valadez’s motion to

suppress the evidence but did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law at that time. The

case was called before a jury on August 25, 2014. After both sides rested and closed their cases,

but prior to closing arguments, the trial court stated, on the record, the following findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

[Valadez] was arrested on a warrant issued on August 28th, 2012, by Justice
of the Peace Precinct Four, Guadalupe County, based on a probable cause
[complaint] submitted by Detective Clint Halbardier.

The probable cause [complaint] for said warrant contained information
which established probable cause for Alvin Valadez, Jr., to be charged with various
offenses, including conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, aggravated assault as
a party to that offense, organized criminal activity to commit aggravated assault,
obstruction or retaliation, and even possibly tampering with witnesses. Because
such probable cause was established for each offense, the Justice of the Peace
could’ve issued the warrant naming any of those felony offenses.
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 04-14-00626-CR

The arresting officers were acting in good faith reliance on the warrant.
Even if the probable cause was inadequate for organized criminal activity, probable
cause was established for other felony offenses.

See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding the trial court’s findings

of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient if they are “recorded in some way, whether written

out and filed by the trial court, or stated on the record at the hearing”).

In his sole issue on appeal, Valadez argues that because the complaint supporting the arrest

warrant failed to demonstrate probable cause that Valadez committed the offense of engaging in

organized criminal activity, the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the arrest

warrant.

SUPPRESSION OF ARREST WARRANT

A. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress on a bifurcated

standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical

facts that depend on credibility choices; we review the court’s application of the law de novo. See

Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Amador v. State, 221

S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Because we look only

within the four corners of the complaint to determine whether probable cause to issue a warrant

exists, the trial court is not required to make any credibility choices in inspecting the affidavit.

Robuck v. State, 40 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet ref’d).

We note this case involves not only the trial court’s determination of probable cause, but

also the underlying question of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. In doing so, we use

a substantial basis standard of review based on the totality of the circumstances presented to the

magistrate. See Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (applying Illinois v.
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Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236–39 (1983). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld

if there is any valid theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not base its

decision on that theory. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

B. Argument of the Parties

Valadez contends that because the State failed to demonstrate the arrest warrant was

supported by a complaint demonstrating probable cause to arrest on the charge of engaging in

organized criminal activity, the trial court erred in denying Valadez’s motion to suppress. Valadez

argues that the warrant was devoid of the facts necessary to support a magistrate’s independent

judgment that probable cause existed that either Valadez, “or any other named suspects, acted with

the intent to establish maintain or participate in the profits of a combination or a criminal street

gang.”

The State counters that the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause for the offense

because the issuing magistrate could reasonably infer that Valadez had conspired with other

members of the Mexican Mafia to commit an aggravated assault against Herrera.

C. Probable Cause to Support Issuance of the Warrant

“An arrest warrant affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to

support an independent determination that probable cause exists to believe that the accused has

committed a crime.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), abrogated

on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also

State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Gurrusqueita v. State, 244 S.W.3d

450, 452 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). We must, therefore, determine whether the

probable cause affidavit in question provided the magistrate with sufficient information to support

an independent judgment that probable cause existed to issue a warrant for Valadez’s arrest. Flores

v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
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 04-14-00626-CR

1. Totality of the Circumstances

A reviewing court’s assessment of the affidavit’s sufficiency is limited to “a reasonable

reading” within the four corners of the affidavit while simultaneously recognizing the magistrate’s

discretion to draw reasonable inferences. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Rodriguez v.

State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); State v. Coker, 406 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d). The magistrate’s probable-cause determination must be upheld if

the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of a

crime. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). Probable cause

requires the affiant to demonstrate there is a probability that the accused committed an offense,

not that the evidence proves the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moss v. State, 75

S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d). “This is a flexible, nondemanding

standard.” Coker, 406 S.W.3d at 396 (citing Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354). A magistrate is enabled

to draw reasonable, common-sense inferences from the facts and circumstances contained in the

affidavit; however, a magistrate may not merely rubber stamp the bare conclusions of others. See

also Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354, Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61.

Our review focuses on the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued “to ensure

. . . an abdication of the magistrate’s duty does not occur.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Our review

must remain realistic and not hyper-technical and we “must uphold the magistrate’s decision so

long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Duarte,

389 S.W.3d at 354; accord State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

An appellate court’s focus cannot be on what other facts “could or should have been

included in the affidavit,” but rather must be “on the combined logical force of facts that actually

are in the affidavit.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354–55; accord Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 60. The

affiant’s reliability, as well as the reliability of his sources, are part of the totality of the
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 04-14-00626-CR

circumstances that the magistrate should evaluate in making a probable-cause determination. See

Coker, 406 S.W.3d at 396.

We thus turn to the circumstances set out within the four corners of the probable cause

affidavit before us.

2. Charge Contained within the Arrest Warrant

The complaint alleged that Valadez,

on or about the 26th through 27th day of August, 2012, in Guadalupe County,
Texas, did then and there commit the offense of Engaging in Organized Criminal
Activity—Aggravated Assault by intentionally and knowingly causing serious
bodily injury to the victim, Roberto Machado Herrera Jr., by punching, kicking and
stabbing with a knife or lethal cutting instrument, while committing the act in
concert of three or more individuals, against the laws of the State.

Detective Halbardier’s affidavit averred that he relied on (1) the Seguin Police Department

offense report and supplements, (2) multiple offense investigations involving several of the named

suspects, (3) multiple witness interviews, (4) suspect interviews, (5) interviews of other involved

persons, and (6) his personal observations. We first address Detective Halbardier’s reliance on

unnamed informants.

3. Affidavit’s Reliance On Unnamed Informants

“With regard to an informant’s tips, we take into account the informant’s veracity,

reliability, and basis of knowledge to determine the value of his assertions, as well as whether his

information is stale.” Rivas v. State, 446 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.)

(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,

pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g)). “Corroboration of the details of an informant’s tip through independent

police investigation can also be relevant in the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.”

Davis, 144 S.W.3d at 197 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–42). The affidavit must also set forth the

basis upon which the officer formed the underlying “belief in an informant’s credibility and

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 04-14-00626-CR

veracity.” Id. “‘[A] deficiency in one may be compensated . . . by a strong showing as to the

other, or by some other indicia of reliability,’ all of which are relevant considerations under the

totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Gates, U.S. at 233).

“While information from an unnamed informant alone does not establish probable cause,

the informant’s tip combined with an independent police investigation may provide a substantial

basis for the probable-cause finding.” Cf. Lowery v. State, 843 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d); Serrano v. State, 123 S.W.3d 53, 62–63 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet

ref’d). The unnamed informant’s credibility may be established by allegations that the informant

has proven reliable on previous occasions. Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 726 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). “This reliability may be established by the general assertions

of the affiant, as stated in the affidavit, concerning the informant’s prior reliability.” Id.

Here, Detective Halbardier indicated he relied on four different unnamed witnesses. The

first had “acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia and knows the details of the gang”; the

second was present when the assault occurred and corroborated the victim’s description of the

assault; the third is gainfully employed and has acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia; and

the fourth was a resident of Seguin with no criminal history. Detective Halbardier further opined,

“I believe the unnamed witnesses are credible and that I and any magistrate can rely on their

information in the matters such as these.” Although the third and fourth informants cannot be

characterized as eyewitnesses of the assault, both gave first-hand accounts of Valadez’s tactics.

Detective Halbardier knew who the informants were and could hold them accountable for

their statements and was able to establish each informant’s inherent reliability or basis of

knowledge. Additionally, each of the witnesses provided their statements directly to the police,

rather than placing an anonymous call or tip, and were unnamed for the sake of their safety. See

Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).
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4. Other Information Relied upon by the Officer

Information “of unknown reliability must be coupled with facts from which an inference

may be drawn that the informant is credible.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 357. However, when the

affidavit contains information given by an informant or eyewitness, the affidavit is sufficient if the

information adequately suggests direct knowledge on his or her part. Wilkerson v. State, 726

S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 894 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 1995, pet. ref’d) (“if the named informant is a private citizen whose only contact with the

police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act . . . the credibility and reliability of the

informant is inherent”).

Detective Halbardier relied on another officer’s interview of the victim taken at the

hospital. In Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 156 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals stated that “[o]bservations reported to the affiant by other officers engaged in

the investigation can constitute a reliable basis for issuing a warrant.”

a. Victim’s Statement

Herrera told Seguin Police Detective Jaime Diaz that he was with two other individuals

when they drove by a party and one of his friends began talking to Ezekiel Longoria, one of the

named conspirators. Longoria asked Herrera “what gang he belonged to,” and Herrera replied

“Orejones.” When Herrera exited the vehicle, Longoria waived his hand and two other individuals

attacked Herrera from behind. Herrera stated “approximately five to six males were assaulting at

one time.” The informant also told Detective Diaz the assault was “set up” because Herrera was

suspected of stealing narcotics that belonged to Valadez. This statement was corroborated by the

third informant’s report that two of the individuals that attacked Herrera, including Valadez,

threatened the informant to “keep his mouth shut.” See Davila v. State, No. AP-76,105, 2011 WL

303265, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2011) (not designated for publication) (relying on
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eyewitness identification of the shooter as support for the arrest warrant); State v. Ozuna, 88

S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d).

b. National and State Databases and other Officers’ Reports

Detective Halbardier confirmed with local, state, and federal officers and with national and

state databases that Valdez was a lieutenant with the Mexican Mafia.

During the past several months of investigating multiple violent gang-related
offenses, working with several Local, State, and Federal officers, it has been
confirmed that all of [these] six individuals are active gang members.

Detective Halbardier also testified he relied on reports from the Seguin Police Department. The

information contained in the affidavit may be based on either direct personal observations of the

affiant or on hearsay information. Belton, 900 S.W.2d at 893. In Belton, the appellant claimed

that because the affidavit in question reflected no personal knowledge on the part of the affiant,

the arrest warrant lacked probable cause. Id. at 894. The court rejected this argument, noting that

the affidavit contained a statement that the affiant possessed police reports and sworn statements,

as well as information from a witness who had actual knowledge concerning appellant’s

participation in a crime. Id.

Because Detective Halbardier read the Seguin Police Department offense report and

supplements, investigated multiple offenses involving several of the named suspects, and

interviewed multiple witnesses, suspects, and other involved persons, his personal observations

meet the low threshold illustrated in Belton. Id.; see also Kolbert v. State, 644 S.W.2d 150, 153

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.).

Corroboration means, that in light of the circumstances, the officer confirms enough facts

to reasonably conclude the information provided is reliable. See State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184,

189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). We therefore conclude that Detective Halbardier

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was entitled to rely on the information provided to him by other officers’ investigations and thus

entitled to rely upon the information provided by the victim and the unnamed informants.

CONCLUSION

In viewing the totality of the circumstances in a common sense and realistic manner, we

conclude the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause was shown to

issue the arrest warrant against Valadez. The officers obtained information from several unnamed

informants that corroborated the victim’s statement as well and the information provided by other

state, local, and national agencies. Given Detective Halbardier’s training and the stated credibility

of the unnamed informants, the magistrate could reasonably infer that Valadez was tied to the

assault on Herrera. The affidavit provided sufficient facts that, together with reasonable inferences

therefrom, provided a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” that Valadez was engaged in

organized criminal activity. See Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702; Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying Valadez’s motion to suppress his

arrest warrant. 2

Having overruled Valadez’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

PUBLISH

2
Because we conclude the magistrate had probable cause to issue the arrest warrant based on the allegations that
Valadez engaged in organized criminal activity in the assault of Herrera, we need not address Investigator Camacho’s
good faith exception.

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