This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-2086
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Patrick Allison Baker,
Appellant.
Filed October 3, 2016
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-14-3946
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Michael D. Leeser, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of being a prohibited person in possession of
a firearm and possession of a short-barreled shotgun, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient because it consisted of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Patrick Allison Baker and C.E. were involved in a relationship for four-
and-one-half years. Both are prohibited from possessing firearms due to previous felony
convictions. In mid-2013, C.E. moved in with her sister, S.H. During that time, Baker
resided with C.E. at S.H.’s house for “a couple of months.” Baker and C.E. were asked
to move out because they were using drugs. In December 2013 or January 2014, C.E.
was permitted to move back into the house, but S.H. and her husband prohibited Baker
from being there. C.E. secretly allowed Baker to visit and spend the night on several
occasions.
In early 2014, C.E. twice observed Baker with a dark-colored shotgun. On the
first occasion, Baker was cleaning the shotgun. On the second occasion, C.E. saw Baker
and another individual hide the shotgun in a vent in the basement bedroom of S.H.’s
house. C.E. moved out of the house shortly thereafter. In April, C.E. told L.H., S.H.’s
sister-in-law, about the shotgun. L.H. told S.H.’s husband, and he called the police after
confirming it was still in the vent. Officer Vern Heltemes of the Moorhead Police
Department responded and removed the shotgun. The shotgun was transferred to the
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), which tested it for latent fingerprints. The
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BCA discovered one fingerprint near the trigger, which was matched to Baker’s right
index finger.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Baker with being a prohibited person in
possession of a firearm and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. The district court
held a court trial and found Baker guilty of both counts. Baker appeals.
DECISION
Baker argues that his convictions must be reversed because they are based on
uncorroborated accomplice testimony. See Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2012) (providing that a
conviction may not be based on accomplice testimony “unless it is corroborated by such
other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense”). He
frames his argument as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. Our supreme court
observed in State v. Scruggs that whether a person may be considered an accomplice is a
legal issue distinct from the sufficiency of the evidence. 822 N.W.2d 631, 641 n.1
(Minn. 2012). Accordingly, we review de novo whether the district court committed
legal error by not viewing C.E. as an accomplice, rather than whether sufficient evidence
supports Baker’s convictions. Id.
Generally, the test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is whether
she “could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the accused is
charged.” State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 582 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). But
“[a] witness who is alleged to have committed the crime instead of the defendant is, as a
matter of law, not an accomplice.” State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn.
2006). When a witness is portrayed as an alternative perpetrator at trial, rather than an
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accomplice, the witness is not considered an accomplice. State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d
592, 603 (Minn. 2010).
Baker argues that the district court should have considered C.E. an accomplice
because she is also prohibited from possessing a firearm, the shotgun was found in her
bedroom, and she could have been charged with the same crimes. And had the district
court treated C.E. as an accomplice, Baker contends, her uncorroborated testimony was
insufficient to convict Baker. We are not persuaded.
Our careful review of the record demonstrates that Baker portrayed C.E. as an
alternative perpetrator at trial. During opening statements, defense counsel argued that
C.E. was “covering up for herself . . . by pointing the finger at [Baker]” and that Baker
“was not in possession of [the shotgun] either at the time that the state says or at any
other time.” During cross-examination, defense counsel elicited C.E.’s testimony that
she was ineligible to possess a firearm and that she knew the firearm was in the vent in
the bedroom in which she was staying. Defense counsel also questioned C.E. about
whether she was jealous of Baker’s new girlfriend and wanted him to be charged with the
crime instead of her. Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel asserted that C.E.
“had the opportunity to lie” and “she was in possession of the weapon.” Defense counsel
concluded by asking the district court not to find Baker guilty of a crime that C.E.
committed: “[The shotgun] was in her room. It was in her vent. She had every reason to
lie about what was going on here.”
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Because Baker clearly portrayed C.E. as an alternative perpetrator, she was, as a
matter of law, not an accomplice. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 653. We discern no error by
the district court in convicting Baker based, in part, on C.E.’s testimony.
Affirmed.
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