MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Sep 30 2016, 8:51 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Billy Campbell, September 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1601-CR-97
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable David J. Certo,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G12-1508-CM-28989
Friedlander, Senior Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1601-CR-97 | September 30, 2016 Page 1 of 5
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[1] Billy Campbell appeals his conviction of battery, a Class A misdemeanor. We
affirm.
[2] On August 15, 2015, Chelsea Lipe, her husband, and their two young children
went to a fair in Marion County. As Lipe drove her family home, she noticed a
white van behind her. The van kept attempting to pass Lipe and ultimately
succeeded. Lipe honked her horn and yelled at the van. The van stopped
abruptly, and Lipe almost collided with it before she stopped her car.
[3] Next, a person later identified as Campbell got out of the driver’s seat of the
van, and Lipe and her husband got out of their car. Campbell and Lipe walked
toward one another, yelling loudly. Lipe was angry, but she did not attempt to
hit Campbell. Instead, he punched her in the face, causing her to stumble back,
fall to the ground, and bump into the front of her car. Meanwhile, Lipe’s
husband had retrieved a tire jack from the car’s trunk and was walking toward
Campbell and Lipe, but he did not get close to the front of the car until
Campbell had already punched Lipe and she was on the ground. Lipe lost a
tooth and suffered a fractured jaw as a result of the punch.
[4] Meanwhile, Campbell’s son exited the van and convinced Campbell to return
to his seat. Campbell drove off, but not before Lipe’s husband smashed the
van’s back window with the tire jack. The Lipes followed the van and called
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Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014).
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the police, directing officers to their location. The police stopped Campbell and
took him into custody.
[5] The State charged Campbell with battery, a Class A misdemeanor. He was
tried to the bench, and the court determined he was guilty as charged. The
court sentenced Campbell accordingly, and this appeal followed.
[6] Campbell raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to rebut Campbell’s claim of self-defense. Self-defense is
recognized as a valid justification for an otherwise criminal act. Miller v. State,
720 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. 1999). “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds
support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the
necessary elements.” Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002)). The State may meet
this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the
defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency
of its evidence in chief. Miller, 720 N.E.2d 799.
[7] The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a
claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the
evidence claim. Huls v. State, 971 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. If
the defendant is convicted despite a claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse
only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the
State beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d 799.
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[8] The statute that governs self-defense provides, in relevant part: “A person is
justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person
or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent
use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2013). “No person in this
state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the
person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.” Id.
[9] To prevail on a claim of self-defense under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2, a
defendant must have: (1) acted without fault, that is, did not provoke, instigate,
or participate willingly in violence; (2) been in a place where he or she had a
right to be; and (3) been in reasonable fear of great bodily harm. Bryant v. State,
984 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In addition, a defendant is
not justified in using force if the defendant “has entered into combat with
another person or is the initial aggressor unless the [defendant] withdraws from
the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the
other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.”
Ind. Code 35-41-3-2(g).
[10] The trial court accurately described the circumstances here as “a case of road
rage that escalated.” Tr. p. 51. There is ample evidence that Campbell
instigated the violence. He stopped his van so abruptly that Lipe almost
collided with it, and he was the first person to exit his vehicle for a face-to-face
confrontation. In addition, Campbell hit Lipe. She was angry and yelled at
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Campbell but had not attempted to hit him. Lipe’s husband had retrieved a tire
jack, but he had not yet moved to the front of Lipe’s car when Campbell
punched Lipe.
[11] Campbell points to his own trial testimony, in which he stated the Lipes were
the aggressors because Lipe was swinging her arms at him and her husband was
“right behind her swinging a tire jack.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. This is a request
to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids. The State
presented sufficient evidence that Campbell instigated the violence, thus
rebutting his claim of self-defense. See Cole, 28 N.E.3d 1126 (affirming battery
and strangulation convictions because the victim testified Cole hit him first,
even though Cole testified the victim attacked him first).
[12] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[13] Judgment affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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