ACCEPTED
03-15-00670
8261402
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/16/2015 11:36:02 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SITTING AT AUSTIN, TEXAS FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
03-15-00670-CV 12/16/2015 11:36:02 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
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Susan Aranda
Vs.
Cindy Sue Willie Partnership Trust
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Brief of Appellant Susan Aranda
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Appealed from Cause No. D-1-GN-13-000525
District Court of Travis County, Texas
Honorable Judge Meachum Presiding
No Oral Argument Requested
Respectfully submitted,
THE CARLSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
11606 N. IH-35
Austin, Texas 78753
Telephone: (512) 346-5688
Fax: (512) 719-4362
Robert L. Ranco
SBN: 24029785
Rranco@carlsonattorneys.com
Roberto Flores
SBN: 24074211
Rflores@carlsonattorneys.com
Attorneys for Appellant
03-15-00670-CV
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Susan Aranda
Vs.
Cindy Sue Willie Partnership Trust
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Certificate of Parties and Attorneys
Pursuant to Rule 38.1 (a) of the Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure Susan
Aranda, Appellant, supplies the following list of parties to the order appealed from
and the names and addresses of counsel:
Parties
Susan Aranda
Cindy Sue Willie Partnership Trust
Attorneys
Robert L. Ranco
SBN: 24029785
Roberto Flores
SBN: 24074211
THE CARLSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
11606 N. IH-35
Austin, Texas 78753
Telephone: (512) 346-5688
Fax: (512) 719-4362
Attorney for Appellee
Sharon D. Hobbs
SBN:09739500
Allen Stein & Durbin, P.C.
6243 IH-10 West, 7th Flood
P.O. Box 101507
San Antonio, Texas 78201
Phone: (210) 734-7488
Fax: (210) 738-8036
Attorney for Appellant
Trial Court
Appealed from Cause No. D-1-GN-13-000525
District Court of Travis County, Texas
Honorable Judge Meachum Presiding
Contents
Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................................... 5
Statement of the Case ................................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Issues ................................................................................................................. 2
Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................................... 3
Summary of the Argument .......................................................................................................... 4
Standard of Review ....................................................................................................................... 5
Argument ....................................................................................................................................... 6
A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Antler’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
Because Aranda Presented Evidence of Each Element of Her Claim ........................................ 6
1) The Ledge Posed an Unreasonable Risk of Harm .............................................................. 6
2) Antler Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known of the Dangerous Ledge ..................... 8
3) Antler Never Warned of the Dangerous Ledge .................................................................. 8
4) Aranda Tripped on the Ledge ........................................................................................... 10
B. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Antler’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment ... 16
1) Antler Did not Present Evidence that Aranda’s Injuries were Not Caused by the Incident
or that they Warned Her ........................................................................................................ 16
2) A Fact Issue Exists Regarding Whether the Unreasonably Dangerous Condition Caused
Aranda’s Injury as Well as Whether Antler Breached its Duty to Remedy The Condition. 17
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 18
Prayer ........................................................................................................................................... 19
Certificate of Service................................................................................................................... 21
Certificate of Compliance........................................................................................................... 21
Appendix ...................................................................................................................................... 22
Table of Authorities
Statutes
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) ...............................................................................................6
Texas State Cases
Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2014) .................................................5
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) ..............................................5
Cohen v. Landry’s Inc., 442 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet denied) ..............................................................................................................6
Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983) ...................................8
Dallas Cent. Appraisal Cen. V. Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2005, no pet.). .........................................................................................................5
Del Lago Partners v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010)......................................10
Ford Motor Co v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2000) ......................................5
G&H Towing Co v. Magee¸347 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. 2011) .......................................15
Hammerly Oaks, Inc v. Edwards¸ 958 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1997) .............................12
Henkel v. Norman, 441 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) ..................................................8, 9
Lear Siegler, Inc v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991).........................................16
Marathon Corp v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2003) ........................................11
Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999) (plurality op.) ................10
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013) ................................17
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) .................17
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Jaquez, 25 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet
denied) ....................................................................................................................6
Seideneck v. Cay Bayreuther Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1970) ........................6
Sweet v. Flow Force Plumbing, L.L.C. NO 05-12-01688-CV 2014, Tex. App.
Lexis 5125 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 13, 2014, no pet.) ......................................12
TXI Operations, LP. v. Perry, 278 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2009) .................................8, 9
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1998). .............................5
Western Invs. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2005) .............................................10
03-15-00670-CV
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Susan Aranda
Vs.
Cindy Sue Willie Partnership Trust
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TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
Statement of the Case
This is personal injury case based on premises liability. Susan Aranda
(hereinafter Aranda) was injured on the property of Appellee, The Willie Limited
Partnership d/b/a ANTLER MINI STORAGE (hereinafter “Antler”) on November
22, 2012. Aranda filed a lawsuit against Antler Mini Storage and The Cindy Sue
Willie Partnership Trust on February 11, 2013. C.R. 2.
Antler filed a Traditional and No-evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
on April 28, 2015. C.R. 44. The motion was not joined by codefendant The Cindy
Sue Willie Partnership Trust. Aranda filed a response and objected to the
presentation of much of Antler’s evidence. C.R. 141. The Traditional and No-
Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment were both granted on July 23, 2015.
1
C.R. 201. Aranda’s objection to the evidence regarding marijuana use was granted.
C.R. 200. Aranda filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for new trial on
August 11, 2015. C.R. 202. The Motion for New Trial was denied on October 5,
2015. C.R. 220. Aranda filed a Motion to Sever which was granted on October 19,
2015. C.R. 222. The order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
became full and final on October 19, 2015. C.R. 222. Aranda appeals the granting
of Antler Mini Storage’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary
Judgment.
Statement of the Issues
A. The Trial Court Erred In Granting Antler’s No-Evidence Motion For Summary
Judgment Because Aranda Presented More Than A Scintilla Of Evidence Of Each
Element Of Her Claim.
1) The Ledge Posed an Unreasonable Risk of Harm
2) Antler Knew or Reasonably Should have Known of the Dangerous Ledge
3) Antler Never Warned of the Dangerous Ledge
4) Aranda Tripped on the Ledge
B. The trial court erred in granting Antler’s Traditional Motion for Summary
Judgment:
1) Antler Did not Present Evidence that Aranda’s Injures Not Caused by the
Ledge or that They Warned Her
2) A Fact Issue Exists Regarding Whether the Unreasonably Dangerous
Condition Caused Aranda’s Injury as Well as Whether Antler Breached Its
Duty to Remedy the Condition
2
Statement of Facts
Aranda and her friends arrived at Antler Mini Storage around 6 pm on
November 22, 2011. C.R. 72. Pg 32:19-22; Pg 33:2-4.1 They had a full truck of
things to pack into the newly rented ministorage unit. C.R. 122 Pg 39:20-21.
When they arrived Aranda got the key and locks from the manager. C.R. 75 Pg
44:20-23. As she did, the manager apologized to Aranda for the poor lighting. C.R.
76. Pg 48:24-49:4. Aranda and her friends then drove around to the unit to pack her
things into the storage unit. C.R. 77 Pg 51:23-52:1.
Unbeknownst to her, the unit Aranda rented was unique. C.R. 97 Pg 10:22-
24. To enter the storage unit required a step up into the unit. C.R. 183. (photos of
the ledge). With large boxes in her arms Aranda packed things into the unit. Not
knowing there was a ledge in the unit, she tripped and fell sometime between 6:20
and 6:40 P.M. C.R. 70 Pg 16:10-12; C.R. 88 Photo 43; 49; C.R. 70 Pg 17:13-15.
As she fell she tried to protect herself, threw away the box she was holding and
landed on her shoulder. C.R. 70 Pg 16:22-17:4. Karen, Aranda’s friend, saw her on
the ground holding her shoulder. C.R. PG 45:9-13. Needing to continue packing
things into the unit, she got back up and continued to move boxes into the unit.
C.R. 127 Pg 45:9-13. She then drove back to Houston. C.R. 72 Pg 32:19-22.
1
Citations to Clerk’s Record will be identified as C.R. Citations to depositions pages and lines
will be included when necessary. (C.R. XX Pg YY)
3
Aranda and her sister Patrica Birdwell returned to the storage unit later. C.R.
80 Pg 73:21-74:2; C.R. PG 97 10:21-25. Upon her investigation she realized that
she fell on a ledge at the entrance of the unit. C.R. 80 Pg 73:21-25. That ledge and
the entire unit were much higher than the other units in the area. C.R. 97 Pg 10:22-
24. The ledge was entirely unmarked. C.R. 88 Photo 43; 49. The ledge and lighting
violated numerous buildings codes regarding the height of risers and general
safety. C.R. 179-84.
Summary of the Argument
In response to Antler’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment Aranda
presented evidence that a fact issue existed regarding all points of her claim.
Aranada presented evidence that the condition was unreasonably dangerous based
on the unusual nature of the ledge and the bad lighting. The ledge was higher than
all the other units, unmarked, and a violation of local ordinances. Aranda presented
evidence that Antler knew or should have known of the dangerous condition
because Antler warned her partially of the danger and the condition existed for
almost twenty years. Finally, Aranda presented evidence that she tripped on the
ledge. Because of the presented evidence, Antler’s Traditional and No-Evidence
Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Moreover, Antler presented no evidence to support its Traditional Motion
for Summary Judgment. Antler did not present evidence that Aranda’s injuries
4
were not caused by the ledge. Antler also did not present evidence that they
adequately remedied the danger by either warning of the danger or removing the
condition. Antler presented inadmissible evidence that Aranda was at fault for her
own injuries due to suspicion of marijuana use. The trial court correctly sustained
Aranda’s objections to that evidence. Because Antler failed to meet its burden to
show that no fact issue existed, the trial court should have denied Antler’s
Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.
Standard of Review
The standard for review of a traditional summary judgment is de novo.
Dallas Cent. Appraisal Cen. V. Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2005, no pet.). When reviewing a summary judgment the court must
examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and must
indulge every inference and resolve all doubts against the motion. City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824-25 (Tex. 2005). With a hybrid motion the court first
addresses whether the nonmovant presented evidence to controvert the no-evidence
motion then moves to the lower standard of the traditional motion. Ford Motor Co
v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2000).
5
Argument
A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Antler’s No-Evidence Motion for
Summary Judgment Because Aranda Presented Evidence of Each Element of
Her Claim
Antler raised issue with four of the six elements of Aranda’s premises claim.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 924, 936 (Tex. 1998). A No-
Evidence Summary Judgment can only be granted based on those elements
specifically raised. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307,
310 (Tex. 2014).
1) The Ledge Posed an Unreasonable Risk of Harm
An unreasonably dangerous condition is one in which there is sufficient
probability of a harmful event occurring that a reasonable prudent person would
have foreseen the likelihood of that harmful event. Seideneck v. Cay Bayreuther
Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1970). These are fact intensive inquiries, and
therefore often best left to a jury’s determination. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Jaquez, 25 S.W.3d 336, 342 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). Though not an
objective test, courts often consider many factors including: 1) whether the
condition was clearly marked; 2) the height of the condition; and 3) whether the
condition met applicable safety standards. Cohen v. Landry’s Inc., 442 S.W.3d
818, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
6
Here, the combination of bad lighting and the step was an unreasonably
dangerous condition. First, the condition was not marked in any way. C.R. 183
(photographs showing no marking). Second, both the ledge and the poor lighting
violated building codes adopted into law. C.R. 180. The riser heights, the tread
depth, and the difference between them did not comply with building codes. C.R.
180. The difference in riser heights was almost three times that which was allowed
by regulation. C.R. 180. Finally, the ledge was unique for the unit. C.R 97 Pg
10:22-24. The riser was too high and unexpected. Both the violation of safety
standards and the unusual height is evidence of an unreasonably dangerous
condition. Id. Antler’s employees admit that the bad lighting was a problem and
apologized for the condition. C.R. 75 Pg 44:24-25. The ledge makes things worse.
Moreover, the danger was foreseeable because stepping over the ledge was
the natural course anyone would take into the unit. C.R. 183 (photographs showing
the entrance). The ledge is made more dangerous by the common activity people
would be doing in the area. It was an entrance, where people’s views would be
obstructed by carrying or moving heavy objects. Because the evidence presented
shows this was a dangerous, poorly lit step, Antler’s summary judgment must be
denied.
7
2) Antler Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known of the Dangerous
Ledge;
When plaintiff is an Invitee a possessor’s knowledge of a dangerous
condition can be actual or constructive. Del Lago Partners v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d
762, 769 (Tex. 2010). Proof of constructive knowledge requires that the condition
exist long enough for the possessor to discover it through reasonable inspection.
CMH Homes, Inc v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 102-03 (Tex. 2003). The “time-notice
rule” is based on the premise that the longer a danger exists the more likely the
owner had a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy the condition. Id.
Whether a reasonable time has passed is based on all facts and circumstances. Id.
Here, the construction was done in 1996. C.R. 180 (“Appraisal District
reported 1996 construction date.”) This alone would give ample amount of time to
inspect and determine that the ledge was dangerous. Id. Additionally, the Antler
employee’s apology about the poor lighting shows that an inspection of the poorly-
lit area, including the ledge, was completed recently. Because Aranda presented
evidence that Antler knew or should have known of the condition, its summary
judgment must be denied.
3) Antler Never Warned of the Dangerous Ledge
As the possessor of real property, Antler had the duty to warn about or make
safe any unreasonably dangerous conditions of which it or should have known.
Henkel v. Norman, 441 S.W.3d 249, 251-52 (Tex. 2014). To be adequate, a
8
warning must be more than a general warning instruction, but rather it must warn
of the particular condition. Id. at 252. (citing TXI Operations, LP. v. Perry, 278
S.W.3d 763, 764-65 (Tex. 2009)). The fundamental question is whether the
warning fulfills the duty to do “whatever action is reasonably prudent under the
circumstances to reduce or to eliminate the unreasonable risk from that condition.”
Id. at 265. (quoting Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex.
1983)). For example, a speed limit sign is not a warning for a pothole. Id. A
warning to drive “slow” is not warning of the actual condition of a construction
area which was muddy and slick when wet. State v. McBride, 601 S.W.2d 552,
556-57 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A vague sign to “be
careful” may be “some evidence that the premises owner was not negligent, but it
is not conclusive.” TXI Operations, LP, 278 S.W.3d at 765. That an invitee
followed the sign’s instructions and the incident still occurred is evidence of the
warnings inadequacy. Id.
First, there is evidence that Antler failed to fix the unreasonably dangerous
condition. Norman Cooper determined that the riser heights, the tread depth, and
the difference between the riser heights did not comply with cited building codes
and laws. C.R. 180. Defendant therefore failed in every way to attempt to remedy
the condition.
9
Second, the warning given by Antler regarding the ledge was completely
deficient. Antler warned of the bad lighting. C.R. 76 Pg 48:24-49:4. No other
warnings about the unit were given. C.R. 76 Pg 48:24-49:4. There was no marking
on the ledge. C.R. 183. Taking the context of the totality of the circumstances,
Aranda was not warned of the inconspicuous and high ledge. See Henkel, 441
S.W.3d at 252. It is impossible to infer that there was a dangerous ledge from the
instruction about lighting. Compra, Id. (The warning “don’t slip” allows for the
inference of a slippery walkway.). Moreover, Aranda’s behavior following the
warning about lighting shows how inadequate the warning was. TXI Operations
LP, 278 S.W.3d at 765. (Following the directive and still getting injured is
evidence of the directive’s inadequacy.). Aranda, knowing only of the bad
lighting, drove her truck around to the storage unit to improve the poor lighting
condition. C.R. 75 Pg 45:1-2. Aranda then walked into the storage unit with boxes
in hand, as would be expected, and tripped on the unexpected ledge. C.R. 70 Pg
16:10-12. Because she was never warned of the ledge, Antler failed in its duty to
warn of the unreasonably dangerous condition.
4) Aranda Tripped on the Ledge
To prove an action for premises liability, the invitee must establish the
breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Del Lago Partners v.
Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex. 2010). The components of proximate cause are
10
(1) cause in fact and (2) foreseeability. Western Invs. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547,
551 (Tex. 2005). If foreseeability is addressed under the element of duty, it need
not be addressed again under proximate cause. Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5
S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. 1999) (plurality op.)
Cause-in-fact requires evidence that the premises defect was a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury. Del Lago Partners., 307 S.W.3d at 774. Here,
there is direct evidence that the premises defect caused the injury. Aranda testified
that she “didn’t know there was an edge there and I hit it with my right foot and
tripped into the storage room….” C.R. 70 Pg 16:10-12. At the time she did not
know on what she fell. Id. Patricia, her sister that was unpacking the truck, saw
Aranda on the ground after she fell. C.R. 97 Pg 7:6-9. She saw that Aranda tripped
going into the unit. C.R. 98 Pg 11:6. She also thought that Aranda fell on the ledge.
C.R. 98 PG 11:7. Karen Short, another friend that was loading the storage unit,
heard Aranda fall at the storage unit. C.R. 113 Pg 9: 2-12. On later inspection
Aranda and her sister realized it was the ledge on which she fell. Her sister
identified that the ledge was much higher than the other units. C.R. 97 Pg 10: 21-
23. Based on this testimony Norman Cooper, a professional engineer, determined
that the improper riser tread caused Aranda’s injury. C.R. 180. All this evidence
points to the fact that Aranda tripped on the ledge.
11
Antler relies on two cases to characterize Aranda’s testimony as mere
inference. Neither is factually on point. Marathon Corp was a decision about
expert testimony and the necessity for something more. Marathon Corp v. Pitzner,
106 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2003). In Marathon plaintiff alleged he fell off a roof, and
was unable to testify as to what caused the fall. Id. at 726. The plaintiff presented
evidence by experts showing he likely fell off the roof when he “reached into the
access panel, came into contact with a high-voltage wire, was shocked, stumbled
back, and fell off the building.” Id. at 729. The Texas Supreme Court, however,
determined that “because there was no proof that the units inside the building had
been shut off” the series of events, though reasonable, was not supported by a key
factual assumption. Id. The evidence “could give rise to any number of
inferences.” Id. There was so little direct testimony that the jury would not even be
sure if he fell off the roof. Id. It was equally likely that plaintiff had been assaulted
because no one could testify to the contrary. Id. Slight circumstantial evidence is
not enough, but rather “something else must be found in the record to corroborate
the probability of the fact’s existence or non-existence.” Id. quoting Hammerly
Oaks, Inc v. Edwards¸ 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997).
The other case on which Antler relies is Sweet v. Flow Force Plumbing,
L.L.C. NO 05-12-01688-CV 2014, Tex. App. Lexis 5125 (Tex. App.—Dallas May
13, 2014, no pet.). There, plaintiff used the shower after repairs were made by the
12
defendant. Id. at *1. A full day after the shower, plaintiff pulled off his shoe to find
his foot had been bleeding. Id. Looking around his home the next day, he noticed a
screw in the shower. Id. He concluded that he must have cut his foot in the shower
on the prior day. Id. The court followed Marathon, and determined there was not
enough evidence to hold defendant liable because “it is equally possible that Sweet
injured his foot during the period of time after his shower and before he remove his
flip-flops that evening.” Id. at *6. There was no evidence that connected the injury
to the shower temporally because there was no evidence that he was not injured
between the shower and the time he noticed the bleeding. Id. Therefore, the court
concluded there was not enough evidence to support the theory that plaintiff was
injured in the shower.
Both cases are factually distinct because the death of direct testimony
required more assumptions by the finder of fact. In each case the very basics of the
injury were unclear. In Marathon there was no witness testimony identifying
where the injury was, or how the injury happened. The jury could have easily also
believed an assault had occurred. In Sweet he could have been injured by anything
between the shower and the time he noticed his foot. Here, there is no question
about several fundamental issues that were not known about either Marathon or
Sweet.
Aranda tripped C.R. 70 Pg 16:3-4.
13
Aranda tripped around 6:20-6:40 C.R. 70 Pg 1:13-15
Aranda tripped going into the storage unit owned by Antler. C.R. 98 PG
11:6.
A similar recitation of facts could not be given about Marathon or Sweet. Each of
these facts is backed by evidence and show that Aranda’s injuries were caused by
the unreasonably dangerous condition. Therefore, Antler’s No-Evidence Motion
for Summary Judgment must be denied.
The degree of particularity in what caused the injury is also clear here and
was not in either Marathon or Sweet. The greater the range of possible injuries, the
more assumptions would naturally need to be made to show one thing caused an
injury. Without knowing specific details, the realm of possibility expands. In
Marathon, Pitzner was believed to be working on the roof, and then found later in
the parking lot with a head injury. Marathon, 106 S.W.3d at 726. Based on just
that information the possible causes of injury are endless. This is evidenced by the
fact that EMS initially reported the injury as an assault. Id. Similarly in Sweet there
was little direct evidence of what caused the injury. All that was known was
plaintiff was injury free and then he was not. The nail was certainly a plausible
source of the injury but there was little evidence actually placing it as the cause of
injury. The possible other causes are endless.
14
Here, there is a fundamental piece of evidence that did not exist in the
others. Several other people saw that she in fact did trip and where she tripped. The
question is not how she was injured (like in Marathon) or where she was injured
(like in Sweet) but on what did she trip on the Antler property at around 6:00 PM.
The evidence points to the ledge.
Antler would ask the court to hold that Aranda’s testimony is not evidence
because she was not aware of what she tripped on at the time she tripped on it.
That holding, and the conclusion that Aranda’s testimony (and the testimony of her
friends) is not enough to present a fact issue, would dramatically change the
evidentiary requirements of premises cases. Premises cases are built on inference.
Plaintiffs do not trip on hazards of which they knew prior to tripping. Injured
plaintiffs are often more worried about getting treatment over investigating
premises liability issue. Only a Plaintiff’s lawyer would be so inclined. A
requirement that a plaintiff immediately investigate the cause of the injury would
ultimately bar any serious case where plaintiff is unable to investigate the incident
due to seriousness of the injury or for other extenuating factors. It would also bar
any case where plaintiff was injured without the benefit of a third party witness to
see the specific cause of the injury. Such a ruling would gut premises liability.
Therefore, this court must hold that Aranda presented a fact issue regarding
whether her injuries were caused by the ledge.
15
Because Aranda presented evidence showing a fact issue regarding all
complained elements, Antler’s Traditional and No-evidence Motions for Summary
Judgment must be denied.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Antler’s Traditional Motion for
Summary Judgment
1) Antler Did not Present Evidence that Aranda’s Injuries were Not
Caused by the Incident or that they Warned her
In its Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment Antler presented
arguments regarding only two elements: 1) causation; and 2) breach. C.R. 44-53.
Antler also addressed causation as it relates to Aranda’s negligence per se claim.
C.R. 53. Because Antler did not raise the other issues the court cannot grant a
summary judgment based on these elements. G&H Towing Co v. Magee¸347
S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011).
Antler’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment cannot be granted
because it failed to present testimony that it remedied the condition. “For a
defendant to be entitled to summary judgment it must disprove, as a matter of law,
one of the essential elements of each of plaintiff’s causes of action. Lear Siegler,
Inc v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991) (emphasis in original). As
discussed above, the only evidence presented about potential remedies to the
condition was Antler’s apology about bad lighting. An inadequate warning is not
conclusive evidence that no fact issue exists. TXI Operations, LP, 278 S.W.3d at
16
765. Reasonable jurors could disagree about whether a warning about bad lighting
is also a warning that a ledge is too high. Because Antler did not present evidence
that it fulfilled its duty to remedy the condition as a matter of law its summary
judgment must be denied.
Antler’s Traditional Summary Judgment must also be denied because it
failed to present evidence that the premises defect caused the injury as a matter of
law. Lear Siegler, Inc., 819 S.W.2d at 471. First, Antler failed to present evidence
that no fact issue existed regarding the element of causation. The trial court
correctly sustained Aranda’s objections to the evidence regarding the marijuana
use and did not consider such evidence. C.R. 200. Antler is left without evidence
more than “she was wobbly.” “Accidents happen” is argument, not evidence and
therefore, Antler failed to present evidence to show no fact issue existed. Because
Antler failed in its initial burden of presenting evidence that no fact issue existed
regarding cause, Antler’s Summary Judgment must be denied.
2) A Fact Issue Exists Regarding Whether the Unreasonably Dangerous
Condition Caused Aranda’s Injury as Well as Whether Antler
Breached its Duty to Remedy The Condition.
As addressed above in response to Antler’s No-Evidence Motion for
Summary Judgment, Aranda presented evidence that she tripped on the ledge as
well as the fact that Antler’s only attempt to remedy the danger was to warn of half
the danger. See Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013)
17
Presenting evidence to surpass the no-evidence motion also surpasses the
traditional motion. Id. Because Aranda presented evidence of fact issues regarding
all elements of her claim, Antler’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Negligence Per Se
The trial court incorrectly granted Antler’s Traditional Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Aranda’s negligence per se claim. The duties that arise under a
negligence and negligence per se claim are by definition distinct. Nixon v. Mr.
Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985) (looking to the
ordinance rather than whether there was an unreasonably dangerous condition to
see if a duty exists). Antler presents no evidence that this was not an issue of
negligence per se. Evidence presented by Aranda shows that both the ledge and
lighting violated local laws and ordinances. C.R. 179-184. Antler only addresses
the issue of causation. Once again because Aranda showed that the ledge, violative
of local laws and ordinances, was what caused her to trip, the trail court incorrectly
granted Antler’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.
Conclusion
In response to Antler’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment Aranda
presented evidence that the ledge on which she tripped was an unreasonably
dangerous condition. It was taller than the units around it, and a violation of local
ordinance. Aranda also presented evidence Antler did not warn of the ledge, but
18
merely warned of the bad lighting. It also did not mark, or attempt to remedy the
ledge. The ledge also existed for approximately twenty years, certainly long
enough for Antler to identify the dangerous condition. Finally, Aranda presented
both her testimony, and the supporting testimony of her friends that she tripped on
the dangerous ledge. The evidence presented is more than a stack of inferences, but
the direct testimony of Aranda and her friends. Because Aranda presented evidence
supporting all elements complained, Antler’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary
Judgment must be denied.
Moreover, Antler failed to present evidence that no fact issue existed
regarding whether they warned of the danger and whether the breach caused the
injury. Antler only presented evidence that it warned of the lighting, not the ledge,
which cannot support a summary judgment. It also presented no evidence that the
ledge did not cause her to trip. Because Antler failed to present evidence to show
no fact issue existed regarding the complained elements, its Traditional Motion for
Summary Judgment must therefore be denied.
Prayer
Aranda never meant to trip. She did not do a pre-trip inspection analyzing
possible hazards and their relative dangers. She did not do a post-trip inspection
immediately following the incident testing for forensics or other clues to narrow
down the inferences she may need to make in coming litigation. She tripped and
19
tried, to get on with her life like normal. To require more of her belies the fact that
law is built not of science but of humanity.
For the reasons stated in the brief Appellant prays the Court reverse the
order granting Antler’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and it remand the matter
back to the trial court so that Susan Aranda may get her day in court.
Respectfully submitted,
THE CARLSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
11606 N. IH-35
Austin, Texas 78753
Telephone: (512) 346-5688
Fax: (512) 719-4362
By:_/s/ Robert L. Ranco
Robert L. Ranco
SBN: 24029785
Rranco@carlsonattorneys.com
Roberto Flores
SBN: 24074211
Rflores@carlsonattorneys.com
20
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served in
accordance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure on this 16th day of December 2015 to all counsel of record.
Attorney: Served by
Sharon D. Hobbs __X_ Facsimile:
Hallen, Stein & Drurbin, PC ____ Email:
6243 IH-10 West __X_ E-service:
7th Floor ____ CMRRR:
PO Box 101507 ____ Other:
San Antonio, Texas 78201
_/s/ Robert L. Ranco
Robert L. Ranco
Certificate of Compliance
I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word
2007 and contains 4,093 words as determined by the software’s word-count
function, excluding the seconds of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Robert L. Ranco
Robert L. Ranco
Roberto Flores
21
Appendix
1) Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
2) Order Sustaining Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s Evidence
22
DC BK15212 PG763 Filed in The District Court
of Travis County, Texas
JUL 2 3 2015 0
At /) t'8Q A_M.
NO. D-1-GN-13-000525 Velva L. Price, District Clerk
SUSAN ARANDA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
vs. §
§ 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE CINDY SUE WILLIE PARTNERSHIP §
TRUST, and THE WILLIE LIMITED §
PARTNERSHIP D/B/A ANTLER MINI §
STORAGE § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S, THE WILLIE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP D/B/A
ANTLER MINI STORAGE, TRADITIONAL AND
NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE 29th day of June, 2015, the Court heard Defendant's, THE WILLIE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP D/B/A ANTLER MINI STORAGE, Traditional and No-
Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court considered Defendant's Motion
and its supporting Affidavits and Exhibits, Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition, Plaintiff's
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, argument of counsel, and all
things the Court is entitled to consider, and GRANTS Defendant's Traditional and No-
Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant's
Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; judgment is
entered in favor of Defendant, THE WILLIE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP D/B/A ANTLER
MINI STORAGE, and against Plaintiff. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Plaintiff take nothing by her suit against Defendant, THE WILLIE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP D/B/A ANTLER MINI STORAGE, with costs to be incurred by
the party incurring same.~
SIGNEDthe.z:i~f ~ ,2015 .
. JUD~CHUM
#1322613/5244-028/SH
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
004133733
201
DC BK15212 PG764
Filed in !he District Court
of Travis County, Texas
CAUSE No. D-1-GN-13-000525
At
-
JUL ~; 2015
/ / 0 () z1M
c1J
Velva L p · - ·
· nee, District Clerk
SUSAN ARANDA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
§
v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
THE CINDY SUE WILLIE PARTNERSHIP §
TRUST, AND THE WILLIE LIMITED §
PARTNERSHIP D/B/A ANTLER MINI §
STORAGE § 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT t
ORDER
After careful consideration of the Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant' s Traditional and
No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, the evidence, the pleadings and the arguments, the
Court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant's references to an alleged drug use on the
day of the incident and whether Plaintiff had a drug addiction.
SIGNED on this 23rd day of July, 2015.
~-------
Judge, 201 st District Court
Travis County, Texas
~~~~ J!~JJIIIIIIIIIIIIIII/111111111111 1111111111111
200
Susan Aranda v. the Willie Limited Partnership D/B/A Antler Mini Storage
Combined Opinion