PD-1308-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 11/6/2015 5:34:31 PM
Accepted 11/9/2015 4:42:11 PM
NO.
PD-‐1308-‐15
ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
IN
THE
COURT
OF
CRIMINAL
APPEALS
OF
THE
STATE
OF
TEXAS
AUSTIN,
TEXAS
____________________________________
ALVIN
VALADEZ,
JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
THE
STATE
OF
TEXAS,
Appellee.
_____________________________________
PETITION
FOR
DISCRETIONARY
REVIEW
FROM
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
FOURTH
COURT
OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT,
SAN
ANTONIO,
TEXAS
CAUSE
NUMBER
04-‐14-‐00626-‐CR
________________________________________
APPELLANT’S
PETITION
FOR
DISCRETIONARY
REVIEW
________________________________________
EDWARD
F.
SHAUGHNESSY
III
Attorney-‐at-‐Law
206
E.
Locust
San
Antonio,
Texas
78212
(210)
212-‐6700
(210)
212-‐2178
(fax)
SBN
18134500
Shaughnessy727@gmail.com
November 9, 2015
Attorney
for
the
Appellant
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
PAGE(S)
TABLE
OF
AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………………………....................iii
TABLE
OF
INTERESTED
PARTIES…………………………………………………………………………………...iv
STATEMENT
REGARDING
ORAL
ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………......v
APPELLANT’S
PETITION
FOR
DISCRETIONARY
REVIEW………………………………….......................6
AUTHORITIES
IN
SUPPORT
OF
APPELLANT’S
PETITION
FOR
DICRETIONARY
REVIEW…………………………………………………………………………...................................................................6
NATURE
OF
THE
CASE……………………………………………………………………………………......................6
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
OF
THE
CASE…………………………………………………....…………………….....7
REASONS
FOR
REVIEW………………………………………………………………....………………........................8
GROUND
FOR
REVIEW………………………………………………………....…………………………………………9
ARGUMENT
AND
AUTHORITIES
IN
SUPPORT
OF
THE
GROUND
FOR
REVIEW…………………………...............………………………………….......................9
CONCLUSION
AND
PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………....................13
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE………………………………………………………………………………..................14
APPENDIX
…………………………………………………………………………………………………....……………..15
ii
TABLE
OF
AUTHORITIES
STATE
CASES
Bonds
v.
State,
403
S.W.3d
867
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
2013)…………………………………………………………..10
Gibbs
v.
State,
819
S.W.2d
821
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1991)………………………………………………..…………….12
Gordon
v.
State,
801
S.W.2d
899
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1990)………………………………………………………….12
Janecka
v.
State,
739
S.W.2d
813
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1987)……………………………………………….………..12
Jones
v.
State,
568
S.W.3d
847
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1978)…………………………………………………………….10
McFarland
v.
State,
928
S.W.
482
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1996)………………………………………………………..12
State
v.
McLain,
337
S.W.3d
268
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
2011)……………………………………………...………….10
State
v.
Streetman,
93
S.W.3d
102
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
2002)……………………………………….....……………10
Federal
Cases
Aguilar
v.
Texas,
378
U.S.
108,
84
S.
Ct.
1509
(1964)…………………………………………….
.....................................10
RULES
Art.
38.23,
Tex.
Code
Crim.
Proc.
Ann.
(West
2014)………………………………..……………………………………10
Art.
15.05,
Tex
Code
Crim.
Proc.
Ann.
(West
2014)………………………………………………….………………..…9,
13
Tex.
Penal
Code
Ann.
§
71.01
(West
2014)…………………………………………………………………………………….11
Tex.
Penal
Code
Ann.
§
71.02(West
2014)……………………………………………………………………………………..11
Rule
66.3
(c),
Tex.
Rule
App.
Proc…..………………………………………………………………………………………………3
iii
Table
of
Interested
Parties
TRIAL
COUNSEL
FOR
THE
STATE:
Keith
Henneke
&
Steven
DeLemos
Assistant
Criminal
Distric
Attorneys
25th
Judicial
District
211
W.
Court
St.,
Suite
260
Seguin,
Texas
78155
TRIAL
COUNSEL
FOR
APPELANT:
Rolando
Garcia
800
Dolorosa,
No.
101
San
Antonio,
TX
78207
Edward
F.
Shaughnessy,
III
206
E.
Locust
San
Antonio,
TX
78212
APPELLANT’S
ATTORNEY
ON
APPEAL:
Edward
F.
Shaughnessy,
III
206
E.
Locust
San
Antonio,
TX
78212
(210)
212-‐
6700
(210)
212-‐2178
(fax)
SBN:
18134500
TRIAL
JUDGE:
W.C
Kirkendall
25th
Judicial
District
Guadalupe
County,
Texas
iv
STATEMENT
REGARDING
ORAL
ARGUMENT
Counsel
for
the
appellant
would
submit
that
in
the
event
that
this
petition
is
granted,
oral
argument
would
be
warranted
inasmuch
as
the
issue
to
be
resolved
by
this
Court
is
novel
and
worthy
of
oral
argument
on
the
issue
presented.
v
PD-‐1308-‐15
ALVIN
VALADEZ,
JR.,
§
IN
THE
COURT
OF
Appellant
§
vs.
§
CRIMINAL
APPEALS
THE
STATE
OF
TEXAS,
§
AUSTIN,
TEXAS,
Appellee
ARGUMENTS
AND
AUTHORITIES
IN
SUPPORT
OF
THE
APPELLANT’S
PETITION
FOR
DISCRETIONARYREVIEW
OF
CAUSE
NUMBER
0-‐14-‐00626-‐CR
TO
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
CRIMINAL
APPEALS:
NOW
COMES,
Alvin
Valadez
Jr.,
defendant
in
the
trial
Court
and
appellant
in
the
lower
Court,
by
and
through,
Edward
F.
Shaughnessy,
III,
attorney
at
law,
and
offers
the
following
arguments
and
authorities
in
support
of
his
request
that
this
Court
grant
his
request
for
a
Petition
for
Discretionary
Review
in
the
instant
case,
cause
number
PD-‐1308-‐
15.
NATURE
OF
THE
CASE
The
appellant,
Alvin
Valadez,
Jr.,
was
indicted
by
a
Guadalupe
County
grand
jury
for
the
offense
of
Possession
of
a
Controlled
Substance
(Heroin
1
to
4
grams)
(Habitual)
in
cause
number
13-‐1568-‐C.
(C.R.-‐18)
The
appellant
was
tried
by
a
jury
and
convicted
of
the
offense
as
charged
in
the
indictment.
The
appellant
was
subsequently
sentenced,
by
the
6
jury,
to
Life
in
confinement
in
the
Texas
Department
of
Criminal
Justice-‐Institutional
Division.
(C.R.-‐64)
Notice
of
appeal
was
subsequently
filed
in
the
trial
Court
and
an
appeal
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Court
of
Appeals
District
was
pursued.
(C.R.-‐60)
That
court
affirmed
the
judgment
of
the
trial
court
in
a
published
opinion,
authored
by
Justice
Alvarez,
on
September
16,
2015.
This
court
has
granted
the
appellant
an
extension
of
time
to
file
the
instant
petition
until
November
16,
2015.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
OF
THE
CASE
IN
THE
LOWER
COURT
On
September
16,
2015,
the
San
Antonio
Court
of
Appeals,
in
an
published
opinion,
authored
by
Justice
Alvarez,
affirmed
the
judgment
of
the
trial
court
in
all
respects.
Valadez
v.
State,
(No.
04-‐14-‐00626-‐CR,
Tex.
App.-‐San
Antonio,
September
16,
2015)
(Appendix
A)
The
appellant
subsequently
filed
a
Motion
for
Extension
of
Time
to
File
a
Petition
for
Discretionary
Review
with
the
Court
of
Criminal
Appeals.
That
motion
was
granted,
and
the
appellant
was
granted
an
extension
of
time
to
file
a
Petition
for
Discretionary
Review
until
November
16,
2015.
This
pleading
is
filed
in
compliance
with
this
Court’s
order
granting
that
extension
of
time.
The
appellant
would
submit
that
there
exists
one
ground
for
review
that
warrants
review
by
this
Court.
It
is
urged
by
the
appellant
that
there
exist,
at
a
minimum,
two
distinct
reasons
for
reviewing
the
action
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Court
of
Appeals
District.
REASONS
FOR
REVIEW
7
A
The
appellant
respectfully
petitions
this
Honorable
Court
to
grant
this
Petition
for
Discretionary
Review
pursuant
to
Rule
66.3
(c),
Tex.
R.
App.
Proc.
which
states
that
one
of
the
non-‐exclusive
reasons
for
this
Court
to
grant
a
petition
for
discretionary
review
is
that
the
Court
of
Appeals
has
decided
an
important
question
of
state
law
in
a
way
that
conflicts
with
the
applicable
decisions
of
the
Court
of
Criminal
Appeals.
The
appellant
would
respectfully
submit
that
the
opinion
of
the
Fourth
Court
of
Appeals
is
in
conflict
with
the
applicable
decisions
of
this
Court.
B
The
appellant
respectfully
petitions
this
Honorable
Court
to
grant
this
Petition
for
Discretionary
Review
pursuant
to
Rule
66.3(b),
Tex.
R.
App.
Proc.
which
states
that,
one
of
the
non-‐exclusive
reasons
for
this
Court
to
grant
a
discretionary
review,
is
that
the
Court
of
Appeals
has
decided
an
important
question
of
state
law
that
has
not
been,
but
should
be,
settled
by
the
Court
of
Criminal
Appeals.
The
appellant
would
respectfully
submit
that
the
Court
of
Appeals
has
decided
an
important
question
of
state
law
that
has
not
been,
but
should
be
settled
the
Court
of
Criminal
Appeals.
C.
The
appellant
respectfully
petitions
this
Honorable
Court
to
grant
this
Petition
for
Discretionary
Review
pursuant
to
Rule
66.3(d),
Tex.
R.
App.
Proc.
which
states
that,
one
of
the
non-‐exclusive
reasons
for
this
Court
to
grant
a
discretionary
review,
is
that
the
Court
of
Appeals
has
misconstrued
a
statute.
The
appellant
would
respectfully
submit
that
the
8
opinion
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
has
misconstrued
a
relevant
provision
of
the
Texas
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure.
GROUND
FOR
REVIEW
9
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
THE
APPELLANT
WAS
ARRESTED
PURSUANT
TO
A
VALID
ARREST
WARRANT
AND
AS
A
CONSEQUENCE
CONTRABAND
FOUND
ON
HIS
PERSON
WAS
LEGALLY
SEIZED
AND
ADMITTED
INTO
EVIDENCE
ARGUMENT
AND
AUTHORITIES
IN
SUPPORT
OF
THE
GROUND
FOR
REVIEW
STATEMENT
OF
APPLICABLE
FACTS
Prior
to
the
onset
of
the
trial,
the
appellant
caused
to
be
filed
a
written
“Motion
to
Suppress
Evidence”
in
which
he
sought
to
suppress
the
fruits
of
a
search
of
his
person.
Asserted
therein
was
a
claim
that
the
actions
of
law
enforcement
violated
the
Fourth
Amendment
to
the
United
States
Constitution
along
with
Art.
38.23,
Tex.
Code
Crim.
Proc.
Ann.
(West
2014)
(C.R.-‐16
)
The
trial
Court
conducted
an
evidentiary
hearing
on
the
motion,
at
the
conclusion
of
which
the
motion
to
suppress
was
denied
and
findings
of
fact
and
conclusions
of
law
were
entered
by
the
trial
Court.
The
trial
court
conducted
a
hearing
on
that
motion
prior
to
trial.
(R.R.2-‐4
thru
28)
At
the
hearing
it
was
established
that
the
appellant
was
arrested
on
August
28,
2012
by
Officer
David
Camacho
of
the
Guadalupe
County
Sheriff’s
Department.
The
arrest
of
the
appellant
was
executed
by
means
of
an
arrest
warrant
issued
that
same
day
by
a
Justice
of
the
Peace
for
Guadalupe
County,
alleging
that
the
appellant
had
committed
the
offense
of
Engaging
in
Organized
Criminal
Activity.1
Camacho
related
that
after
verifying
the
validity
1
The Warrant Of Arrest was admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress as
State’s exhibit 1. The supporting complaint/affidavit was admitted into evidence as State’s
exhibit 2.
10
of
the
warrant,
he
along
with
a
fellow
officer,
went
to
the
home
of
the
appellant
in
Seguin.
After
locating
the
appellant,
Camacho
conducted
a
“search
incident
to
arrest”
which
resulted
in
the
discovery
and
seizure
of
the
four
balloons
of
heroin
that
formed
the
basis
for
the
appellant’s
indictment.
(R.R.2-‐12,
13)
Camacho
also
related
that
he
had
no
reason
to
believe
that
the
arrest
warrant
that
formed
the
basis
for
the
appellant’s
arrest
and
subsequent
search
was
lacking
in
probable
cause.2
(R.R.12)
The
warrant
in
question
authorized
the
appellant’s
arrest
for
the
offense
of
“Engage
in
Organized
Criminal
Activity”.
The
warrant
was
supported
by
a
five-‐page
affidavit/complaint
presented
to
the
magistrate
by
Clint
Halbardier,
of
the
Seguin
Police
Department.
That
affidavit
purported
to
present
a
case
establishing
probable
cause
to
believe
that
six
named
individuals3
had
committed
the
offense
of
Organized
Criminal
Activity
by
committing
the
offense
of
Aggravated
Assault
against
Roberto
Herrera
while
committing
the
assault
in
concert
of
three
or
more
individuals.
4
The
Halbardier
affidavit
went
on
to
detail
an
investigation
conducted
by
members
of
the
Seguin
Police
department
regarding
an
alleged
assault
committed
against
Roberto
Herrera
on
August
26,
2012.
In
support
of
the
allegations
in
the
affidavit
Halbardier
relied
in
substantial
part
on
information
provided
by
four
“unnamed
witnesses”
who
allegedly
witnessed
the
assault
in
question,
or
were
privy
to
certain
circumstantial
evidence
relating
to
the
assault
and
the
alleged
perpetrators
thereof.
The
affidavit
in
question
contains
a
number
a
number
of
assertions
regarding
the
behavior
of
the
other
five
suspects
named
in
2
Camacho did not relate what the warrant and underlying affidavit/compliant established vis-à-
vis probable cause in terms of an offense.
3
The individuals named were as follows: Danny Ramon Gonzales, Roy Martinez, Alvin Valadez
(the appellant), Christopher Lopez, Ezekiel Longoria, and Abel Lomas.
4
See: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(a)(1) (West 2014)
11
the
affidavit.
With
respect
to
the
assertions
in
the
affidavit
that
relate
to
the
acts
of
the
appellant
there
are
four
assertions
contained
in
the
affidavit
that
purport
to
establish
probable
cause
to
believe
that
the
appellant
had
committed
the
offense
in
question.
They
are
as
follows:
1)
UW35
stated
that
(the
appellant)
showed
up
after
at
his
residence
after
the
assault
and
threatened
UW3.
UW3
also
asserted
that
the
Valadez
threatened
UW3
not
to
tell
anything
to
tell
the
police
anything
about
the
assault;
2)
UW46
purportedly
informed
the
affiant
that
the
appellant
had
made
threats
to
UW4;
3)
Halbardier
also
asserted
that
the
appellant
was
a
“documented”
member
of
the
Mexican
Mafia;
4)
Halbadier
also
included
a
non-‐factual
conclusion
that
the
appellant
“is
acting
in
concert
with
the
other
suspects
in
trying
to
threaten
witnesses
not
to
give
their
testimony
to
police
and
to
help
avoid
prosecution
for
the
aggravated
assault
of
the
victim”.
No
other
factual
assertions
contained
in
the
Halbardier
affidavit
relate
to
acts
attributed
to
the
appellant
before,
during,
or
after
the
alleged
assault
against
Roberto
Herrera.
Following
the
conclusion
of
the
hearing
the
trial
Court
denied
the
appellant’s
motion
to
suppress
the
evidence.
(R.R.2-‐27)
Prior
to
the
onset
of
the
trial,
the
trial
court
made
findings
of
fact
and
conclusions
of
law.
Those
consist
of
the
following:
The
defendant
was
arrested
on
a
warrant
issued
on
August
28th,
2012
by
Justice
of
the
Peace
Precinct
Four,
Guadalupe
County,
based
on
a
probable
cause
affidavit
submitted
by
Detective
Clint
Halbardier.
5
The affiant described UW3 as a gainfully employed Texas resident with acquaintances involved
in the Mexican Mafia.
6
The affiant described UW4 as a resident of Seguin with no criminal history.
12
The
probable
cause
affidavit
for
said
warrant
contained
information
that
established
probable
cause
for
(the
appellant)
to
be
charged
with
various
offenses,
including
conspiracy
to
commit
aggravated
assault,
aggravated
assault,
aggravated
assault
as
a
party
to
that
offense,
organized
criminal
activity
to
commit
aggravated
assault,
obstruction
or
retaliation,
and
even
possibly
tampering
with
witnesses.
Because
such
probable
cause
was
established
for
each
offense,
the
Justice
of
the
Peace
could
have
issued
the
warrant
naming
any
of
those
felony
offenses.
The
arresting
officers
were
acting
in
good
faith
reliance
on
the
warrant.
Even
if
the
probable
cause
was
inadequate
for
organized
criminal
activity,
probable
cause
was
established
for
other
felony
offenses.
(R.R.5-‐18,
19)
ARGUMENT
IN
THE
LOWER
COURTS
In
the
trial
Court
the
appellant
asserted
that
the
arrest
warrant,
that
formed
the
legal
foundation
for
his
arrest
and
the
subsequent
search
of
his
person,
was
illegal
in
that
it
failed
to
demonstrate
“probable
cause”
to
warrant
a
belief
by
the
issuing
magistrate
that
the
appellant
had
committed
the
offense
of
Organized
Criminal
Activity.
That
argument
formed
the
basis
of
the
appellant’s
sole
point
of
error
in
his
appeal
to
the
San
Antonio
Court
of
Appeals.
The
appellant’s
sole
point
of
error
was
overruled
and
the
appellant’s
conviction
and
sentence
were
affirmed
in
all
respects.
HOLDING
OF
THE
LOWER
COURT
The
lower
Court
reasoned
as
follows:
“In
viewing
the
totality
of
the
circumstances
in
a
common
sense
and
realistic
manner,
we
conclude
the
magistrate
had
a
substantial
basis
for
concluding
that
probable
cause
was
shown
to
issue
the
arrest
warrant
against
Valadez.
…
The
affidavit
provided
sufficient
facts
that,
together
with
reasonable
inferences
13
therefrom,
provided
a
“fair
probability”
or
“substantial
chance”
that
Valadez
was
engaged
in
organized
criminal
activity.”
Valadez
v.
State,
supra,
at
slip
op.
pg.
12.
The
appellant
respectfully
submits
that
the
holding
of
the
Court
below
is
in
conflict
with
the
applicable
opinions
from
this
Court
with
respect
to
what
constitutes
“probable
cause”
for
an
arrest.
The
appellant
also
would
submit
that
what
constitutes
“probable
cause”
to
issue
an
arrest
warrant
for
the
offense
of
Engaging
in
Organized
Criminal
Activity
has
never
been
addressed
by
this
Court
and
as
a
result
an
important
question
of
state
law
is
presented
by
the
instant
case
and
review
of
that
issue
by
this
Court
is
warranted.
Lastly,
the
opinion
of
the
Court
below
appears
to
misconstrue
the
statutory
provision
mandating
that
an
arrest
warrant
must
contain
information
that
demonstrates
that
the
accused
has
committed
some
offense
against
the
laws
of
the
State,
either
directly
or
that
the
affiant
has
good
reason
to
believe
,
and
does
believe,
that
the
accused
has
committed
such
offense.
See:
Art.
15.05,
Tex
Code
Crim.
Proc.
Ann.
(West
2014).
These
three
contentions
will
be
addressed
hereinafter
in
the
order
set
forth
above.
I
With
respect
to
what
constitutes
“probable
cause”
this
Court
has
stated
on
a
number
of
occasions
that
“probable
cause”
exists
when
the
affidavit/complaint
provides
the
issuing
magistrate
with
sufficient
information
to
support
an
independent
judgment
that
probable
exists
for
the
warrant.
Jones
v.
State,
568
S.W.3d
847
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1978).
The
14
establishment
of
probable
cause
mandates
that
an
affidavit
in
support
of
an
arrest
warrant
contain
facts
and
circumstances
within
the
affiant’s
knowledge
and
of
which
he
has
reasonably
trustworthy
information,
sufficient
to
warrant
a
prudent
person
to
believe
that
the
subject
of
the
arrest
warrant
has
committed
an
offense.
State
v.
Streetman,
93
S.W.3d
102
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
2002).
In
the
case
of
an
arrest
warrant,
such
as
in
the
instant
case,
the
issuing
magistrate,
and
the
reviewing
trial
judge
are
limited
to
the
contents
of
the
affidavit
in
support
of
the
warrant/complaint.
Aguilar
v.
Texas,
378
U.S.
108,
84
S.Ct.
1509
(1964);
State
v.
McLain,
337
S.W.3d
268
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
2011).
In
a
case
involving
a
warrant,
and
the
underlying
affidavit,
there
are
no
credibility
issues
to
take
into
account
hence
an
appellate
court
is
to
employ
the
de
novo
standard
of
review
in
passing
on
the
propriety
of
trial
court’s
ruling.
See:
Bonds
v.
State,
403
S.W.3d
867
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
2013).
The
opinion
of
the
Court
below
recognized
these
concepts
in
the
course
of
its
review
of
the
trial
Court’s
ruling.
Nevertheless,
it
is
and
was
the
appellant’s
contention
that
even
in
reviewing
the
affidavit
in
a
“common
sense”
manner
as
opposed
to
a
“hypertechnical”
manner
the
four
corners
of
the
affidavit
in
dispute
wholly
fail
to
support
a
finding
by
a
reasonably
prudent
person
that
the
appellant
had
committed
the
offense
of
Engaging
in
Organized
Crime.
The
offense
of
Engaging
in
Organized
Activity
is
defined
in
a
highly
circumscribed
manner,
and
is
limited
in
its
scope.
It
requires
proof
that
the
accused
as
a
member
of
a
criminal
street
gang
committed
or
conspired
to
commit…
aggravated
assault.
See:
Tex.
Penal
Code
Ann.
§§
71.01(d)
&
71.02(a)(1)
(West
2014).
In
the
context
of
the
instant
case,
a
valid
warrant
for
the
named
offense
would
necessitate
factual
assertions,
within
the
four
corners
of
the
affidavit,
that
the
subject
of
the
warrant
that
the
named
suspect
had
acted
as
15
a
member
of
a
criminal
street
gang.7
It
would
also
necessitate
factual
assertions,
within
the
four
corners
of
the
affidavit,
that
the
suspect
person
had
committed
the
offense
of
aggravated
assault8.
Those
are
the
elements
of
the
offense
for
which
the
instant
warrant
was
issued
and
the
arrest
was
perfected.
It
is
the
contention
of
the
appellant
that
the
affidavit
is
question
is
wholly
devoid
of
any
facts
that
would
support
a
finding
by
the
issuing
magistrate
that
the
named
suspect
(the
appellant),
acting
as
a
member
of
a
criminal
street
gang,
as
defined,
had
committed
aggravated
assault
on
the
person
of
Roberto
Machado
Herrera.
The
entirety
of
the
affidavit
in
question
reflects
nothing
more
than
actions
by
the
appellant
after
the
fact.
There
are
no
facts
contained
within
the
four
corners
of
the
affidavit
that
so
much
as
suggest
that
the
appellant
assaulted
the
complainant
or
that
he
aided,
abetted
or
assisted
the
actors
named
in
the
affidavit.
The
implications
contained
in
the
affidavit
suggest
nothing
more
than
the
appellant
acquired
knowledge
of
the
event
in
question
after
the
fact
and
sought
to
assist
the
named
actors
avoid
apprehension
and
or
prosecution.
This
is
a
far
cry
from
presenting
facts
to
the
issuing
magistrate
that
would
support
a
reasonable
belief
that
the
appellant
had
participated
in
the
assault
in
any
fashion.
By
finding
to
the
contrary,
the
court
below
has
issued
an
opinion
that
is
in
conflict
with
the
holdings
of
this
Court
on
the
issue
of
what
constitutes
probable
cause
for
an
arrest
warrant.
See:
McFarland
v.
State,
928
S.W.
482
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1996);
Gibbs
v.
State,
819
7
“Three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable
leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities. Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 71.01(d), supra.
8
The affidavit in dispute did not assert that the facts supported an arrest warrant on the grounds
that the appellant had conspired to commit the offense of aggravated assault as a member of a
criminal street gang. (State’s exhibit 3, pg. 2)
16
S.W.2d
821
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1991);
Gordon
v.
State,
801
S.W.2d
899
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1990);
Janecka
v.
State,
739
S.W.2d
813
(Tex.
Crim.
App.
1987).
The
opinion
of
the
lower
court
is
in
conflict
with
the
applicable
holdings
of
this
court
on
the
question
of
what
constitutes
a
valid
affidavit
in
support
of
an
arrest
warrant.
Review
of
the
holding
of
the
lower
court
is
warranted.
II
The
appellant
would
also
submit
to
this
court
that
the
question
of
what
constitutes
a
valid
and
sufficient
affidavit
to
warrant
the
issuance
of
an
arrest
warrant
for
the
offense
of
Engaging
in
Organized
Crime
has
never
been
addressed
by
this
court
in
any
fashion,
Consequently,
this
case
presents
an
important
question
of
State
law,
that
has
not
been,
but
should
be
decided
by
this
court.
Review
of
the
holding
of
the
lower
court
is
warranted.
III
Lastly
the
appellant
would
submit
that
the
holding
of
the
lower
court
has
misconstrued
the
statute
that
governs
the
sufficiency
of
arrest
warrants.
More
specifically
the
appellant
would
submit
that
the
opinion
of
the
lower
court
has
misconstrued
Art.
15.05
(2),
Tex.
Code
Crim.
Proc.
ann.
(West
2014)
which
sets
forth
the
statutory
requirements
for
a
valid
affidavit
in
support
of
an
arrest
warrant.9
The
opinion
of
the
lower
court
has
misconstrued
that
provision.
Review
of
the
holding
of
the
lower
court
is
warranted.
9
The complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it have these substantial
requisites:…. It must show that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of the
State, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and does believe that the
accused has committed such offense.
17
CONCLUSION
AND
PRAYER
It
is
respectfully
requested,
by
the
appellant
that
a
petition
for
discretionary
review
to
the
Fourth
Court
of
Appeals
be
granted
and
that
the
case
be
briefed
on
the
merits
of
the
appellant’s
ground
for
review
with
argument
to
follow.
Respectfully
submitted,
/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III
EDWARD
F.
SHAUGHNESSY,
III
Attorney
at
Law
206
E.
Locust
San
Antonio,
Texas
78212
(210)
212-‐6700
(210)
212-‐2178
(fax)
SBN
18134500
Attorney
for
the
appellant
18
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
I,
Edward
F.
Shaughnessy,
III.,
certify
that
a
copy
of
the
foregoing
petition
was
mailed
to
Heather
McMinn,
District
Attorney,
25th
Judicial
District,
211
W.
Court
Street,
Suite
260,
Seguin,
Texas
78155,
on
this
the
_6_
day
of
November,
2015.
/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
I,
Edward
F.
Shaughnessy,
III
certify
that
a
copy
of
the
foregoing
petition
was
mailed
to
the
office
of
the
State
Prosecuting
Attorney,
P.O.
Box
78711,
Austin,
Texas
78711,
on
this
the
_6_
day
of
November,
2015.
/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III
CERTIFICATE
OF
COMPLIANCE
I,
Edward
F.
Shaughnessy,
III,
attorney
for
the
appellant
hereby
certify
that
the
instant
pleading
contains
3624
words,
exclusive
of
the
appendix.
/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III
19
APPENDIX
20
Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-14-00626-CR
Alvin VALADEZ Jr.,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 13-1568-CR-C
Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 16, 2015
AFFIRMED
This case arises from the conviction of Appellant Alvin Valadez Jr. for felony possession
of a controlled substance. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Valadez was
convicted by a jury. Valadez entered a plea of true to the State’s allegations regarding prior
consecutive felony convictions and the jury assessed punishment at life confinement in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
In his sole issue on appeal, Valadez argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
to suppress evidence because the complaint supporting the arrest warrant failed to demonstrate
04-14-00626-CR
probable cause he committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Valadez’s Arrest
On August 28, 2012, a Guadalupe County justice of the peace signed an arrest warrant
authorizing the arrest of Alvin Valadez Jr. for the offense of engaging in organized criminal
activity. The warrant was supported by a complaint asserting Valadez and five other individuals
committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity with the underlying offense being
the aggravated assault of Roberto Machado Herrera Jr.
2. Arrest Warrant
Seguin Police Department Detective Clinton Halbardier signed the five-page complaint 1
based on his investigation and that of the Seguin Police Department. In his application, Detective
Halbardier reported he relied on statements provided by four unnamed informants who directly
witnessed the assault in question or were privy to certain circumstantial evidence relating to the
assault. Detective Halbardier further averred that he believed these witnesses to be credible and
the magistrate could rely on them. He cited interviews with the victim, previous investigations of
the listed suspects, and Seguin Police Department offense reports and supplemental reports.
Detective Halbardier’s complaint asserted that on August 26, 2012, Herrera was
approached by five or six men who questioned him about his gang affiliation. After Herrera
informed the group he was part of the “Orejones,” the group asserted they were the “EME” or the
“Merecido,” common names for the Mexican Mafia. The group further instructed Herrera that he
1
We note Detective Halbardier is the complainant on the application of the arrest warrant. His statement is sworn
before the magistrate. The terms complaint and affidavit are, therefore, used interchangeably in this opinion.
-2-
04-14-00626-CR
should deny being a member of the Orejones because he was in Merecido territory. As Herrera
exited his vehicle, one of the individuals waived his arm and Herrera was attacked from behind
with a knife. Herrera was stabbed and beaten.
Detective Halbardier averred that all six suspects, including Valadez, were confirmed to
be active gang members. The officer outlined Valadez’s affiliation as “a documented Mexican
Mafia gang member” and a “lieutenant with the Mexican Mafia,” based on national and state
database information searches.
Detective Halbardier also relied on the statements of four witnesses who asked to be
unnamed in the complaint for “personal safety and security reasons.” Two of the witnesses were
gainfully employed, had previously provided credible information, and had acquaintances
involved in the Mexican Mafia. The third witness was present during the assault and his statement
corroborated Herrera’s statements, and the final witness had no criminal history. Two of the four
witnesses reported being threatened not to tell officers about the assault. Additionally, several of
the informants reported the assault stemmed from suspicions that Herrera stole drugs from
Valadez. Detective Halbardier’s complaint concluded,
considering all of the known facts and the current information provided by the
witnesses, [Valadez] has been named multiple times in the past as the leader of the
Mexican Mafia in Seguin. [Valadez] is acting in concert with the other suspects in
trying to threaten witnesses not to give their testimony to police and to help avoid
prosecution for the aggravated assault on the victim.
A Guadalupe County justice of the peace issued the arrest warrant that same day, authorizing the
arrest of Valadez for the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. After locating and
securing Valadez, Guadalupe County Sheriff’s Office Investigator David Camacho executed the
arrest warrant and conducted a search incident to arrest. During the search, Investigator Camacho
discovered four balloons of heroin in Valadez’s pocket.
-3-
04-14-00626-CR
B. Hearing on the Motion to Suppress the Arrest Warrant
On August 20, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Valadez’s motion to suppress the
arrest warrant based on the complaint’s failure to establish probable cause.
Investigator Camacho testified that on August 28, 2012, he traveled to Valadez’s residence
to arrest Valadez. Investigator Camacho was familiar with Valadez and positively identified
Valadez at his residence; after a short scuffle, Valadez was taken into custody without further
incident. The officer conducted a search incident to arrest and located four balloons of heroin in
Valadez’s pocket.
Detective Halbardier described the overall structure of the Mexican Mafia and that
lieutenants were generally in charge of day-to-day operations in a specific city or county. He also
relayed the Mexican Mafia was known for engaging in both sanctioned and unsanctioned assaults.
Detective Halbardier testified that, in his opinion, the assault on Herrera was a sanctioned assault
by Valadez.
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Valadez’s motion to
suppress the evidence but did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law at that time. The
case was called before a jury on August 25, 2014. After both sides rested and closed their cases,
but prior to closing arguments, the trial court stated, on the record, the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
[Valadez] was arrested on a warrant issued on August 28th, 2012, by Justice
of the Peace Precinct Four, Guadalupe County, based on a probable cause
[complaint] submitted by Detective Clint Halbardier.
The probable cause [complaint] for said warrant contained information
which established probable cause for Alvin Valadez, Jr., to be charged with various
offenses, including conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, aggravated assault as
a party to that offense, organized criminal activity to commit aggravated assault,
obstruction or retaliation, and even possibly tampering with witnesses. Because
such probable cause was established for each offense, the Justice of the Peace
could’ve issued the warrant naming any of those felony offenses.
-4-
04-14-00626-CR
The arresting officers were acting in good faith reliance on the warrant.
Even if the probable cause was inadequate for organized criminal activity, probable
cause was established for other felony offenses.
See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding the trial court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient if they are “recorded in some way, whether written
out and filed by the trial court, or stated on the record at the hearing”).
In his sole issue on appeal, Valadez argues that because the complaint supporting the arrest
warrant failed to demonstrate probable cause that Valadez committed the offense of engaging in
organized criminal activity, the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the arrest
warrant.
SUPPRESSION OF ARREST WARRANT
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress on a bifurcated
standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts that depend on credibility choices; we review the court’s application of the law de novo. See
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Amador v. State, 221
S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Because we look only
within the four corners of the complaint to determine whether probable cause to issue a warrant
exists, the trial court is not required to make any credibility choices in inspecting the affidavit.
Robuck v. State, 40 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet ref’d).
We note this case involves not only the trial court’s determination of probable cause, but
also the underlying question of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. In doing so, we use
a substantial basis standard of review based on the totality of the circumstances presented to the
magistrate. See Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (applying Illinois v.
-5-
04-14-00626-CR
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236–39 (1983). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld
if there is any valid theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not base its
decision on that theory. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Argument of the Parties
Valadez contends that because the State failed to demonstrate the arrest warrant was
supported by a complaint demonstrating probable cause to arrest on the charge of engaging in
organized criminal activity, the trial court erred in denying Valadez’s motion to suppress. Valadez
argues that the warrant was devoid of the facts necessary to support a magistrate’s independent
judgment that probable cause existed that either Valadez, “or any other named suspects, acted with
the intent to establish maintain or participate in the profits of a combination or a criminal street
gang.”
The State counters that the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause for the offense
because the issuing magistrate could reasonably infer that Valadez had conspired with other
members of the Mexican Mafia to commit an aggravated assault against Herrera.
C. Probable Cause to Support Issuance of the Warrant
“An arrest warrant affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to
support an independent determination that probable cause exists to believe that the accused has
committed a crime.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), abrogated
on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also
State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Gurrusqueita v. State, 244 S.W.3d
450, 452 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). We must, therefore, determine whether the
probable cause affidavit in question provided the magistrate with sufficient information to support
an independent judgment that probable cause existed to issue a warrant for Valadez’s arrest. Flores
v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
-6-
04-14-00626-CR
1. Totality of the Circumstances
A reviewing court’s assessment of the affidavit’s sufficiency is limited to “a reasonable
reading” within the four corners of the affidavit while simultaneously recognizing the magistrate’s
discretion to draw reasonable inferences. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Rodriguez v.
State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); State v. Coker, 406 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d). The magistrate’s probable-cause determination must be upheld if
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of a
crime. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). Probable cause
requires the affiant to demonstrate there is a probability that the accused committed an offense,
not that the evidence proves the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moss v. State, 75
S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d). “This is a flexible, nondemanding
standard.” Coker, 406 S.W.3d at 396 (citing Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354). A magistrate is enabled
to draw reasonable, common-sense inferences from the facts and circumstances contained in the
affidavit; however, a magistrate may not merely rubber stamp the bare conclusions of others. See
also Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354, Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61.
Our review focuses on the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued “to ensure
. . . an abdication of the magistrate’s duty does not occur.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Our review
must remain realistic and not hyper-technical and we “must uphold the magistrate’s decision so
long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Duarte,
389 S.W.3d at 354; accord State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
An appellate court’s focus cannot be on what other facts “could or should have been
included in the affidavit,” but rather must be “on the combined logical force of facts that actually
are in the affidavit.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354–55; accord Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 60. The
affiant’s reliability, as well as the reliability of his sources, are part of the totality of the
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circumstances that the magistrate should evaluate in making a probable-cause determination. See
Coker, 406 S.W.3d at 396.
We thus turn to the circumstances set out within the four corners of the probable cause
affidavit before us.
2. Charge Contained within the Arrest Warrant
The complaint alleged that Valadez,
on or about the 26th through 27th day of August, 2012, in Guadalupe County,
Texas, did then and there commit the offense of Engaging in Organized Criminal
Activity—Aggravated Assault by intentionally and knowingly causing serious
bodily injury to the victim, Roberto Machado Herrera Jr., by punching, kicking and
stabbing with a knife or lethal cutting instrument, while committing the act in
concert of three or more individuals, against the laws of the State.
Detective Halbardier’s affidavit averred that he relied on (1) the Seguin Police Department
offense report and supplements, (2) multiple offense investigations involving several of the named
suspects, (3) multiple witness interviews, (4) suspect interviews, (5) interviews of other involved
persons, and (6) his personal observations. We first address Detective Halbardier’s reliance on
unnamed informants.
3. Affidavit’s Reliance On Unnamed Informants
“With regard to an informant’s tips, we take into account the informant’s veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge to determine the value of his assertions, as well as whether his
information is stale.” Rivas v. State, 446 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.)
(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,
pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g)). “Corroboration of the details of an informant’s tip through independent
police investigation can also be relevant in the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.”
Davis, 144 S.W.3d at 197 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–42). The affidavit must also set forth the
basis upon which the officer formed the underlying “belief in an informant’s credibility and
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veracity.” Id. “‘[A] deficiency in one may be compensated . . . by a strong showing as to the
other, or by some other indicia of reliability,’ all of which are relevant considerations under the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Gates, U.S. at 233).
“While information from an unnamed informant alone does not establish probable cause,
the informant’s tip combined with an independent police investigation may provide a substantial
basis for the probable-cause finding.” Cf. Lowery v. State, 843 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d); Serrano v. State, 123 S.W.3d 53, 62–63 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet
ref’d). The unnamed informant’s credibility may be established by allegations that the informant
has proven reliable on previous occasions. Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 726 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). “This reliability may be established by the general assertions
of the affiant, as stated in the affidavit, concerning the informant’s prior reliability.” Id.
Here, Detective Halbardier indicated he relied on four different unnamed witnesses. The
first had “acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia and knows the details of the gang”; the
second was present when the assault occurred and corroborated the victim’s description of the
assault; the third is gainfully employed and has acquaintances involved in the Mexican Mafia; and
the fourth was a resident of Seguin with no criminal history. Detective Halbardier further opined,
“I believe the unnamed witnesses are credible and that I and any magistrate can rely on their
information in the matters such as these.” Although the third and fourth informants cannot be
characterized as eyewitnesses of the assault, both gave first-hand accounts of Valadez’s tactics.
Detective Halbardier knew who the informants were and could hold them accountable for
their statements and was able to establish each informant’s inherent reliability or basis of
knowledge. Additionally, each of the witnesses provided their statements directly to the police,
rather than placing an anonymous call or tip, and were unnamed for the sake of their safety. See
Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).
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4. Other Information Relied upon by the Officer
Information “of unknown reliability must be coupled with facts from which an inference
may be drawn that the informant is credible.” Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 357. However, when the
affidavit contains information given by an informant or eyewitness, the affidavit is sufficient if the
information adequately suggests direct knowledge on his or her part. Wilkerson v. State, 726
S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 894 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 1995, pet. ref’d) (“if the named informant is a private citizen whose only contact with the
police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act . . . the credibility and reliability of the
informant is inherent”).
Detective Halbardier relied on another officer’s interview of the victim taken at the
hospital. In Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 156 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals stated that “[o]bservations reported to the affiant by other officers engaged in
the investigation can constitute a reliable basis for issuing a warrant.”
a. Victim’s Statement
Herrera told Seguin Police Detective Jaime Diaz that he was with two other individuals
when they drove by a party and one of his friends began talking to Ezekiel Longoria, one of the
named conspirators. Longoria asked Herrera “what gang he belonged to,” and Herrera replied
“Orejones.” When Herrera exited the vehicle, Longoria waived his hand and two other individuals
attacked Herrera from behind. Herrera stated “approximately five to six males were assaulting at
one time.” The informant also told Detective Diaz the assault was “set up” because Herrera was
suspected of stealing narcotics that belonged to Valadez. This statement was corroborated by the
third informant’s report that two of the individuals that attacked Herrera, including Valadez,
threatened the informant to “keep his mouth shut.” See Davila v. State, No. AP-76,105, 2011 WL
303265, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2011) (not designated for publication) (relying on
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eyewitness identification of the shooter as support for the arrest warrant); State v. Ozuna, 88
S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d).
b. National and State Databases and other Officers’ Reports
Detective Halbardier confirmed with local, state, and federal officers and with national and
state databases that Valdez was a lieutenant with the Mexican Mafia.
During the past several months of investigating multiple violent gang-related
offenses, working with several Local, State, and Federal officers, it has been
confirmed that all of [these] six individuals are active gang members.
Detective Halbardier also testified he relied on reports from the Seguin Police Department. The
information contained in the affidavit may be based on either direct personal observations of the
affiant or on hearsay information. Belton, 900 S.W.2d at 893. In Belton, the appellant claimed
that because the affidavit in question reflected no personal knowledge on the part of the affiant,
the arrest warrant lacked probable cause. Id. at 894. The court rejected this argument, noting that
the affidavit contained a statement that the affiant possessed police reports and sworn statements,
as well as information from a witness who had actual knowledge concerning appellant’s
participation in a crime. Id.
Because Detective Halbardier read the Seguin Police Department offense report and
supplements, investigated multiple offenses involving several of the named suspects, and
interviewed multiple witnesses, suspects, and other involved persons, his personal observations
meet the low threshold illustrated in Belton. Id.; see also Kolbert v. State, 644 S.W.2d 150, 153
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.).
Corroboration means, that in light of the circumstances, the officer confirms enough facts
to reasonably conclude the information provided is reliable. See State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184,
189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). We therefore conclude that Detective Halbardier
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was entitled to rely on the information provided to him by other officers’ investigations and thus
entitled to rely upon the information provided by the victim and the unnamed informants.
CONCLUSION
In viewing the totality of the circumstances in a common sense and realistic manner, we
conclude the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause was shown to
issue the arrest warrant against Valadez. The officers obtained information from several unnamed
informants that corroborated the victim’s statement as well and the information provided by other
state, local, and national agencies. Given Detective Halbardier’s training and the stated credibility
of the unnamed informants, the magistrate could reasonably infer that Valadez was tied to the
assault on Herrera. The affidavit provided sufficient facts that, together with reasonable inferences
therefrom, provided a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” that Valadez was engaged in
organized criminal activity. See Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702; Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying Valadez’s motion to suppress his
arrest warrant. 2
Having overruled Valadez’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
PUBLISH
2
Because we conclude the magistrate had probable cause to issue the arrest warrant based on the allegations that
Valadez engaged in organized criminal activity in the assault of Herrera, we need not address Investigator Camacho’s
good faith exception.
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