ACCEPTED
03-15-00301-CR
7353683
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/13/2015 2:42:18 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-15-000301-CR
COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/14/2015 2:42:18 PM
AUSTIN THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICTJEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
EX PARTE JOSE C. LOREDO,
Appellant
APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1
HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS
TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 095790
STATE'S BRIEF
Ralph Guerrero
First Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Hays County Government Center
712 South Stagecoach Trail, Suite 2057
San Marcos, Texas 78666
Ph: (512) 393-7600/Fax; (512) 393-7619
State Bar No. 24041021
ralph.guerrero@co.hays.tx.us
Attorney for the State of Texas
Emily E.L. Landeros
ORAL ARGUMENT IS
Law Clerk
NOT REQUESTED
Associate Member of the State Bar of Texas
State Bar No. 24095477
emily.landeros@co.hays.tx.us
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant: Jose Concepcion Loredo
Appellate Counsel: David Mendoza
608 S. Guadalupe Street
San Marcos, Texas 78666
Writ Counsel: David Mendoza
Trial Counsel: Lawrence Souza
101 Stumberg
San Antonio, Texas 78204
Appellee: State of Texas
Counsel: Wes Mau, Criminal District Attorney
712 S. Stagecoach Trail, Ste. 2057
San Marcos, TX 78666
Appellate Counsel: Ralph Guerrero, First Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
Post-Conviction Counsel: Angie D. Roberts-Huckaby, Assistant
District Attorney
Trial Counsel: Amy Lockhart, Assistant District
Attorney
Chris Johnson, Assistant District
Attorney
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iu
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 3
ISSUE PRESENTED 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 8
STATE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S SOLE ISSUE 8
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF BECAUSE A DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUE DOES NOT EXIST
IN THIS CASE..... 9
H. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF BECAUSE APPELLANT WAIVED ANY DOUBLE JEOPARY
CLAIM IN HIS PLEA AGREEMENT 11
HI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF BECAUSE APPELLANT WAIVED ANY DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAIM BY FAILING TO RAISE A CLAIM AT TRIAL 13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. PROC. 9.4 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17
11
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) 11
State Cases
ExparteMarascio, Nos. WR-80,939-01, WR-80,939-02, & WR-80,939-03, 2015
WL 5853202 (Tex. Grim. App. Oct. 7, 2015) 11, 14
ExparteMilner, 394 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. Grim. App. 2013) 6, 9
State V. Moore, 240 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. Grim. App. 2007) 13
Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Grim. App. 2006) 8
Gonzales v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. Grim. App. 2000) 7, 13, 14
Exparte Birdwell, 7 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. Grim. App. 1999) 6, 11
Exparte Williams, 637 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Grim. App. 1982) 13
Ex parte Valenzuela-Rodriguez, No. 03-13-00249-GR, 2014 WL 4363140 (Tex.
App.—^Austin Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) 8
Moore v. State, 262 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.—^Fort Worth 2008) 12
State V. Shastid, 940 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per
curiam) 9
Matter ofM.C., 915 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App—San Antonio 1996, no writ) 8
Rules
Tex. R. App. Proc. 39.1 3
Tex. R. App. Proc. 39.7 3
111
NO. 03-15-000301-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
AUSTIN THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTPQCT
EX PARTE JOSE C. LOREDO,
Appellant
APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1
HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS
TmAL COURT CAUSE NO. 095790
STATE'S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW the State of Texas, by and through her First Assistant
District Attorney, Ralph Guerrero, and Law Clerk, Emily Landeros, and
respectfully submits this Brief in Opposition to Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule
38.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and would show the Court the
following:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jose Concepcion Loredo ("Appellant") was charged by information and
complaint with Assault Bodily Injury - Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor,
on May 5, 2010, (C.R. 9, 10). A Hays County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for
Aggravated Assault With a Deadly Weapon - Family Violence on October 14,
2010 (C.R. 44).
On September 8, 2011, Appellant entered a plea agreement for the felony
offense in which he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of Assault Causing
Bodily Injury - Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor. (C.R. 46). The plea
agreement included the special terms that Appellant would also plead guilty to the
misdemeanor assault charge pending in county court. (C.R. 46).
On the same day. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to Assault
Causing Bodily Injury - Family Violence in county court. (C.R. 16). He was
sentenced to 160 days for both offenses and given 160 days credit in both
judgments for time served. (C.R. 16-17, 55-56).
On March 6, 2015, Appellant filed an Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Seeking Relief from Double Jeopardy. (C.R. 18-21). The trial court
entered its order denying the application on June 29, 2015. (C.R. Suppl. 6).
Appellant appeals said denial. (C.R. 76).
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant has not requested oral argument in this case. The facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and oral argument
would not aid the decisional process. See Tex. R. App. Proc. 39.1. However,
should the Court desire the parties to appear and argue, the State would appear for
oral argument. See Tex. R. App. Proc. 39.7.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the trial court properly deny habeas corpus relief in response to an
alleged double jeopardy violation when the State prosecuted Appellant for two
separate felony and misdemeanor offenses, Appellant entered a plea agreement in
the felony case in which he pled guilty to a lesser misdemeanor offense. Appellant,
pursuant to that agreement, pled guilty to the pending misdemeanor charge in order
to receive a lesser sentence, and Appellant failed to preserve his double jeopardy
claim at trial?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Sunday, May 10, 2009, an officer with the San Marcos Police
Department responded to a call by victims April and Conchita Najera
("Conchita"). (C.R. 11-12). April informed the officer that she had gone to a park
with her child where she was assaulted by her ex-boyfnend. Appellant. (C.R. 11-
3
12). April claimed that Appellant approached her and "pulled her by the hair and
then grabbed her face along the jaw line." (C.R. 11-12). She escaped, but
Appellant grabbed her again by the hair and by the waist area and began to hit and
push her. (C.R. 12).
During that time, April's mother, Conchita, drove to the park and witnessed
Appellant assaulting her daughter. (C.R. 12). When Conchita asked Appellant why
he had assaulted her daughter, Appellant, just a few feet away from Conchita's
vehicle, said that it was none of her business and pulled out a knife with a silver
blade. (C.R. 12). Conchita told April to call the police. Appellant then ran to his
vehicle and left. (C.R. 12). The responding officer obtained several photographs of
April's injuries, which showed bruises to her face and left eye as well as scratches
to her nose. (C.R. 12). Both April and Conchita provided written statements. (C.R.
12).
Appellant was thereafter indicted for Aggravated Assault with a Deadly
Weapon - Family Violence, a second degree felony. (C.R. 44). Appellant was also
charged by information and complaint with Assault Causing Bodily Injury -
Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor. (C.R. 10, 11).
On September 8, 2011, a plea agreement was entered for the felony offense.
(C.R. 46). By agreement, Appellant pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of
Assault - Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor. (C.R. 46). The plea included
the special terms that Appellant would also plead guilty to the Assault - Family
Violence charge pending in county court. (C.R. 46-53).
On the same day. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to Assault
Bodily Injury - Family Violence in county court for the misdemeanor charge.
(C.R. 13-14, 16). He was sentenced to 160 days in county jail for both offenses
and given 160 days credit for time served. (C.R. 16-17, 55-56). Appellant was
represented by counsel, Lawrence Souza, when he entered both pleas. (C.R. 13-14,
46).
On January 28, 2015, Appellant filed an Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the felony case. (C.R. Cause No. CR-10-0816-A). However, Appellant
withdrew said application on February 4, 2015. (C.R. Cause No. CR-10-0816-A).
On March 6, 2015, Appellant filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Seeking Relief from Double Jeopardy in the misdemeanor case. (C.R. 18-21).
Appellant filed notice of appeal on May 14, 2015. (C.R. 76). The trial court entered
its order denying relief on June 29, 2015. (C.R. Suppl. 6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied Appellant's Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus because (1) no double jeopardy issue exists, (2) Appellant waived any
double jeopardy protections in his plea agreement, and (3) Appellant waived his
double jeopardy claim by failing to assert the claim at trial. The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against: "1) a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal; 2) a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and 3) multiple punishments for the same offense." Ex parte Milner,
394 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Appellant was prosecuted for two different offenses: a Class A misdemeanor
Assault in county court and Aggravated Assault in district court. In the felony case,
Appellant voluntarily pled to the lesser-included offense of Assault Causing Bodily
Injury - Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor, under a special agreement that
he would also plead guilty to the separate Class A misdemeanor assault charge
pending in county court. Therefore, no double jeopardy claim exists and the Court
should affirm the trial court's ruling.
Furthermore, Appellant waived any potential claim of double jeopardy by
voluntarily agreeing to the second assault prosecution as part of a plea agreement
resulting in a lesser sentence. See Ex parte Birdwell, 1 S.W.3d 160, 163-64 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). By pleading guilty to both charges in exchange for lesser
sentences. Appellant gave up any potential double jeopardy protections.
Finally, Appellant failed to preserve his double jeopardy claim at the trial
court. An appellant may raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal
or collateral attack only when (1) "the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy
violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record," and (2) "enforcement of
usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interests." Gonzales v.
State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Appellant failed to raise his
double jeopardy claim prior to taking advantage of the plea agreement which
necessarily waived that claim. Therefore, no violation is clearly apparent from this
record, and the legitimate state interest in giving effect to negotiated pleas would
be undermined by allowing him to make this claim after lying behind the log until
now. Consequently, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of relief
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
STATE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S SOLE ISSUE
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that he is unlawfully restrained of his
liberty by and through a subsequent conviction and punishment for the same
offense. (App. Br., p. 5). A double jeopardy issue does not exist in this case
because Appellant was prosecuted for two different offenses. Alternatively, even if
a double jeopardy issue did exist, Appellant waived any double jeopardy claim in
his plea agreement by agreeing to subject himself to the same offense in order to
receive a lesser sentence. Finally, Appellant waived his double jeopardy claim by
failing to assert it at the trial court and therefore, he cannot raise his claim for the
first time on collateral attack.
On appeal, the appellate court reviews the habeas corpus decision of the trial
court in the light most favorable to the ruling and shall uphold the ruling absent a
clear abuse of discretion. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Ex parte Valenzuela-Rodriguez, No. 03-13-00249-CR, 2014 WL 4363140,
at *1 (Tex. App.—^Austin Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). In granting or
denying habeas corpus relief, the trial court is presumed to have acted correctly.
See Matter of M.C., 915 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no
writ). Further, the appellate court will affirm the trial court's decision if it "is
correct on any theory of law applicable to the case." State v. Shastid, 940 S.W.2d
405, 407 (Tex. App.—^Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per curiam).
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS
CORPUS RELIEF BECAUSE A DOUBLE JEOPARDY
ISSUE DOES NOT EXIST IN THIS CASE
"The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from three
things: 1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 2) a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 3) multiple punishments for
the same offense." Exparte Milner, 394 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Appellant argues that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by and through a
subsequent conviction for the same offense. (Appellant's Br. 5). However, none of
the above-mentioned double jeopardy issues exist. A second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal did not occur. A second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction did not occur. Appellant did not receive multiple
punishments for the same offense.
Appellant was prosecuted for two different offenses, which is evidenced by
the nonconforming language contained in the charging instruments. He was
prosecuted and convicted of Assault Causing Bodily Injury - Family Violence, a
Class A misdemeanor in county court, cause number 95790. (C.R. 16-17). He was
also prosecuted for Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon - Family Violence
in cause number CR-10-0816.
The felony indictment accused Appellant of acts separate and distinct from
the acts alleged in the misdemeanor information and complaint. The indictment
accused Appellant of brandishing a deadly weapon during, or in the irnmediate
flight therefrom, an assault on April involving Appellant "grabbing her hair and
face with [his] hands." (C.R. 44). Conversely, the information and complaint
accused Appellant of causing bodily injury to April "by grabbing April Najera
about the face," "pulling [her] hair," or "striking" her. (C.R. 9, 10). Because the
felony indictment alleges criminal acts separate and distinct from the acts alleged
in the information and complaint. Appellant was prosecuted for two different
offenses.
Subsequently, Appellant reached a plea agreement in the felony case in
which he voluntarily pled to the lesser offense of Assault Causing Bodily Injury -
Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor. (C.R. 46-53, 55-56). The special terms
of the plea agreement specifically state that Appellant would also plead guilty to
the Assault - Family Violence case pending during that time in county court.
(C.R. 46). Therefore, no double jeopardy claim exists and the trial court's order
should be affirmed.
10
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS
CORPUS RELIEF BECAUSE APPELLANT WAIVED
ANY DOUBLE JEOPARY CLAIM IN HIS PLEA
AGREEMENT
Even if a double jeopardy issue would normally exist, Appellant waived any
double jeopardy claim. Double jeopardy is not an absolute right; a defendant may
freely choose "to subject himself to a potential double jeopardy violation because,
in his judgment, it results in a beneficial outcome." Ex parte Marascio, Nos. WR-
80,939-01, WR-80,939-02, & WR-80,939-03, 2015 WL 5853202, at *6 (Tex.
Grim. App. Oct. 7, 2015) (Keasler, J., concurring). Further, although a plea
agreement does not by itself waive double jeopardy protections, a defendant
waives any double jeopardy claim if he agrees to subject himself to the same
offense in order to receive a lesser sentence for which he has already earned
enough to credit to have discharged. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63
(1975); Ex parte Birdwell, 7 S.W.3d 160, 163-64 (Tex. Grim. App. 1999). In Ex
parte Birdwell, the applicant pled guilty after subjecting himself to a second trial
for an offense for which he had previously been convicted, and he did so
intentionally in order to receive a lesser sentence that he had already earned
sufficient credit to discharge. Id. The court held that under these circumstances, the
applicant waived his right to be free from a second prosecution for the same
offense. Id.
11
Similarly, in this case. Appellant was indicted for Aggravated Assault with a
Deadly Weapon - Family Violence, a felony offense. (C.R. 44). As part of the plea
agreement, he voluntarily agreed to plead guilty to the lesser-included offense of
Assault Causing Bodily Injury - Family Violence, a Class A misdemeanor, under
the special terms that he would also plead guilty to the Assault Causing Bodily
Injury - Family Violence case pending in county court. (C.R. 46, 47-53). By
entering this agreement. Appellant avoided a possible felony sentence. He also
received 160-day sentences for each offense, both of which were credited a full
160 days for time served. (C.R. 16-17, 55-56). Therefore, Appellant agreed to
subject himself to the same offense for the purposes of receiving a lesser sentence
for which he had already earned enough credit to have discharged. Appellant thus
waived any double jeopardy claim in this matter.
Additionally, the fact that Appellant (1) entered both pleas on the same day,
and (2) was represented by an attorney throughout the plea bargaining process,
when he entered both pleas, and when he was convicted of both offenses, is further
evidence that Appellant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived any
double jeopardy claim. In Texas, plea agreements may contain a wide variety of
stipulations. Moore v. State, 262 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. App.—^Fort Worth 2008),
rev'd on other grounds, 295 S.W.Sd 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Furthermore, a
12
defendant "is deemed to have entered into the agreement knowingly and
voluntarily unless he shows otherwise." State v. Moore, 240 S.W.3d 248, 251 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); see also Ex parte Williams, 637 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982). Appellant does not argue that he entered into an invalid plea
agreement. Therefore, Appellant, while represented by counsel, knowingly and
voluntarily entered into the plea agreement in which he agreed to subject himself to
the same offense pending in county court in order to receive a lesser sentence,
thereby waiving any double jeopardy claim. Consequently, the Court should affirm
the trial court's denial of relief.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS
CORPUS RELIEF BECAUSE APPELLANT WAIVED
ANY DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM BY FAILING TO
RAISE A CLAIM AT TRIAL
Finally, Appellant waived any double jeopardy claim by failing to raise a
double jeopardy claim at trial. Generally, a defendant has the burden of preserving
a double jeopardy claim by raising the claim at or before trial. See Gonzales v.
State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When the defendant alleges a
"successive prosecutions for the same offense" double jeopardy claim, such as in
this case, a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate procedural vehicle.
See id. at 643, n.9. A double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on
13
appeal or collateral attack only when (1) "the undisputed facts show the double
jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record," and (2)
"enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state
interests." Id. at 643. Finally, if a writ applicant could have properly brought the
double jeopardy claim on direct appeal, "then the claim's merits will not be
entertained on habeas." Exparte Marascio, 2015 WL 5853202, at *7 (Keasler, J.,
concurring) (discussing Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004)).
Appellant cannot properly assert a double jeopardy claim on direct appeal or
on collateral attack in this case, and thus waived his claim by failing to assert it at
the trial court because a double jeopardy violation is not "clearly apparent on the
face of the record." See Gonzales, 8 S.W.3d at 643. In Gonzales, the court held that
the appellant failed to meet his burden in presenting a record showing on its face a
"multiplepunishments" violation. See id at 645. Instead, appellant could only show
that it was ''possible he was multiply punished for the same offense" based on the
jury's general verdict convicting him of aggravated robbery and a lesser offense.
Id. at 641. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of relief, holding
that the appellant waived his claim on appeal by failing to timely raise it at trial. Id.
at 645-46.
14
In this case, Appellant has likewise failed to present a record which shows
on its face a "multiple punishments" double jeopardy violation. Instead, the record
shows that Appellant was prosecuted for two separate offenses. Alternatively, even
if a double jeopardy violation would normally exist, Appellant affirmatively
waived his double jeopardy rights by voluntarily entering into a plea agreement in
which he agreed to be twice convicted of assault in order to receive a lesser
sentence. As a result, a double jeopardy violation is not "clearly apparent from the
face of the record." The legitimate state interest in giving effect to negotiated pleas
would be gravely undermined by allowing Appellant to make this claim after lying
behind the log until now. Appellant failed to preserve his claim of double jeopardy
at trial, and thus, he cannot raise it on direct appeal or through a post-trial writ of
habeas corpus. The Court should therefore affirm the trial court's denial of relief
15
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, premises considered, the State respectfully prays that this honorable
Court of Appeals affirm the trial court's judgment denying habeas corpus relief,
and grant to the State all relief to which it is justly entitled.
Respectfully Submitted,
Bv:
Ralph Guerrero
First Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Hays County Government Center
712 S. Stagecoach Trail, Suite 2057
San Marcos, Texas 78666
State Bar No. 24041021
ralph.guerrero@co.hays.tx.us
Attorney for the State of Texas
By:
Emily E.L. timderos
Law Clerk
Associate Member of the State Bar of Texas
State Bar No. 24095477
emily.landeros@co.hays.tx.us
16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. PROC. 9.4
I certify that this brief contains 1,772 words, exclusive of the caption,
identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of
contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented,
statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of
service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix.
Ralph Guerrero
First Assistant Criminal District Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief has been e-delivered to:
David A. Mendoza
608 S. Guadalupe Street
San Marcos, Texas 78666
attomeydavidmendoza@gmail.com
on this the 13th day of October, 2015.
Ralph Guerrero^
First Assistant Criminal District Attorney
17